S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. These writ appeals are a classic example of how the state machinery can make a particular class of employees run pillar to post, seeking redressal of their grievance for fixation of pay and other service Conditions, by adopting various delay tactics and bureaucratic laziness, though the incumbents obtained a judgment in their favour from the Division Bench of this Court, as early as on 01.08.2012.

2. For convenience, we refer the parties and documents in this judgment as in W.A.No.667 of 2025, unless otherwise stated.

3. The party respondents in these writ appeals are pre- primary school Teachers and Ayahs attached to various Government pre-primary schools, who were appointed by the Parent Teachers Associations of the respective schools. The grievance projected by them has a checkered history. Going by the pleadings in the writ petitions, the pre-primary sections attached to the Government Schools are being run by the Parent- Teachers Associations, based on Government Orders of 1988. The initial scheme was to appoint qualified staff therein, and their emoluments were to be paid by collecting Rs.15/- per month from the students. By the said scheme, the pre-primary Teachers and Ayahs were getting only meager emoluments, and that too not regularly. Later, the Government started paying honorarium to them, which has been raised to Rs.900/- and Rs.600/- per month, respectively, to the pre-primary Teachers and Ayahs. Since there was no hike in the honorarium for several years, the Association of pre-primary Teachers and Ayahs and some individual employees of the respective category approached this Court for redressal of their grievance by filing W.P.(C)No.2700 of 2009 seeking their absorption into Government Service and to fix their service conditions. Though the learned Single Judge by the judgment dated 27.01.2011 dismissed that writ petition, by Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012 in W.A.No.205 of 2011, the Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ appeal by disposing of the writ petition with certain directions.

                  3.1. On 03.07.2012, when W.A.No.205 of 2011 came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court, by noting that the minimum wages fixed by the Government for pre-primary school Teachers in the unaided schools ten years back to that date was Rs.2,500/- per month, and noting the high rate of inflation for over the past ten years and the increase in wages and salaries paid to Government staff and others, the Division Bench suggested Government that the pre-primary school Teachers should be paid at least Rs.5,000/- per month and Ayahs Rs.3,500/- per month. In the writ appeal, the learned Government Pleader produced a communication issued by the General Education Department on 21.07.2012 stating that the Government had been taking earnest steps to comply with the court direction contained in the interim order, i.e., pertaining to payment of wages as mentioned above. However, it was stated by the Government that the additional annual financial commitment of the Government will be to the tune of rupees 14 crores and therefore, clearance from the Finance Department is required. Therefore, the Division Bench posted the case to 01.08.2012, for the learned Government Pleader to furnish instructions from the Government with clearance from the Finance Department, for passing final judgment in the writ appeal.

                  3.2. However, on 01.08.2012, the learned Government Pleader had produced a communication dated 31.07.2012, wherein it is stated that pre-primary education under the Right to Education Act is under active consideration of the Central Government, and the decision in this regard is awaited. The Government accordingly sought a further three months' time for final instructions in this matter. Therefore, the Division Bench proceeded to dispose of the writ appeal pending final decision from the Government, by granting some temporary reliefs to relieve the suffering of the appellants therein, until the Government finally decides the matter with regard to pre-primary schools already functioning and more schools, if necessary, required to be established and the Government’s commitments towards it, particularly to employees. Therefore, the Division Bench by leaving it to the State Government, in consultation with the Central Government to evolve a suitable policy to pre-primary education in the State as required under Section 11 of the Right to Education Act, considered the interim relief in the form of wages payable to the appellants therein until policies are evolved by the Government, including matters pertaining to service conditions of Teachers and Ayahs of pre-primary schools, because the Government is likely to take several months to decide on everything finally. After considering the several aspects, including the wages paid to the part-time sweepers in the State, wages paid to class IV employees whose educational qualification is 8th standard, minimum wages fixed for pre-primary school Teachers in unaided Schools in 2010, daily wages paid to ladies under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, etc., and noting that the work done by the pre-primary school Teachers is not less noble or tiresome than the work of primary school Teachers who get probably a minimum salary of Rs.15,000/- per month, the Division Bench of this Court by Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012, directed the Government as an interim measure to start paying Rs.5,000/- per month to all pre- primary school Teachers attached to the Government Schools run by the Parent Teachers Association and Rs.3,500/- per month to Ayahs, until final decision is taken by the Government. Paragraphs 11, 12 and the last paragraph of Ext.P1 judgment of the Division Bench of this Court read thus:

                  “11. Before parting with the matter, we feel there is need to identify educational needs of children in the State with reference to financial position of parents and by taking into account the ground reality, that at least a section of the people have the capacity to provide quality education at high cost to their children in private unaided Schools. Constitutional obligation of free and compulsory education arises only for the deserving children and those who opt out of it by going to Self Financing Schools at their cost need not be disturbed by the Government by discouraging such schooling and by driving every child to Government School. Quality education in Self Financing Sector will certainly relieve the Government of their burden and the same is consistent with the Right to Education Act, which recognises Self Financed Schools, which are not funded and to which reimbursement by the Government is expressly prohibited under Section 8 of the Right to Education Act.

                  12. The remaining limited question to be considered is whether we should grant interim relief to the Pre-Primary School Teachers and Ayahs pending Policy decision of the Government with regard to the establishment of Pre- Primary Education under the Right to Education Act including fixation of pay and allowances to Pre-Primary School Teachers and Ayahs. We suggested the Government to increase wages to Rs.5,000/- for Pre-Primary School Teachers and Rs.3,500/- for Ayahs, per month. Part Time Sweepers in the State are paid Rs.6,000/- and above per month, and Class IV employees, whose educational qualification is 8th Standard, are paid Rs.10,000/- to Rs.12,000/- per month. We have already noticed that the minimum wages fixed for Pre-Primary School Teachers in Unaided Schools in 2010 was as much as Rs.2,500/- per month. Considering all these, we do not think Rs.5,000/- per month for a Pre-Primary School Teacher, who has SSLC as educational qualification and compulsory Pre-Primary School Training from Government or recognised Institution, is anyway high by any standards. Probably it would be the minimum, which works out to a little over Rs.160/- per day, which is the daily wages paid to ladies under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The work done by Pre-Primary School Teachers is not less noble or tiresome than the work of Primary School Teachers, who get probably a minimum of Rs.15,000/- per month. We, therefore, direct the Government as an interim measure, to start paying at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month to all Pre- Primary School Teachers in such Schools attached to Government Schools run by Parent-Teachers Association and Rs.3,500/- per month to Ayahs, until final decision is taken by the Government. The payment should start for the period starting from 01.08.2012 onwards, i.e. for the salary payment due from 01.09.2012 onwards, until final decision is taken by the Government. The payment so made will be only ad hoc and subject to final orders of the Government based on Policy to be evolved by them. We are sure that the Government will not commit any mistake of fixing the salary at anything below the minimum stated by us above, though only as a temporary measure. This Writ Appeal is allowed by vacating the judgment of the learned Single Judge and by disposing of the WP(C) as above.”

                  3.3. The Government did not fully implement the directions in Ext.P1 judgment, and instead sought an extension of time from this Court. Meanwhile, the Government and the Directorate of Public Instruction filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)No.30132 of 2012 before the Apex Court against Ext.P1 judgment of this Court. However, the Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave to Appeal as per Ext.P2 order dated 15.10.2012.

                  3.4. After the dismissal of the Special Leave to Appeal by the Apex Court, the Government issued an order dated 29.01.2013 implementing Ext.P1 judgment of the Division Bench with regard to the interim payments of Rs.5,000/- and Rs.3,500/- respectively to the pre-primary Teachers and Ayahs, who, according to the Government and Directorate of Public Institutions (‘DPI’ for short) were qualified to receive it. There were disputes on such categorisation, and the Government thereafter issued another order dated 25.04.2013 stating that as on 01.08.2012, the staff who have completed at least one year of service shall be paid minimum wages irrespective of qualifications. According to the writ petitioners, even these interim payments were not made to all the staff who were in service as on 01.08.2012, though direction in the judgment was to that effect, stating one reason or the other. Later, in W.A.No.205 of 2011, this Court passed Exts.P3 to P5 orders dated 31.05.2013, 10.10.2013 and 13.11.2013 respectively, which, according to the writ petitioners, direct the Government to make interim payments to all the staff as on 01.08.2012, without insisting on any new qualification, experience, or service.

                  3.5. In Ext.P3 order dated 31.05.2013, the Division Bench of this Court had taken serious note of the manner in which the Government and DPI have dealt with the direction in Ext.P1 judgment by holding that there is no question of this Court tolerating any further administrative nuances, by either the Government or the DPI’s office in the matter. This Court recorded the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General who appeared on that date on behalf of the respondents in that writ appeal that the entire matter would be sorted out and settled in complete compliance with the directions of the Division Bench within an outer limit of two weeks from that date. In Ext.P4 order dated 10.10.2013 and in Ext.P5 order dated 13.11.2013 also, the Division Bench of this Court has made certain directions and observations with a view to persuading the Government and the DPI to implement the directions in Ext.P1 judgment without unnecessary delay.

                  3.6. Since no fruitful result followed from the part of the Government and DPI, the pre-primary staff, like the writ petitioners and others, submitted a petition dated 15.11.2013 requesting the appellants to implement the declarations and the directions in the judgment with emphasis on framing their service conditions, including fixation of scale of pay. In that petition, the writ petitioners specifically stated that more than one year had lapsed after the judgment, and no steps were being taken to fix their service conditions. However, even after the same, no steps are taken by the Government to frame the service conditions, including the fixation of the scale of pay of the pre-primary staff as directed in Ext.P1 judgment.

                  3.7. Therefore, the writ petitioners herein filed different writ petitions, invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking various reliefs, inter alia a writ of mandamus commanding the appellants to frame the service conditions including scale of pay of the pre-primary staff attached to Government Schools in the pre-primary sections run by Parent Teachers Association, whose grievances are dealt with and declared in Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012 in W.A.No.205 of 2011; to declare that the pre-primary staff attached to Government Schools in the pre-primary sections run by the Parent Teachers Association are entitled to get their service conditions including scale of pay fixed by the Government as stated in Ext.P1 judgment; to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the appellants to change the nomenclature of the interim payment made, vide Ext.P1 judgment as minimum salary or wages instead of honorarium so that it would attract periodical revisions in accordance with enhancement of cost index, etc.

4. During the pendency of the majority of these writ petitions, the Government issued Exts.P9 and P10 Government orders dated 22.01.2022 and 04.04.2022, by which the payment of honorarium to the staff of the pre-primary schools appointed after 07.12.2012 in violation of the Government Order was decided to be not paid and also implementation of the directions in Ext.P1 judgment was postponed indefinitely stating the reason that the service conditions of pre-primary staff in the Government Schools can be implemented only after the formulation of National Education Policy by the Central Government. Thereafter, the writ petitioners amended the writ petitions by challenging Ext.P10 Government order dated 04.04.2022 also, by seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the said Government Order, contending it as against Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012 in W.A.No.205 of 2011, and as unconstitutional, arbitrary, and illegal.

5. On behalf of the State, counter-affidavits have been filed in the writ petitions opposing the reliefs sought for and raising various contentions. For better understanding of the contentions of the Government, we extract the contentions in one of such counter affidavits, filed in W.P.(C)No.6111 of 2014 dated 20.05.2015, hereunder. Paragraphs 3 to 23 of that counter affidavit read thus:

                  “3. However, in WA No. 205 of 11 filed against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Hon'ble High Court sought views of the Government for increasing the fee from Rs.15/- to Rs.150/-. Government expressed its views as follows: "Now, the Right to Education Act stipulates that pre-primary education should be imparted by Government/local institutions free of cost. As such, Government cannot agree to the views of the Hon’ble High Court on revising the fee from Rs.15/- to Rs.150/-pm. The other alternative is to raise the honorarium fixed Vide G.O.(MS)No.99/2010/G.edn. Pre- schooling makes a child fit to start his education in regular schools and, no doubt the services of the Teachers in this regard is invaluable. As there is no scope for revising the fees, the only alternative is to revise the honorarium to substantial amount. Hence the Government is examining the question of revising the honorarium in consultation with the Finance Department. Moreover the statistics regarding the preprimary school in Government and Aided section will be furnished within one month as the DPI has informed that details called for from some districts has yet to be received".

                  4. However, as per Judgment dated 01.08.2012, the Hon'ble High Court, directed to evolve a suitable policy and as an interim measure, directed the Government to make payment at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month to all Pre- Primary School Teachers in such schools attached to Government schools run by Parent-Teachers Association and Rs.3,500/- per month to Ayahs, until final decision is taken by the Government. It was also directed that the payment should start for the period starting from 01.08.2012 onwards, ie. for the salary payment due from 01.09.2012 onwards, until final decision is taken by the Government.

                  5. Accordingly vide GO(Ms)385/2012/GEdn dated 07.12.2012 Government granted an honorarium of Rs.5000/- and Rs.3500/- per month to the qualified teacher and Ayahs of the pre primary classes conducted by the PTA of Government schools with effect from 01.08.2012 by strictly following the qualification and teacher-Ayah students ratio stipulated in GO(Ms)2453/88/G.Edn dated 05.07.1988. As per the GO dated 05.07.1988 , for a unit of 30 children there shall be one teacher and one Ayah. The teachers’ qualification shall be pass in SSLC and certificate obtained from the preprimary Teacher Training Institution recognized by Government and that of the Ayah shall be a passing in Standard VII, Later on the representation of the under qualified but experienced pre primary teachers and Ayahs Government extended benefits of enhanced honorarium to them also vide GO(MS)146/13/Gedn dated 25.04.2013 subject to the condition that they should have completed at least one year of service as on 01.08.2012.

                  6. As a part of taking a policy decision, Government gave preference to the student community of the State and the academic needs as Government is duty bound to ensure the quality and that the students really benefit from it. Therefore a comprehensive educational package for unifying the pre primary education in the pre primary classes in the State under the General Education Department, the nursery/kindergarten run by private agencies and the Anganawadis under Social Justice Department, was approved vide G.O(Ms)158/14/G Edn dated 11.08.2014 . A true copy of the G.O(Ms)158/14/G Edn dated 11.08.2014 is produced herewith and the same may be marked as Ext.R1(a).

                  7. As part of the implementation of Right to Education Act, adequate steps were taken by the state Government for the purpose of imparting pre-school education in the State. As a first step a unified child friendly curriculum all encompassing the Physical, Social, Intellectual and Emotional developments of the child was developed and approved. General Education Department together with Social justice Department, decided to provide space for Anganwadis in the Government schools where excess accommodation is available and pre primary is not functioning. As a result adequate and sufficient centers are established throughout the state. There are about 33,000 Anganwadies in the State which also cater to the needs of children in the age group 03-6.

                  8. In compliance with Section 11 of the RTE Act, Government is providing free and compulsory education to the students below the age group of 6 years through the preprimary schools and Anganawadis, Government earlier sanctioned starting of preprimary schools by the Parent teacher Association in all Government schools where excess accommodation is available and willing to meet the expenses, in addition to the Government schools in which Government directly runs preprimary. Government imposed a ban on recruitment of new Preprimary teachers and Ayah. If there are more number of children over and above the ratio prescribed under RTE the state should offer Educational facility to such children through the Anganwadis under ICDS. Preprimary school education falls in the domain of Social Justice department under ICDS programme implemented by social welfare. There are above 33,000 Anganawadies where pre school educational services supported with nutritional programme and health service are provided to children in age group upto 6.

                  9. As per Rule 6(11) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, framed under the Central Act 35 of 2009, it is duty of the Government and the local authority to provide free and appropriate pre-School education based on the pre-primary education policy formulated by the Government to all the children above the age of 3 years till they complete 6 years so as to prepare them for elementary education. It has also been provided that a uniform child friendly curriculum shall be developed by the academic authority for these centers which shall have linkage with Anganwadis for providing integrated child development scheme service to all the children. The minimum academic and professional qualification of pre- primary teachers shall be as laid down by the National Council for Teacher Education.

                  10. It is true that as per G.O.(MS) No.158/2014/G.Edn dated 11.08.14, a child friendly curriculum uniformly has been evolved in Anganwadi and pre-primary schools including nursery and kindergarten in the State. As stated above there are more than 33000 Anganwadies in the State. Therefore, the objective of the preschool as contemplated and envisaged in the Central Act are being met by the Anganwadies existing under the Social Justice Department and by other pre-primary Schools in the State.

                  11. Government have also sanctioned the constructions of building for Anganwadies in Government School premises where excess land and space is available and pre-primary section is not functioning. In the meeting convened by Honourable Minister for Education on 18.10.2014, it has also been decided to give classrooms to Anganwadies in Government Schools where excess rooms are available. It is also a fact that Government also issued G.0.(MS) No.2887/14/G.Edn dated 19.07.2014 in connection with the aforesaid issue. A true copy of the G.O.(Rt) No. 2887/14/G.Edn dated 19.07.2014 is produced herewith and the same is produced herewith as Ext.R1(b).

                  12. Since preprimary is brought under RTE Act, the condition stipulated there in has to be strictly adhered to. Hence state Government has to monitor properly the eligibility and quality in education. Therefore as stipulated in RTE, the existing teachers who doesn't have the prescribed qualification shall have to acquire such minimum qualification with in a period of 5 years.

                  13. The engagement of Preprimary Staff by the PTA are not statutory appointments by Governments and hence the claim for scale of pay is not sustainable. Similarly placed employees in the Government sector such as Anganwadi worker and helper, Alternate school teachers whose appointing authority is not Government, are being paid honorarium. They are not granted Scale of Pay. Hence a hike in the honorarium can only be considered while formulating the policy. However before taking a final policy decision in a time bond manner consultation with advisory departments such as law, finance and Social Justice is necessary. Since a policy decision is involved, approval of that policy by the Council of Ministers is mandatory.

                  14. The work done by the primary teacher and Preprimary teacher are similar but procedure and manner for selection differ in nature.

                  15. The statement by the petitioners that the enhanced honorarium was sanctioned to the preprimary staff who according to Govt. and Director of Public Instruction were qualified to receive is ambiguous. Among the 2810 Preprimary teacher engaged by PTA 1580 are non-qualified. There was no dispute on such a categorization as it was based on the reference of the Hon'ble High court that Govt. was obliged to give reasonable wages to the teachers serving with qualification to teach in Preprimary schools while pronouncing the judgment in 01.08.2012. Sanctioning the honorarium to the under qualified teachers was a benevolent step by the Government, though they don’t have any right to claim the same.

                  16. Since in the opinion of the Government that was apparent inconsistency in the interim order in WA 205 of 2011 dated 10.10.2013 and judgment in WA 205 of 2011 dated 01.08.2012. Government decided to file SLP for correction of "apparent error on the face of records’, But however Government look into account the time limit fixed by the Hon'ble High Court and extended the benefit of the enhanced honorarium at the rate of Rs.5000/- & 3500/- to the non-qualified Preprimary teachers and Ayahs who doesn't come under the purview of GO(MS)385/2012 and GO(MS)146/2013, but were in service on 01.08.2012 subject to the decision of SLP to be filed by Government. In short all the preprimary teachers irrespective of qualification and experience have been extended the benefits of enhanced honorarium.

                  17. The Anganawadi workers, helpers and alternate school teachers are similarly placed employees as that of preprimary staff in Government Schools. They are granted honorarium. The appointment and selection of these Preprimary teachers and Ayahs are not confirmed by any uniformly laid down standards and has been done by individual PTAs. The State Government cannot take over the establishment of PTAs’. There is no specification in the judgment dated 01.08.2012 that minimum salary should be paid. “Direction was to start paying". The Hon'ble Court specified it as payment & paying. Since Government was granting honorarium, the hike obviously was for the same.

                  18. The statutory appointments made by the Government is the eligibility criteria for fixation of salary on scale of pay basis. Sanctioning of honorarium to the Preprimary staff who were in service as on 01.08.2012 was a benevolent step by Government though they doesn't have any right to claim the same. Government haven't put any irreparable loss or injury to anyone, but are striving to ensure remuneration to the Pre-primary staff that was not even available to them earlier.

                  19. The petitioners cannot be treated in par with the pre- primary teachers appointed by Government. The teachers and Ayahs of these schools are appointed by the PSC through competitive examination and rank list. Persons so appointed are qualified and eligible for salary on scale of basis. Since preprimary is brought under RTE Act the condition stipulated there in has to strictly adhered to. Hence state Government has to monitor properly the eligibility and quality in education. Therefore as stipulated in RTE, the existing teachers who doesn't have the prescribed qualification shall have to acquire such minimum qualification within a Period of 5 years. Government can only ensure that reasonable amount is being paid to the staff in unaided schools. Government cannot insist the Manager of these schools to pay the staff in par with their Government counterpart. It is true that Government have to maintain the standards of teaching. This standard can be achieved only with qualified persons in service and hence the non qualified hands in service are to be terminated first.

                  20. Government is providing free and compulsory preprimary education through the pre primaries and Aganawadis in the State. Equal pay for equal work is a sound principle and the Government always ensures the same in relevant cases viz, payment to the staff of unaided schools are decided by the manger where Government have no right to implement equal pay for equal work in those schools. The persons working in other private institutions are also paid by the Head of the institution and Government cannot ensure equal pay in such cases.

                  21. All the Preprimary staff in service as on 01.08.2012 are enjoying the benefit of the enhanced honorarium irrespective of their qualification and length of service, based only on the certificate of the HM that they were in service as on 01.08.2012.

                  22. It is respectfully submitted that as per the order in W.A No.205 of 2011, the Honourable High Court directed to evolve the policy regarding the pre-primary education. However there is no direction for the fixation of service condition.

                  23. Government is in the process of formulating a policy on Preprimary education as directed by the Hon'ble High Court in WA 205 of 2011 dated 01.08.2012. However before taking a final policy decision in a time bond manner consultation with advisory departments such as law, finance and Social Justice is necessary. Since a policy decision is involved, approval of that policy by the Council of Ministers is mandatory and it will take some time. In other words, Government is in the process of evolving the policy decision”.

6. After hearing both sides, the learned Single Judge by the impugned common judgment dated 06.02.2025, disposed of the writ petitions with certain directions. Paragraphs 12 to 21 and the last paragraph of the impugned judgment read thus:

                  “12. This Court notices that the challenge in these writ petitions is essentially on account of the failure on the part of the Government to act in accordance with the directions contained in the Division Bench judgment of this Court at Ext.P1, referred to earlier. The directions contained in Ext.P1 were Categoric. This Court, taking note of the importance of the Pre-Primary education, with reference to the provisions of the Right to Education Act, had issued specific directions to the Government to frame the Service Rules. The Government took almost 10 years to come up with Ext.P10, taking the stand that, unless and until the National Education Policy, 2020 is implemented, the Service Rules cannot be framed.

                  13. True, this Court in Ext.P1 had further directed that the Government should also take concurrence from the Central Government. But, that does not mean that an order in the nature of Ext.P10 can be issued by the Government in that regard. The directions are issued by this Court under the hope that the Government would act accordingly on the basis of the orders issued. This is all the more so with respect to the prayers made by a marginalized group of the Society, who are the petitioners in these writ petitions.

                  14. On the basis of the afore, I am of the opinion that Ext.P10 issued by the Government dated 04.04.2022, cannot be sustained. This Court finds that the considerations made in Ext.P10 are contrary to the directions issued in Ext.P1 Division Bench judgment of this Court. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that Ext.P10 is only to be quashed.

                  15. This Court also takes note of the submission made by Sri.Santhosh  Kumar,  the  learned  Special  Government Pleader, to the effect that the Government has since constituted a Committee, pursuant to the directions of this Court and the afore Committee is in seisin of the matter. He assures before this Court that the Committee would definitely come to a positive finding without much delay and hence, no directions, especially as regards payments to be effected to the petitioners may be issued.

                  16. But, even on the basis of the afore submission made by the learned Government Pleader, I am of the opinion that, insofar as Ext.P10 has been issued, in utter disregard to the directions issued by this Court in Ext.P1, the said order requires to be set aside.

                  17. The further issue arising for consideration is the interim arrangements to be extended, in the meantime. This Court takes note of the submission made by both sides that, at present, the Teachers and Ayahs are being paid a sum of Rs.12,500/- and Rs.7,500/- per month, respectively. The afore fixation is to be considered with reference to the directions issued in Ext.P1 judgment. Ext.P1 judgment, as already noticed, was issued all the way back in August 2012. In Ext.P1 judgment, the amounts directed to be paid were to the extent of Rs.5,000/- and Rs.3,500/- respectively. True, the Government has subsequently enhanced the honorarium being paid to the petitioners as noticed earlier.

                  18. But, this Court notices that the afore increase in the honorarium _is also not sufficient, taking into account the increase in the day-to-day expenses.

                  19. This Court further notices that a Primary Teacher is being paid in the pay band of Rs.25,000 - 54,000. However, the afore payment need not be extended to the petitioners. But, a reasonable escalation has to be made as regards the pay to be given to the petitioners also. This Court also notices the consideration made in Ext.P1 with respect to the daily income of an average manual labourer. It is known to everyone that manual labourer gets atleast Rs.1,000/- a day. This Court cannot equate the manual labourer with the present petitioners (Teachers/Ayahs) who are the foundations, with respect to the formation of every individual in the country.

                  20. In such circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the Teachers should be paid an amount of Rs.27,500/- per month and Ayahs should be paid an amount of Rs.22,500/- per month. The next issue to be considered is the date from which the afore escalation has to be carried out. This Court notices that Ext.P1 judgment has been rendered on 01.08.2012 with specific directions. Ext.P1 judgment also refixed the pay, with the hope that the Government would come up with the Service Rules and the payment to only have an ad-hoc status. In that view of the matter, the afore escalation in honorarium should be given effect from 01.08.2012. This Court also hopes that the Government will pay the arrears with respect to the Teachers/Ayahs, as expeditiously as possible, within a period of six months from today. The escalation as above is to be made effective with respect to the month of March 2025, to be disbursed from April 2025 onwards.

                  21. This Court further takes note of the submission made by Sri.George Poonthottam, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, with respect to Exts.P12 to P16 in W.P(C) No.29515 of 2017, by which, almost similarly placed Pre- Primary Teachers in the Schools attached to the Panchayath Department have been regularized. He would further submit that similar treatment has to be extended to the petitioners also. The afore submission made by the learned senior counsel is definitely an attractive one which requires acceptance. However, in the light of the fact that the policy is stated to be framed by the Government in the light of the directions issued in Ext.P1, no positive directions are issued, under the hope that the Government would definitely take that also into consideration while framing the policy, with specific reference to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Jaggo v. Union of India [2024 KHC Online 6750 : AIR 2025 SC 296].

                  In the result, these writ petitions are disposed of as under:

                  i. G.O.(MS) No.54/2022/GEDN dated 04.04.2022 (Ext.P10 in W.P(C) No.5506/2014) is set aside.

                  ii. The Teachers/Ayahs to be paid an honorarium of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively, effective from March 2025 onwards, to be disbursed from April 2025.

                  iii. Escalation as above to have retrospective effect from 01.08.2012 and Government to disburse arrears within six months time.

                  iv. While formulating the service conditions of the Teachers/Ayahs the Government to take note of the claim for regularisation with specific reference to the dictum of the Apex Court in Jaggo v. Union of India [2024 KHC Online 6750 : AIR 2025 SC 296].”

7. Being aggrieved, the State and its officials have now filed these writ appeals under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, raising the various contentions.

8. On 08.04.2025, when W.A.No.667 of 2025 came up for admission, we admitted the same on to file. After considering the preliminary arguments advanced by the learned Special Government Pleader and also the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners, we granted an interim stay of the operation and implementation of the judgment to the extent it directs to pay an honorarium of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- to the Teachers and Ayahs of the Government pre-primary schools as directed in the impugned judgment.

9. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader (General Education) and the learned Senior Counsel/Counsel for the party respondents-writ petitioners.

10. The learned Special Government Pleader argued that the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment are beyond the scope of prayers in the writ petitions. In fact, there is no prayer in the writ petitions to refix the honorarium, but the prayer is to direct the Government to fix the service Conditions. The learned special Government Pleader further submitted that the fixing of honorarium or emoluments is the policy decision of the Government, which cannot be interfered with by exercising writ jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge fixed an unjustified amount, with effect from 01.08.2012 onwards, without any materials available before the court to fix the said amount. The setting aside of Ext.P10 circular dated 04.04.2022 by the learned Single Judge is unwarranted. In Ext.P1 judgment, the amount was fixed as Rs.5,000/- to pre-primary Teachers and Rs.3,500 to Ayahs as an interim measure till the Government takes a policy decision, and the said ad hoc payment is enhanced to Rs.13,500/- and Rs.8,500/- respectively, as per the Government order dated 03.11.2025 and now as per the last finance budget declaration the Government has decided to enhance it by Rs.1,000/- more. The service conditions of the pre- primary school Teachers and Ayahs can be formulated only after the implementation of the National Education Policy, 2020, by the Central Government, and this aspect was not considered by the learned Single Judge. In support of his arguments, the learned Special Government Pleader relied on the judgments of the Apex court in S.C.Chandra v. State of Jharkhand [(2007) 8 SCC 279], Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association. v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1980) 3 SCC 97], State of West Bengal v. Subhas Kumar Chatterjee [(2010) 11 SCC 694], Chandrashekar A.K. v. State of Kerala [(2009) 1 SCC 73], K.T.Veerappa v. State of Karnataka [(2006) 9 SCC 406], Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals [(2007) 1 SCC 408], and Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [AIR 1989 SC 1899].

11. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel as well as the learned counsel appearing for the party respondents vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge has ordered only escalation of the interim payment directed in Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012. There is relief pertaining to the payment of honorarium in the writ petitions. By pointing out the reliefs in W.P.(C) No.29515 of 2017, the learned counsel for the respondent in W.A.No.2767 of 2025 submitted that one of the reliefs sought in that writ petition is a declaration of the service conditions following Ext.P7 order of Pondichery Government, which in effect includes consolidated pay also. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that though the Government neglected the case of the respondents, orders have been issued by the Government regularising the services of nursery school Teachers who are appointed by the Panchayaths under various schemes. Evidencing the same, the respondents have produced Exts.P12 to P16 orders. The learned Single Judge considered the pay parity to be given to the writ petitioners, in the light of observations in Ext.P1 judgment. Even after the dismissal of the Special Leave to Appeal filed by the State against Ext.P1 judgment, the Government has passed Ext.P10 order to circumvent the directions in Ext.P1 judgment, which was rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents in W.A.No.1834 of 2025 relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in K.T.Veerappa v. State of Karnataka [(2006) 9 SCC 406], Benedict Denis Kinny v. Tulip Brian Miranda [(2021) 12 SCC 780], Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Abdul Rehman Khanday [2025 KHC Online 7194: Manu/SC/0827/2025], Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Aravind Kumar Singh [(2026) SCC Online SC 302] and that of the High Court of Gujarat in State of Gujarat v. Adarsh Gujarat Anganwadi [2025 SCC Online Guj 3426].

12. Similarly, in support of their arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent in W.A.No.2767 of 2025 relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh [(2017) 1 SCC 148], Jaipal v. State of Haryana [(1988) 3 SCC 354], Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana [(1987) 4 SCC 634], Arindam Chattopadhyay v. State of West Bengal [(2013) 4 SCC 152], Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand [2026 SCC online SC 129] and Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. [(2025) SCC Online SC 1735].

13. We have appreciated the rival submission made at the Bar, and also perused the materials placed on record. The point arises for consideration in these writ appeals is as to whether any interference is needed to the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, whereby Ext.P10 Government Order dated 04.04.2022 was set aside and honorarium payable to the pre- primary school Teachers and Ayahs was fixed as Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively, with effect from 01.08.2012 ?

14. Ext.P1 judgment was pronounced by the Division Bench of this Court as early as on 01.08.2012, directing the State Government in consultation with the Central Government, to evolve a suitable policy and scheme for imparting pre-school education to the student community in the State. In the said judgment, the Division Bench of this Court noted that quality education in the self-financing sector will certainly relieve the Government of its burden, and the same is consistent with the Right to Education Act, which recognises self-financing schools, which are not funded and to which reimbursement by the Government is expressly prohibited under Section 8 of the Right to Education Act. Therefore, while evolving the policy and scheme for imparting pre-primary education to the student community in the State, the Government would be burdened by the payment of salary and other emoluments as far as pre-primary school Teachers and Ayahs in the Government schools alone. As an interim measure while ordering the Government to start paying Rs.5,000/- and Rs.3,500/- per month respectively to the Teachers and Ayahs of the pre-primary schools, the Division Bench had taken note of several aspects such as the salary of part-time sweepers, class IV employees, the minimum wages fixed for pre- primary school Teachers in unaided schools, the payment made to ladies under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, the salary of the primary school Teachers etc.

15. Even after the pronouncement of Ext.P1 judgment, the Government did not take any action to comply with the directions in that judgment. Therefore, the Division Bench of this Court was constrained to pass further orders in W.A.No.205 of 2011. The order dated 31.05.2013, passed by the Division Bench of this Court, which is marked as Ext.P3, read thus:

                  “We are extremely unhappy with the manner in which an affidavit has been filed in response to the previous order issued day before yesterday. We see that the Assistant Director (Planning) in the office of the DPI has attempted to say some reason or the other, including that the arrears due to some of the teachers are yet due and would be disbursed soon after receipt of fund from the Government. The comprehensive directions issued by the Division Bench in the judgment in the writ appeal were directions to the Government as well. There is no question of the Government and the DPI landing in isolated islands and the DPI's office waiting for further orders from the Government. There is also no question of this Court tolerating any further administrative nuances, by either the Government or the DPI's office in the matter. The beneficiaries of the judgment belong to economically marginalized sector catering to the pre-primary toddlers of the State of Kerala. The judgment of the Division Bench, as already noted, stands with the approval of the Honourable Supreme Court of India. In the last order, we had indicated that we would order the personal appearance of Secretary to Government and the DPI answer why further action shall not follow against them.

                  2. The learned Additional Advocate General who appears today on behalf of the respondents persuasively says that the entire matter would be sorted out and settled in complete compliance of the directions of the Division Bench within an outer limit of two weeks from day. We record that Submission.

                  3. This case will be pursued if the aforesaid undertaking does not take effect and if complete obedience and compliance of all the directions in letter and spirit is not reported to this Court on or before the next date of hearing. It is hereby ordered that the officials in the Department of Education and in the office of Director of Public instructions, who deal with files relating to this matter, including the Government Secretary and the DPI, excluding non-gazetted cadre, shall not draw their salary until this Court is satisfied that the directions have been completely complied with. This interdiction may also spill over to the other departments as may be found involved in any further delay in the matter. It is hereby further notified that if this Court is not satisfied as to such compliance, action will be initiated calling upon the officials concerned to show cause as to why further action shall not be taken, including under the Contempt of Courts Act.

                  Post on 20.06.2013.”

16. Subsequently, the Division Bench passed Ext.P4 order dated 10.10.2011 in the writ appeal, which read thus:

                  “The file of this writ appeal relating to a marginalised group in favour of whom directions were issued by this Court on 01.08.2012 keeps growing without materials being placed by the respondents to conclusively show that they have complied with the directions as per that judgment.

                  2. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader on behalf of the Government and the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants, the Kerala Pre-Primary Teachers & Ayahs Association and few Pre-Primary Teachers and Ayahs.

                  3. The judgment dated 1st August, 2012, which stands affirmed by the Supreme Court of India, does not provide any room to tinker in any new qualification or to determine the effect of the benefit of the judgment based on qualification, length of service, mode of recruitment or student ratio in any Pre-Primary School. The gist of the judgment is that if there is a Pre-Primary Section in a Government school and if the Headmaster/Headmistress of that school has certified that a particular person had been working as a Pre-Primary Teacher or Ayah, as the case may be, as on 1-8-2012, such person will have to be paid at the rate of ₹5,000/- per month, if that person is a Pre-Primary Teacher, or at the rate of ₹3,500/- per month. If that person is working as an Ayah, going by the certification by the Headmaster/Headmistress. This is the settled position. No wisdom can be squeezed into by the executive, either by way of Government Orders or otherwise, diffuse this settled judicial order.

                  4. Now, turn to the different materials, including the affidavit of the Director of Public Instructions sworn to on 18th June, 2013 and the reply affidavit on behalf of the appellants to that. The crucial facts which we need to now note to exclude any further laborious arguments are that even according to the Government, there are 2436 Pre- Primary Teachers and 1896 Ayahs in the different Pre- Primary sections attached to the different Government schools in Kerala. If that be so, the judgment dated 14th August, 2012 will have to be given effect to by ensuring that all the 2436 Pre-Primary Teachers are paid at the rate of ₹5,000/- per month from 01.08.2012 and 1896 Ayahs are paid at the rate of ₹3,500/- per month from 01.08.2012.

                  5. Rather than give room to cross interrogatories as to whether the Government have complied with the directions of the Division Bench to make payments as aforesaid, we need to be clearly shown that such payments have been made. This is a question of simple arithmetics.

                  6. For reaching at a conclusion on the question posed in the immediately preceding paragraph, the Director of Public Instructions is hereby required to provide the list of 2436 Pre-Primary Teachers and 1896 Ayahs and give the specific date on which each of them was paid the amounts due in terms of the Judgment dated 01.08.2012. With the present much trumpeted I.T. enabled administration, we are sure that this information can be made available to this Court in not less than two weeks. Otherwise, there is no meaning in saying that we are going through an era of e-governance.

                  7. The Director of Public Instructions is, therefore, directed to personally file an affidavit on or before November 8, 2013, without fail disclosing the aforesaid particulars in a tabular statement after necessary cross-checking and thereby excluding any further requirement or rectifications. Such affidavit shall be served on the learned counsel for the appellants. Let it be notified here itself that this Court expects such affidavit to be foolproof regarding facts in relation to each among 2436 Pre-Primary Teachers and 1896 Ayahs.

                  8. If affidavit as aforesaid is not placed, the Director of Public Instructions shall be personally present on 13th November, 2013.

                  List at 1.45 p. m. on 13.11.2013.”

17. Again, on 13.11.2013, the Division Bench of this Court passed Ext.P5 order, which read thus:

                  “The learned Senior Government Pleader assures on behalf of the Director of Public Instructions that the entire exercise will be over and reported to this court in the form of an affidavit. Let the affidavit be placed on record by the Director of Public Instructions in conformity with the complete requirements in terms of the earlier orders. That affidavit should be on board on or before 17.12.2013.

                  Post on 19.12.2013.”

18. When the Government did not frame a scheme for imparting pre-primary education and failed to evolve a suitable policy decision, the writ petitioners are constrained to approach this Court again with the present writ petitions. But, much after the filing of the writ petitions, the Government made the slight move for implementation of Ext.P1 judgment only on 26.08.2021 by forming a committee for the purpose of framing the policy requirement in the matter. But as rightly noted by the learned Single Judge, none of the issues framed for consideration of the committee was with reference to the directions contained in Ext.P1 judgment. Only when the learned Single Judge noticed that the report of the committee did not contain the directions in Ext.P1 judgment, the Government again directed the committee to revisit the issues with respect to the policy to be framed pursuant to Ext.P1 judgment.

19. After the lapse of a considerable time, that also, after filing of the present writ petitions, during the pendency of the writ petitions, the Government issued Ext.P10 order dated 04.04.2022 claiming that unless and until the National Education Policy is implemented in the State, the question of formulation of service conditions of pre-primary school Teachers and Ayahs cannot be considered. Therefore, the writ petitioners amended the respective writ petitions by challenging Exts.P9 and P10 orders also. The reading of Ext.10 order does not show that the Government has made any earnest effort to comply with the directions in Ext.P1 judgment to evolve a policy decision in concurrence with the Central Government. On the other hand, the Government is now trying to escape from its duty by casting the burden upon the Central Government. Therefore, there is no illegality in the finding of the learned Single Judge that the intention of the Government is only to buy time and accordingly, the learned Single Judge, rightly set aside Ext.P10 Government Order dated 04.04.2022. Now the only question remaining is whether the learned Single Judge is justified in directing the Government to pay honorarium to the Teachers/Ayahs at the rate of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively per month with effect from 01.08.2012 ?

20. In fact, there is no dispute raised by the Government about the necessity to evolve a suitable policy and scheme for imparting pre-school education to the student community in the State. But, the contention of the Government is that the service conditions of the pre-primary school Teachers and Ayahs can be considered only after the implementation of the National Education Policy, 2020, by the Central Government. It is also the stand of the Government that the learned Single Judge is not justified in directing the Government to pay honorarium to the Teachers/Ayahs at the rate of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively, when the Government itself has now enhanced the amount as Rs.13,500/- and Rs.8,500/- respectively and decided to enhance it further by Rs.1,000/-. According to the Government, it is a policy matter of the Government and the learned Single Judge did not consider any material to fix the amount of honorarium as Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/-. The writ petitioners, on the other hand, are supporting the impugned judgment. Before entering into the propriety of fixation of the aforesaid amount by the learned Single Judge, it would be appropriate to briefly go through the principles laid down in the judgments relied by the parties on either side.

21. While coming to the judgments relied by the learned Special Government Pleader, in S.C. Chandra [(2007) 8 SCC 279], the Apex Court, while considering the fixation of pay scale in respect of staff of Non-Government secondary schools taken over by the Bihar Government, by passing the Bihar Non- Government Secondary Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981, held that granting pay scales is purely an executive function and hence the court should not interfere with the same. The Apex Court further held that it may have a cascading effect, creating all kinds of problems for the Government and the authorities. Hence, the court should exercise judicial restraint and not interfere in such executive function as held in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [(2007) 1 SCC 408].

22. Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [(2007) 1 SCC 408], relied by the learned Special Government Pleader and referred by the Apex Court in S.C. Chandra [(2007) 8 SCC 279] is an appeal that has been filed before the Apex Court against the impugned judgment and order dated 30.09.2005 passed by the Uttaranchal High Court in W.P.(C)No.3360 of 2001. By that judgment, the High Court has modified the award of the Labour Court, U.P., Dehradun, to the extent that the workmen in whose favour the award had been made were allowed to be continued in the service of the appellant employer till their superannuation, and if their services were not required, they should not be terminated except in accordance with industrial law. The High Court further directed that the workmen in question should be paid wages like the regular employees performing the work and duties in the appellant company. In paragraph 39 of the said judgment, the Apex Court extracted the judgment in Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [AIR 1989 SC 1899], which read thus:

                  “39. In Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (AIR 1989 SC 1899), this Court observed:

                  “17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved in these appeals we may have a fresh look at the inter se functioning of the three organs of democracy under our Constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognised under the Constitution in its absolute rigidity but the Constitution-makers have meticulously defined the functions of various organs of the State. Legislature, executive and judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. Legislature and executive, the two facets of people's will, they have all the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse, nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The expanding horizon of judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our own exercise of power is the self- imposed discipline of judicial restraint.

                  * * *

                  19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution and if not, the court must strike down the action. While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an Appellate Authority. The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonise quo any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers.”

23. In Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [(2007) 1 SCC 408], the Apex Court held that the courts must exercise judicial restraint and not encroach into the executive or legislative domain. Orders for the creation of posts, appointment to these posts, regularisation, fixing pay scales, continuation in service, promotion, etc., are all executive or legislative functions, and it is highly improper for judges to step into this sphere, except in a rare and exceptional case. The Apex Court in that judgment fully agreed with the views of the Madras High Court in Rama Muthuramalingam v. Deputy Superintendent of Police [AIR 2005 Mad 1].

24. In Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association [(1980) 3 SCC 97], the Apex Court, while considering the issue of absorption of the Panchayat Schools in Tamil Nadu State, by District Boards, held as under:

                  “9. The more serious charge is that length of service for fixing seniority has inflicted manifest injustice on the “A” wing i.e. regular government staff, being born in arbitrariness and fed on mala fides. It is fair to state the generalities and then proceed to particularities. Here we must realise that all the schools having been taken over by the State directly the personnel had to be woven into the basic fabric. Some relevant formula had to be furnished for this purpose so that the homogenisation did not unfairly injure one group or the other. In 1970 government chose not to integrate but to keep apart. Later, this policy was given up. We cannot, as court, quarrel if administrative policy is revised. The wisdom of yesterday may obsolesce into the folly of today, even as the science of old may sour into the superstition now, and vice versa. Nor can we predicate mala fides or ulterior motive merely because Assembly interpellations have ignited rethinking or, as hinted by Counsel, that the Education Minister's sensitivity is due to his having been once District Board teacher. Democratic processes — both these are part of such process — are not anathema to judges and we cannot knock down the order because government have responded to the Question Hour or re-examined the decision at the instance of a sensitive minister.”

25. In Subhas Kumar Chatterjee [(2010) 11 SCC 694], the Apex Court while considering the controversy pertaining to the Senior Laboratory Assistants in the Roads and Buildings Research Institute and various Other Divisions under the Public Works (Roads) Department, Government of West Bengal as to whether the Senior Laboratory Assistants are entitled to the same scale of pay on par with the research assistants in the same department held thus:

                  “14. This Court time and again cautioned that the court should avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compel the Government to implement the same. Equation of posts and equation of salaries is a matter which is best left to an expert body. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge. Even the recommendations of the Pay Commissions are subject to acceptance or rejection, the courts cannot compel the State to accept the recommendations of the Pay Commissions though it is an expert body. The State in its wisdom and in furtherance of its valid policy may or may not accept the recommendations of the Pay Commission. (See Union of India v. Arun Jyoti Kundu [(2007) 7 SCC 472 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 695] and State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [(2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] ) It is no doubt true, the constitutional courts clothed with power of judicial review have jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have remedy only if they are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction while fixing the pay scale for a given post.”

26. In Chandrashekar.A.K. [(2009) 1 SCC 73], the Apex Court, while considering the issue whether a person who has resigned from service is entitled to the benefit of revision of scale of pay with retrospective effect, in an appeal that arose out of a judgment and order dated 11.01.2006 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.2004 of 2005 held thus:

                  “14. The question as to whether the scale of pay would be revised or not is a matter of policy decision for the State. No legal right exists in a person to get a revised scale of pay implemented. It may be recommended by a body but ultimately it has to be accepted by the employer or by the State which has to bear the financial burden. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in HEC Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society v. Heavy Engg. Corpn. Ltd. [(2006) 3 SCC 708 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 602] stating: (SCC p. 716, para 19)

                  “19. It is not in dispute that the effect of such voluntary retirement scheme is cessation of jural relationship between the employer and the employee. Once an employee opts to retire voluntarily, in terms of the contract he cannot raise a claim for a higher salary unless by reason of a statute he becomes entitled thereto. He may also become entitled thereto even if a policy in that behalf is formulated by the Company.””

27. In K.T.Veerappa [(2006) 9 SCC 406], the Apex Court, while considering the pay scales of the appellants therein who are holding non-teaching posts in the University of Mysore after the Tukol Pay Commission Report, held thus:

                  “13. He next contended that fixation of pay and parity in duties is the function of the executive and financial capacity of the Government and the priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the Government are also relevant factors. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [(2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] and Union of India v. S.B. Vohra [(2004) 2 SCC 150 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 363] . There is no dispute nor can there be any to the principle as settled in State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [(2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] that fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties is the function of the executive and the scope of judicial review of administrative decision in this regard is very limited. However, it is also equally well settled that the courts should interfere with administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity when they find such a decision to be unreasonable, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and taken in ignorance of material and relevant factors.”

28. In Asif Hameed [AIR 1989 SC 1899], while considering an appeal against the judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court by which the selection to the MBBS/BDS course for the session 1988-89 in the two Government Medical Colleges of Jammu and Kashmir has been set aside, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved in these appeals we may have a fresh look on the inter se functioning of the three organs of democracy under our Constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognised under the Constitution in its absolute rigidity but the Constitution makers have meticulously defined the functions of various organs of the State. legislature, executive and judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. legislature and executive, the two facets of people's will, they have all the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The expanding horizon of judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our own exercise of power is the self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint.”

29. By relying on the judgments mentioned above, the learned Special Government Pleader has been trying to impress upon this Court that fixation of pay and other service conditions is the policy decision of the Government, and the court exercising writ jurisdiction may not interfere with this exclusive domain of the Government. It is also the attempt of the learned Special Government Pleader that as far as enhancement of honorarium paid to the pre-primary school Teachers and Ayahs is concerned, the Government has already taken some decisions from time to time and therefore the interim order also need not have been passed by the learned Single Judge, which in fact was not requested in the writ petitions.

30. While coming to the judgments relied by the learned Senior Counsel/learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners are concerned, in K.T.Veerappa [(2006) 9 SCC 406], which is relied by the learned Special Government Pleader also, at paragraph 14, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “14. In S.B. Vohra case [(2004) 2 SCC 150 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 363] this Court dealing with the fixation of pay scales of officers of the High Court of Delhi (Assistant Registrars) has held that the fixation of pay scale is within the exclusive domain of the Chief Justice, subject to approval of President/Governor of the State and the matter should either be examined by an expert body or in its absence by the Chief Justice and the Central/State Government should attend to the suggestions of the Chief Justice with reasonable promptitude so as to satisfy the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Further, it is observed that financial implications vis-à- vis effect of grant of a particular scale of pay may not always be a sufficient reason and differences should be mutually discussed and tried to be solved.”

31. In Adarsh Gujarat Anganwadi [(2025) SCC Online Guj 3426], while considering the power of the High Courts to determine wages payable to anganwadi workers and anganwadi helpers, the High Court of Gujarat held thus:

                  “74. The core question, which stares at us, is that, whether this Court can snub the plight of AWWs and AWHs despite the observations of the Apex Court. We are conscious of the scope, ambit and restraints on the powers of High Court in issuing directions for determining the appropriate wages. It is trite that a Letters Patent Appeal, as permitted by the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as is was vested in the Single Bench. (vide : Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Anjaneya Swami Temple, (1996) 3 SCC 52). It has become obligatory for us to address the plight of AWWs and AWHs, so far, their claim for appropriate wage is concerned.

                  75. The Apex Court has taken note of the employment of the AWWs and AWHs as full-time, and their onerous and arduous duties, which have direct influence on health and education of minors and their mothers. The Central Government and the State Government are also called upon to take serious note of the plight of the AWWs and AWHs, who are rendering important services on a paltry monthly remuneration. Even after the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Maniben (supra), the Central and State Government have remained insouciant in addressing the issues. In order to verify the status of the AWWs and AWHs, after the judgment of the Apex Court, vide order dated 18.06.2025, we had called upon the appellants to produce the data showing any revision of wages, and accordingly an affidavit dated 18.07.2025 was filed showing the data of entire State. On a perusal of the same, we did not find any increase in the wages of the AWWs and AWHs and their plight remains inexorable, hence, this Court cannot have blinkered vision for the paltry remuneration paid to them.

                  76. Despite the observations made by the Apex Court, way back in the year 2022 in the case of Maniben (supra), the wages remain paltry, and they are also not being paid minimum wages. We may derive the support from the below mentioned decision of the Apex Court for answering the issue of fixation and payment of wages by us. The Full Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 246, while considering the State's obligation enshrined in Directive Principles in Part-IV of the Constitution and enforcement of the fundamental rights, has observed thus:

                  “123. … … … The Fundamental rights are intended to foster the ideal of a political democracy and to prevent the establishment of authoritarian rule but they are of no value unless they can be enforced by resort to courts. So they are made justiciable. But, it is also evident that notwithstanding their great importance, the directive principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in a court of law. It is unimaginable that any court can compel a legislature to make a law. If the court can compel Parliament to make laws then parliamentary democracy would soon be reduced to an oligarchy of Judges. It is in that sense that the Constitution says that the directive principles shall not be enforceable by courts. It does not mean that directive principles are less important than Fundamental rights or that they are not binding on the various organs of the State. Article 37 of the Constitution emphatically states that directive principles are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. It follows that it becomes the duty of the court to apply the directive principles in interpreting the Constitution and the laws. The directive principles should serve the courts as a code of interpretation. Fundamental rights should thus be interpreted in the light of the directive principles and the latter should, whenever and wherever possible, be read into the former. Every law attacked on the ground of infringement of a Fundamental Right should, among other considerations, be examined to find out if the law does not advance one or other of the directive principles or if it is not in discharge of some of the undoubted obligations of the State, constitutional or otherwise, towards its citizens or sections of its citizens, flowing out of the preamble, the directive principles and other provisions of the Constitution.”

32. In Benedict Denis Kinny [(2021) 12 SCC 780], considering an election issue pertaining to a seat of a councilor in Mumbai Municipal Corporation reserved for backward class citizens, the Apex Court at paragraph 21 held thus:

                  “21. We need to first notice the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The power of judicial review vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution and is basic structure of our Constitution. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is original, extraordinary and discretionary. The lookout of the High Court is to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any decision of a constitutional authority, a statutory authority, a tribunal or an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The judicial review is designed to prevent cases of abuse of power or neglect of a duty by the public authority. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel public/statutory authorities to discharge the public functions entrusted on them. The courts are guardians of the rights and liberties of the citizen and they shall fail in their responsibility if they abdicate their solemn duty towards the citizens. The scope of Article 226 is very wide and can be used to remedy injustice wherever it is found. The High Court and the Supreme Court are the constitutional courts, which have been conferred right of judicial review to protect the fundamental and other rights of the citizens. Halsbury's Laws of England, Fifth Edn., Vol. 24 dealing with the nature of the jurisdiction of superior and inferior courts stated that no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so. In para 619, Halsbury's Laws of England states:

                  “The chief distinctions between superior and inferior courts are found in connection with jurisdiction. Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court. An objection to the jurisdiction of one of the superior courts of general jurisdiction must show what other court has jurisdiction, so as to make it clear that the exercise by the superior court of its general jurisdiction is unnecessary. The High Court, for example, is a court of universal jurisdiction and superintendency in certain classes of claims, and cannot be deprived of its ascendancy by showing that some other court could have entertained the particular claim.”

33. In Abdul Rehman Khanday [2025 KHC Online 7194 : Manu/ SC/ 0827/ 2025], the Apex Court refused to interfere with the observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court including the imposition of symbolic cost, for the inaction of the officers of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to comply with the order dated 03.05.2007 passed by the High Court and held that the said inaction on the part of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is prima facie contemptuous.

34. Mahendra Prasad Agarwal [(2026) SCC Online SC 302] was an appeal by the alleged contemnor against an interim order passed by the High Court directing the listing of the contempt petition for framing charges. In that judgment, the Apex Court made the following observations and directions:

                  “14. There is no doubt about the fact that the “consider jurisprudence”, so routinely adopted these days and if we may use the expression - to throw the ball out of the Court, is counterproductive and harms the system.

                  15. When a claim of a right is legal and justified, relief must follow. The Constitutional or statutory remedies are not intended for academic discourse. If a case deserves relief, it must be granted then and there, unflinchingly if need be. Balancing of equities is not to be confused with avoiding or postponing the relief. These are not matters of law, but of its working and practice. Unlike law and its procedures, good

practices that evolve over a period of time are far more precious than written laws, as it is in this practice that we see acceptance and internalization of the spirit of law. It is necessary to recognize, nurture and develop good practices which become habits. These habits come from the shared belief, values and attitudes that breathe vitality into rule of law. Legal culture integrates collective beliefs, fostering habits. It is necessary and in fact compelling to keep our remedies simple, effective and efficient.

                  16. Returning to the facts of our case, having examined the orders passed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that there has not been a clear and categorical direction about existence of a right, its violation and what exactly the government is to comply. Had there been such clarity, the government would not have choice. In fact, it should have no choice. It should either comply, appeal or face contempt. It is necessary for the courts to articulate its direction in clear terms and also specify the method and manner of compliance if necessary.

                  17. We have also noticed the recent tendency, a bad practice so to say, to invoke contempt jurisdiction for quick relief, even when appealable orders have already been passed. In this very case, there is a detailed order of the government dated 09.05.2025, and this has remained unchallenged. Though the High Court passed the order impugned before us on 28.05.2025, there is no reference to the decision of the government dated 09.05.2025. It is necessary for the respondents to challenge the said order.

                  18. The present litigation has spanned for over 16 years. It is therefore necessary to pass the following order;

                  a) We permit the respondents to file a writ petition against the order dated 09.05.2025. The said writ petition will be taken up along with the contempt proceedings pending before the High Court.

                  b) The High Court will first take up the writ petition and pass final orders taking into account its earlier orders  passed  on  7.10.2010,  06.03.2013  and 14.07.2013.

                  c) The High Court shall not remand the matter back to the authorities for reconsideration as the perspective of the government is clearly evident.

                  d) If it is satisfied with the merits of the matter, it shall issue clear and categorical directions for compliance. If not, it may dismiss the Writ Petition with clear and simple reasons.

                  e) High Court will hear the learned counsels for the State as well as the writ petitioners before passing reasoned order”.

35. Jagjit Singh [(2017) 1 SCC 148], was a Special Leave Petition filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in an issue pertaining to payment of minimum salary with permissible allowance to the writ petitioners who are daily wage workers as pump operators, fitters, helpers, drivers, plumbers, choukidars, etc., wherein the Apex Court, held thus:

                  “60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the employees concerned (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities as were being discharged by regular employees holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” summarised by us in para 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted that during the course of their employment, the temporary employees concerned were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities which at some point in time were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts were also posted to discharge the same work which was assigned to temporary employees from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity on any of the principles summarised by us in para 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would be applicable to all the temporary employees concerned, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages on a par with the minimum of the pay scale of regularly engaged government employees holding the same post.”

36. In Jaipal [(1988) 3 SCC 354], while considering the payment of salary to instructors under the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme under the Education Department of Haryana, who have filed a writ petition to direct the respondents therein to put them on regular pay scales to that of primary school Teachers in the Education Department of Haryana plus other consequential benefits from the date of their initial appointment and further direct the respondents to pay them the difference in arrears of salary accrued to them from the date of their initial appointment, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “9. The respondents' plea that instructors are not transferable does not affect the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The instructors are appointed locally to implement the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme because they are in a better position to motivate the adults and drop-outs children for participating in the scheme. An outsider may be handicapped in motivating the local residents for participating in the scheme. As regards the difference in qualification is concerned it is true that the squad teachers possess JBT certificates and many of them are graduates but minimum qualification for squad teachers is also matric. Similarly minimum qualification for instructors is matric but many of the petitioners are graduates and some of them are trained teachers possessing JBT certificates. Great emphasis was laid on behalf of the respondent State that instructors are part-time employees while squad teachers are full time employees. Similar arguments were raised on behalf of the State in the case of Bhagwan Dass [(1987) 4 SCC 634 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 24 : (1987) 5 ATC 136] in resisting the claim of supervisor but the submission was rejected by this Court on the ground that having regard to the duties and functions which the supervisors are required to perform it was difficult to uphold the plea that he was a part-time employee. In the instant cases also we have already noticed the details of the duties and functions assigned to an instructor which normally say that the petitioners are required to teach at the centre for four hours and in addition to that they are required to motivate adults and drop-out children of the locality and to prepare survey reports, in addition to that they are further required to implement various schemes initiated by the government, they are further required to organise sports, athletics programme and to persuade local affluent people for making donations. They are required to educate the local residents with regard to the various welfare schemes initiated by the government for the welfare of the residents of the rural areas. Having regard to their duties and functions it is difficult to uphold the respondent's plea that the instructors are part-time employees as they work only for four hours.

                  10. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the instructors are entitled to the same pay scale as sanctioned to squad teachers. We, accordingly, direct that the petitioners' salary shall be fixed in the same pay scale as that of squad teachers. The pay of each of the petitioners shall be fixed having regard to the length of service with effect from the date of his initial appointment by ignoring the break in service on account of six months fresh appointments. The petitioners will be entitled to increments in the pay scale in accordance with law notwithstanding the break in service that might have taken place. We further direct that those directions shall be implemented with effect from 1-9-1985 as directed by this Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass [(1987) 4 SCC 634 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 24 : (1987) 5 ATC 136] . The petitioners' claim for regularising their services in the Department cannot be accepted as admittedly the project of Adult and Non-formal Education is temporary which is likely to last till 1990. We accordingly allow the writ petitions partly with costs which we quantify at Rs 5000.”

37. In Bhagwan Dass [(1987) 4 SCC 634], while considering a writ petition instituted under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the petitioners therein raising two grievances, such as they are given a deliberate break of one day after the lapse of every six months and have thus been treated as temporary Government Servants notwithstanding the fact that they have been continuously working ever since the dates of their respective appointment subject to the aforesaid break of one day at intervals of six months instead of absorbing them as regular employees in regular pay scales and secondly though the petitioners perform their duties as supervisors in education department and do the same work as is being done by their counterparts, the respondents 2 to 6 therein who are discharging similar duties as supervisors in the education department who are absorbed as regular Government service they are less paid, the Apex Court directed the respondents that the pay of each of the petitioners shall be fixed having regard to the length of service with effect from the date of his initial appointment by ignoring the break in service arising in the context of the fact that the initial appointment orders were for six months and fresh appointment orders were issued after giving a break of a day or two. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “13. Lastly we have to deal with the contention that the scheme is a temporary scheme and the posts are sanctioned on an year to year basis having regard to the temporary nature of the scheme. We are unable to comprehend how this factor can be invoked for violating “equal pay for equal work” doctrine. Whether appointments are for temporary periods and the schemes are temporary in nature is irrelevant once it is shown that the nature of the duties and functions discharged and the work done is similar and the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” is attracted. As regards the effect of the breaks given at the end of every six months, we will deal with this aspect shortly hereafter. That however is no ground for refusing to respect the “equal pay for equal work” doctrine. Be it realised that we are concerned with the “equal work equal pay” doctrine only within the parameters of the four grounds and the fact situation discussed hereinabove. We are not called upon, and we have no need or occasion to consider the applicability or otherwise of the said doctrine outside these parameters. For instance we are not required to express any opinion in the context of employment of similar nature under different employers, or in different cadres under the same or different employers. Nor are we concerned with questions required to be dealt with by authorities like the Pay Commissions such as equation of cadres or determination of parity-differential between different cadres or making assessment of workloads or qualitative differential based on relevant considerations and such other matters. We are concerned in the present matter with employees of the same employer doing same work of same nature discharged in the same department but appointed on a temporary basis instead of in a regular cadre on a regular basis. We have therefore decided the questions raised before us in the backdrop of facts of the present case. On the other dimensions of the doctrine we remain silent as there is no need or occasion to speak.”

38. In Arindam Chattopadhyay [(2013) 4 SCC 152], the issue before the Apex court was pertaining to Assistant Child Development Project Officers in West Bengal, who were, by an order dated 07.07.1999, temporarily transferred to the ICDS Project to act as CDPOS in their existing pay scales, wherein the Apex Court held thus:

                  “13. Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that although the appellants were recruited as Acdpos, the State Government transferred and posted them to work as CDPOs in ICDS Projects. If this would have been a stopgap arrangement for few months or the appellants had been given additional charge of the posts of CDPO for a fixed period, they could not have legitimately claimed salary in the scale of the higher post i.e. CDPO. However, the fact of the matter is that as on the date of filing of the original application before the Tribunal, the appellants had continuously worked as CDPOs for almost 4 years and as on the date of filing of the writ petition, they had worked on the higher post for about 6 years. By now, they have worked as CDPOs for almost 14 years and discharged the duties of the higher post. It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor has any material been produced before this Court to show that the appellants have not been discharging the duties of the post of CDPO or the degree of their responsibility is different from other CDPOs. Rather, they have tacitly admitted that the appellants are working as full- fledged CDPOs since July 1999. Therefore, there is no legal or other justification for denying them salary and allowances of the post of CDPO on the pretext that they have not been promoted in accordance with the Rules. The convening of the Promotion Committee or taking other steps for filling up the post of CDPO by promotion is not in the control of the appellants. Therefore, they cannot be penalised for the Government's failure to undertake the exercise of making regular promotions.”

39. In Bhola Nath [(2026) SCC Online SC 129], the Apex Court, while considering the issue whether the action/inaction of the State in not recognising the appellants therein, continuous service for the purpose of regularisation is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, held thus:

                  “13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis for the respondent-State’s decision to discontinue the appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service.We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship between the appellants and the respondent-State was mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of the appellants’ experience and institutional familiarity, while the appellants remained in public service. In such circumstances, any departure from a long-standing practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking order.

                  13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State’s contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having availed of the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.

                  14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions as follows:

                  I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the nomenclature of contractual engagement and thereafter denying them consideration for regularization.

                  II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without either recording cogent reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

                  III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance of contractual terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional scrutiny.

                  IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual   labels   or   mechanical   application of Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or to discard long-serving employees in a manner inconsistent with fairness, dignity and constitutional governance.

                  V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment.”

40. In Dharam Singh [(2025) SCC Online SC 1735], considering the controversy, whether years of ad hoc engagement, defended by shifting excuses and pleas of financial strain, can be used to deny the right of those who have kept public institutions running, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to both the Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long- term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.

                  18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.”

41. Though the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned Senior Counsel/learned counsel for the party respondents-writ petitioners addressed extensive arguments relying on the above referred judgments, for and against the fixation of ad hoc payment of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively to the writ petitioners who have been working as pre- primary school Teachers and Ayahs, as the case may be, we notice that the said fixation of ad hoc payment is not sought as one of the reliefs in any of the writ petitions. When this point was argued by the learned Special Government Pleader, the reply to the same by the learned Senior Counsel/counsel of the respondents is that this Court can mold the relief, even if no such relief is specifically sought in the writ petitions.

42. From the reliefs sought in the writ petitions, we notice that the main grievance of the writ petitioners is the non- implementation of the direction in Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012 of the Division Bench pertaining to the formulation of service conditions of the Teachers/Ayahs.

43. When Ext.P1 judgment specifically directs the Government to formulate the service conditions and scheme in respect of the pre-primary Teachers and Ayahs, the Government cannot take a stand that the said scheme or service conditions cannot be formulated till the Central Government implements the National Education Policy. The said attitude of the Government is nothing but a clear violation, or in other words, scant disregard to the directions in Ext.P1 judgment. Therefore, as already noted, the learned Single Judge is perfectly justified in setting aside Ext.P10 order, which was one passed by the Government during the pendency of the writ petitions.

44. While coming to the issue of fixation of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- as ad hoc payment that also from 01.08.2012 as ordered by the learned Single Judge is concerned, we notice that by Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012, the Government was directed to pay an honorarium of Rs.5,000/- per month to all pre- primary school Teachers and Rs.3,500/- per month to Ayahs, until final decision is taken by the Government. Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not have fixed the sum of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively payable to the pre-primary school Teachers and Ayahs with effect from 01.08.2012, the date of Ext.P1 judgment. Apart from that, from the judgments of the Apex Court as extracted above, we notice that the fixation of pay and allowances to the Government servants is a matter within the domain of the Government and a writ court can grant that relief by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances. The court is not an expert to fix the payments to be made to the employees, which is a lengthy process, and can be undertaken only by taking note of several aspects such as pay parity, the work done by the concerned staff, the inflation rate, etc, especially in the case of enhancement of already ordered pay. As already noted hereinbefore, in Ext.P1 judgment, the Division Bench of this Court suggested the payment of Rs.5,000/- and Rs.3,500/- respectively, as an interim measure by giving due consideration to several aspects such as the amount paid to part- time sweepers and Class IV employees, the educational qualifications of such employees, minimum wages fixed for pre- primary school Teachers in unaided schools in 2010, the payment made to ladies under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, etc. No doubt, while considering the period elapsed and the hike in the living expenses and also the inflation rate, the aforesaid amount ordered to be paid as an interim arrangement by the Division Bench in Ext.P1 judgment is grossly insufficient at present. It is also to be borne in mind that as per Article 43, under Part IV Directive Principles of State Policy, the State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural,  industrial  or  otherwise,  work,  a  living  wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. Therefore, it is the responsibility of a welfare State to ensure a decent living wage to its employees.

45. At the same time, while fixing the ad hoc payment of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/-, the learned Single Judge did not consider any of the aspects considered by the Division bench in Ext.P1 judgment. From the materials placed on record, it is evident that after Ext.P1 judgment and the consequential orders passed by the Government, the ad hoc payments directed by the Division Bench were enhanced on different occasions and at present, from the submission of the learned Special Government Pleader, we notice that the payment made by the Government is Rs.13,500 and Rs.8,500/- respectively to pre-primary school Teachers and Ayahs which was decided to be enhanced as Rs.14,500/- and Rs.9,500/- respectively. Whether this amount is in proportion to the inflation rate, when compared to the ad hoc payment directed in Ext.P1 judgment in the year 2012, is also a matter to be considered, while ordering the enhancement of the said ad hoc payments till the service conditions are formulated by the Government, which is not done in the present case.

46. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar as discussed above, in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we are of the considered opinion that there is no illegality or impropriety in the

directions issued by the learned Single Judge to formulate the service conditions of Teachers and Ayahs by the Government by taking note of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Jaggo V. Union of India [AIR 2025 SC 296], and the setting aside of Ext.P10 order of the Government. But, for the reasons stated above we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge went wrong in fixing the honorarium payable to the Teachers and Ayahs as Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively with effect from 01.08.2012. Similarly, while considering the fact that though Ext.P1 judgment was passed as early as in the year 2012, the Government has slept over the directions for these years or prolonged the matter by raising one or other reasons, we are of the view that the Government has to be directed to formulate the service conditions of the Teachers and Ayahs as directed in Ext.P1 judgment within a specific time. The fixation of honorarium payable to the Teachers and Ayahs on enhanced rate from time to time with effect from the date of filing of the first writ petition among these batch of writ petitions, till the finalization of service conditions is also a matter to be left to the decision of the Government by taking note of all the attending circumstances including inflation rate and other aspects considered in Ext.P1  judgment, in a time bound manner.

                  In the result, these writ appeals are disposed of as follows:

                  1. The impugned judgment dated 06.02.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.5506 of 2014 and connected matters is upheld to the extent it set aside Ext.P10 Government Order bearing G.O.(MS)No.54/2022/GEDN dated 04.04.2022 produced in W.P.(C)No.5506 of 2014.

                  2. The directions in the impugned judgment regarding the formulation of service conditions of Teachers/Ayahs by the Government by taking note of the claim for regularisation with specific reference to the dictum of the Apex Court in Jaggo [AIR 2025 SC 296], is upheld.

                  3. The direction in the impugned judgment to pay honorarium at the rate of Rs.27,500/- and Rs.22,500/- respectively with effect from March 2025 onwards to be disbursed from April 2025, and the disbursal of arrears at that rate with effect from 01.08.2012 within six months is set aside.

                  4. The formulation of service conditions of the Teachers/Ayahs as directed in Ext.P1 judgment by taking note of the different aspects dealt with in Ext.P1 judgment as well as in the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and also in this judgment shall be completed by the Government as expeditiously as possible at any rate within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

                  5. The appellants shall take a decision pertaining to the honorarium payable to the Teachers/Ayahs on an ad hoc basis with effect from the date of the first writ petition in this batch of writ petitions, i.e., from 24.02.2014, the date of filing of W.P.(C)No.5506 of 2014, till such formulation of service conditions, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, taking note of the observations in this judgment, including the inflation rate after Ext.P1 judgment dated 01.08.2012 and act accordingly.