1) The issue involved in the Petitions is about arbitrability of disputes concerning termination of licenses to occupy airport premises by the Airports Authority of India.

2) There are two Petitioners before this Court-Survee Shidal and Survee Foods Private Limited, who are aggrieved by termination notices issued by the Airports Authority of India (AAI) on 22 March 2025 terminating the agreements granting licenses for running Restaurants cum Hangout formats at Juhu Airport. They have accordingly filed Petitions under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) seeking interim measures in the form of stay on termination notice dated 22 March 2025 and for allowing them to continue operations of Restaurant-cum-Hangout format as per the Agreement executed in their favour.

3) M/s. Survee Shidal has also filed Commercial Arbitration Application (L) No.38289 of 2025 under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, for appointment of the arbitrator. Since the Respondent/AAI has raised objection about arbitrability of the disputes relating to termination of license and eviction from Airport premises, all the three proceedings are taken up for analogous hearing.

FACTS

4) Briefly stated, facts of the case are that AAI issued Notice Inviting Tender for operation of restaurant-cum-hangout format in premises admeasuring 150 sq. mtrs. and 630 sq. mtrs at Juhu Airport located at Juhu Airport, Vile Parle (W) Mumbai. Petitioners submitted their bids in pursuance of the Notice Inviting Tender. The bids of the Petitioners were accepted and AAI issued Letters of Intent to Award (LOIA) in favour of the Petitioners. LOIA dated 1 March 2024 was issued in favour of the Petitioner-M/s. Survee Shidal in respect of the premises admeasuring 630 sq. mtrs for a period of 7 years. AAI granted LOIA dated 13 February 2024 in favour of Petitioner-Survee Foods Private Limited in respect of the premises admeasuring 150 sq.mtrs for a period of 7 years. In pursuance of the LOIA, parties executed Concession Agreements/License Agreements dated 21 February 2024 and 15 March 2024 under which Petitioners were granted licenses for a period of 7 years after completion of gestation period of 60 days or from commencement of operations, whichever was earlier. Petitioners paid amount of security deposit to the AAI. Both the Petitioners were put in physical possession of the licensed areas admeasuring 630 sq.mtrs and 150 sq.mtrs. The Petitioners thereafter started construction and fit out work in the premises. While the construction work was in progress, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) issued notices under Section 354A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (MMC Act) alleging unauthorised construction. Petitioner replied to the notices. The MCGM thereafter issued stop work notices to the Petitioners on 10 January 2025. Petitioners filed L.C. Suit No.123 of 2025 before the City Civil Court, which are pending and in which interim injunction is granted restraining the MCGM from taking steps in respect of the construction.

5) On 22 March 2025, AAI issued notices terminating the Concession Agreement contending inter alia that officer executing the contract was not empowered to allot the land. It was further alleged that the structure is constructed by the Petitioners inside the boundary wall by trespassing into prohibited area and by encroaching upon the larger land than the one which was allotted. The Petitioners are aggrieved by Termination Notice dated 22 March 2025 and have accordingly filed Section 9 Petitions seeking interim measures. By order dated 23 June 2025, this Court directed maintenance of status-quo, which protection continues to operate till date.

6) In the meantime, M/s. Survee Shidal has filed Commercial Arbitration Application (L) No.38289 of 2025 under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. The Respondent-AAI has appeared in the Petitions and filed affidavit-in-reply denying existence of arbitration agreement for adjudication of disputes involved in the Petition. The AAI has relied upon provisions of Chapter-VA of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (AAI Act) and has produced copies of eviction notices dated 11 June 2025 issued by the Eviction Officer. Accordingly, submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for rival parties on the issues of permissibility to make reference to arbitration as well as entitlement of Petitioners for interim measures, are heard.

7) Mr. Tamboly, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner-M/s. Survee Shidal has contended that there exists a valid and bindings arbitration agreement between the parties. That the dispute resolution clause in the Concession Agreements (Clause No.25.6) provides for adjudication of unresolved disputes by arbitration. That the arbitration clause covers disputes arising out of and in connection with the Concession Agreement, which necessarily includes the disputes concerning alleged breach, termination, monetary claims, damages and consequential reliefs. He submits that the Respondent itself had earlier consented for arbitration and its subsequent refusal is an afterthought and cannot defeat contractual obligation to arbitrate. He relies upon order dated 23 June 2025 in Section 9 Petitions in support of his contention that the validity of termination is an arbitrable dispute.

8) Mr. Tamboly further submits that objections based on Chapter-VA of AAI Act raises, at the highest, a mixed question of fact and law viz., whether the dispute is purely one of unauthorised occupation or whether it arises out of a broader commercial contract and the legality of its termination. Such determination is not straightaway and cannot be conclusively decided by the reference Court. He submits that issue is not ex-facie barred and therefore needs to be left open for decision by the Arbitral Tribunal for determination under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. That the Tribunal is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction including all objections with regard to existence or validity of arbitration agreement. That the scope of enquiry under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act is confined to prima facie existence of arbitration agreement and the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial for determining arbitrability except in cases where non-arbitrability is manifest and ex-facie. He submits that in respect of Agreement executed between the Petitioner and sub-licensee, this Court has appointed Arbitrator vide order dated 10 April 2026. That the Agreement of sub-licensee was executed in furtherance and in lieu of Concession Agreement, which is under adjudication in the present proceedings. That since disputes arising out of derivative agreement are referred to arbitration, the disputes arising out of Concession Agreement cannot be held to be non-arbitrable.

9) Mr. Tamboly further submits that the excepted matters must be strictly construed and relies on judgments of the Apex Court in Food Corporation of India Versus. Shreekanth Transport(1999 (4) SCC 491) and State of Goa Versus. Praveen Enterprises(2012 (12) SCC 581). In support of his contention that issue relating to arbitrability should ordinarily be left open to Arbitral Tribunal Mr. Tamboly relies on judgments in Office for Alternative Architecture Versus. Ircon Infrastructure and Servises Ltd.(2025 SCC Online SC 1908) and SBI General Insurance Company Limited Versus. Krish Spinning(2024 12 SCC 1). In support of his contention that disputes concerning breach, delay and validity of termination are arbitrable unless expressly excluded, Mr. Tamboly relies on judgments of the Apex Court in J.G. Engineers Private Ltd. Versus. Union of India and another(2011 5 SCC 758) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and another Versus. Motorola India Private Ltd.(2009 2 SCC 337) and of Delhi High Court in India Trade Promotion Organisation Versus. International Amusement Limited(2007 SCC Online Del 981). In support of his contention that earlier orders passed in same proceedings cannot be lightly ignored, Mr. Tamboly relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Arjun Singh Versus. Mohindra Kumar and others(AIR 1964 SC 993). On the above broad submissions, Mr. Tamboly prays for constitution of Arbitral Tribunal and for continuation of ad-interim measures already made during pendency of the arbitral proceedings.

10) Mr. Pandey, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner-M/s. Survee Foods Pvt. Ltd. adopts submissions of Mr. Tamboly.

11) Mr. Samdani, the learned senior advocate appearing for the Respondent-AAI opposes the Petitions under Section 9 and Application under Section 11 submitting that the licenses relate to Airport premises which property belongs to AAI. That Petitioners are in unauthorised occupation of Airport Premises within the meaning of Section 28-A(f) of the AAI Act on account of termination of their licenses. That clauses 25.1 and 25.10 of the License Agreements expressly exclude the disputes and differences, which are covered by Chapter-VA of the AAI Act. That therefore excepted matters cannot be referred to arbitration and Arbitral Tribunal would have no jurisdiction in respect thereof. In support, he relies on judgment in Prabartak Commercial Corporation Ltd. Versus. Chief Administrator, Dandakaranya Project and another(1991 1 SCC 498.).

12) Mr. Samdani further submits that in view of clauses 25.1 and 25.10 of the License Agreements and provisions of Chapter-VA of the AAI Act r/w. Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act, the dispute pertaining to termination, validity of termination, recovery of possession or arrears and damages are to be dealt with exclusively by the Eviction Officer appointed under Section 28-B of the AAI Act. That this principle is applied by this Court in HLV Limited Versus. Airports Authority of India(Arbitration Appeal No.83 of 2024 decided on 9 June 2025.). That in HLV Limited (supra) this Court has held that disputes relating to eviction from Airport Premises are non-arbitrable and the same fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Eviction Officer. He submits that the judgment in HLV Limited is upheld by the Apex Court by dismissal of Special Leave Petition vide order dated 21 July 2025. He also relies on judgment of the Delhi High Court in Airport Authority of India Versus. M/s. Grover International Ltd. And another(2011 SCC Online Del 446) in support of the contention that similar view is taken in relation to application of provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act) to airport premises. Mr. Samdani also relies upon judgment of this Court in Airports Authority of India Versus. Satyavan Vishnu Agate(Review Petition (L) No.18565 of 2025 decided on 16 April 2026) in support of his contention that this Court has upheld non-arbitrability of disputes and differences covered by Chapter-VA of the AAI Act.

13) Mr. Samdani further submits that reading of Sections in Chapter-VA of the AAI Act as a whole, makes it clear that the said Act constitutes a complete code, governing matters relating to unauthorised occupation and eviction of Airport premises. That the said Chapter confers upon the Eviction Officer powers of a Civil Court in certain matters including the power of summoning and examining witnesses and receiving evidence. That there is statutory appeal to the High Court and the orders passed by the Eviction Officer under Section 28-A of the AAI Act are treated as final thereby excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of actions taken or to be taken under the said Chapter. He relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Dhulabhai Versus. State of Madya Pradesh and others(1968 SCC Online SC 40) in support of his contention that jurisdiction of Civil Court is impliedly barred.

14) Mr. Samdani further submits that only those claims, which are dehors the termination, recovery of possession and arrears, which cannot be adjudicated by Eviction Officer, can be referred to arbitration and only after the order of the Eviction Officer. In support, he relies on judgment of Delhi High Court in Turkinz Versus. India Tourism Development Corporation Limited and another(Arbitration Petition No.518 of 2015 decided on 20 October 2015).

15) Mr. Samdani relies on judgment in Booz Allen and Hamilton INC Versus.. SBI Homes Finance Limited and others(2011 5 SCC 532) in support of his submission that adjudication of certain category of proceedings are reserved by the legislature exclusively for public fora, as a matter of public policy and jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals is accordingly excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. He relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Drolia and others Versus. Durga Trading Corporation(2021 2 SCC 1) in support of the contention that legislature is empowered to exclusively reserve certain category of proceedings for public fora. On above broad submissions, Mr. Samdani prays for dismissal of the Petitions.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS

16) The core issue that arises for consideration in the two Petitions filed under Section 9 and the Application filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act is whether disputes relating to termination of license of the Petitioners and relating to their eviction are arbitrable and whether reference to arbitration can be made by this Court while exercising referral jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.

17) As observed above, Petitioners are granted license for running Restaurant-cum-Hangout format by the AAI on land belonging to it at Juhu Airport. The land on which licenses were granted to operate restaurants abuts Swami Vivekananda Road and the restaurants, though constructed on AAI land, are meant to cater to members of public as well. The licenses are secured by the Petitioners by participating in the tender process. The Officer holding the post of Airport Director of AAI apparently took a decision to grant licenses in respect of the AAI land for operating the restaurants. After being successful in the biding process, the Petitioners were issued LOIA in respect of lands admeasuring 150 sq. mtrs. and 630 sq. mtrs for operation of restaurants-cum-hangout formats. The LOIA set out the terms and conditions of grant of license. After payment of initial amount stipulated in LOIA, AAI executed License Agreements, which are also described as Concession Agreements, with the Petitioners. Under the Agreements, licenses for a period of 7 years are granted to Petitioners for running of restaurants at the designated lands on payment of stipulated license fees. The General Terms and Conditions are appended to the license agreements, which contain arbitration agreement in Clause 25 as under :

                   (25) Dispute Resolution

                   25.1 All disputes and differences arising out of or in any way touching or concerning this Agreement (except those the decision whereof is otherwise herein before expressly provided for or to which the AAI ACT, 1994 and the rules framed thereunder which are now enforce or which may here-after come into forte are applicable) (the "Dispute") shall be dealt as under:

                   25.2 Through Mediation: All dispute(s), at the first instance, shall be referred to the "Mediation Committee of Independent Experts (MCIE) or individual mediator for mediation as per "AAI Mediation Policy and applicable laws. All cost of mediation shall be borne equally by the parties.

                   25.3 In case either party withdraws from the Mediation or the dispute(s) is nut resolved within 120 days of reference to the Mediation, then the aggrieved party may invoke arbitration through Clause 28.5 within 30 days from the date of receipt of Partial Settlement Agreement or Failure Report.

                   25.4 Unless the contract has already been repudiated or terminated, the parties shall, in every case, continue to proceed to perform their respective obligations under the agreement. Once the request of the Party is accepted under Mediation Policy of AAI, the dues of the party shall be treated as disputed for all purposes.

                   25.5 Adjudication through Arbitration: In case no final settlement has been arrived at between the parties after mediation or partially settled as per sub Para

                   25.6 above, the unresolved dispute(s), on invocation by the aggrieved party shall be referred for adjudication by arbitration.

                   a. When the amount involved is above 25 crores, adjudication shall be made by Arbitral Tribunal comprising of 03 arbitrators. Each party to appoint one arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint the Presiding Arbitrator.

                   b. When the amount involved is Rs. 25 Crores and below shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator to be appointed by the Authority, AAl, after obtaining consent of the other party, as per format annexed at Annexure M.

                   25.7 Unless the contract has already been repudiated or terminated, the parties shall, in every case, continue to proceed to perform their respective obligations under the agreement.

                   25.8 Arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended from time to time.

                   25.9 Fee payable to the Arbitrator(s) shall be as per Schedule-IV of the Arbitration & Concillation Act, 1996 and shall be borne by both the parties equally.

                   25.10 No dispute shall be referred for resolution under this clause through arbitration in matters for which eviction & recovery procedure is provided under Chapter -VA of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 as amended by Act 2003.

                   25.11 The venue of such arbitration shall be Juhu Airport and the language of arbitration proceedings shall be English.

                   25.12 Adjudication by Regulatory Authority or Commission

                   25.12.1. In the event of constitution of a statutory Regulatory Authority or Commission with powers to adjudicate upon disputes between the Concessionaire and the Authority, all disputes arising after such constitution shall, instead of reference to adjudication under this Clause/above clauses, be adjudicated upon by such Regulatory Authority or Commission in accordance with the Applicable Laws and all references to Dispute Resolution Procedure shall be construed accordingly. For the avoidance of doubt, the parties hereto agree that the adjudication hereunder shall not be final and binding until an appeal against such adjudication has been decided by an appellate tribunal or judicial court, as the case may be, or no such appeal has been preferred within the time specified in the Applicable Laws

                   The case shall be referred to the sole Arbitrator by the Chairman/Member/ RED of the Authority, subject to the condition that the licensee shall have to deposit 50% of the disputed amount (in the form of BG (Additional bank guarantee with validity of minimum two years from the date of making reference to Arbitration and further extendable) RTGS/ NEFT) with AAl as condition precedent before making reference to the Arbitration for adjudication of dispute.

                   During the arbitral and Dispute resolution under Mediation proceedings, the licensee(s) shall continue to pay the full amount of license fee/dues regularly as per the award/agreement and perform all covenants of the agreements.

                   ‘(emphasis supplied)

18) Thus, under Clause 25, though ‘all the disputes and differences’ arising out of, touching or concerning the license agreement could be first referred to Mediation Committee of Independent Experts and could thereafter be referred to arbitration, clause 25.1 excludes certain types of disputes and differences from the ambit of arbitration agreement. The excluded disputes and differences relate to the decision to which provision of AAI Act and the rules framed thereunder apply. Thus, on strict interpretation of Clause 25.1, the decision to which provisions of AAI Act apply, are not covered by the expression ‘dispute’ which can be dealt with under clauses 25.2 onwards. If there is any ambiguity in the language used on clause 25.1, the clarity is achieved in clause 25.10, which makes it expressly clear that no dispute shall be referred for resolution through arbitration in maters for which eviction and recovery procedure is provided in Chapter-VA of the AAI Act, as amended by the Act of 2003.

19) Since Clause 25.10 seeks to exclude the disputes in relation to eviction and recovery proceedings provided under Chapter-VA of the AAI Act, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions under Chapter- VA of the Act. Chapter-VA has been inserted in the AAI Act by the Act 43 of 2003 w.e.f 1 July 2004. Chapter-VA makes provisions for eviction of unauthorised occupants in the airport premises. Sections 28-A to 28-R are inserted in the AAI Act by the 2003 amendment. Section 28-A defines various terms and for the purpose of present controversy, it would be necessary to refer to the definition of the terms ‘airport premises’ and ‘unauthorized occupation’ in clauses (a) and (f) of Section 28-A and which provides thus:

                   28-A. Definitions.—

                   In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,—

                   (a) “airport premises” means any premises—

                   (i) belonging to airport;

                   (ii) taken on lease for the purposes of airport;

                   (iii) acquired for the Authority under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) or any other corresponding law for the time being in force.

                   Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this clause, “airport” includes private airport;

                   (f) “unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any airport premises, means the occupation by any person of the airport premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the airport premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever.

20) Section 28-B provides for appointment of Eviction Officers for the purpose of exercise of powers conferred and for performance of duties imposed under Chapter-VA. Under Section 28-C, if the eviction officer is of the opinion that if persons are in unauthorized occupation of any airport premises and that they should be evicted, a notice can be issued in writing calling upon such persons to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. Section 28-C of the AAI Act provides thus:

                   28-C. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction.—

                   (1) If the eviction officer is of the opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any airport premises and that they should be evicted, the eviction officer shall, in the manner hereinafter provided, issue a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.

                   (2) The notice shall—

                   (a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and

                   (b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the airport premises—

                   (i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than seven days from the date of issue thereof, and

                   (ii) to appear before the eviction officer on the date specified in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown and also for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired.

                   (3) The eviction officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the airport premises and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to the persons concerned.

                   (4) Where the eviction officer knows or has reasons to believe that any person is in occupation of the airport premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed.

21) Under Section 28-D, the Eviction Officer can make an order of eviction upon reaching a satisfaction that the airport premises are in unauthorised occupation. Under Section 28-D(2), if a person against whom eviction order is made, refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction, the Eviction Officer can evict such person and take possession of the airport premises by use of such force as may be necessary. Section 28-D provides thus:

                   28-D. Eviction of unauthorised occupants.—

                   (1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under section 28C and any evidence produced by him in support of the same and after personal hearing, if any, given under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 28C, the eviction officer is satisfied that the airport premises are in unauthorised occupation, the eviction officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the airport premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified in the order, by the persons who may be in occupation thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the airport premises.

                   (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction on or before the date specified in the order or within fifteen days of the date of publication under sub-section (1), whichever is earlier, the eviction officer or any other officer duly authorised by the eviction officer in this behalf may, after the date so specified or after the expiry of the period aforesaid, whichever is earlier, evict that person from, and take possession of, the airport premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary.

22) Under Section 28-G, the Eviction Officer is empowered to regulate payment of rent or damages in respect of the airport premises. Under Section 28-H, the eviction officer has same powers as vested in a Civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of various matters. Section 28-H provides thus:

                   28-H. Powers of eviction officers.

                   An eviction officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry into this Chapter, have the same powers, as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:—

                   (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

                   (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

                   (c) any other matter which may be prescribed.

23) Under Section 28-K, a person aggrieved by the order of Eviction Officer can prefer an appeal to the High Court. Section 28-K provides thus:

                   28-K. Appeals to Tribunal.—

                   (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the eviction officer under this Chapter may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal to the [High Court]:

                   Provided that the 1 [High Court] may entertain any appeal after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days, but not after the period of thirty days from the date aforesaid, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.

24) Section 28-M provides for finality to the order made by Eviction Officer which cannot be called in question in a suit, application or execution or other proceedings. Section 28-M also debars a Court from granting any injunction in respect of any action taken or intended to be taken in pursuance of powers conferred on Eviction Officer under Chapter-VA. Section 28-M of the AAI Act provides thus:

                   28-M. Finality of orders.—

                   Subject to the provisions of this Act, every order made by an eviction officer *** under this Chapter shall be final and shall not be called in question in any suit, application, execution or other proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or intended to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Chapter.

25) Thus, Chapter-VA is a complete code in matters relating to ‘unauthorized occupation’ of any airport premises. Under definition of the term ‘unauthorized occupation’ in Section 28-A, even occupation without authority or continuation in occupation after expiry or determination of authority, becomes unauthorized occupation.

26) Since Chapter-VA provides for a complete code relating to matters of eviction from airport premises and in relation to recovery of airport premises, Clause 25.1 and Clause 25.10 exclude the disputes relating to eviction and recovery procedure governed by Chapter-VA of the AAI Act from the purview of arbitration. These disputes relating to eviction and recovery procedure are ‘excepted maters’ and cannot be referred to arbitration as per the agreement between the parties. It is well settled position that in respect of excepted maters, arbitrator has no jurisdiction and reference of dispute to the arbitration, if made, becomes invalid rendering the entire proceeding before the arbitrator, including the award, null and void. This position is well settled by judgment of the Apex Court in Prabartak Commercial Corporation Ltd. (supra) in which it has held in paras-2 to 5 as under:

                   2. The dispute between the parties was referred by the court in terms of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The reference was made, notwithstanding the objections on the part of the respondents. The respondents contended that the matter in dispute was outside the scope of the arbitration clause. That objection was rejected by the learned Additional District Judge. An advocate was appointed as an arbitrator. The arbitrator entered upon the reference and submitted awards on December 16, 1968 and on September 30, 1969. A preliminary decree was directed to be drawn up despite the objections filed by the respondents under Section 33 of the Act.

                   3. In an appeal filed in the High Court under Section 39(1)(vi), the respondents contended that the dispute regarding rates came within the ambit of Clause 13-A of the agreement and that clause provided "in the event of a dispute the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the circle shall be final". The respondents pointed out that the arbitration agreement was contained in Clause 14 and that clause specifically excluded any dispute arising under Clause 13-A. Disputed rates were matters which came within the ambit of Clause 13-A. Such disputes were not covered by the arbitration agreement. The awards were, therefore, made without jurisdiction and were void.

                   4. The learned Judge of the High Court held that Clause 14 containing the arbitration agreement had no application to the dispute in question which fell under Clause 13-A and, therefore, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction in the matter. He held that the reference of the dispute to the arbitrator was invalid and the entire proceedings before the arbitrator including the awards made by him were null and void.

                   5. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judge. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout.

27) Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act provides that Part-I of the Act cannot affect any other law by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration. Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act provides thus :

                   (3) This Part shall not affect any other law for the time being in force by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration.

28) Thus, it is lawful for the legislature to statutorily prescribe that certain disputes cannot be resolved through arbitration. This principle is settled in the judgments of the Apex Court in Booz Allen and Hamilton INC (supra) and Vidya Drolia (supra). In Booz Allen and Hamilton INC, the Apex Court has held in paras-35 and 36 as under:

                   35. The Arbitral Tribunals are private fora chosen voluntarily by the parties to the dispute, to adjudicate their disputes in place of courts and tribunals which are public fora constituted under the laws of the country. Every civil or commercial dispute, either contractual or noncontractual, which can be decided by a court, is in principle capable of being adjudicated and resolved by arbitration unless the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunals is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Adjudication of certain categories of proceedings are reserved by the legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter of public policy. Certain other categories of cases, though not expressly reserved for adjudication by public fora (courts and tribunals), may by necessary implication stand excluded from the purview of private fora. Consequently, where the cause/dispute is inarbitrable, the court where a suit is pending, will refuse to refer the parties to arbitration, under Section 8 of the Act, even if the parties might have agreed upon arbitration as the forum for settlement of such disputes.

                   36. The well-recognised examples of non-arbitrable disputes are: (i) disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of criminal offences; (ii) matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, child custody; (iii) guardianship matters; (iv) insolvency and winding-up matters; (v) testamentary matters (grant of probate, letters of administration and succession certificate); and (vi) eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes where the tenant enjoys statutory protection against eviction and only the specified courts are conferred jurisdiction to grant eviction or decide the disputes.

29) Thus, exclusion of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal by the legislature and resolution of such disputes only by public fora is a matter of public policy. In Vidya Drolia the Apex Court has reiterated the principle and has held in para-35 as under:

                   35. Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. states that civil or commercial dispute, whether contractual or non-contractual, which can be decided by a court, is in principle capable of being adjudicated and resolved by an Arbitral Tribunal unless the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal is either expressly or by necessary implication excluded. Legislature is entitled to exclusively reserve certain category of proceedings for public forums, be it a court or a forum created or empowered by the State to the exclusion of private forum. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal are matters of public policy. When public policy mandates and states that a case or a dispute is non-arbitrable, the court would not allow an application under Section 8 (or even Section 11 as observed supra) even if the parties have agreed upon arbitration as the mechanism for settlement of such disputes.

30) In the present case, Chapter-VA provides for a complete code for matters relating to eviction and recovery of possession of the airport premises. Section 28-M of the AAI Act bars the jurisdiction of a Court or authority in respect of any action taken or even an action which is intended to be taken in pursuance of power conferred by or under Chapter-VA. Thus, in relation to any action taken or intended to be taken in exercise of powers conferred under Chapter-VA, the arbitrator cannot exercise jurisdiction. There is a statutory bar on resolution of disputes relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises under Section 28-M of the AAI Act. Such statutory bar prescribed by the legislature is a matter of public policy and has been held by the Apex Court in Booz Allen and Hamilton INC and Vidya Drolia. The legislature can impose such statutory bar. Therefore, the provisions of Section 28-M of the AAI Act, coupled with provisions of Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act, would clearly make disputes relating to actions taken or intended to be taken by Eviction Officer, in exercise of any power conferred by or under Chapter-VA, non-arbitrable.

31) Applying the settled principles in Constitution Bench decision in Dhulabhai (supra) jurisdiction of Civil Court, as well as of arbitrator, is otherwise impliedly barred in view of provisions of Section 28-M of the AAI Act.

32) Apart from statutory bar imposed under Section 28-M on arbitrability of disputes relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises in relation to action taken or intended to be taken by Eviction Officer in exercise of powers under Chapter-VA, Clauses 25.1 and 25.10 of the license agreement once again explicitly make it clear that no disputes relating to eviction or recovery procedure governed by provision of Chapter-VA can be resolved through arbitration. In my view therefore resolution of disputes relating to eviction of the Petitioners cannot be resolved through arbitration, both on account of statutory bar under the provisions of Section 28-M of AAI Act, when read in conjunction with provisions of Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act as well as on account of specific covenants of Clauses 25.1 and 25.10 of the license agreement.

33) In the present case, the licenses of the Petitioners have been terminated by notices/orders dated 22 March 2025. Thus, the authority to occupy airport premises has been terminated and has expired w.e.f. 22 March 2025. This is clear from following directions in notices dated 22 March 2025:

                   Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon Airport Director, Juhu Airport (Accepting Authority), your Agreement dated 21/02/2024 is hereby terminated, with immediate effect and you are also directed to hand over the peaceful possession of the site to AAI henceforth as was handed over to you on 29/02/2024 as per Schedule of premises.

34) Since authority to occupy airport premises is terminated with issuance of termination notice dated 22 March 2025, Petitioners have automatically become unauthorised occupants of the airport premises within the meaning of Section 28-A(a) and (f) of the AAI Act. Thus, immediately upon issuance of termination notices dated 22 March 2025, Petitioners became liable for being evicted under the provisions of Sections 28-C and 28-D of the AAI Act. The Eviction Officer has expressed the intention to take action in pursuance of powers conferred upon him under Section 28-C and 28-D of the AAI Act upon issuance of termination notice dated 22 March 2025. The eviction action has indeed been initiated by issuance of notice under Section 28-C and 28-F of the AAI Act by the Enquiry Officer on 11 June 2025. Thus, under the provisions of Section 28-M of the AAI Act, any dispute relating to occupation of airport premises by the Petitioners has become nonarbitrable. Even otherwise, Clauses 25.1 and 25.10 of license agreement specifically renders disputes relating to eviction and recovery procedure non-arbitrable.

35) The issue of dispute relating to eviction and recovery of dues in respect of airport premises not being arbitrable is settled by the judgment of Single Judge of this Court in HLV Limited. In that case, the applicant therein had executed lease deed in respect of the land owned by AAI in the year 1983 and the tenure of the lease was for a period of 30 years. Another lease was executed in the year 1996 for separate parcel of land and the tenure was up to the year 2024. There was arbitration clause in each of the lease deeds providing for resolution of all disputes and differences arising from, or any in way touching or concerning the lease deeds through arbitration. However, arbitration clause in the lease deeds explicitly excluded from arbitration any facet to which the provisions of PP Act applied. AAI sought to evict the Applicant in the year 2017. Chapter-VA was inserted in the AAI Act, and the leased lands became ‘airport premises’ within the meaning of Chapter-VA of the AAI Act. The Eviction Officer initiated proceedings under Chapter-VA in which the Applicant therein filed application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that the disputes between the parties are governed by the arbitration clause. Section 8 applications were dismissed by the Eviction Officer and the Applicant filed appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act r/w Section 28-K of the AAI Act. In the light of the above factual position, the issue before this Court in HLV Limited was whether the disputes and differences relating to eviction and recovery of dues under the lease deeds fell within the scope of arbitration in the light of exclusions contained in arbitration clause. The issue is captured in para- 22 of the judgment as under:

                   22. As stated at the threshold, regardless of the web of pleadings and proceedings involved, the core issue that falls for consideration in these proceedings is whether the proceedings for eviction and recovery of lease rentals fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement between the parties.

36) The issue is answered by this Court by holding in paras-45 to 49 as under:

                   45. When the AAI Act was amended in 2003 to include Chapter VA under which AAI is now proceeding to effect eviction from the leased land, Leela contends that the parties never chose to amend the lease deeds to replace references to the Public Premises Eviction Act with references to the AAI Act. The AAI Act also does not repeal the Public Premises Eviction Act insofar as it relates to airport premises. So also, Leela contends, the AAI Act does not have a provision of ouster of jurisdiction of other courts in the manner of the effect of the Public Premises Eviction Act. Consequently, the contention is that eviction under AAI Act is not covered by the exclusion from arbitration.

                   46. In my opinion, these contentions attempt to raise abstruse points which can at best be argued on merits in the final hearing of the eviction proceedings. They have no relevance to whether the Eviction Officer under the AAI Act has jurisdiction as a matter of law, and whether eviction is at all arbitrable.

                   47. The proceedings adopted by AAI are under the statutory provisions available under the AAI Act. The reference to the Public Premises Eviction Act in the lease deeds, both in the deeming position contracted by the parties and in the provision of exclusion from the arbitration, enables identification of the leased land as public premises in the context of eviction proceedings. The effect of these provisions is that eviction from the leased land stands excluded from the arbitration agreement. Once it is clear that eviction is excluded from arbitrability, in my opinion, it does not matter which other provision or forum is available in law to enable eviction. So long as eviction is not covered by arbitration, the availability of a new provision of law that came into force after the execution of the lease deeds for effecting eviction, cannot become unavailable to AAI to pursue eviction. The reference in the lease deeds is to the Public Premises Eviction Act with the objective of excluding eviction from the scope of arbitration. At that stage, it was not possible to have envisaged to refer to Chapter VA of the AAI Act, since it did not exist. What the provisions clearly point to is that the parties intended to exclude eviction from the leased land from arbitration.

                   48. Towards this end, Mr. Kumbhakoni is precisely right in submitting that to discern the contracting intent of the parties when interpreting the contract, regard must be had to the position in fact and in law as prevailing at the time of execution of contract. By choosing the reference to the Public Premises Eviction Act, what the parties achieved in the lease deeds is the recording of what is not arbitrable. That is all that matters for purposes of dealing with the Section 8 Applications. Merely because the parties chose to exclude eviction and related recoveries from arbitrability by reference to the Public Premises Eviction Act, it would not follow that the AAI is estopped from utilising other powers specially made available in the AAI Act to effect eviction. Such a reading is absurd to say the least. When the objective of the contract is achieved – to exclude eviction from arbitration, it would not mean that the exclusion from arbitration would present a legal handicap to AAI, forcing it not to avail of special powers conferred by Parliament to achieve the same objective.

                   49. Therefore, whether it is the Public Premises Eviction Act or the AAI Act that is the correct legislation for AAI to utilise, is a question that is not relevant to the accuracy of the decision under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. Once it is clear that eviction is not amenable to arbitration, any appropriate forum – any other than an arbitral tribunal – would be available for eviction. For the reasons set out above, in my opinion, the arbitration agreement is not in existence insofar as it relates to eviction and related recoveries. Therefore, the scope of eviction and related recoveries being outside the scope of arbitration, no fault can be found with either the AAI or with the Impugned Orders on the premise that it was the AAI Act that was invoked and not the Public Premises Eviction Act

37) In HLV Limited, this Court has highlighted the objective and purpose of inserting Chapter-VA in the AAI Act for smooth eviction of unauthorized occupants from the airport premises and has held in paras- 58 and 59 of the judgment as under :

                   58. Premises owned by AAI are premises that the public exchequer has paid for. Such premises are public premises. The parties consciously agreed that the land leased for the hotel and the flight kitchen would be treated as public premises. The law governing public premises and eviction of unauthorised occupants was always applicable to the land leased to Leela by AAI. In 2003, the AAI Act was amended to empower the AAI to directly exercise powers to evict unauthorised occupants. The availability of a new law is of no import to the non-existence of an arbitration agreement insofar as eviction is concerned – I have already dealt with this issue above. To now inflict violence to the beneficial provisions of Chapter VA of the AAI Act, aimed at achieving a wider public purpose of ensuring that private parties whose leases have expired, do not squat on the AAI’s land, is unacceptable.

                   59. The objective and purpose of Chapter VA of the AAI Act is to enable smooth eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises owned by the AAI. The right to occupy the 18,000 Land and the 11,000 Land flowed from the lease deeds. Leela is itself not keen to retain the 11,000 Land, and has asserted in its submissions filed in this Court that it has often offered to return the same. As regards the 18,000 Land, Leela has been the beneficiary of ad hoc extensions from time to time and is prima facie in occupation, without authority of a lease deed. Whether it has a contract for extension on the same terms for another 30 years, and that too when admittedly such extension has not yet been granted sanction by the Competent Authority, is a matter that can squarely be determined by the Eviction Officer when he hears the matter on merits.

38) This Court concluded in para-66 of the judgment in HLV Limited as under:

                   66. In the result, it would be appropriate to summarise my findings thus:

                   a) The arbitration agreements executed between AAI and Leela, which are contained in the lease deeds, do not cover within their ambit, the subject matter of eviction of unauthorised occupation by Leela of the leased land, and recovery of associated rent and damages;

                   b) The parties had explicitly agreed to the position that the land leased to Leela would constitute public premises despite the construction of the building for conduct of business of the hotel and flight kitchen. Therefore, one need not look beyond the contract and into legislation to determine if eviction is excluded from the scope of arbitration;

                   c) The reference to the Public Premises Eviction Act in each of the lease deeds leads to the identification of the class of disputes and differences for their exclusion from coverage by arbitration. The reference to the said legislation has the effect of affirming the parties’ consensual commitment by contract that eviction and related recoveries would fall outside the scope of arbitration. This is not a provision by which AAI is obliged not to avail of statutory powers to effect eviction of unauthorised users of the land;

                   d) The introduction of Chapter VA in the AAI Act is a new power granted by Parliament after execution of the lease deeds, to enable a public authority such as the AAI to recover its premises being used by persons without authority. Eviction and recovery of lease rentals from public premises being outside the scope of arbitration, whether some other legislation is utilised is of no consequence to the core issue arising in these proceedings. That legislative purpose and objective of the AAI Act is being undermined by the contentions and arguments about such land not being “airport premises” which is neither relevant nor in consonance with the committed contractual position that the land leased to Leela by AAI constitutes public premises;

                   e) There was no requirement to amend the lease deeds to replace references to Public Premises Eviction Act with references to the AAI Act. Such a course of action was totally unnecessary since what is achieved by the provisions of the lease deeds is to exclude eviction and recovery from arbitration;

                   f) Both the leases – for the 18,000 Land and the 11,000 Land – have expired. Prima facie, the continued occupation of the land is unauthorised and squarely brings the matter within the jurisdiction of Chapter VA of the AAI Act. This has no implication for the arbitration agreements, which in any case, provided for eviction of the land under the then applicable law, to be outside the scope of arbitration;

                   g) Whether or not one could hold that the lease for the 18,000 Land was extended for another 30 years on the same terms without any revision and on the same terms and conditions, is a facet of the matter that can be eminently argued by Leela before the Eviction Officer when attempting to show cause in reply to Eviction Officer’s notice. Prima facie, the parties not having actually executed and registered a new lease deed, and the parties having accepted the ad hoc short term extensions of the lease, and the last extension has expired;

                   h) The filing of the Suit by Leela seeking a declaration that the extension of lease for another 30 years has been granted, undermines Leela’s submissions about the dispute being arbitrable. On the contrary, it signals an attempt to litigate across forums, with the hope to continue the status quo and thereby prolong the enjoyment of the leased land at outdated lease rentals and that too beyond the expiry of the contracted lease periods;

                   i) Past arbitrations in relation to the minimum guaranteed amounts payable under the lease for the 11,000 Land have nothing to do with eviction proceedings. In fact, the Delhi High Court has had occasion to stricture and impose costs on Leela when setting aside an arbitral award confirming that no amounts are payable by Leela in relation to the 11,000 Land – that position attained finality after approach to the Supreme Court;

                   j) In any event, it is Leela’s case that it is ready and willing to hand over the 11,000 Land and therefore it should not have any issue with handing the same over. Any dispute or difference relating to implications of utilisation of FSI entitlements on such land and damages therefor, can indeed be subjected to arbitration;

                   k) Eviction proceedings shall be conducted by the Eviction Officer in question with due dispatch and if necessary, on a day-to-day basis in accordance with law. Leela is directed to participate in the proceedings to enable completion of the same expeditiously;

                   l) All disputes and differences other than those relating to eviction and recovery of lease rentals are amenable to arbitration. Considering that this component of the disputes are covered by the arbitration agreement in existence, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the Section 11 Applications pending and alive. In these circumstances, such components of disputes and differences (other than eviction and related dues) are hereby referred to arbitration by Justice (Retd.) Sanjay V. Gangapurwala, former Chief Justice of Madras High Court and this Court. The parties shall approach the Learned Arbitral Tribunal within a period of one week of the upload of this judgement on the website of this Court to take instructions on how to proceed further in the matter; and

                   m) Considering the nature of the contentions raised and the implications of long-term protection secured on an interim basis, and considering the quality of the contentions raised by the losing party, costs must follow the event. The costs imposed above shall be honoured by Leela within a period of four weeks from the upload of this judgement on the Court’s website

39) Thus, the judgment of this Court in HLV Limited conclusively decides the issue that disputes and differences relating to eviction of unauthorized occupants in the airport premises are not arbitrable. However, in para-66(l) this Court directed that only those disputes and differences, which do not relate to eviction and recovery of lease rentals, are amenable to arbitration.

40) The judgment of HLV Limited has been confirmed by the Apex Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed by HLV Limited by a reasoned order dated 21 July 2025. It was sought to be canvassed before the Apex Court by HLV Limited that since this Court appointed arbitrator for resolution of other disputes, the eviction proceedings under the AAI Act were not maintainable. The Apex Court has rejected the contention by holding that direction in para-66(l) envisages resolution of only those disputes and differences other than those relating to eviction and recovery of lease rentals. The Apex Court has confirmed the view of this Court that the issue relating to eviction and recovery of lease rentals are excluded from arbitration. The Apex Court has refused to interfere with the judgment of this Court, but has left open all points to be canvassed before the Eviction Officer. Paras-3 to 16 of the order dated 21 July 2025 passed by the Apex Court reads thus:

                   3. We heard Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India alongwith Mr.N Venkatraman, the learned A.S.G.

                   4. The principal argument canvassed by Mr. Rohtagi before us is that as the parties are to go for arbitration, the proceedings under the provisions of the AAI Act for the purpose of eviction are not maintainable.

                   5. The eviction proceedings have been instituted on the premise that the leases for the two parcels of land have expired. According to the High Court, the continued occupation of the land is unauthorised and would bring the matter within the jurisdiction of Chapter VA of the AAI Act.

                   6. We tried to understand the principal submission of the learned counsel by looking into para 66 (l) closely.

                   7. At the cost of the repetition, we reproduce para 66 (l) as under:-

                   “l) All disputes and differences other than those relating to eviction and recovery of lease rentals arc amenable to arbitration. Considering that this component of the disputes are covered by the arbitration agreement in existence, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the Section 11 Applications pending and alive. In these circumstances, such components of disputes and differences (other than eviction and related dues) are hereby referred to arbitration by Justice (Retd.) Sanjay V. Gangapurwala, former Chief Justice of Madras High Court and this Court. The parties shall approach the Learned Arbitral Tribunal within a period of one week of the upload of this judgement on the website of this Court to take instructions on how to proceed further in the matter”

                   8. Prima facie para 66(l) makes it very clear that the disputes and differences which the Arbitrator has to now look into are the ones other than those relating to eviction and recovery of lease rentals.

                   9. The two issues i.e. the eviction and the recovery of lease rentals are excluded from Arbitration.

                   10. However, the argument proceeds further. The arguments proceeds on the footing that since the arbitrator is looking into the other larger issues, why the possession and occupation of the petitioner should be disturbed at this stage.

                   11. Having gone through the materials on record, more particularly, the impugned order(s) passed by the High Court, there is no good reason for us to say at this stage that the proceedings instituted under Chapter VA of the AAI Act are without jurisdiction.

                   12. The Adjudicating Authority under the AAI Act is yet to hear the parties. It shall be open for the petitioner(s) as well as the respondents to put forward all their submissions before the authority.

                   13. Ultimately, if any adverse order is passed by the authority under the AAI Act, the same is appealable.

                   14. At this point of time, we see no good reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order(s) passed by the High Court.

                   15. We keep all submissions open for both the sides to be canvassed before the authority concerned.

                   16. The petitions stand disposed of accordingly.

41) The Delhi High Court has also taken a similar view in Airport Authority of India Versus. M/s. Grover International Ltd. (supra). The Delhi High Court has held that the question of validity or invalidity of termination effected by AAI was a dispute to which PP Act and the rules framed thereunder applied and which was excluded from the arbitration clause. The Delhi High Court held that once proceedings under the PP Act are initiated, then the invalidity of termination has to be set up as a defense in those proceedings only and cannot be subject matter of adjudication before any other fora. The Delhi High Court held in para-28 of the judgment as under :

                   28. I am also not satisfied with the reply of the counsel for GIL to the query posed at the outset. The question of validity or invalidity of termination of the agreement effected by AAI was a dispute to which PP Act and the rules framed thereunder applied and which was thus excluded from the arbitration clause. A tenant/lessee of a public premises, upon its tenancy/lease being determined cannot, before the public authority has had an opportunity to initiate proceedings for eviction under the PP Act, rush and raise the dispute of validity of termination in a Court or in arbitration proceedings and invite adjudication thereon and contend that the same is maintainable for the reason of the proceedings under the PP Act having not been initiated till then. If the public authority does not initiate the proceedings under the PP Act, the termination in any case would be to no avail, whether it be valid or invalid. However if proceedings under the PP Act are initiated, then the invalidity of the termination has to be set up as a defence in the said proceedings only and cannot be a subject matter of adjudication before any other fora. Under Section 5 of the PP Act the satisfaction to be accorded whether a person is an unauthorized occupant or not is of the Estate Officer and not of any other fora. If the argument of the counsel for GIL were to be accepted, it would frustrate the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer. On the contrary if it were to be held that a finding by a Civil Court or an arbitrator is not binding on the Estate Officer, rendering such a finding would be meaningless and which no Court or arbitrator would return. The finding of invalidity is thus in the teeth of the bar of Section 15 of the PP Act. The Supreme Court in Ashoka Marketing v. Punjab National Bank AIR 1991 SC 855 held PP Act to be a special legislation enacted to deal with the mischief of rampant unauthorized occupation of public premises. The Division Bench of this Court in Fabiroo Gift House v. ITDC 2003 (66) DRJ 243 also held that claims adjudicable before Estate Officer are not arbitrable.

42) Thus, though the Petitioners may be aggrieved by termination notices dated 22 March 2025, if they believe that the terminations are illegal or invalid, this can only be their defense in the eviction proceedings initiated by the eviction officer. The issue of validity of termination notices cannot be determined separately in arbitration.

43) In India Trade Promotion Organisation (supra) the Division Bench of Delhi High Court has interpreted a pari materia provision under Section 15 of the PP Act, which bars and prohibits any Court from entertaining any suit or proceedings for eviction. The Delhi High Court held that PP Act is a special Act which prescribes complete procedure for adjudication of proceedings under that Act, which is a complete code in itself. The Delhi High Court further held that provisions of Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act cannot be made subject matter of arbitration. The Delhi High Court further held that the jurisdiction conferred by the statute cannot, by a contract, be conferred upon an arbitrator or made subject matter of reference before an arbitrator. Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Versus. Punjab National Bank(1990 (4) SCC 406,) The Delhi High Court held that PP Act was enacted to control rampant unauthorized occupation of public premises by providing machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorized occupation and the Rent Control Act which is also a special Act, cannot override the provisions of the PP Act. The Delhi High Court held that the same reason would equally apply to PP Act and the arbitration. The Delhi High Court held in para-38 of the judgment as under:

                   38. Section 15 read with Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act to deal with the applications under Sections 5 and 7. Section 15 of the PP Act bars and prohibits any Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for eviction, etc. as provided under Clauses (a) to (e) therein. The general power of the Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to entertain suit or proceedings is therefore ousted if a dispute raised falls in Clauses (a) to (e) of the aforesaid section. Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act empowers an Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 to deal with applications for eviction of unauthorised occupants and applications for payment of rent and damages in respect of public premises. The Act also prescribes a procedure for filing an appeal by a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Estate Officer under Section 9 of the PP Act. The aforesaid Act is, therefore, a special Act which also prescribes complete procedure for adjudication of proceeding under the PP Act. The said Act is a complete code in itself. We do not think that proceedings under Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act can be made subject matter of arbitration. The said enactment is a special legislation, whereby specific powers have been conferred on an Estate Officer to adjudicate and decide applications under Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act. Courts have been prohibited and restrained from exercising jurisdiction over matters mentioned in Sections 5 and 7 of PP Act in view of Section 15 of the PP Act. Reading of Sections 5 and 7 makes it clear that it is the Estate Officer alone who has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to decide applications under Sections 5 and 7 of the Said Act. The said jurisdiction conferred by the statute cannot by a contract be conferred upon an arbitrator or made subject matter of reference before an arbitrator. PP Act has given exclusive jurisdiction to an Estate Officer, who alone has authority to determine the specified disputes and matters and, therefore, these are not matters that can be referred to an Arbitrator. There cannot be waiver of statutory provisions. Contract must be within the legal framework. Parties cannot contract out of the statute. The matters on which an Estate officer has exclusive jurisdiction are not arbitrable and parties by a contract cannot agree to refer matters on which jurisdiction has been conferred and given to Estate Officer. Arbitrability of the claims covered by Sections 5 and 7 of PP Act is therefore excluded. We are fortified in our conclusion by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Limited v. Punjab National Bank, (1990) 4 SCC 406. In the said case the question arose whether the Rent Control Act which also a special Act will override the provisions of PP Act. It was held that the PP Act is a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and will prevail over Delhi Rent Control legislation which is intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants in respect of premises other than Government premises. Rent Control legislation, it was held is also a special statute but was enacted earlier in point of time. However, both enactments are special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein and in such circumstances, it is the objective and purpose behind the two enactments, that determines which enactment will apply and given preference. The purpose and objective underlying the two Acts and intentment are conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions [See Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Company Limited, 1956 SCR 603]. Applying the said principles in Ashoka Marketing (supra) it has been held that PP Act was enacted to control the rampant unauthorised occupation of public premises by providing machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. The said enactment has a public purpose and interest. Special powers in this regard have been conferred under the enactment on the Estate Officer to deal with the problem of unauthorised occupation in premises belonging to Government, public companies and corporations controlled and owned by the Central Government. Same reasoning will equally apply to PP Act and Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

44) In Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata Versus. Vijay Kumar Arya and others(2009 SCC Online Cal 266) the issue before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was whether Eviction Officer appointed under the PP Act had the necessary authority and competence to determine the issue of legality, validity or propriety of notice to quit issued by the port trust. Answering the issue in the affirmative, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held in paras-28 and 33 of the judgment as under :

                   28. After the Ashoka Marketing case the question that is posed here should scarcely have arisen. Any further doubt is now settled by the Nusli Neville Wadia judgment. Though an estate officer under the said Act is not required to be versed in law, he has sufficient powers to decide the, question as to whether a notice under section 4 of the said Act is an unauthorised occupant and it is the adjudication on such score against the notice that will permit him to proceed to evict the occupant adjudged to be unauthorised. Just as in the case of any landlord governed by the Transfer of Property Act such landlord would have to justify his decision to determine the lease or terminate the authority of the occupier to remain in possession in a civil suit instituted either by the landlord for eviction or by the lessee or occupier to challenge the notice, so is it with a statutory authority landlord under the said Act of 1971. The said Act merely removes the authority of the Civil Court to adjudicate such issue and places it before an estate officer under the said Act to decide the matter in summary proceedings. The estate officer has to look into all material before him and, in fit cases, receive oral evidence before he can arrive at a conclusion as to whether the notice under section 4 of the said Act is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. If he holds that the notice is, indeed, an unauthorised occupant he proceeds to remove the notice and his belongings from the public premises; if he finds that the notice is entitled to continue in possession, the matter is over. It is only the entire scope of adjudication on such issues that it removed from a Civil Court and is placed before the estate officer; the substantive law under the Transfer of Property Act may still be cited before the estate officer and taken into account by him for the purpose of his adjudication. The usual process under the Civil Procedure Code is merely substituted by a summary procedure before the estate officer. The only difference is that the lessee or occupier of any public premises may not bring a matter before the estate officer of his own accord, such lessee or occupier may only defend his position as respondent if the estate officer is moved by the statutory authority landlord.

                   33. In view of the bar, under section 15 of the said Act, of the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, if the estate officer does not have authority to adjudicate as to whether a person is in unauthorised occupation of the concerned public premises it would lead to an anomalous situation with the Writ Court being the only forum available to the alleged unauthorised occupant. Such an interpretation would leave the said Act of 1971 very vulnerable. The estate officer must be seen to have the power to adjudicate the fundamental issue as to whether a noticee under section 4 of the said Act is in unauthorised occupation. It is only upon such interpretation that the said Act of 1971 would be a complete code in respect of matters relating to the determination of a lease of any public premises or termination of the authority to occupy such public premises and the consequential eviction of the occupier upon him being adjudged to be in unauthorised occupation. Both the Ashoka Marketing and the Nusli Neville Wadia judgments support this view.

45) There is yet another order of the Delhi High Court in Turkinz (supra) where application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act is decided in the context of arbitration agreement contemplating two kinds of disputes. One fell within the purview of PP Act and the others, which could be referred to arbitration. The Delhi High Court held that dispute concerning unauthorised occupation of licensed premises was covered by PP Act and only other disputes could be referred to arbitration. It is held in paras-2 to 4 as under:

                   2. A plain reading of the above clause makes it clear that both the parties have anticipated two kinds of disputes. One falling within the purview of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 ('PP Act') and the other which could be referred to arbitration.

                   3. At present, admittedly, proceedings against the Petitioner under the PP Act regarding the alleged unauthorised occupation of the premises consequent upon the termination of the license are in progress. It is only upon the conclusion of those proceedings will it be clear whether the Petitioner would have other claims against the Respondent which would be require to be referred to arbitration.

                   4. Mr. Rajat Aneja, Advocate for the Petitioner, does not dispute that in view of the decision in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd vs. ITDC Ltd. 2011 (4) Arb LR 384 and the decision dated 25th April 2016 in W.P.(C) No.588/2016 [M/s Fortune Grand Management Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Tourism & Transport Corporation] disputes concerning the unauthorised occupation of licensed premises of Respondent No.1 would be covered under the PP Act and that it is only any other dispute that can be referred to arbitration

46) Mr. Tamboly has strenuously contended that it is too early at this stage to foresee or imagine the exact claim that would be filed by the Petitioners before the arbitrator. He submits that only after the statement of claim is filed, a clarity would be achieved as to which part of the claim is arbitrable and which is not. He has submitted that since some disputes can admittedly be referred to arbitration in view of judgment of this Court in HLV Limited and of Delhi High Court in Turkinz, and reference in respect of disputes be made to arbitration leaving open the objections of arbitrability to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. This precise submission was apparently made before the Apex Court while assailing the judgment in HLV Limited. However, the Apex Court has not accepted the suggestion that since arbitrator was appointed for ‘other’ issues, even the issues relating to possession and occupation of premises can be looked into by the arbitrator instead of being decided under Chapter-VA of the AAI Act.

47) Mr. Tamboly has relied on judgments of the Apex Court in Krish Spinning (supra) and Office for Alternative Architecture (supra) in support of his contention that this Court must adopt hands-off approach and make reference to arbitration leaving open all objections to arbitrability. I am unable to agree. When this Court has already arrived at a finding that the disputes relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises are non-arbitrable, there is no question of making reference to arbitration or for grant of any interim measures in favour of the Petitioner.

48) Mr. Tamboly has relied on judgment of the Apex Court in Food Corporation of India Versus. Shreekanth Transport (supra) and State of Goa Versus. Praveen Enterprises (supra) in support of his contention that the expression ‘excepted matters’ applies only where the contract clearly provides that specified matters are to be finally adjudicated by the named authority and that the scope of such exclusion must be found in the contract and cannot be enlarged by implication. While there can be no dispute about the proposition canvassed by Mr. Tamboly, in the present case, the factum of disputes and differences relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises being ‘excepted matters’ is writ large, both by virtue of contractual clauses 25.1 and 25.10 of the license agreement, as well as provisions of Section 25-M of the AAI Act r/w. Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act. The proposition therefore will have no application in the facts of the present case.

49) Mr. Tamboly has sought to contend that the disputes concerning breach of license agreement or validity of termination are arbitrable, unless expressly excluded and has relied upon judgments in J.G. Engineers Private Ltd. (supra) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and another Versus. Motorola India Private Ltd. (supra). However, as observed above, the issue of validity of termination notices would be a defense which can be set up by the Petitioners before the Eviction Officer in proceedings initiated under Chapter-VA of the AAI Act. Therefore, the issue of invalidity of termination or commission of breaches of by AAI of the license agreement are not arbitrable, since they are also covered by provisions of Chapter-VA of the AAI Act.

50) Mr. Tamboly has relied on judgment of the Apex Court in Arjun Singh (supra) in support of his contention that though earlier interlocutory orders may not always operate as res-judicata, repeated applications on same facts and seeking same reliefs can be rejected as abuse of process. This submission is canvassed by referring to interlocutory order passed by this Court on 23 June 2025, in which this Court had recorded prima-facie observations about judgment in HVL Limited being distinguishable. The findings recorded in the interlocutory order passed by this Court on 23 June 2025 in the present proceedings for granting status-quo would not bind this Court while deciding the present proceedings finally. The observations made in the order dated 23 June 2025 are only prima-facie and made for the purpose of deciding the issue of grant of ad-interim measures. By no stretch of imagination, can it be contended that the said findings would bind me while deciding the proceedings finally.

51) Though Mr. Samdani has relied upon observations made by this Court while allowing review petitions in Satyavan Vishnu Agate (supra) in support of his contention that this Court has recorded findings about exclusion of disputes and differences covered under Chapter-VA of the AAI Act from arbitration agreement, I propose not to rely upon those findings. In Satyavan Vishnu Agate this Court had passed orders appointing arbitrator in Section 9 Petitions by recording consent of AAI for arbitration. Appeals were filed challenging those orders by relying on provisions of Chapter-VA of the AAI Act, which were disposed of granting liberty to the AAI to seek review of the orders passed by the Single Judge, who had recorded the consent and admission on behalf of AAI. Accordingly review petitions were filed before the learned Single Judge and by judgment dated 16 April 2026, the learned Single Judge has allowed the Review Petitions by restoring Section 9 Petitions. However, the learned Single Judge has clarified in para-32 of the judgment that all observations made by the Court are only in furtherance of need to consider whether Section 9 Petitions deserve to be restored. Though the learned Single Judge has made observations in favour of AAI about exclusion of disputes and differences covered by Chapter-VA of the AAI Act from arbitration clause, I do not propose to rely on those findings in view of clarification issued in para-32 of the judgment.

CONCLUSIONS

52) The conspectus of the above discussion is that disputes and differences relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises are nonarbitrable and therefore reference to arbitration cannot be made in relation to those disputes. Even the issue relating to invalidity of termination notices are non-arbitrable since the same can be a defence of the Petitioners in eviction proceedings before the Eviction Officer. It is only those issues which do not concern eviction, recovery of possession, recovery of rent/damages etc. and which are not covered by Chapter-VA of the AAI Act, which can be resolved by the mode of arbitration. As of now, the disputes sought to be raised by the Petitioners are only in respect of termination notices dated 22 March 2025 by which their licenses are terminated. Those disputes are not capable of being resolved through arbitration for the reasons indicated above. If Petitioners have any disputes and differences with the AAI, which are not covered by Chapter-VA of the AAI Act, the Petitioners will be free to file fresh Section 11 applications qua those disputes alone.

53) Since reference to arbitration cannot be made in relation to disputes and differences concerning termination of license agreements and eviction of Petitioners, there is no question of granting any interim measures in their favour. Chapter-VA of AAI Act is a complete code in itself. The eviction proceedings are already initiated by the Eviction Officer. If and when an order for eviction of Petitioners is passed by the Eviction Officer, the Petitioners have the remedy of filing appeal before this Court under the provisions of Section 28-K of the AAI Act. Since no interim measures can be made in favour of the Petitioners, Section 9 Petitions will have to be necessarily dismissed.

54) I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:

                   I. Commercial Arbitration Petition (L.) Nos.13393 of 2025 and 12378 of 2025 filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act are dismissed and ad-interim measures granted earlier stand vacated.

                   II. Commercial Arbitration Application No. 38289 of 2025 is disposed of granting liberty to the Applicant therein to file fresh application for seeking reference to arbitration only qua disputes to which provisions of Chapter-VA of the AAI Act do not apply.

55) With the above directions, all the three proceedings are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.