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CDJ 2026 Ker HC 699
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| Court : High Court of Kerala |
| Case No : OP(KAT) No. 50 of 2026 |
| Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. MURALEE KRISHNA |
| Parties : State Of Kerala, Represented By The Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram & Others Versus K Raghavan Nambiar Sub Jail Warden, Kannur, Kerala |
| Appearing Advocates : For the Appearing Parties: Princy Xavier, Senior Government Pleader, Shaijan C. George, T.N. Sreekala, Vinai John, Ajay Ramesh, Advocates. |
| Date of Judgment : 19-05-2026 |
| Head Note :- |
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 19 -
Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 32296,
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| Summary :- |
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| Judgment :- |
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Muralee Krishna, J.
1. The respondents in O.A.(EKM) No.1194 of 2020 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Additional Bench at Ernakulam (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the impugned Ext.P4 order dated 20.10.2022 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.
2. Going by the averments in the original application, the respondent-applicant, while working as Head Warden at Sub Jail, Vadakara, was dismissed from service with effect from 09.08.2004 by Annexure A2 order dated 01.09.2004, on account of his conviction in S.C. No. 145 of 2001 by the Additional Assistant Sessions Court, Thalassery. The respondent attained the age of superannuation on 30.04.2008. Though the respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Sessions against the conviction and sentence, the said appeal ended in dismissal. Later, by Annexure A3 order dated 04.04.2016 in Crl.R.P No.924 of 2013, this Court acquitted the respondent. Therefore, the respondent submitted Annexure A4 representation dated 18.08.2016 to the 1st petitioner for full pay and allowance, which he would have been entitled to if he had not been dismissed from service, and also for pension and other retirement benefits. Since no action was taken on Annexure A4 representation, the respondent approached the Tribunal by filing O.A. (EKM)No.1562 of 2018, which was disposed of by the Tribunal by Annexure A5 order dated 20.08.2018, directing the 1st petitioner to consider the representation in accordance with the rules and to take an appropriate decision, after hearing the respondent. Thereafter, Annexure A4 representation was rejected by the 1st petitioner by Annexure A1 order dated 07.05.2019. Though the Government approached the Apex Court by filing a Special Leave Petition against Annexure A3 order of this Court, by Annexure A6 order dated 16.08.2022, the Apex Court dismissed that Special Leave Petition. Being aggrieved by the rejection of Annexure A4 representation, the respondent filed O.A. (EKM)No.1194 of 2020 under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs;
“a) Call for the records leading to the issue of Annexures Al and quash the same;
b) Direct the respondents to grant the applicant all the service benefits as if there was no order of dismissal, including arrears of pay and allowances within a time frame as might be found just and proper by this Hon’ble Tribunal;
c) Direct the respondents to grant the applicant pension and other retirement benefits as if the applicant had superannuated from service with effect from 30.04.2008 without break;
d) Direct the respondents to pay the applicant arrears of pay and allowances and other retirement benefits including pension with interest calculated @ 12% per annum with effect from the dates from which the arrears fell due month after month, up to the date of full and final settlement of the same”.
3. On behalf of the 1st petitioner, a reply statement dated 15.12.2020 was filed in the original application, opposing the reliefs sought for by the respondent.
4. After hearing both sides, and on appreciation of the materials on record, the Tribunal, by the impugned Ext.P4 order, allowed the original application. Paragraphs 6 to 9 and the last paragraph of that order read thus;
“6. The claim of the applicant for pay and allowances and retirement benefits, consequent to the acquittal in a Criminal Case, is governed by Rule 18(iii)(b) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rule, 1960 (for short “KCS (CC&A)-Rules”). Rule 18 provides for dismissal or removal of an employee, consequent to conviction on a criminal charge by a criminal court, and he is sentenced to imprisonment and/or with fine. Clause (b) provides that “in case the said conviction is subsequently set aside in appeal or otherwise and the Government servant is acquitted of the charges, the order of dismissal or removal ceases to have effect and revised orders shall be issued forthwith to reinstate him in service entitling him for all the benefits to which he would have been entitled, had he been in service.”
7. The learned Government Pleader points out that Rule 18 (iii)(b) has since been amended and there is no automatic right for payment of pay and allowances.
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the applicant pointed out that the acquittal of the applicant was on 04.04.2016, whereas the amendment came into effect only on 12.01.2017.
9. In the said circumstances, the applicant would be entitled to full pay and allowances, as provided in Rule 18(iii)(b) KCS (CC&A) Rules, 1960, as if he continued in service without any break, till the date of his superannuation. The above view is fortified by the judgment of the Full Bench of the Hon’ble High Court in State of Kerala v. N.G.Joseph [(2015 (1) KLT 56].
In the circumstances, the Original Application is allowed. There shall be a direction to the respondents to disburse the pay and allowances due to the applicant for the period from 09.08.2004 till the date of his superannuation. The respondents shall also process the pensionary claims of the applicant, sanction and disburse the same, for which the applicant shall submit the pension papers in time. The entire proceedings shall be completed within a period of within a period of three months therefrom”.
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, the State and its officials are now before this Court with this original petition.
6. Heard the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the respondent.
7. The learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the acquittal of the respondent as per Annexure A3 order of this Court is not an honourable acquittal. The learned Senior Government Pleader highlighted an observation in Annexure A3 order that there are several strong reasons to doubt the role of the revision petitioner (the respondent herein) and his complicity in the offence of rape, to argue that the acquittal of the respondent was by giving the benefit of doubt. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Government Pleader, Annexure A1 rejection order of the representation of the respondent ought not have interfered with by the Tribunal.
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent would argue that the acquittal of the respondent is an honourable acquittal. By pointing out the observations in Annexure A6 order of the Apex Court that the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal case is a ‘clean acquittal’, the learned counsel submitted that no interference is needed on the impugned order of the Tribunal.
9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
10. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;
"The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."
11. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.
12. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.
13. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
14. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.
15. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
16. It is discernible from the materials placed on record that the respondent was dismissed from service, as he was convicted and sentenced in the Sessions Case by the Additional Assistant Sessions Court, which was confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Court. But later, after the attainment of superannuation age by the respondent, he was acquitted in the criminal case by Annexure A3 order dated 04.04.2016 by this Court. Though the State approached the Apex Court by filing S.L.P. (Crl) No.27659 of 2020, the said special leave petition was dismissed by the Apex Court as per Annexure A6 order dated 16.08.2022, for the reason that it was highly belated. However, in the said order, the Apex Court observed that the acquittal of the respondent by this Court is a ‘clean acquittal’. The aforesaid paragraph in the order of the Apex Court is extracted hereunder ;
“Having given anxious consideration to the submissions made and having examined the record, we find absolutely no justified reason emanating from what has been stated in paragraph 8 and 9 of the application seeking condonation of delay. Without much comments, suffice it to observe that the averments aforesaid depict a sorry state of affairs where the matters were sought to be proceeded in the different Departments of the Government at a pace chosen by the officers themselves and even the propositions and counter-propositions were allegedly exchanged without any regard to the question of limitation. And this all has been happened when the respondent No. 1 had been pressing for the relief of restoration of his service benefits after clean acquittal by the High Court.
17. While appreciating the reasons for acquittal stated in Annexure A3 order and the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court in Annexure A6 order, it can only be said that the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal case is an honourable acquittal. In such circumstances, we find no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order of the Tribunal.
Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal.
In the result, this original petition stands dismissed.
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