1. Heard Mr. Job, learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. A C. T. Scan, machine that was insured by the United India Insurance Company, became subject matter of a dispute in CC/251/2009. The allegation made by the complainant was about the said C. T. Scan machine being installed in Sreekandapuram Hospital, which according to the complainant had suffered from certain defects, and the expenses borne for the rectification of the said defects had been insured under a cover, the amount thereof was not indemnifiable and excluded. The Insurance Company repudiated the claim on the ground that the machine was suffering from wear and tear and not a defect which was indemnifiable under the terms of the policy. This repudiation gave rise to the filing of the complaint in the year 2009 and was finally heard and allowed vide order dated 30.03.2015.

3. The Insurance Company assailed the said order before the State Commission in FA/717/2015 and the same has been allowed and the matter has been remanded back to the District Commission for deciding the matter afresh providing reasonable opportunity including that of the appointment of an expert or impleading a party or admitting any document that may be necessary. These observations seem to have been made on account of the fact that the Manufacturer of the machine had not been impleaded in the complaint.

4. Learned counsel submits that the State Commission had committed an error by passing an order of remand which amounts to authorize the Insurance Company to fill the gaps and the lacunae in the case for which the power to remand cannot be exercised, and that too even in a complaint which was decided after six years. The submission is that the Insurance Company having failed to discharge its burden by adducing any evidence in respect of wear and tear, there was no reason for the State Commission to have remanded the matter back for filling up the said lacunae and allowing the complaint to be decided and reconsidered once again.

5. The arguments raised by Mr. Job, learned counsel are attractive and may also be tenable, but for the recital contained in the impugned order in paragraph 10, which is as follows:

                          "10. The learned counsel for the 1st opposite party has requested to grant one more opportunity to the 1st opposite party to substantiate the contention of the 1st opposite party. The learned counsel for the complainant has also requested for granting one more opportunity to contest the matter, impleading the manufacturer of the equipment as a party. Taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the submission of the learned counsel for the complainant, Advocate Vidhu and the learned counsel for the 1st opposite party, Advocate T.J. Lakshmanan, we are inclined to set aside the order passed by the District Commission to enable both sides to substantiate their contentions afresh."

6. A perusal of the said recital categorically records that the learned counsel for the complainant also requested for granting one more opportunity to contest the matter by impleading the manufacturer of the machine as a party. It is a clear acquiescence and a concession granted by the counsel before the State Commission and has also presumably been made the basis for remand.

7. Learned counsel urges that on instructions he states that there was no such concession made expressly or otherwise, and therefore the order cannot be said to have been passed on any concession of the counsel.

8. This Commission is unable to agree with this submission for the simple reason that the facts recorded in the order have to be taken to be correct and there is no material before this Commission to believe that the counsel had not made any such statement.

9. Apart from the fact that there is no affidavit of the learned counsel who had made the statement before the State Commission on behalf of the petitioner, the said statement is a statement of fact and is therefore acquiescence regarding facts of the case. The said concession is not a concession in law. It is by now settled that a concession on a question of fact is binding when made by a counsel keeping in view the terms of a vakalatnama, where the counsel is duly authorized to finally settle a case, which should ordinarily be on instructions of the client. The Apex Court after referring to several judgments has once again reiterated the law that a concession made by a counsel on question of fact would be binding on the client. Reference be had to the judgment in the case of Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Shariff, (2011) 12 SCC 658, paragraph 14, which is extracted herein under:

                          "14. It is also clear that the High Court has recorded in the impugned judgment dated 3-3-2009 that the counsel agreed with instructions from the plaintiff and reiterated this fact in its order dated 28-8-2009 in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 13474 of 2009 in the abovementioned RFA while rejecting the plea of the counsel for the appellant herein that he did not give consent that he had no instructions from his clients A concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is binding on the client, but if it is on a question of law, it is not binding."

10. Consequently, the remand order is an outcome on the peculiar facts as recorded by the State Commission and therefore even if the argument of the counsel may be attractive, this Commission does not find any material irregularity or illegality so as to warrant exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court with regard to the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of this Commission in the case of Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Company, (2011) 11 SCC 269", which is followed by the recent decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Maity v. SBI, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 77 and Rajiv Shukla vs. Gold Rush Sales and Services Ltd. and Ors., (2022) 9 SCC 31.