Common Order:

1. Heard Mr. N. Manohar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Muralidhar Reddy Katram, learned Government Pleader for Revenue appearing on behalf of the respondents.

2. All these writ petitions arise out of identical facts and impugn the same proceeding, i.e., Proceeding No. DCOKNR - F10CAH (1) /1/2020 - ESEC dated 12.05.2025 (hereinafter “impugned proceeding”) issued by respondent No.2 - District Collector, Karimnagar. As such, the writ petitions involve common issues to be adjudicated. Therefore, they were heard together and are being decided vide the present common order.

3. These writ petitions challenge the impugned proceeding, whereby respondent No.2 directed unilateral cancellation of registered sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioners, on the ground that the properties form part of the prohibited list maintained under Section 22A of the Telangana Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter “the Act, 1908”).

Brief Facts:

4. Before adverting to the facts of the case, this Court would like to highlight that the lands of all the petitioners herein fall in Survey Nos.197 and 198 of Kothapalli Village & Mandal, Karimnagar District. As will be demonstrated infra, the said fact is crucial to decide the issues arising in the present writ petitions.

5. Coming to the facts of the case, the present writ petitions trace their genesis to a long-drawn litigation. The litigation began in 1975 when declarations of surplus lands were made by one Shaik Saleh and his family in relation to multiple survey numbers of Kothapalli and Rekurthi Villages of Karimnagar District. These declarations were made under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. Alleging such declarations to be fraudulent, a complaint was lodged in 1996. Pursuant to such complaint, the then Revenue Divisional Officer, Karimnagar (hereinafter “RDO”) had addressed a letter dated 09.12.1996 to the then Joint Sub-registrar, Karimnagar, to not register any documents pertaining to the properties over which ceiling cases were pending against Shaik Saleh and family.

6. Contending that the RDO’s letter dated 09.12.1996 was not being implemented, one D. Rajalingam along with three (03) others filed W.P. No. 8454 of 1997. In the said writ petition, a learned Single Judge vide order dated 13.04.1997 directed the Joint Sub-registrar to conduct inquiry in relation to the declarations made by Shaik Saleh and his family within a period of three (03) months. Likewise, the learned Single Judge issued a direction to implement the letter dated 09.12.1996. Against the learned Single Judge’s order in W.P. No. 8454 of 1997, the legal heir of Shaik Saleh, i.e., Shaik Abubakar filed an appeal bearing W.A. No. 612 of 1997. The said writ appeal was disposed of by modifying the learned Single Judge’s order by directing the inquiry to be conducted by an Officer not below the rank of Joint Collector. For the purpose of the said inquiry, the authorities were directed to issue notices to all persons interested.

7. In compliance with the orders in W.A. No. 612 of 1997, an inquiry was conducted by the then District Collector, Karimnagar. The inquiry pertained to the question whether false declarations were made by Shaik Saleh and family to subvert the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The declarations of the alienees / relatives of Shaik Saleh were examined. These declarations, inter alia, were of the following people:





8. The District Collector concluded that false declarations were made by Shaik Saleh and his family. However, as can be seen from the table above, in relation to Survey Nos.197 and 198, it was held that Habeeb Ali made contradictory statements. This Court highlights the fact that the inquiry report does not propose any action against Habeeb Ali. In fact, apart from the alleged contradictory statements, nothing was said in relation to Habeeb Ali’s ownership/ declaration of land in Survey Nos.197 and 198.

9. Following the inquiry report, the then District Collector addressed a letter dated 23.01.1998 to the Registrar, Karimnagar, requesting him to not entertain transactions in relation to the lands covered by the ceiling cases mentioned in the inquiry report.

10. While things stood thus, eight (08) writ petitions were filed by people seeking rectification of records in relation to various survey numbers viz., Survey Nos.6, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 26, 27, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 58, 157, 160, 184, 186, 191, 194, 207, 216, 222, and 223 of Rekurthi Village. The records in relation to these survey numbers recorded the names of Shaik Saleh and his family. The writ petitions were disposed of directing the authorities to conduct inquiry in relation to the claims of the petitioners therein and pass orders.

11. Based on the inquiry report prepared pursuant to the order in W.A. No. 612 of 1997 and the orders passed in the eight (08) writ petitions referred to above, the District Collector, vide Proc. No. F2/44/1999dated 24.10.2003, directed the District Revenue Officer (hereinafter “DRO”) to pass suitable orders and to initiate criminal proceedings against the daughters of Shaik Saleh, i.e., Shaik Zubeda, Shaik Sajida, and Shaik Haleema.

12. Pursuant to the proceedings dated 24.10.2003, the DRO passed an order dated 26.10.2003 directing rectification of records by deleting the names of Shaik Saleh’s family. The corrections / rectifications were carried out by the then Mandal Revenue Officer vide order dated 22.11.2003 in relation the Survey Nos.6, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 26, 27, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 58, 157, 160, 184, 186, 191, 194, 207, 216, 222, and 223 of Rekurthi Village.

13. The orders dated 24.10.2003, 26.10.2003, and 22.11.2003 were challenged by Shaik Saleh’s legal heirs in W.P. No. 25662 of 2003 and batch. This Court dismissed the said writ petitions vide common order dated 27.03.2022. However, appeals bearing W.A. No. 442 of 2022 were filed against the said order. Vide interim order dated 13.07.2022, the proceedings / orders holding that Shaik Saleh made false declarations and changes to the revenue entries were stayed by the Division Bench. The said writ appeals are pending.

14. It is pertinent and noteworthy that all the proceedings following the inquiry conducted pursuant to the order in W.A. No. 612 of 1997 were in relation to survey numbers of Rekurthi Village. None of the proceedings concern Survey Nos.197 and 198 of Kothapalli Village.

15. While the above writ petitions in relation to Rekurthi Village were pending, one N. Srinivas filed a complaint dated 20.11.2017 before the Lokayukta claiming that the lands in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 vested in the Government pursuant to the ceiling cases. He claimed that such lands were worth Rs.80.00 Crores and were being illegally occupied. He further alleged that such lands were being illegally sold and such sales were being registered by the Stamps and Registration Department.

16. Pursuant to such complaint, an order dated 25.11.2024 was, apparently, passed by the Lokayukta directing the authorities to take action and reclaim the Government land and cancel the existing sale deeds. The said order dated 25.11.2024 has been referred to in the impugned proceeding. However, no copy of the same has been filed by either side.

17. Acting on the directions of the Lokayukta and realising that sale deeds are being executed in relation to Government land, the respondents, noting that lands in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 form part of the prohibited list under Section 22A of the Act, 1908, respondent No.2 issued the impugned proceeding dated 12.05.2025 directing the District Registrar to cancel the registered sale deeds pertaining to the lands situated in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 of Kothapalli Village. The impugned proceeding was issued under Rule 243 of the Telangana Registration Rules, 2016 (hereinafter “Rules, 2016”).

18. Following the directions of respondent No.2, the District Registrar had cancelled the nearly 453 registered documents, including the sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioners herein.

19. Contending that the respondent authorities could not have, without issuing a notice, unilaterally cancelled registered sale deeds, the petitioners have filed the present writ petitions.

20. Contentions of the petitioners:

          20.1 Adverting to their sale deeds and other link documents, the petitioners claimed to be the absolute owners of the properties in relation to which the sale deeds were unilaterally cancelled. They claim that the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 are private patta lands. The original declarant, Habeeb Ali, was granted a separate land holding under the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. In relation to Habib Ali’s land, who is the petitioners’ predecessor-in-title, no case is pending.

          20.2 The petitioners contend that the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 of Kothapalli Village are not part of the prohibited list maintained under Section 22A of the Act, 1908. Further, they claim that they had obtained a list of prohibited properties and in the said list their properties were not mentioned.

          20.3 On behalf of the petitioners, it was vehemently argued that the respondent authorities could not have unilaterally cancelled the sale deeds invoking powers under Rule 243 of the Rules, 2016. Reliance was placed on Thota Ganga Laxmi v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (2010) 15 SCC 207, Ragam Enterprises v. State of Telangana 2018 (2) ALD 77, Y. Rama Lakshmi v. State of Telangana 2023 (5) ALD 696, and Jorigala Bangaram v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 (2) ALD 731.

          20.4 It was argued by the petitioners that such unilateral cancellation violates principles of natural justice. Further, it was contended that where the statute is silent on the compliance of principles of natural justice, the same have to be read into the statute. In this regard, the petitioners relied on Deeksha Educational Society v. State of Telangana 2022 (5) ALD 468, Canara Bank v. Debasis Das (2003) 4 SCC 557, and Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (1988) 4 SCC 534.

21. Contentions of the respondents:

          21.1 According to the respondents, land in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 form part of the ceiling cases pertaining to the declarations made Shaik Saleh and his family. False declarations were made in relation the land in the said survey numbers. In this regard, extensive reliance was placed on the inquiry report prepared pursuant to the order in W.A. No. 612 of 1997. 21.2 The respondents contend that lands which were supposed to vest in the Government under the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, continues to be in possession of private parties. Further, such private parties are transferring Government land by executing sale deeds. Therefore, the lands covered by the ceiling cases of Shaik Saleh and family, including lands in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198, were included in the prohibited list under Section 22A of the Act, 1908. 21.3 The respondents argued that multiple letters were issued to the District Registrars with directions to not register documents pertaining to land covered by ceiling cases of Shaik Saleh. The counter affidavit of the respondents refers to the following letters:



          21.4 The sale deeds executed in favour of the present petitioners were cancelled as they were registered contrary to the directions issued from time to time and also were registered in contravention of Section 22A of the Act, 1908. 21.5 The respondents relied on Rule 243 of the Rules, 2016 to contend that sale deeds executed contrary to Section 22A of the Act, 1908 can be unilaterally cancelled.

          21.6 Further, it was argued by the respondents that as the petitioners have acquired land pursuant to a fraudulent declaration, the sale in their favour is vitiated by fraud. They argued that fraud vitiates everything. As such, no right exists in the petitioners to maintain the present writ petitions. They relied on State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao (2005) 6 SCC 149.

          21.7 Likewise, relying on P.S. Parthasarthy v. State of Telangana W.P. Nos.2918 and 3103 of 2019, decided on 26.03.2019 by the High Court for the State of Telangana, it was argued on behalf of the respondents that deeds executed pursuant to a fraud would perpetuate such fraud and inspire and instigate dubious transactions.

          21.8 Contending that the present writ petitions are not maintainable, the respondents relied on Vatumalli Laxmi Prasanna v. State of Telangana(2017) 6 ALD 517 (hereinafter “Vatumalli”). It was argued that the act of registration of a document is administrative in nature. Against such actions, a writ petition would not lie, as an alternative civil law remedies are available.

          21.9 Relying on Vatumali (Supra), the respondents also argued that no notice is required to be issued before exercising powers under Rule 243 of the Rules, 2016.

Findings of this Court:

22. As discussed above, the question before this Court is whether the respondent authorities could have unilaterally cancelled the sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioners under Rule 243 of the Rules, 2016, on the ground that the lands covered under Survey Nos.197 & 198 of Kothapalli Village form part of the prohibited list maintained under Section 22A of the Act, 1908.

23. To address the said question, it is necessary to examine the Scheme of Section 22A of the Act, 1908 and the relevant Rules. Section 22A of the Act, 1908 was first introduced through an amendment in 1999. This earlier version of Section 22A prohibited the registration of documents deemed to be opposed to public policy. However, in K. Rama Devi v. State of Andhra Pradesh W.P. No.14099 of 2003 & batch decided on 07.12.2005 by the erstwhile High Court for the State of Andhra Pradesh, the earlier version of Section 22A was struck down by a Division Bench as unconstitutional on the ground that the term “public policy” was vague and undefined.

24. Section 22A, as it stands today, was inserted in 2007. For the sake of convenience, current version of Section 22A of the Act, 1908 is extracted below:

          “Section 22-A. Prohibition of Registration of Certain Documents –

          (1) The following classes of documents shall be prohibited from registration, namely:

          (a) documents relating to transfer of immovable property, the alienation or transfer of which is prohibited under any statute of the State or Central Government;

          (b) documents relating to transfer of property by way of sale, agreement of sale, gift, exchange or lease in respect of immovable property owned by the State or Central Government, executed by persons other than those statutorily empowered to do so;

          (c) documents relating to transfer of property by way of sale, agreement of sale, gift, exchange or lease exceeding ten (10) years in respect of immovable property owned by Religious and Charitable Endowments falling under the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 or by Wakfs falling under the Wakfs Act, 1995, executed by persons other than those statutorily empowered to do so;

          (d) agricultural or urban lands declared as surplus under the Telangana Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 or the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976;

          (e) any document or class of documents pertaining to properties which the State Government may, by notification, prohibit the registration of, where there are avowed or accrued interests of Central and State Governments, Local Bodies, Educational, Cultural, Religious and Charitable Institutions, or properties attached by Civil, Criminal, Revenue Courts or under Direct and Indirect Tax Laws, and others which are likely to adversely affect those interests.

          (2) For the purpose of clause (e) of sub-section (1), the State Government shall publish a notification after obtaining reasons for and a full description of the properties furnished by the concerned District Collectors, in the manner prescribed.

          (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the registering officer shall refuse to register any document to which a notification issued under clause (e) of sub-section (1) applies.

          (4) The State Government, either suo motu or on an application by any person or for giving effect to the final orders of the High Court of Telangana or Supreme Court of India, may proceed to de-notify, either in full or in part, the notification issued under sub-section (2).

          (5) Notwithstanding anything in any judgment, decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or any other authority to the contrary, no notification declaring that the registration of any document or class of documents is opposed to public policy and the refusal of the same for registration under Section 22-A of the principal Act during the period from 1st April 1999 (the date of commencement of the Registration (Telangana Amendment) Act, 1999) up to the date of commencement of the Registration (Telangana Amendment) Act, 2006 substituting the new Section 22-A in the principal Act, shall be deemed to be invalid; and the refusal for registration of the said document shall be deemed to have been validly refused. Accordingly:

          (a) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any Court against the State Government or any person or authority for the purpose of registration; and

          (b) no Court shall enforce any decree or order directing such registration.

25. As can be seen from the above provision, Section 22A (1) prohibits the registration of documents relating to the transfer of immovable property in the following situations:

          a) where the transfer is prohibited by any statute;

          b) where the transfer concerns land owned by the Central or State Government and the transfer deed, in relation to such land, has been executed by an unauthorised person;

          c) where the property belongs to a Religious or Charitable Endowment, or is a Wakf property;

          d) where the property has been declared as ceiling surplus under the Telangana Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, or under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976;

          e) where the State Government, by notification, has prohibited the registration of documents relating to property in which the State or Central Government or other institutions have accrued or avowed interests and where the property is attached by courts of law.

26. One noteworthy aspect of Section 22A (1) is the distinction between Clauses (a) to (d) on the one hand and Clause (e) on the other hand. Clauses (a) to (d), essentially, deal with lands that belong to the Government or a Religious Endowment. In other words, lands covered by Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 22A (1) cannot be owned by a private person and are vested in State or Central Government or are owned by a Religious / Charitable Endowment. The title and ownership of the lands covered by Clauses (a) to (d) is crystallised in favour of the Government or a Religious Endowment. For lands to be covered under Clauses (a) to (d), there shall be no litigation pending over the same. Only lands over which rights have been crystallised can be brought under Clauses (a) to (d).

27. On the other hand, Clause (e) of Section 22A (1) deals with lands over which the State or Central Government or other institutions have “avowed or accrued interests.” This indicates that Clause (e) covers lands where ownership rights of the Central or State Government of such Institutions are not yet crystallised. In other words, Clause (e) pertains to lands where ownership claims are pending adjudication or cases where such claims may be raised in the future. This Clause also covers properties which are attached in pending cases by Courts of law.

28. If prior to the preparation of the prohibited list, the ownership of the land is pending adjudication and rights of the Government over such lands remain uncrystallized, such lands cannot be brought under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 22A (1). The registration of such lands can only be prohibited by bringing them under Clause (e) of Section 22A (1), i.e., when the Government has an “avowed or accrued” interest. In this regard, gainful reference can be made to the Full Bench decision of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary v. Revenue Department 2015 SCC OnLine Hyd. 407, wherein the Court noted that Clause (e) does not deal with the lands undisputedly owned by the Government. The relevant paragraph is extracted below:

          “156. Thus, we give a brief overview of clause (e) of Section 22-A (1). This clause is distinct and is appropriately understood if we notice the words employed in clause (b) viz., immovable property owned by the State or Central Government. Thus, while clause (b) prohibits registration of property owned by the State of Central Government, clause (e) prohibits registration of such properties in which the State or Central Government, Local Bodies including Religious, Charitable Institutions claim avowed or accrued interest. The aforesaid clause, therefore, clearly does not envisage that such properties are not undisputedly owned by the Governments either State or Central or the Local Bodies or Charitable Institutions, etc. Obviously, insofar as properties owned by the State or Central Government or belonging to Religious, Charitable Institutions or Wakf are separately dealt with under clause (b) and (c) above. So also, the properties vested in the State under A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holding) Act, 1973 or the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 are covered by clause (d). Hence, other than such properties, the properties in which the State Government, Educational Institutions or Religious or Charitable Institutions, etc., claim any interest, the same are covered by clause (e) provided ofcourse a notification expressing the same be published in the official gazette. It is also clear that such avowed or accrued interest is in the nature of a claim and it is open for the parties to dispute such claim and that by itself being a claim is subject to appropriate adjudication. In a given case, therefore, such claimed interest may be contested by third parties and is not an established ownership of State Government or such Local Bodies as envisaged under said clause. The prohibition envisaged by way of a notification under clause (e), however, itself provided for a safeguard under Section 22(4) of the Act where a party can successfully establish its title as against the avowed or accrued interest professed by the State or Local Bodies and seek modification or deletion of relevant entry from the notification. Sub-Section (4) therefore provides a mechanism where the entries relating to a property may be contested and shown to be incorrect and is required to be deleted. We have already elaborated on the said mechanism provided under Section 22-A(4) and suffice it to state that such adjudication under sub-Section (4) thereof cannot by itself be treated as final and would be subject to appropriate proceedings before competent Courts. In our view, therefore, clause (e) would be attracted wherever Government or Local Bodies, etc. claim an interest in the property and seeks prohibition to register the same. The cases where entries in the RSR are covered by dots, in our view, would fall under this clause and inclusion of any such properties under prohibited category by way of a notification under clause (e) is published, the registering authority is duty bound to deny registration. The aggrieved party, in such situation, will have an option to avail the mechanism provided under sub-section (4) of Section 22-A and if not satisfied to initiate such appropriate legal proceedings for vindication of its rights. The cases relating to properties not covered by respective notifications under A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 or the Wakf Act, 1995 would also fall under the purview of clause (e) if notified accordingly and shall also be subject to redressal of grievance under Section 22-A (4) or by the appropriate remedies available under law.”

          (emphasis supplied)

29. The distinction between Clauses (a) to (d) and Clause (e) becomes significant, as a separate procedure is contemplated under these clauses for including lands in the prohibited list. While Section 22A does not use the phrase “prohibited list”, the Rules, 2016 refer to lists to be prepared of lands covered under Clauses (a) to (d) and Clause (e) of Section 22A (1). These lists came to be commonly referred to as the “prohibited list”.

30. Now coming back to the difference in procedure for lands to be included in the prohibited list, it is pertinent to note that Clause (e) of Section 22A (1) and Section 22A (2) contemplate a notification to be issued by the State Government in relation to lands where the Central or State Government, Local Bodies, Educational, Cultural, Religious and Charitable Institutions have an ‘avowed or accrued’ interest or where such lands are attached by any Court. No such notification is required if the lands are brought under Clauses (a) to (d).

31. In this regard, reference shall be made to Chapter XXXIII of the Rules, 2016, which contains Rules 238 to 241. The said Rules deal with the manner in which lists are to be prepared of lands in relation to which the registration of documents is prohibited. For the sake of convenience, the said Rules are extracted below:

          “238. District Collectors shall furnish lists of immovable properties falling under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 22-A including any subsequent additions, deletions or modifications to the District Registrar concerned and to the Inspector-General of Registration under proper acknowledgement in Form I and II respectively of Appendix XI. The lists shall be signed by the District Collectors. Lists signed by any other officer shall not be considered.

          239-A. After updating the entire record the Commissioner, Endowments, shall furnish lists of immovable properties falling under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 22-A including any subsequent additions, deletions or modifications to the District Registrar concerned and to the Inspector-General of Registration under proper acknowledgement in the Form V and VI of Appendix XI. The lists shall be signed by the Commissioner, Endowments. The registering authority can refuse registration of such a document covering the property belonging to any institution/endowment which is entered in the ‘Register’ maintained under the provisions of section 43 read with section 45 of the Endowments Act.

          239-B. The Wakf Board shall maintain a Register of auqaf containing the particulars of all Wakf properties and all title deeds and documents relating thereto. Sub-section(2) of section 37 of Wakf Act, 1995 provides that the Board shall forward the details of properties entered in the Register of auqaf to the concerned land record office having jurisdiction of the wakf property. The concerned land record office, in turn, under sub-section (3) shall either make necessary entries in the land record or communicate within a period of six months from the date of registration of wakf property under Section 36, its objections to the Board. After completion of afore said process the Chief Executive Officer, Telangana, State Waqf Board shall update the entire records with the Revenue officials concerned, and he shall furnish lists of immovable properties falling under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 22-A including any subsequent additions, deletions or modifications to the District Registrar concerned and to the Inspector- General of Registration under proper acknowledgement in the Form V and VI of Appendix XI. The lists shall be signed by the Chief Executive Officer, Telangana State Waqf Board.

          240. The District Collectors shall furnish list of land declared as surplus under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 falling under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 22-A including any subsequent additions, deletions or modifications to the District Registrar concerned and to the Inspector-General of Registration in Form III respectively of Appendix XI under proper acknowledgment. The lists shall be signed by the District Collector for the lands declared as surplus under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The Special Officer and Competent Authority concerned shall sign the lists of lands declared as surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Lists signed by any other officer shall not be considered.

          241. The District Collector shall furnish the list of properties to be notified or to be de-notified under section 22-A (1)(e) or section 22 (A)(4), as the case may be, to the Principal Secretary to Government, Revenue (Registration) Department, Telangana State for publication in the Gazette in Form IV of Appendix XI.

          242. The Registering Officer shall refuse to register any document relating to a property which is included in the lists furnished under Rule 238, 239, 240 and in the lists notified by the Government under section 22-(A)(1)(e) or section 22-A(4).

          243. The Authority/Officer competent may execute a document cancelling any previously registered document executed by unauthorized persons affecting the interest in immovable properties listed in section 22-A; and notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or these Rules, the Registering Officer shall register it.”

32. The above Rules delineate the procedure to be followed while adding properties to the prohibited lists. Rules 238 to 240 deal with lands covered under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 22A (1). Rule 241 deals with lands covered under Clause (e) of Section 22A (1).

33. Under Rule 238, if the property falls under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 22A (1), the Competent Authority to prepare the prohibited list is the concerned District Collector. The District Collector shall prepare the list in accordance with Form I and II of the Appendix XI and sign it. Such signed lists shall be forwarded to the District Registrar and to the Inspector-General of Registration. Likewise, Rule 239A deals with Endowment lands which are covered under Clause (c) of Section 22A (1). The said Rule empowers the Commissioner, Endowments to prepare the prohibited lists as per Form V and VI of Appendix XI. The said lists shall include the properties of Endowments which are mentioned in the Register maintained under Sections 43 and 45 of the Endowments Act. The lists shall be signed by the Commissioner, Endowments and the same shall be forwarded to the concerned District Registrar and to the concerned Inspector-General of Registration.

34. Similarly, Rule 239B deals with Waqf properties covered under Section 22A (1). It provides that the Chief Executive Officer, Telangana State Waqf Board shall forward the lists of properties entered in the register of auqaf to the concerned District Collector and to the concerned Inspector-General of Registration. Before forwarding such lists, the same shall be signed by the Chief Executive Officer, Telangana State Waqf Board. In relation to Clause (d) of Section 22A (1), Rule 240 prescribes the procedure for lands covered under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The competent authority to prepare the prohibited lists of lands which were declared as surplus under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is the District Collector. Likewise, for the lands declared as surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the Special Officer and the Competent Authority shall prepare the prohibited lists. The said lists shall be signed and forwarded to the concerned District Collector and to the concerned Inspector-General of Registration in accordance with Form III of Appendix XI.

35. Rule 241 provides that the District Collector shall forward list of properties which are covered under Clause (e) of Section 22A (1) to be notified in the Gazette. The list shall be forwarded to the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department. As stated above, these are the properties in which the Government has an ‘avowed or accrued’ interest. Unless the lands covered under Clause (e) are notified in the Gazette, the documents pertaining to them shall be registered. In the absence a Gazette notification, the District Registrars cannot refuse to register a document.

36. Rule 242 states that the Registering Officer shall refuse to register any document pertaining to lands mentioned in the prohibited lists prepared under Rules 238 to 241.

37. Rule 243 provides that the Competent Authority / Officer can cancel registered documents in relation to properties listed in Section 22A. Therefore, existence of properties in the prohibited list maintained under Section 22A is a sine qua non for exercising power under Rule 243. The applicability of this Rule would be discussed at an appropriate stage.

38. To sum up, the concerned authority, under the Rules, 238 to 240, has to prepare the prohibited list and sign the same. Such lists have to clearly state the clause under which the property / land falls and the lists shall be prepared in accordance with the applicable Form in Appendix XI. Once such signed lists are prepared, the same shall be forwarded to the concerned District Registrar and the concerned Inspector-General of Registration. Likewise, under Rule 241, the properties supposed to be notified in the Gazette under Section 22A (1) (e) read with Section 22A (2) have to be communicated by the concerned District Collector to the Principal Secretary. These Rules shall be strictly followed while notifying or de-notifying properties.

39. Coming back to the facts of the case, the respondent authorities claim that the lands in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 are part of the prohibited list maintained under Section 22A. However, no exact date has been provided as to when the lands in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 were included in the list of prohibited properties. Further, the pleadings of the respondents and the impugned proceeding is silent as to which Clause of Section 22A (1) covers the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 of Kothapalli Village.

40. The impugned proceeding dated 12.05.2025 states that the lands covered by Shaik Saleh’s ceiling cases were added in the prohibited list in 1997 vide Ref. No. CC/200/97 dated 23.07.1997. Likewise, the impugned proceeding also refers to letter bearing Lr.No.LR1/108/1997 dated 23.01.1998, whereby the District Registrar was directed to add the lands covered by Shaik Saleh’s ceiling cases in the prohibited list. While these letters were addressed to the District Registrar with a direction to not register documents pertaining to Shaik Saleh’s ceiling cases, they cannot be relied upon to say that the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 were part of the prohibited list under Section 22A. Section 22A of the Act, 1908 was inserted for the first time in 1999. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the lands covered by Shaik Saleh’s ceiling cases were part of the prohibited list in 1997.

41. A perusal of the record refers to multiple letters vide which the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 were added to the prohibited list. However, none of the letters clearly indicate as to when the list was prepared and the lands were added. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to a letter bearing No. F1/07/2015 dated 23.08.2016. The said letter was filed along with the counter affidavit by the respondents. The said letter was addressed by the Collector, Karimnagar to the District Registrar, Karimnagar with a request to verify whether the lands in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 were part of the prohibited list. Therefore, even the respondent authorities were unsure about the addition of the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 in the prohibited list.

42. This Court would like to also advert to the letter bearing Letter No. G1/4532/2024 dated 26.06.2025 addressed by the District Registrar, Karimnagar to the District Collector, Karimnagar. The said letter, which speaks of cancellation of sale deeds pursuant to the impugned proceeding, was also filed by the respondents along with the counter affidavit. The said letter clearly mentions that lands in Survey Nos.175, 197 and 198 were not included in the prohibited list in 2007 and 2012. It was only in 2016 that the lands were added in the prohibited list. However, the said letter does not indicate if the procedure contemplated under Rules 238 to 240 of the Rules, 2016 was followed.

43. The relevant portion of the letter dated 26.06.2025 is extracted below:

          “In the instant case the Sy Nos. 175, 197 and 198 of Kothapalli (H) village were not notified in the prohibited list as furnished bythe then Tahsildars, Karimnagar in the year 2007 and 2012 (list enclosed). And also, the list furnished in the year 2012is not as per instructions issued by the Commissioner & Inspector General (R&S), A.P., Hyderabad Dran Circular Memo No G1/19131/05, Dated: 14.09.2007.

          It is to submit that later in the year 2016 the then Collector (LR). Karimnagar has forwarded a letter vide reference 3rd cited which was received in this office on 29/08/2016, to the then District Registrar, Karimnagar requesting to Incorporating the Sy. Nos. in prohibited list and requested to initiate cancellation of documents upon which the then District Registrar, Karimnagar has issued a memo vide reference 4 cited to concerned Sub Registrars to Incorporate the Sy. Nos 175, 197 & 198 of Kothapalli (VAM), in prohibited list and further directed to generate EC for above Sy. Nos for onward submission of report to the District Collector, Karimnagar and also the then District Registrar, Karimnagar has informed the then Collector (LR) that as the said Sy. Nos are furnished in prohibited list some documents which are presented by the parties are been registered by the registering officers, however after receiving your letter the numbers were kept in prohibited list. The said numbers were incorporated on 01/09/2016 then after the Sub Registrars have registered certain documents based on link documents which are prior to 01/09/2016 with a bona-fide intention as per section 86 of Registration Act, 1908.”

44. Nothing has been placed to record to suggest that a list signed by the Collector, in terms of Rules 238 to 240, was prepared and forwarded to the District Registrar and the Inspector-General of Registration.

45. Likewise, the pleadings of the respondents, the impugned proceedings, and the multiple communications between the authorities do not indicate the Clause under which the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 fall. In other words, it is unclear as to which Clause of Section 22A (1) covers the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198. As stated above, if the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 fall under Clause (e), it was incumbent on the Government to publish a Gazette notification.

46. Even though the respondents have not specified the clause under which the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 fall, one can reasonably infer that the respondents intend to bring them under Clause (d) of Section 22A(1). Clause (d) covers lands declared as surplus under the Telangana Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 or the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The respondent authorities claim that the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 are surplus lands, and that the declaration was incorrectly and fraudulently made by Habeeb Ali.

47. After perusing the record, particularly the inquiry report prepared pursuant to the order in W.A. No. 612 of 1997, this Court is of the opinion that the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 cannot be brought under Clause (d) of Section 22A (1). As discussed above, only lands that have been declared as surplus can fall under Clause (d). This means that the status of the lands as “surplus lands” should not be in dispute. If it is shown that the lands were never declared surplus, and where no order has been passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal declaring such lands as surplus, the authorities cannot include them in the prohibited list prepared under Clause (d) of Section 22A (1) and Rule 240 of the Rules, 2016.

48. In the present case, the inquiry report prepared pursuant to the order in W.A. No. 612 of 1997 only doubts the declaration made by Habeeb Ali in respect of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198. The inquiry report merely states that Habeeb Ali made contradictory statements. The said report does not contemplate any action against Habeeb Ali and does not state that the land declared by him was surplus land.

49. Even if the inquiry report is interpreted to mean that the land in Survey Nos.197 and 198 is surplus land which belongs to the Government, no action has been taken till date to take possession of the said land. At best, the Government can claim that it has an avowed or accrued interest in the said land on the basis of the inquiry report.

50. In Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra), this Court gave multiple illustrations to explain when properties fall under Clause (e) of Section 22A (1). In relation to lands where the ownership is disputed, this Court therein had held as follows:

          “149. Further, from the illustrations, which are advanced during the course of submissions, we would like to mention a few to indicate the documents or classes of documents pertaining to the properties, which can be said to be indisputably covered by the provision by virtue of the words avowed or accrued.

          Illustration I : A particular land is an assigned land. The assignee was granted a patta with a rider or a clause prohibiting alienation. However, the said assignee had alienated the property to B under a registered sale deed. A obtains a decree against B for recovery of money and files an execution petition for attachment and sale of that property of B, which is an assigned land and which the assignee had no right to alienate to B. If this property is sold in a court auction sale, an innocent purchaser would purchase, but would later realize that it is an assigned land and is prohibited from alienation. Thus, this is a property in which the Government has an avowed interest as the Government can at any time resume the assigned land for violating the conditions of the patta granted to the original assignee and may either retain possession of it or may re-assign it to some other eligible landless poor person. Therefore, the Government can notify this property under this clause and prohibit registration of documents pertaining to this property to protect the interests of the State as well as the innocent purchasers.

          Illustration II : There are surplus lands, which are declared surplus under the Ceiling Laws. In some cases, surplus lands are surrendered and taken possession by the Government. In certain other cases, the surplus lands are yet to be taken possession due to some litigation still pending between the parties concerned with the lands and the machinery of the State. If the Government ultimately succeeds, the Government will take possession of those surplus lands. In the meanwhile, the properties should be protected from alienation as any sales would affect the interests of the innocent purchasers as the purchasers might not be knowing about the pending litigations. In case of such surplus lands, where the ownership of the Government has not become final, the Government has still got avowed or accrued interest in those lands.

          Illustration III : An employee of the Government amassed wealth by misusing his official position and by corrupt means and is facing charges of acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. The criminal case under the applicable Penal or Special Law has not attained finality. In case of successful proof of charges against such accused-Government employee, the Government may proceed to confiscate the ill-gotten properties. Till the confiscation proceedings and the criminal proceedings reach a finality, the Government cannot claim ownership of the properties. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, the Government has an avowed or accrued interest in those properties.

          Illustration IV : On a property, there are huge arrears of tax, which are due to the local body. Under the Municipal Law, there is a charge on the property for the taxes due. The local body can at any time bring the property to sale for realization of the tax dues. If that property is sold by the owner without paying the tax dues, the same being a charge on the property, the innocent purchaser would become liable to pay the taxes which are huge and such situation would be detrimental to his interests. In such property, it can be said that the local body has got accrued interest so long as the tax dues remain unpaid.

          150. We need not multiply the illustrations. Many such situations can be visualised wherein the Government or the other institution mentioned in clause (e) can be said to be having avowed or accrued interest in certain immovable properties. Therefore, the meanings ascertained and assigned supra to the words avowed or accrued interest subject to contextual variations in a given set of facts of a particular case, in our well considered view, would meet the ends of justice.”

          (emphasis supplied)

51. As can be seen from Illustration II from the above extract, where the ceiling proceedings have not become final and the Government has not taken possession of the surplus lands, such lands can only be included in the prohibited list prepared under Clause (e) of Section 22A (1). Therefore, in the present case, the lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 can only be brought under Clause (e) of Section 22A (1). In such a case, a prohibited list of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 has to be prepared in accordance with 22A (1) (e) read with Section 22A (2) and Rule 241 of the Rules, 2016. Meaning thereby that, the prohibited list comprising of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 has to be published in the State Gazette.

52. To sum up the above discussion, this Court holds that there is no proof that the prohibited list comprising of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 was prepared by following the Rules, 2016. Likewise, as the inquiry report is vague in relation to Habeeb Ali’s declaration, it cannot be said that the ownership of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 absolutely vests in the Government. In such a scenario, the Government can prohibit registration of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 only by publishing a Gazette notification in accordance with Section 22A (1) (e) and Rule 241. Therefore, this Court holds that the inclusion of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 of Kothapalli Village itself is unsustainable.

53. Now coming to the issue of unilateral cancellation of sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioners, the respondent authorities relied on Rule 243 of the Rules, 2016 to contend that the issuance of the impugned proceeding was valid. As mentioned above, the power under Rule 243 can only be exercised if the properties were included in the prohibited list prepared under Section 22A. If the inclusion of properties in the prohibited list itself is doubtful or where such prohibited list was prepared contrary to the applicable Rules, the power under Rule 243 cannot be exercised.

54. It is pertinent to note that Rule 243 is expropriatory in nature. It has an effect of taking away a person’s property. Therefore, it has to be strictly interpreted. In Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held as follows:

          “22. The aforesaid principles in our jurisprudence compel this Court to construe any expropriatory legislation like the Land Acquisition Act very strictly. The judicial pronouncements on this aspect are numerous, only a few of them may be noted here.

          23. In DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana [(2003) 5 SCC 622] , this Court construed the statute on Town Planning Law and held: (SCC p. 635, para 41)

          “41. Expropriatory statute, as is well known, must be strictly construed.”

          The same principle has been reiterated subsequently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria [(2003) 7 SCC 336] in the context of ceiling law. (See SCC para 22 at p. 347 of the Report.)

          24. These principles again found support in the decision of this Court in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd. [(2007) 8 SCC 705] wherein this Court construed the status of a person's right to property after deletion of Article 19(1)(f) from Part III. By referring to various international covenants, namely, the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights, this Court held that even though right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right but it would however be given an express recognition as a legal right and also as a human right. While discussing the ambit and extent of property right, this Court reiterated that expropriatory legislation must be given strict construction. (See SCC paras 53-57 at pp. 731-32 of the Report.)”

          (emphasis supplied)

          Therefore, the procedure contemplated under Rules, 2016 to add properties to the prohibited list needs strict compliance.

55. As this Court has held that the inclusion of lands in Survey Nos.197 and 198 in the prohibited list is not in accordance with the Rules, 2016, the impugned proceeding dated 12.05.2025 is liable to be set aside.

56. The other contention raised by the petitioners was that the impugned proceeding was issued in violation of principles of natural justice. This Court agrees with the arguments of the petitioners that the authorities cannot unilaterally cancel sale deeds without issuing a show cause notice. While Rule 243 does not expressly provide for issuance of a show cause notice, it is trite law that the Government at all times shall act in a fair, reasonable, and a non-arbitrary manner. Where the Government contemplates any punitive action which has adverse consequences, it has to necessarily issue a show cause notice.

57. In Sahara India (Firm) (1) v. CIT (2008) 14 SCC 151, the Apex Court has held that principles of natural justice can be read into a statute where no opportunity of hearing is contemplated. The relevant paragraph is extracted below:

          “19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial.”

58. Likewise, in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2024) 1 SCC 632, the Apex Court has held that where Rules are silent, principles of natural justice can be read into them. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

          “60. When conducting an inquiry, it is the duty of the inquiring authority to proceed in a manner that is visibly free from the taint of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. An inquiry that can culminate into imposition of a major penalty like termination of service of an employee, must doubly conform to a just, fair and reasonable procedure. Any displacement of the principles of natural justice can only be in exceptional circumstances, as contemplated in the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and not otherwise. Wherever the rules are silent, principles of natural justice must be read into them and a hearing be afforded to the person who is proposed to be punished with a major penalty [SBI v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty, (2018) 12 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (L&S) 418] .

          XXXXX

          73. The undue haste demonstrated by the Committee for bringing the inquiry to a closure, cannot justify curtailment of the right of the appellant to a fair hearing. The due process, an important facet of the principles of natural justice was seriously compromised due to the manner in which the Committee went about the task of conducting the inquiry proceedings. As noted above, when the proceedings, subject-matter of the present appeal had taken place, the PoSH Act was nowhere on the horizon and the field was occupied by the Vishaka [Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 932] Guidelines. The said Guidelines also did not exclude application of the principles of natural justice and fair play in making procedural compliances. The silence in the Guidelines on this aspect could not have given a handle to the Committee to bypass the principles of natural justice and whittle down a reasonable opportunity of affording a fair hearing to the appellant. This Court has repeatedly observed that even when the rules are silent, principles of natural justice must be read into them.

          XXXXX

          77. The intent and purpose of the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and Rule 3-C of the CCS (Conduct) Rules is that the procedure required to be adopted for conducting an inquiry into the complaint of sexual harassment that can lead to imposition of a major penalty under the Rules, must be fair, impartial and in line with the Rules. Pertinently, the emphasis on adhering to the principles of natural justice during an inquiry conducted by a Complaints Committee finds specific mention in Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted Rules of 2013. But the spirit behind the due process could never be suppressed or ignored even in the absence of the Statute or the Rules inasmuch as the principles of natural justice are the very essence of the decision-making process and must be read into every judicial or even a quasi-judicial proceeding.”

          (emphasis supplied)

59. Interpreting a provision similar to Rule 243, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in JorigalaBangram (Supra) held also held that the principles of natural justice must be followed before issuing proceedings which unilaterally cancel registered sale deeds.

60. Thus, respondent No.2 ought to have issued a show cause notice to the petitioners before issuing the impugned proceeding dated 12.05.2025. The impugned proceeding is also liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice.

61. The decisions of Thota Ganga Laxmi (Supra) and Y. Ramalakshi (Supra) relied upon by the petitioners are inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The said decisions deal with unilateral cancellation of sale deeds between private parties, i.e., the vendor and vendee. In contrast, the present case deals with the unilateral cancellation of sale deeds by the Government on the ground that such sale deeds pertain to prohibited properties.

62. A feeble argument was made on behalf of the respondent authorities that the present writ petitions were not maintainable, relying on Vatumalli (supra). This argument does not hold ground, as the petitioners have demonstrated that the impugned proceedings violate their fundamental rights. Likewise, the finding in Vatumalli (supra) that writ petitions against administrative actions of registering authorities were not maintainable was set aside by the Division Bench in W.A. No. 1505 of 2017.

63. Further, the respondents' argument that the properties covered by the sale deeds in favour of the petitioner are the result of fraud also cannot be accepted. The respondents cannot rely on allegations of fraud to overcome their non-compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 22A and the Rules, 2016.

64. Therefore, this Court holds that the impugned proceeding dated 12.05.2025 and all other consequent proceedings are liable to be set aside.

APROPOS VINJAMURI RAJAGOPALA CHARY (SUPRA):

65. Before concluding, this Court would like to highlight the inconsistency between two Division Benches of this Court in relation to the binding nature of the Full Bench decision in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra).

66. In the opinion of this Court, the said inconsistency raises pertinent questions of law regarding the interpretation of Section 22A of the Act, 1908. In Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel 1967 SCC OnLine SC 123, the Hon’ble Apex Court has noted that a Single Judge can highlight inconsistent judgments of the same High Court and can refer them to the Chief Justice. The Apex Court observed as follows:

          “10. The effect of a precedent of the Gujarat High Court fell to be considered indirectly in this case. Before Raju, J., it was urged for the first time in the course of this litigation that in the absence of the sanction of the Charity Commissioner the court sale was invalid. Counsel for the auction purchaser contended that this question was not raised before the District Court and that Court cannot be said to have acted illegally or with material irregularity in not deciding the question. Counsel for the auction purchaser relied upon two decisions in support of that proposition : PinjareKarimbhai v. Shukla Hariprasad [3 Guj LR 529] and Haridas v. Rataney [23 Bom LR 802] . He urged that under the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960, the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court which originally extended over the territory now forming part of the State of Gujarat, ceased when a new High Court was set up in the State of Gujarat, but it was held by a Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in State of Gujarat v. Gordhandas [3 Guj LR 269] that the decision of the Bombay High Court will be regarded as binding since the Gujarat High Court had inherited the jurisdiction power and authority in respect of the territory of Gujarat. When pressed with the observations made in the two cases cited at the Bar, Raju, J., found an easy way out. He observed that the judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court had “no existence in law”, for in the absence of a provision in the Constitution and the Charter Act of 1861, a Judge of a High Court had no power to refer a case to a Full Bench for determination of a question of law arising before him, and a decision given on a reference “had no existence in law”. The learned Judge also thought that if a Judge or a Division Bench of a court makes a reference on a question of law to a Full Bench for decision, it would in effect be assuming the jurisdiction which is vested by the Charter of the Court in the Chief justice of the High Court. In so observing the learned Judge completely misconceived the nature of a reference made by a Judge or a Bench of Judges to a larger Bench. When it appears to a Single Judge or a Division Bench that there are conflicting decisions of the same Court, or there are decisions of other High Courts in India which are strongly persuasive and take a view different from the view which prevails in his or their High Court, or that a question of law of importance arises in the trial of a case, the Judge or the Bench passes an order that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a request to form a Special or Full Bench to hear and dispose of the case or the questions raised in the case. For making such a request to the Chief Justice, no authority of the Constitution or of the Charter of the High Court is needed, and by making such a request a Judge does not assume to himself the powers of the Chief Justice. A Single Judge does not by himself refer the matter to the Full Bench : he only requests the Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench for hearing the matter. Such a Bench is constituted by the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice of a Court may as a rule, out of deference to the views expressed by his colleague, refer the case : that does not mean, however, that the source of the authority is in the order of reference. Again it would be impossible to hold that a judgment delivered by a Full Bench of a High Court after due consideration of the points before it is liable to be regarded as irrelevant by Judges of that Court on the ground of some alleged irregularity in the constitution of the Full Bench.”

          (emphasis supplied)

67. While this Court has referred to certain paragraphs of Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra), no reliance has been placed on it. Dehors the references to Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra), the impugned proceeding dated 12.05.2025 is liable to be set aside.

68. It is pertinent to note that noting multiple interpretations of Section 22A of the Act, 1908, a Full Bench was constituted by the erstwhile High Court of Judicature for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. One of the issues before the Court was whether a Gazette Notification shall be published in relation to lands covered by all the Clauses of Section 22A (1) or whether such notification is mandatory only in relation to lands covered by Clause (e) of Section 22A (1). The Full Bench in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra) held that Gazette Notification is required to be published only in relation to the lands covered by Clause (e) of Section 22A (1).

69. Against Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra), a Special Leave Petition was filed before the Apex Court which came to be decided as Siri Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society Ltd. v. State of A.P. (2018) 16 SCC 786. The Apex Court, noting that the constitutionality of Section 22A was pending, remanded the matter back to the High Court. The Court noted that the arguments raised in the Special Leave Petition may be raised before the High Court.

70. The relevant portion of Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society (Supra) is extracted below:

          “6. The learned counsel for the State points out that the main issue pending before the High Court is the vires of Section 22-A of the Act. All the contentions now sought to be raised by the appellants are, in fact, the subject-matter of the challenge before the High Court. However, we find that some of the appellants before this Court are not parties before the High Court. Since the main issue is pending before the High Court, we deem it appropriate to remit these matters to the High Court. Those persons who are parties before this Court, but not parties to the pending writ petitions in the High Court, may get themselves impleaded by way of appropriate application(s) for impleadment/ intervention, etc., or may even file fresh writ petitions.

          7. We note that in all these appeals, registration has been permitted making it subject to the result of the appeals with a further condition that no further registration shall take place without permission from the Court. It is ordered that the registration already permitted by this Court shall be treated as a provisional registration subject to the result of the writ petitions now pending before the High Court. We make it clear that merely because a provisional registration has been permitted, the parties shall not claim any additional equity. We further make it clear that without express permission from the High Court, there shall be no further transfer. In order to avoid further difficulty to the similarly situated people, we make it clear that it will be open to them to approach the High Court and seek appropriate and similar interim orders regarding transfers during the pendency of the writ petitions.

          8. The learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that the same mechanism for redressal under Section 22-A(1)(e) may be made applicable as far as the grievance in respect of Sections 22-A(1)(a) to (d) is concerned. It is pointed out that even in respect of the orders which have otherwise become final, they would be relegated to the same authority and will be subject to further revision/appeal, etc. This is also a matter to be considered by the High Court when the writ petitions are finally heard.Therefore, we permit the parties to raise this contention also before the Bench concerned while considering the vires of the section, in order to reach a workable solution. The Court may consider the issue on its own merit and the impugned order [Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary v. State of A.P., 2015 SCC OnLineHyd 407 : (2016) 2 ALD 236] shall not stand in that way.

          9. We further make it clear that we have not otherwise considered the matter on merits. In view of the above, the appeals are disposed of.”

          (emphasis supplied)

71. A Division Bench of this Court in BHEL Employees Model Mutually Aided Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v. State of Telangana 2021 SCC OnLine TS 3640, interpreted Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society (Supra) to mean that the Full Bench decision of Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra) is no longer good law. The Division Bench in BHELEmployees (Supra) held as follows:

          “42. Thus, the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Siri Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society Ltd. (supra) is that the Full Bench order in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary and others (supra) came to be set aside, and the matters were all remitted to the High Court with the above directions. Thus the ratio of the said decision has been wiped out by the order of the Supreme Court.”

          (emphasis supplied)

72. Against the Division Bench’s judgment in BHELEmployees (Supra), a Special Leave Petition vide SLP (C) No.7727/2021 was filed. The Apex Court dismissed the said Special Leave Petition vide order dated 30.06.2021 and held as follows:

          “Heard learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court.

          The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of accordingly.”

73. While the BHELEmployees (Supra) came to be passed, the vires of Section 22A remained pending before another Division Bench of this Court. On 19.10.2023, the said Division Bench of this Court in Invecta Technologies (P) Ltd. v. State of A.P. 2023 SCC OnLine TS 4565, upheld the validity of Section 22A. While giving its findings, the Division Bench relied on the Full Bench’s decision in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra). In Invecta Technologies (Supra), the following was observed:

          “31. However, the Full Bench of this Court in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (supra) has not dealt with the issue of validity of Section 22A of the Act, but the interpretation of Section 22A of the Act binds this Court.”

          (emphasis supplied)

74. It is pertinent to note that the Division Bench in Invecta Technologies (Supra), which upheld the constitutionality of Section 22A, did not consider the decision of the Supreme Court in Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society (Supra) and the decision of another Co-ordinate Bench in BHEL Employees (Supra), which held that the Full Bench decision in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra) is no longer good law.

75. Further, it is also unclear whether on remand from the Apex Court, the batch of cases decided along with Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra) were reheard along with Invecta Technologies (Supra). Upon verification, this Court found that only one appeal, i.e., W.A. No. 232 of 2012 was reheard along with Invecta Technologies (Supra). This raises another question as to whether a Division Bench in Invecta Technologies (Supra) could have reheard a case decided by a Full bench in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra).

76. In the opinion of this Court, to clarify the position of law, the following questions may have to be considered by a Bench of appropriate strength, which the Hon’ble Chief Justice, in exercise of His Lordship’s power and discretion, may constitute:

          i. Whether Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra) is still good law, given the Hon’ble Supreme Court had remanded the matter back vide its decision in Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society (Supra)?

          ii. Whether the decision in Invecta Technologies (Supra) is per incuriam for placing absolute reliance on Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra) and disregarding Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society (Supra) and BHELEmployees (Supra)?

          iii.Whether on remand from the Hon’ble Supreme Court, could the Division Bench in Invecta Technologies (Supra) rehear the batch of cases decided by a Full Bench in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary (Supra)?

          iv. Whether the issues raised before the Supreme Court in Nivasam Mutual Aided House Building Society (Supra) were decided on remand in Invecta Technologies (Supra)?

CONCLUSION:

77. In light of the aforesaid discussion, all these writ petitions are allowed and the impugned proceeding bearing Proceeding No.DCOKNR - F10CAH (1)/1/2020 - ESEC dated 12.05.2025 is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

78. The Registrar (Judicial-I) of this Court is directed to place a copy of this order before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in all the writ petitions shall stand closed.