Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The appellants in W.A.No.1724 of 2025 filed this review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’ for short), pleading that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated 26.02.2026 passed by this Court in that writ appeal.

2. Heard Sri.P. Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, Sri.George Thomas (Mevada), the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 - State Bank of India and Smt.M.U. Vijayalakshmi, the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent SBI Life Insurance Company.

3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioners addressed arguments reiterating the very same contentions that were addressed in the writ appeal and considered by this Court in the judgment dated 26.02.2026. Apart from raising those contentions once again, it is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that in Ext.P9 notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI’ Act for short), the bank determined the borrower's liability by including the insurance premium amount, thereby treating it as a part of the loan liability and in Ext.P11 legal notice, the bank admitted that the aggregate loan sanctioned includes insurance premium of Rs.1,59,000/- and these documents are not properly appreciated by this Court while passing the judgment.

4. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would submit that there is no error apparent on the face of the record in the impugned judgment. The learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent also supported the aforesaid submission of the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2.

5. In order to understand the circumstances that entitle the court to exercise its power of review, it would be appropriate to go through the provisions concerned as well as the law on the point laid down by the judgments of the Apex Court, as well as this Court. Section 114 and Order XLVII of CPC are the relevant provisions as far as the review of a judgment or order of a Court is concerned.

6. Section 114 of the CPC reads thus:

                  “114. Review-

                  Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved-

                  (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                  (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or

                  (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”

7. Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC reads thus:

                  “1. Application for review of judgment.

                  (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-

                  (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                  (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

                  (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record of for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

                  (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

                  Explanation-

                  The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”

8. It is trite that review power under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of the CPC is available to be exercised only on setting up any one of the following grounds by the petitioner;

                  (i) discovery of a new and important matter or evidence, or

                  (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or

                  (iii) any other sufficient reason.

9. In Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167] the Apex Court held that under the guise of review, a litigant cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided.

10. The Apex Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held thus:

                  “Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

                  (Underline supplied)

11. In N.Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria [(2013) 15 SCC 534] the Apex Court held that the mistake apparent on the face of the record means that the mistake is self-evident, needs no search, and stares at its face. Surely, review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits.

12. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [2013 (8) SCC 320] the Apex Court laid down the following principles as far as a review petition is concerned.

                  “16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

                  (A) When the review will be maintainable:-

                  (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

                  (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

                  (iii) Any other sufficient reason.

                  The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others [(1955) 1 SCR 520], to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. and others [JT (2013) 8 SC 275].

                  (B) When the review will not be maintainable:-

                  (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

                  (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

                  (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

                  (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

                  (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

                  (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

                  (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

                  (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

                  (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

13. In Sasi (Dead) through LRs v. Aravindakshan Nair and others [AIR 2017 SC 1432] the Apex Court held that in order to exercise the power of review, the error has to be self- evident and is not to be found out by a process of reasoning.

14. In Shanthi Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam State Electricity Board and others [(2020) 2 SCC 677] the Apex Court by referring to Parsion Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held thus:

                  “The scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided”.

15. Again in Govt. of NCT of Delhi v K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd [2024 SCC Online SC 1090] the Apex Court considered the grounds for review in detail and held thus:

                  “Order XVLII does not end with the circumstances as S.114, CPC, the substantive provision, does. Review power under S.114 read with Order XLVII, CPC is available to be exercised, subject to fulfillment of the above conditions, on setting up by the review petitioner any of the following grounds:

                  (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or

                  (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or

                  (iii) any other sufficient reason.”

16. In Sujatha Aniyeri v. Kannur University [2025 KHC OnLine 212] in which both of us are parties, after considering the point, what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, this court held that review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on the merits. If the direction in the judgment was erroneous, then the remedy was to challenge the same by filing an appeal and not by filing a review petition.

17. Keeping in mind the above principles, let us consider the review petition filed by the petitioners herein. In the judgment dated 26.02.2026, we have considered the pleadings in the writ petition as well as the arguments addressed at the Bar while hearing the writ appeal in detail. In the appeal judgment, we considered the issue whether the original borrower namely, Sri Radhakrishan Nair, availed the benefit of housing loan insurance cover as contended by the review petitioners and answered against them. It would be worth to extract paragraphs 16 to 20 and the last paragraph of that appeal judgment to understand the reasoning given by this Court to arrive at a finding against the review petitioners-appellants. Those paragraphs read thus;

                  “16. In Ext.P1 arrangement letter, it is stated that the Bank has decided to sanction a Home Loan limit of Rs.35,03,000/- with the breakup of Rs.33,44,000/- towards the Home Loan and Rs.1,59,000/- towards the Funding of Housing Loan Insurance Cover (if requested). In Clause 2 of Ext.P1, under the head Purpose it is stated that “(ii) Premium for Home Loan Insurance Cover (if requested)- Rs.1,59,000/-". Clause 17 of Ext.P1 says that the sanction of the loan will be valid for three months from the date of that letter. That means if any of the sanctioned amounts were not accepted within three months, the same will lapse. In the fourth page of Ext.P1, two options are stated, i.e., “I/We wish to avail/do not wish to avail” Loan for Funding of Premium of Home Loan Insurance Cover. However, Ext.P1 shows that neither of these Clauses was struck off by either the insurer or the insured. Annexure R1(C) is a copy of Ext.P1 produced by the appellants before the District Consumer Dispute Redressal ‘Forum. But surprisingly, in Annexure R1(C), the words “do not wish to avail” are seen struck off. According to the respondents, this was done purposefully by the appellants while producing a copy of Ext.P1 to the District Consumer Redressal Forum.

                  17. It is pertinent to note that Ext.P2 is the statement of account of the loan account. From the perusal of Ext.P2, it can be seen that the amount paid by the borrower at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month was credited towards the loan amount of Rs.33,44,000/-. If the contention of the appellants is accepted, the sum of Rs.1,59,000/- to be paid by the borrower towards the insurance premium should also have been deducted every month either from a separate account or by including that amount in Ext.P2 account. But Annexure R1(D), the details of the Suraksha Loan Account produced by the Bank would show that there is no transaction, except an entry shown as “DR” dated 30.01.2018 of a sum of Rs.1,59,000/- and cancellation of the said amount on 30.07.2022. Admittedly, the premium amount of Rs.1,59,000/- is not transferred to the 3rd respondent insurer.

                  18. The appellants state that the non transferring of the insurance premium to the 3rd respondent is an omission on the part of the Bank. But to accept the aforesaid contention of the appellants, it is to be proved that the predecessor of the appellants, i.e., Sri.C.Radhakrishnan Nair, has submitted an insurance application to the 3rd respondent. But in the instant case, it is not in dispute that the loan documents were signed by the authorised signatory/power of attorney holder of Sri.C.Radhakrishnan Nair, since Sri.C.Radhakrishnan Nair was not available in India. It is also not in dispute that the medical examination of Sri.C.Radhakrishnan Nair was not carried out, which, according to the 3rd respondent, is mandatory for granting the insurance coverage. Apart from that, as noted above, from Ext.P2 account statement, it is evident that the sum of Rs.1,59,000/-, which, according to the appellants, was sanctioned to Sri.C.Radhakrishnan Nair, was not credited to the loan account. No amount was paid towards the aforesaid sum of Rs.1,59,000/- either in Ext.P2 loan account or in Annéxure R1(D) Suraksha account.

                  19. In D. Srinivas [2018 (3) SCC 653], the Apex Court held that when the insurer accepted the premium without conducting a medical examination of the insured, it had waived the condition precedent of the medical examination. But to the present case, the said dictum is not applicable, since no amount is admittedly credited to the account of the 3rd respondent insurer towards the premium of the insurance offered to the borrower by Ext.P1 arrangement letter.

                  20. It is also worth to note that in Annexure R1(A), standing instructions given by the deceased borrower through his power of attorney holder, the instruction was only pertaining to the payment of monthly instalments of the loan account and not pertaining to the Suraksha Account. All the aforesaid facts lead to an irresistible conclusion that the borrower Sri.C.Radhakrishnan Nair had not availed the benefit of insurance coverage, and he had not paid any amount as insurance premium. Though through Ext.P1 arrangement letter, the insurance premium is also offered to the borrower, the same was not sanctioned since he had not availed that benefit. In such circumstances, we find no merit in the contention of the appellants that the loan availed by the deceased Sri.C.Radhakrishnan Nair, the predecessor of the appellants, is secured by the Insurance under the 3rd respondent. Therefore, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on that ground by the learned Single Judge.

                  In the result, this writ appeal is disposed of by setting aside the impugned judgment dated 11.06.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.9933 of 2024, and the writ petition stands dismissed.”

18. Now coming to Exts.P9 and P11 documents pressed into service by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, Schedule B in Ext.P9 notice issued by the bank under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is pertaining to the details of security documents, including all supplementary documents and documents evidencing the creation of mortgage. Similarly, Ext.P11 is a letter dated 13.02.2024 issued by the 1st respondent to the 1st petitioner. In those documents, the details of the amount of loan and the amount of insurance cover were mentioned. But, merely for the said reason, it cannot be said that the bank has sanctioned the aforesaid amount of Rs.1,59,000/- towards the loan insurance to the borrower, particularly when the materials on record, as discussed in the appeal judgment extracted above, clearly shows that the predecessor of the petitioners not availed the insurance cover for the loan amount.

19. Having considered the grounds for review stated in the present review petition and the submissions made at the Bar, we find absolutely no ground to hold that the judgment dated 26.02.2026 in W.A.No.1724 of 2025 is suffering from any error apparent on the face of the record as contended by the petitioners. The attempt of the petitioners is only to reagitate the issue already found against them by using the review jurisdiction as an appeal in disguise.

                  In the result, the review petition stands dismissed.