Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy, J.

1. The present Appeal arises out of the Judgment and Decree dated 29.03.2007 passed in O.S.No.1496 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned judgment’) on the file of I Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (hereinafter shall be referred to as ‘the Trial Court’), whereby the suit instituted by the appellant No.1/plaintiff herein against the respondents/defendants seeking declaration of title in respect of the suit schedule properties coupled with mandatory injunction directing respondent No.2/defendant No.2 seeking to delete the entry relating to the suit properties from the relevant records maintained by it and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the appellant No.1/plaintiff over the suit schedule properties, was dismissed.

2. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties hereinafter shall be referred to as they were arrayed before the Trial Court.

I. BRIEF FACTS:

3. The brief facts of the case as borne out from the record, are that the property admeasuring Ac.3-13 guntas in Survey Nos.139 and 140, situated at Shaikpet Village, Golconda Mandal, shown as Item No.1 of the plaint schedule, originally belonged to the plaintiff’s maternal uncle, Srikishan Agarwal. The plaintiff’s great-grandfather, late Eknath, had constructed Sri Hanuman Temple at premises No.9-4-85, Nanalnagar X Roads, Hyderabad, which is Item No.2 of the plaint schedule, and the same is claimed to be a private family temple.

4. It is stated that Srikishan Agarwal executed a registered Will dated 23.02.1977, bequeathing the said properties in favour of the plaintiff. Upon demise of the testator on 20.04.1996, the plaintiff claims to have been in possession and enjoyment of the properties and has been performing poojas in the temple. According to him, one Gopalgir, claiming to be the poojari of the temple, asserted that the temple was a Mutt. The plaintiff, however, maintains that the temple was constructed more than 120 years ago by his family out of their personal funds and not out of any charitable or public contributions, and therefore, it does not partake the character of a public or endowed institution. However, at the instance of the said poojari claiming it to be a mutt, the officials of defendant No.2 allegedly attempted to interfere with the suit scheduled property. It is alleged that the officials visited the temple on 28.05.1996 under the pretext of inspection, threatened the plaintiff to vacate the premises, and attempted to dispossess him. It is under these circumstances, the plaintiff was constrained to institute the present suit.

5. In reply to the plaint averments, the defendant No.2 filed a written statement inter-alia denying the claim of the plaintiff. It is contended that the land and temple in question are endowed properties and constitute a public institution, and that the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that the temple was constructed by his ancestors out of their personal funds. It is further contended that Srikishan Agarwal was only functioning as a poojari of the temple and had no absolute right over the property, and that the temple cannot be treated as the private or family temple of the plaintiff or his ancestors. It is also stated that neither the plaintiff nor his ancestors ever approached the authorities seeking a declaration that the temple or the land attached to it is a private property. According to the defendant No.2, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 87 of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Instutitions And Endowments Act, 1987 (for short ‘the Act’) and that the GPA said to have been executed in favour of the plaintiff by Srikishan Agarwal stood cancelled upon his death. Hence, the defendant No.2 prayed for dismissal of the suit.

II. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE TRIAL COURT:

6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for determination:

               i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of ownership in respect of the suit schedule properties?

               ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction as prayed for?

               iii. Whether plaintiff is entitled for the relief of perpetual injunction as prayed for?

               iv. Whether the suit property is ancestral property of plaintiff to claim any relief?

               v. Whether the temple along with land endowed to Endowment department as contended by defendants?

III. EVIDENCE ON RECORD:

7. During the course of trial, the plaintiff examined PWs 1 to 3 and got marked Exhibits A1 to A5 on his behalf. On the other hand, DW1 was examined and Exhibits B1 to B12 were marked on behalf of defendants.

IV. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:

8. After considering the rival contentions, the learned Trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 29.03.2007, dismissed the suit by observing that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the suit schedule properties were his ancestral or private properties or that the Hanuman temple constructed therein was a private temple. The learned Trial Court held that though the plaintiff relied upon the registered Will dated 23.02.1977 (Ex. A1) executed by Srikishan Agarwal, the evidence on record disclosed that Srikishan Agarwal was only functioning as a Muthawalli/Trustee of the temple and did not possess absolute ownership over the property so as to validly execute a will deed in favour of the plaintiff. It was further held that mere entry of the name of Srikishan Agarwal in the revenue records and pattadar pass books, would not confer absolute title, as the land formed part of a religious endowment and grants made for temple service, do not create personal ownership. Consequently, the learned Trial Court concluded that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest over the suit properties, and therefore he was not entitled to the reliefs of declaration, mandatory injunction, or permanent injunction, and accordingly dismissed the suit.

9. Aggrieved by the same, the Plaintiff filed the present Appeal to set aside the impugned judgment and decree. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant No.1/plaintiff expired and his legal representatives i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 were brought on record.

V. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:

a) Submissions on behalf of the Appellants/Plaintiff:

10. The learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiff submits that though the learned Trial Court held certain issues in favour of the appellant No.1, it erroneously dismissed the suit by misapplying the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar v. Government of A. P (1996 (1) ALT 33 (SC)) and wrongly held that the suit schedule property is an endowed property. It is further contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the Ryotwari patta (Ex. A5) granted by the competent authority clearly establishes that the suit schedule property is the absolute and private property of late Srikishan Agarwal, and that the respondents never challenged the genuineness of the said document. The appellants also rely upon the registered Will dated 23.02.1977 (Ex. A1) executed by Srikishan Agarwal in favour of plaintiff, which was duly proved before the learned Trial Court, and therefore, the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to be declared as the absolute owner and possessor of the suit schedule properties.

11. The learned Counsel further contends that the learned Trial Court placed undue reliance on Ex.B10 and Ex.B11, including proceedings of the Endowments Department, and erroneously treated the property as endowed property. According to the appellant, mere reference to Srikishan Agarwal as a Muthawalli or Trustee in those documents cannot be construed as an admission that the property belongs to the Endowment Department, particularly in the absence of any specific order declaring the suit property as endowed property. It is also contended that the learned Trial Court committed an error in directing the appellant to pay court fee of Rs.1,47,563/-, despite the fact that the suit was instituted by the appellant as an indigent person, which was allowed after due enquiry, and such direction is contrary to the provisions of Order XXXIII Rule 14 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’).

12. The learned counsel for the plaintiff placed reliance on several judicial precedents in support of his contentions, namely, The Commissioner of Endowments v. Vittal Rao (AIR 2005 SC 454), Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1996 SC 966), Viceroy Hotels Limited v. Telangana State Wakf Board (AIR 2024 Telangana 109), Sri Varaha Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Devasthanam, Simhachalam v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((2024(1) ALD 808)) and R. Govind Reddy v. R. Lakshminarayan Reddy alias Sadan Reddy ((1959 (II) An.W.R. 201)), to contend that grants made to individuals cannot be treated as grants to endowments, that vested rights cannot be taken away by statutory provisions inconsistent with the Inams Abolition Act, and that once a competent authority holds that a property is not an endowment or wakf property, the same issue cannot be reopened in subsequent proceedings in view of the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the findings of the learned Trial Court are unsustainable in law and prays to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree.

b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondent/Defendants:

13. Per Contra, the learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for the respondents contended that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, and therefore, do not warrant any interference by this Court. It is submitted that the said temple situated in the suit schedule property is a public temple and the land shown is an endowment property meant for the maintenance of the temple and performance of poojas, and the plaintiff has no absolute right or title over the same. It is further contended that the material on record, including the Gazette notification (Ex. B1) and the Muntakhab extracts, clearly establishes that the temple is recognized as an endowment institution, and the land attached to it was granted for the purpose of conducting religious services. According to the respondents, Srikishan Agarwal was only functioning as a Muthawalli or Trustee of the temple and was managing the affairs of the temple, and therefore, he did not possess absolute ownership over the property so as to bequeath the same under the said alleged Will.

14. The learned Government Pleader further contends that the entries made in the revenue records and pattadar pass books, relied upon by the plaintiff cannot confer title when the property forms part of a religious endowment, particularly when the land was granted for temple. It is argued that the Gazette publication declaring the temple as an endowment institution was never challenged by the plaintiff or his predecessors, and therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly held that the property belongs to the temple.

15. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents placed reliance on several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, namely A. A. Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board ((2007) 7 SCC 482), Sri Ganapathi Dev Temple Trust v. Balakrishna Bhat ((2019) 9 SCC 495), State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pujari Utthan Avam Kalyan Samiti, ((2021) 10 SCC 222) and Vijendra Kumar v. A. P. Charitable & Religious Institutions & Endowment Department ((2018) 2 SCC 555), to contend that properties belonging to temples and religious institutions are required to be zealously protected and that persons such as archakas, poojaris or managers entrusted with the management of such institutions cannot claim personal ownership over temple properties. It is further contended that the poojari or manager only holds the property on behalf of the deity or the institution and does not acquire proprietary rights over the same, and therefore, any claim of private ownership set up by such persons is unsustainable in law. The learned Government Pleader further relied upon Ganna Saraswathi v. State of Telangana (2024 SCC OnLine TS 4456), Subhash Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam ((2021) 20 SCC 454) and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((2021) 6 SCC 771), to contend that Endowments Tribunal is the competent Forum for adjudicating the dispute.

16. The learned Government Pleader further submits that, since the plaintiff had failed to establish his title or lawful right over the suit schedule properties, he is not entitled to the reliefs of declaration, mandatory injunction, or permanent injunction as sought in the original suit. Hence, the respondents pray that the appeal be dismissed by confirming the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.

VI. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:

17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as the learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for the respondents, and upon careful consideration of the entire material available on record, the following points arise for consideration in this Appeal:

               (i) Whether the suit is maintainable before the Civil Court in view of the provisions of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987?

               (ii) Whether the suit schedule property is private property of the plaintiff or forms part of a religious endowment attached to a public temple?

               (iii) Whether late Srikishan Agarwal had transferable ownership so as to execute the Will dated 23.02.1977 (Ex.A1)?

               (iv) Whether Exs. A1 and A5 confer valid title upon the plaintiff?

               (v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs of declaration and consequential injunctions?

               (vi) Whether the impugned judgment warrants interference?

VII. ANALYSIS:

Point No. (i): Jurisdiction of the Civil Court:

18. At the outset, it is apposite to consider the question of maintainability of the suit and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, since the said issue strikes at the very root of the proceedings. It is a settled principle of law that where the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is either expressly or impliedly barred by a special statute, such question must be determined at the threshold before entering upon the merits of the controversy.

19. Accordingly, this Court proposes to first examine whether the present dispute falls within the ambit of the provisions of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, particularly Sections 87 and 151 thereof, and consequently, whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands excluded. This determination necessarily involves an examination of the nature of the dispute, namely, whether it pertains to matters which are statutorily entrusted to the authorities constituted under the said enactment. The material on record discloses that the core controversy between the parties revolves around the character of the suit schedule property, namely, whether the same forms part of a temple endowment or constitutes the private property of the plaintiff, and further, whether the temple in question is a private family temple or a public religious institution. Such questions, by their very nature, involve determination of the character of the institution, the nature of the property attached thereto, and the status of the person claiming rights over the same.

20. The learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for the respondents has strongly contended that the dispute in the present case essentially relates to the nature and character of the institution and the property attached to it, namely whether the temple in question is a private temple belonging to the family of the plaintiff or a public religious institution with endowed properties. According to the defendants, such a question squarely falls within the scope of the powers conferred upon the authorities under the Endowments Act. In this regard, reliance is placed on Section 87 of the Act, 1987, which confers power upon the Endowments Tribunal to enquire into and decide disputes relating to matters such as whether an institution or property constitutes a religious institution or endowment, whether a property is an endowment property, and other allied questions relating to the administration and management of religious institutions.

21. It is also relevant to note that Section 151 of the said Act contain a specific bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of matters for which provision is made under the Act. Section 151 of the Act reads as under:

               151. Bar of Jurisdiction:

               “No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters of dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act.”

22. The above said provision makes it clear that no suit or legal proceeding in respect of matters relating to the administration or management of an institution or endowment, or any dispute for which provision is made under the Act, shall be instituted in any Court of law, except in conformity with the provisions of the Act. Thus, when the legislature has created a special forum for adjudication of disputes relating to religious institutions and endowed properties, the parties are expected to seek their remedies before the authorities constituted under the Act.

23. Further, in the present case, the dispute essentially revolves around whether the suit schedule property forms part of an endowment attached to a temple or whether it is the private property of the plaintiff. Such determination squarely falls within the scope of Section 87 of the Act, 1987. In view of the bar contained under Section 151 of the Act, the Civil Court cannot adjudicate upon such matters, as the statute provides a specific forum before the Endowments authorities for determination of such questions. It is no doubt true that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is very wide and Civil Courts are competent to try all suits of a civil nature unless their jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. However, where a special statute creates a specific mechanism for adjudication of particular categories of disputes and also contains a provision excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, such statutory bar cannot be ignored. In the present case, the principal relief sought by the plaintiff is a declaration that the suit schedule properties are his private properties and for a direction to the authorities to delete the entry showing the properties as endowment properties in the official records. Determination of such a question necessarily involves an enquiry into the nature of the institution and the character of the property, which is a matter that falls within the statutory powers of the authorities under Section 87 of the Act.

24. At this juncture, it is relevant to extract Section 87 of the Act, which reads as follows:

               “87. Power of Endowments Tribunal to decide certain disputes and matters-

               (1) The Endowments Tribunal having jurisdiction shall have the power, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the person concerned, to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question

               (a) whether an institution or endowment is a charitable institution or endowment;

               (b) whether an institution or endowment is a religious institution or endowment;

               (c) whether any property is an endowment, if so whether it is a charitable endowment or a religious endowment;

               (d) whether any property is a specific endowment;

               (e) whether any person is entitled by custom or otherwise to any honour, emoluments or perquisites in any charitable or religious institution or endowment and what the established usage of such institution or endowment is in regard to any other matter;

               (f) whether any institution or endowment is wholly or partly of a secular or religious character and whether any property is given wholly or partly for secular or religious uses; or

               (g) where any property or money has been given for the support of an institution or endowment which is partly of a secular character and partly of religious character or the performance of any service or charity connected with such institution or endowment or the performance of a charity which is partly of a secular character and partly of a religious character or where any property or money given is appropriated partly to secular uses and partly to religious uses, as to what portion of such property or money shall be allocated to secular or religious uses.

               (h) Whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an Institution or Endowment.

               2) The Endowments Tribunal may, pending his decision under sub-section (1), pass such order as he deems fit for the administration of the property or custody of the money belonging to the institution or endowment.

               (3) The Endowments Tribunal may while recording its decision under sub-section (1) and pending implementation of such decision, pass such interim order as it may deem fit for safeguarding the interests of the institution or endowment and for preventing damage to or loss or misappropriation or criminal breach of trust in respect of the properties or moneys belonging to or in the possession of the institution or endowment.

               (4) The presumption in respect of matters covered by clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) in sub-section (1) is that the institution or the endowment is a public one and that the burden of proof in all such cases shall lie on the person claiming the institution or the endowment to be private or the property or money to be other than that of a religious endowment or specific endowment, as the case may be.

               (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the above sub-sections the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction shall continue to enquire into and decide the disputes referred to in sub-section (1) until the constitution of the Endowments Tribunal.]”

25. Under Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, the competent authority is empowered to decide whether any property constitutes an endowment or a specific endowment attached to a religious institution. In the process of determining such question, the authority is competent to examine the nature of the property and the title under which it is claimed. Therefore, when the dispute essentially relates to whether the suit property forms part of a temple endowment or is private property, the matter squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under the Act. In addition, the plaintiff claims that the Hanuman Temple was constructed by his great-grandfather and that the temple is a private family temple belonging to his ancestors. Such a claim necessarily involves determination of whether the plaintiff belongs to the founder’s family and whether his ancestors were the founders of the institution. The determination of such question squarely falls within the scope of Section 87(1)(h) of the Act, which empowers the competent authority under the Endowments Act to decide whether a person is a founder or a member of the founder’s family of a religious institution. Therefore, the dispute raised by the plaintiff is required to be adjudicated by the authorities under the Act and not by the Civil Court.

26. Sub-section (4) of Section 87 of the Act, provides that in respect of matters covered under clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1), there shall be a presumption that the institution or endowment is a public one, and the burden of proof lies on the person, who claims that the institution is private or that the property does not belong to a religious endowment. In view of the statutory presumption under Section 87(4) of the Act, the burden squarely lies upon the plaintiff to establish that the temple is a private temple and that the suit schedule properties are not endowment properties. However, the plaintiff has failed to discharge the said burden by producing cogent and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the suit is not maintainable before the Trial/Civil Court.

27. It is a well-settled rule of law that where a statute creates rights and provides a special machinery for enforcement of those rights by constituting a Tribunal or a Special Court, such Tribunal becomes vested with exclusive jurisdiction to decide the matters entrusted to it under the statute, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. In the case of Sri Parimala Ranganathaswami Devasthanam v. S. Muthuswami Iyer ((1962) 2 MLJ 203), the Honourable Madras High Court held that when a special enactment creates a forum for adjudication of disputes, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction stands excluded in respect of matters which the statute requires to be decided by the authorities constituted under the Act. The relevant paragraphs are extracted herein:

               “11. A Bench of this Court consisting of Jagadisan and Kailasam, JJ., have made certain apposite observations in Venkatachala Odayar v. Ramachandra Odayar MANU/TN/0274/1961: AIR1961Mad423, though the point that actually arose for consideration before the Bench was different. In dealing with Sections 6 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, which provides for a bar of jurisdiction of the civil Courts in substance similar to the bar enacted by Section 13 of the Act we are concerned with, the learned Judges referred to the well-settled rule of law that where a statute creates new rights and establishes a special machinery for working out those rights by constituting a Tribunal or special Court that tribunal or Court becomes vested with exclusive jurisdiction to decide the matters entrusted to it by the statute, and thereby excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Courts as well. All this discussion is on the basis that the respondent is a cultivating tenant entitled to the protection and the benefits of the Act. But it is nowhere conceded in the pleadings or in the arguments or established by the evidence that the respondent is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act. We see therefore no force in the argument of counsel for the respondent that the Subordinate Judge in this case had jurisdiction to give remission based upon the provisions of the Act.”

28 In view of the statutory scheme and the nature of the dispute, this Court holds that the suit is not maintainable before the Civil Court.

29. Accordingly, the point No. (i) is answered against the appellants.

Alternative Findings on Merits (remaining points):

30. Without prejudice to the finding recorded on point No. (i), with regard to the issue relating to maintainability, this Court has also examined the matter on merits based upon the evidence available on record to ascertain whether the plaintiff has been able to establish his claim that the temple is a private family temple and that the properties attached thereto constitute his private property.

31. The plaintiff has primarily relied upon the registered Will dated 23.02.1977 (Ex. A1) executed by Srikishan Agarwal, under which the suit schedule properties are stated to have been bequeathed in his favour. The plaintiff has also placed reliance upon certain revenue records and pattadar pass books standing in the name of Srikishan Agarwal to contend that the property is private property belonging to the family. However, the material placed on record by the defendants indicates that Srikishan Agarwal was only functioning as a Muthawalli or trustee of the temple and was managing the affairs of the institution.

32. The documents produced by the defendants, including the Gazette notification dated. 21.09.1989 and other records relating to the Endowments Department, show that the temple has been recognized as a religious institution and that the land attached thereto has been treated as an endowment property meant for the maintenance of the temple and the performance of religious services. In such circumstances, mere fact that certain revenue records stood in the name of Srikishan Agarwal would not, by itself, establish that the property was his absolute private property.

33. The learned Trial Court has carefully examined the oral and documentary evidence produced by both parties and has recorded a clear finding that the plaintiff failed to produce convincing material to establish that the temple was constructed exclusively by his ancestors out of their personal funds or that the property in question was the private property of the family. The learned Trial Court also taken into account the legal principle that where land is granted for the purpose of rendering service to a religious institution, the holder of such land does not acquire absolute ownership but holds it subject to the obligations attached to the endowment.

34. It is also pertinent to note that the plaintiff has not challenged the Gazette Notification, wherein the temple is shown as an endowment institution under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987. Once an institution is notified and included in the list of endowments through a Gazette publication issued under the statutory authority, such notification carries a presumption of correctness unless it is questioned before the competent Forum in the manner known to law. In the present case, the plaintiff has not taken any steps to challenge the said Gazette Notification before the Forum or Tribunal constituted under the Endowments Act. In the absence of any such challenge, the plaintiff cannot seek to indirectly question the validity or correctness of the Gazette publication in the present proceedings before the Civil Court. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff that the suit temple and the attached properties are private family properties cannot be accepted, particularly when the statutory notification recognizing the institution as an endowment remains unchallenged.

35. Insofar as the contention of the plaintiff that the learned Trial Court erred in directing payment of court fee is unsustainable. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff was permitted to institute the suit as an indigent person under the provisions of Order XXXIII of CPC. As per Order XXXIII Rule 14 of CPC, where a suit instituted by an indigent person fails or is dismissed, the Court is empowered to order that the amount of court fee which would have been payable by the plaintiff had he not been permitted to sue as an indigent person shall be recoverable by the State Government from the plaintiff. For better appreciation, Order XXXIII Rules 11 and 14 of CPC are extracted hereunder:

               “ORDER XXXIII– SUITS BY INDIGENT PERSONS

               11. Procedure where indigent person fails.

               Where the plaintiff fails in the suit or the permission granted to him to sue as an indigent person has been withdrawn, or where the suit is withdrawn or dismissed, -

               (a) because the summons for the defendant to appear and answer has not been served upon him in consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to pay the court-fee or postal charges (if any) chargeable for such service or to present copies of the plaint or concise statement, or

               (b) because the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court shall order the plaintiff, or any person added as a co-plaintiff to the suit, to pay the court-fees which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been permitted to sue as an indigent person.

               14. Recovery of amount of court-fees.

               Where an order is made under rule 10, rule 11 or rule 11A, the court shall forthwith cause a copy of the decree or order to be forwarded to the Collector who may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, recover the amount of court-fees specified therein from the person or property liable for the payment as if it were an arrear of land revenue.

36. Therefore, when the suit of the plaintiff was ultimately dismissed, the learned Trial Court was justified in directing recovery of the court fee payable on the plaint. Such direction is in consonance with the statutory scheme governing suits filed by indigent persons under Order XXXIII of the CPC and cannot be said to be erroneous or contrary to law.

37. With regard to Inam grant and the proceedings of the Atiyat authorities, the plaintiff alleged that the suit schedule property was originally granted in favour of his ancestor, Eknath S/o Jaitmal, who is stated to have been in possession as Inamdar and that succession to the said grant was recognized by the Atiyat Cash Grant Revenue (Malguzari), Government of Hyderabad, by proceedings dated 07.07.1954. However, mere reliance on such alleged Inam or Atiyat proceedings cannot by itself conclusively establish the property as private in nature. The core issue in the present case relates to whether the suit schedule property forms part of the endowment attached to the temple or whether it is the private property of the plaintiff’s family. Such determination squarely falls within the scope of Section 87 of the Act, which empowers the competent Tribunal to decide disputes relating to religious institutions and endowment properties. Therefore, even assuming that the plaintiff relies upon the aforesaid Atiyat proceedings, the question regarding the nature of the property and the rights claimed over it must be adjudicated by the Tribunal constituted under the Endowments Act, and in view of the bar contained under Section 151 of the Act, the Civil Court cannot undertake such determination in the present proceedings.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS:

38. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the rival submissions, the pleadings and the entire material available on record, and in the light of the issues framed for determination, this Court is of the considered opinion that the suit as instituted is not maintainable before the Civil Court, having regard to the statutory scheme under the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987.

39. It is well settled that where a special statute creates rights and liabilities and also provides a complete machinery for adjudication of disputes arising thereunder, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands excluded either expressly or by necessary implication.

40. In the present case, Sections 87 and 151 of the Act clearly indicate that questions relating to the nature of the institution, the character of the property, and allied issues fall within the exclusive domain of the authorities constituted under the Act. Consequently, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction stands expressly barred, and the plaintiff ought to have worked out his remedies before the competent forum under the statute.

41. Even otherwise, on merits, this Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden cast upon him to establish that the temple in question is a private family temple and that the suit schedule properties are private properties. On the contrary, the statutory presumption under Section 87(4) of the Act operates against the plaintiff.

42. The learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, has recorded findings which are neither perverse nor contrary to law. It is trite that an appellate court would not ordinarily interfere with findings of fact unless such findings are shown to be wholly arbitrary, perverse or based on no evidence.

43. Tested on the aforesaid touchstone, this Court finds no infirmity, either factual or legal, in the conclusions reached by the learned Trial Court warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction.

IX. RESULT:

44. Accordingly, the Appeal fails and is dismissed, and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is hereby affirmed.

45. However, having regard to the nature of the controversy and the statutory framework governing the field, liberty is reserved to the appellants to avail such remedies as are open to them before the competent authority/Endowments Tribunal, in accordance with law.

46. It is further clarified that any observations made in this judgment are confined solely to the adjudication of the present appeal, particularly on the question of maintainability, and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the controversy. In the event the appellants avail remedies before the competent authority/ Tribunal under the Act, such authority / Tribunal shall consider and decide the matter independently, on its own merits and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any findings or observations contained in this judgment.

47. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

48. As a necessary corollary, all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.