Vivek Rusia, J.

1. Since identical questions of fact and law are involved in these Writ Petitions, hence all these matters are being decided by this common order. For the sake of convenience, the facts are being taken from Writ Petition No.16624/2010 to decide the controversy involved therein.

2. The petitioner-Company has filed the Writ petition No.16624/2010 along with bunch of Writ Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the Order-In-Original dated 29.03.2010 passed by the Respondent No.3- Assistant Commissioner, Customs & Central Excise, Satna and common Order-In-Appeal dated 30.09.2010 passed by the Respondent No.2- Commissioner (Appeals) Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, Bhopal (M.P.) rejecting the Appeal No.145/BPL/2010 filed by the petitioner-Company.

Facts of the case, in short, are as follows :-

3. The petitioner- Company is a registered Company under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Sector-128, Noida, Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner-Company is engaged in the business of cement manufacturing. Being a registered Company, it was availing the benefit of Cenvat credit of Central Excise Duty as well as Input Services such as air travel agent, maintenance and repair, Mandap keeper, Rent-A-Cab and telephone services on the strength of a document of input services distributor under input service used in or in relation to the manufacture of final produce.

4. A show cause notice dated 09.10.2009 was issued to the petitioner-Company proposing to disallow Cenvat credit of service tax of Rs.4,35,646/- on the strength of invalid documents and recovery thereof along with interest in terms of Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, read with Section 11A & Section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944. A penalty was also proposed to be imposed under Rule 25 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 and Rule 15 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. In turn, a detailed reply was filed stating that the Input Cenvat Credit service has been correctly availed by the petitioner-Company.

5. The Assistant Commissioner, Customs & Central Excise, Satna vide Order-In-Original dated 29.03.2010 disallowed the Cenvat credit of service tax, Ed.cess and other services amounting to Rs.4,09,640/- and directed for recovery of the same from the Petitioner-Company under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994/Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1994 read with Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 to be paid forthwith and also directed to pay interest under Section 11AB of the said Rules, 2004. Apart from it, a penalty of Rs.2000/- was also imposed on the petitioner-Company under Rule 15 of the said Rules, 2004.

6. Being aggrieved by the Order-In-Original dated 29.03.2010 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Customs & Central Excise, Satna, the petitioner-Company preferred an appeal on 20.07.2010 alongwith an application for stay before the Commissioner (Appeals), Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, Bhopal (M.P.), raising the ground that it is eligible for the input services. Apart from it, while filing the appeal, the petitioner- Company vide letter dated 20.07.2010 also sent an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of two months from the date of receipt of the impugned order dated 29.03.2010 explaining the delay that the person who was dealing with the file had left the organization without filing the appeal and keeping the Order-in-Original in a file which could not be traced. The aforesaid application was also supported by a written submission filed by Shri Pankaj Verma, Vice President of the petitioner-Company, stating that the person who was expected to file the appeal had left the organization all of a sudden without handing over the papers, hence a delay occurred in filing the appeal.

7. The Commissioner (Appeals) Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, Bhopal (M.P.) vide order dated 30.09.2010 rejected the appeal stating that the appeal filed by the petitioner-Company is clearly time barred being 54 days delay as the impugned order dated 29.03.2010 was received by the petitioner on 12.04.2010 whereas the appeal was filed on 06.08.2010 and the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal was deliberately dated as 20.07.2010 but the same was filed alongwith the appeal so as to dilute the delayed period.

8. Being aggrieved by the Order-In-Appeal dated 30.09.2010 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, Bhopal (M.P.), the petitioner-Company filed the present Writ Petition before this Court.

Submissions.

9. Shri Avinash Zargar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on judgments passed by the Apex Court in the cases of "Collector of Customs Vs. Hindustan Motors Ltd [(2000) 10 SCC 465]" and "The property Company (P) Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda [(2026) LiveLaw SC 19]" as also the judgment passed by this Court in the case of "AI Sadhik Haj Tour Organizers Vs. Commissioner of Custom, CGST & Central Excise, Jabalpur [(2022) SCC OnLine MP 6079]".

10. Shri Siddharth Seth, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Apex Court in the case of "Singh Enterprises Vs, Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur (2008) 3 SCC 70", "Amcon Tea Estate Vs. Union of India [(2010) 15 SCC 139]" & "Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited and Others [(2017) 5 SCC 42]" in which it was held that the delay beyond the statutory period cannot be condoned by the quasi-judicial Authority as well as the High Court. He has also placed reliance on the judgment passed by this Court in the case of "M/s Hemant Singh Bais Vs. The Assistant Commissioner, CGST and Central Excise Division, Bhopal and Others [(2023) 7 TMI 1023]".

11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

Conclusion.

12. Admittedly, the petitioner ( appellant before the Appellate Authority) preferred the appeal before the Appellate Authority beyond the period of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner is not in dispute that the Appellate Authority has no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days; however, submits that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can condone the delay. In the case of "Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India Private Limited and Another [(2009) 4 SCR 1197]" , the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court answered the question that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing a reference application filed by the Commissioner under Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period of 180 days. It is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are clearly excluded and, accordingly, the benefit conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act.

13. The applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act has to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act, 1963, but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as held in paragraphs 16, 17 and 21 of the judgement of "Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India Private Limited and Another [(2009) 4 SCR 1197] " passed by the the Supreme Court of India , they are reproduced below for ready reference and convenience :-

          "16. The other decision relied on by the counsel for the appellant is M.V. Elisabeth and Others vs. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Goa, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433. The learned ASG heavily relied on the following observations:

          "66. The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers....."

          Here again, there is no dispute about the above proposition. The High Courts in India are having inherent and plenary powers and as a Court of Record the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers. However, the said principle has to be decided with the specific provisions in the enactment and in the light of the scheme of the Act, particularly in this case, Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H of the unamended Cn, it would not be possible to hold that in spite of the above-mentioned statutory provisions, the High Court is free to entertain reference application even after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.

17. The other decision relied on is M.M. Thomas vs. State of Kerela and Another, (2000) 1 SCC 666. This case arose out of the vesting of all private forests in the State of Kerala on the appointed day (10.05.1971) under the Kerela Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. It is true that in para 14 it was held that the High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct any apparent error in respect of any order passed by it. This is the plenary power of the High Court. In para 17 of the abovementioned decision, it was held :

          "17. If such power of correcting its own record is denied to the High Court, when it notices the apparent errors its consequence is that the superior status of the High Court will dwindle down. Therefore, it is only proper to think that the plenary powers of the High Court would include the power of review relating to errors apparent on the face of the record."

          There is no doubt that the High Court possess all powers in order to correct the errors apparent on the face of record. While accepting the above proposition, in the light of the scheme of the Act, we are of the view that the said decision is also not helpful to the stand taken by the appellant.

          21. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the "reference application" filed by the Commissioner under unamended Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period of 180 days and rightly dismissed the reference on the ground of limitation."

14. Recently, the Apex Court in the case of "The property Company (P) Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda [(2026) LiveLaw SC 19]" held that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 would only apply to the suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to the "courts" and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

15. Therefore, in view of the above, the delay beyond the period of limitation cannot be condoned.

16. Consequently, all these Writ Petitions are dismissed.