1. This revisional application challenges the order dated January 30, 2026 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jalpaiguri as the designated Tribunal, in Misc Case No. 284 of 2024 filed some time on May 21, 2024 constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act).

2. The conspectus of the disputes between the parties is very short. The petitioners herein are the son and daughter-in-law of the opposite parties.

3. The opposite parties had approached the tribunal under Sections 22(2), 23 and 5 of the said Act.

4. The prayers made in such petition are set out hereunder:-

               i. Restraining the O.P.s immediately from causing threat, damage, injury both physical and mental to the Petitioners;

               ii. Directing the O.P.s to quit and vacate the house of the Petitioner No.-1 immediately situated at 112 Rabindra Nagar, P.O.- Sen Para, P.S. – Kotwali, Dist – Jalpaiguri, Pin Code – 735101 fully described in the schedule below;

               iii. Directing the O.P. No.-1 to pay maintenance to the Petitioners @ Rs. 10,000/- (Ten Thousand) only per month for their food, clothing, treatment, medicine and other maintenance;

               iv. Prohibiting the O.P.s from abusing, assaulting and otherwise torturing the Petitioners;

               v. Expenses of the Proceeding amounting to Rs. 20,000/- (Twenty Thousand);

               vi. Pass such other Order/Orders as your Honour deems fit and proper.

5. The learned Tribunal, after considering all facts and circumstances, which have been detailed in the order impugned dated January 30, 2026, came to the finding that the petitioners' continued possession of the property is inimical to the welfare and protection of the opposite parties. Thus, the petitioners were directed to vacate the property and hand over peaceful and vacant possession to the opposite parties within 30 days from the date of the order.

6. The petitioner has raised two fundamental issues. The first issue pertains to the maintainability of the application before the designated tribunal by the opposite parties. The second issue relates to the merits of the matter.

7. In respect of the first issue, it was submitted that the basic ingredient for applicability of the said Act is that there has to be a transfer by way of a gift or otherwise by the concerned senior citizen/citizens of his property subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide basic maintenance and basic physical needs to the transferor and when such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities, the transfer of the property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence , and shall, at the option of the transferor, be declared void by the tribunal. In the instant case, according to him, no such transfer took place by the opposite parties, being the senior citizens, in favour of the petitioner. Thus, the applicability of the said Act does not arise and the tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to pass such an order, especially one directing the petitioner herein to vacate the premises and for possession to be thereby restored to the opposite parties. He has placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020 in the case of Smt. S Vanitha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors.

8. On the second issue, the petitioners' case is that the petitioners are not living in the residential premises of the opposite party no. 1. Their occupation of a part of the land is in a dwelling house which was constructed by the petitioner no. 1 and thereafter gifted to the petitioner no. 2. Thus, the question of eviction from one’s own residential premises does not arise under the said Act. Hence the order impugned passed by the tribunal is on an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction and therefore liable to be set aside.

9. On the factual aspect, certain new points have been raised by the petitioners. Such new points, which were not before the learned Tribunal, are as under:-

               a. Petitioner is not residing in the opposite parties' house.

               b. Petitioners have a residence in the adjacent land, which has been constructed by the petitioner no. 1.

               c. This property constructed by the petitioner no. 1 has been gifted by him to his wife, the petitioner no. 2 herein.

               d. The opposite party no. 1 had not transferred or gifted any property to the petitioners.

10. Mr. Druti Roy, learned advocate, appearing for the opposite party has submitted that the petitioner has relied upon merely a part of Section 23 and has not placed reliance on the entirety of subsection 2 and Section 23 of the said Act. He has also placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No(s). of 2025 (Arising from SLP (Civil) No(s). 7675 of 2024) in Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. The State of Bihar and Ors.

11. I have heard learned counsel for both parties at length and considered the records and the decisions relied upon by them.

12. The facts of the case are fairly simple.

13. In a nutshell, the facts are enumerated hereinafter.

14. The opposite parties, who are the father and mother respectively of the petitioner no. 1 and in-laws of the petitioner no. 2, had instituted a case before the tribunal seeking the relief set forth hereinbefore under Section 22(2), 23 and 25 read with Section 4(2)(f) of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007.

15. The opposite parties complained of the acts of the petitioners herein that they have physically assaulted and manhandled the opposite parties, on account whereof the petitioners ought to be directed to pay certain maintenance and also be evicted from the residential premises of the opposite parties.

16. These simple facts as aforestated have been somewhat convoluted by certain new and contrary pleadings presented by the petitioner. The opposite parties claimed to be the owner of the 8 decimals (0.089 acres) of land, 0.04 acres being the result of the patta received by the opposite party no. 1 from the state government and .043 acres received by way of devolution, being the property of Haranath, the deceased brother of the opposite party no.1, who expired without any heir.

17. The opposite parties have four children, Dilip, Tapan, Sanjib, and Sampa. Dilip is the petitioner herein, residing in the same premises as that of the opposite parties. Sanjib resides with the opposite parties and tends to their requirement and needs. Tapan resides elsewhere in his separate establishment and also renders services to his parents. Sampa is married and stays at her matrimonial home. The opposite party no. 1 was granted a patta in respect of land measuring 0.04 acres or 4 decimals in L.O.P. No. 219. In this land he had constructed a dwelling house consisting of rooms, kitchens, and privy. The elder brother of opposite party no. 1, Haranath Das, was granted a similar patta in respect of 0.043 acres or 4 decimals in the same plot being L.O.P. No. 219. Haranath died and his entire property devolved upon the opposite party no. 1. Thus, opposite party no. 1 herein became the owner of 0.083 acres or 8 decimals (0.04 of his own plus 0.043 of Haranath). In fact, opposite party no. 1 is recorded as owner in LR records and the concerned BL & LRO has issued a khatian being LR Khata no. 761.

18. Opposite party no. 1 had thereafter transferred about 5 decimals of land to his son Sanjib.

19. It is contended by the opposite parties that the petitioners are occupying one room in the house of the opposite party no. 1 and due to family differences, the opposite parties had asked the petitioners to vacate the room, whereupon the petitioners manhandled and assaulted the opposite parties. In fact, the assault was quite severe and resulted in a police complaint being filed as opposite party no. 1 had to be admitted to the hospital due to the intensity of the assault.

20. The petitioners, on the other hand, have sought to establish that the land belonging to Haranath does not and could not have devolved on the opposite party no. 1 as there are four sisters of opposite party no. 1 who have an equal share in the land of Haranath. Thus, the land of Haranath was liable to be divided into five equal shares amongst his legal heirs (sisters and brothers). Further, the petitioner state that Haranath in his lifetime had given the petitioner the right to possess and enjoy his land and that the petitioner indeed has a right to such land.

21. Thus, according to the petitioners, opposite party no. 1 could not be the sole beneficiary of the land of Haranath, the petitioners could not be evicted from the said land either by the prayer of opposite party no. 1 or by the order of the tribunal, especially since such order is without jurisdiction.

22. The issues as to whether the sisters would have a right to the land of Haranath or not are a matter which can only be raised by the sisters and not by the petitioner as a son of Loknath (opposite party no. 1).

23. 4 decimals of the land had been gifted to their son Sanjib on November 11, 2022 and the balance land had been gifted through a further deed of gift by the opposite party no.1 to his son Sanjib on January 8, 2024. Thus the entirety of the 8 decimals of land had been gifted by opposite party no. 1.

24. The petitioner also stated that the petitioner was in possession of the land of Haranath and had constructed a building over the said land and that the land measuring 4 decimals had been recorded in the names of the petitioner. It is on this land that the petitioner had constructed his dwelling house, which he had subsequently on May 12, 2023 gifted to his wife, the petitioner no. 2. The name of the petitioner no. 2 is allegedly mutated over the land that she had acquired by way of the aforesaid gift.

25. The genesis of the occupation by the petitioner and construction of the dwelling house and the subsequent gift of the same to his wife, the petitioner no. 2, is a family settlement consisting of the sisters of opposite party no. 1 and the opposite party no. 1 himself upon such settlement the property has been duly demarcated and partitioned and it is only after such settlement that the petitioner no. 1 has constructed his dwelling house thereon.

26. Before adverting to the substantive issue raised by the petitioner herein, it is imperative to deal with the issue of maintainability of the application before the learned Tribunal, as raised by the petitioner.

27. Section 23 of the said Act falls under Chapter 5 of the Act which relates to protection of life and property of senior citizens.

28. The sine qua non for applicability of Section 23 of the Act thereof, is that a Senior Citizen after the commencement of the Act has transferred by way of gift or otherwise any property to the person against whom such application has been filed. The petitioners’ contention that the opposite parties had not gifted or otherwise transferred any of their property to any of the petitioners, on account whereof the application before the learned Tribunal ought not to be entertained, is belied by the fact that they have, in no uncertain terms, admitted in the Revisional Application (in paragraph 5) that the land belonging to Haranath, the uncle of the petitioner no. 1, was transferred to him by way of an amicable family settlement to which the opposite party no. 1 herein was also a party.

29. Thus, even if it be construed that the opposite party no. 1 had 1/5th share in 0.43 decimals of land of Haranath, he has, on the petitioners' own admission, transferred the same to the petitioner no. 1. On the petitioners' own admission, the sine qua non, if it is so construed for invocation of Section 23 of the Act, stands duly satisfied. Thus, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal cannot, under any circumstances, be said to have been passed without jurisdiction.

30. In the circumstances, on the merits, two issues have to be considered while dealing with a case of this nature. First, whether the property of the senior citizens is well and sufficiently protected , and second, the need to protect the lives of senior citizens.

31. In so far as the petitioners' case on merit is concerned, the factual aspects raised in this revisional application are not just new but are indeed contrary to the case made out by the petitioners before the learned Tribunal in as much as :-

               a. The petitioners have categorically stated before the learned Tribunal that they resided in a room of the house of the opposite parties.

               b. There was no question of a new dwelling house constructed by the petitioner no. 1 where the petitioners were residing.

               c. There is not a whisper before the learned Tribunal that the petitioner no. 1 had gifted this dwelling house to his wife.

32. The new points which are contrary to the stand taken by the petitioners before the learned Tribunal are as follows:-

               a. The gift deed relied upon by the petitioner no. 1 pertains to land and not to any dwelling house.

               b. There is no document to support that there is a structure constructed by the petitioner on the adjacent land as argued.

33. The stand of the petitioners before the Tribunal, in their written statement, was that the petitioners were occupying one room which the petitioner no. 1 had constructed. In fact, it is this one room which he had gifted to his wife, the petitioner no. 2 herein. Thus, the stand taken by the petitioners in their pleadings before the Tribunal and in this revisional petition are contrary to each other. There is no evidence produced by the petitioners to show that the petitioner no. 1 has constructed a house or that they are in possession of such house or that the pleadings in the written statement were made inadvertently or that they were incorrect.

34. In the instant case it is not in dispute that the house on 5 decimals of land was constructed by opposite party no. 1. The property is self-acquired and not ancestral or joint property. The living condition of the opposite parties are rather inadequate and insufficient, cramped in nature and not befitting the opposite parties in view of their age and health (86 and 76 respectively). It has also been established from the finding of the learned Tribunal that the petitioner no. 1, on several occasions, quite on a daily basis, returns home in an inebriated state, creating a hostile and unsafe environment for the opposite parties. It may however be true that the opposite party no. 1 has made certain painful remarks regarding the fertility of the petitioner no. 2, which cannot justify any physical assault or manhandling by the petitioner no. 1, a son of his parents, the opposite party herein.

35. The continued and repeated assault, abuse, and harassment, which is established by the police report and duly corroborated by the consistent complaints made by the opposite parties, is a matter of concern and falls squarely within the purview of the said Act.

36. The petitioner no. 1, as a son, is obliged to take care of his parents, being senior citizens, let alone physically abusing and assaulting them to the extent that the opposite parties had to be admitted to a hospital with severe injuries.

37. It is evident that the petitioners' continued occupation of the property leaves them in the vicinity of the opposite parties, which could severely prejudice the opposite parties and be detrimental to their health and physical safety.

38. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeswar Prasad Roy (supra) is unequivocal that the tribunal is bestowed with the power to direct eviction of the errant children and in order to prevent any sort of misuse, harassment, and assault, it is indeed essential that an order of eviction be made against such errant children. It is true that the said Act does not expressly provide for powers of eviction, however, such a power is implicit in the Act itself which has been made with the salutary public purposes of upholding the safety of senior citizens.

39. It is clear that the tribunal's power to order eviction is an instance of the enforcement of senior citizens' right to protection. This Act, being a welfare legislation, needs to be construed in a manner which would be beneficial for the well-being of the senior citizen and the Act has to be construed in a manner which would further such purpose and not limit the same.

40. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the learned Tribunal, which has been assailed in this revisional application, has been rightly passed and warrants no interference in view of the following:-

               a. The said Act has been rightly applied by the learned Tribunal. This being a welfare legislation, needs to be construed in a liberal manner as has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the various cases referred to hereinbefore.

               b. This being a beneficial legislation for the senior citizen, the safety and protection of the property of the senior citizen is as important under the Act as the safety and protection of the senior citizens themselves from any untoward or aggravated situation, such as the assertions made by the petitioner no. 1 herein.

               c. The finding of the learned Tribunal on the basis of the report of the B.L. & L.R.O., Sadar that the opposite parties herein, the applicants before the Tribunal, are in exclusive possession of 0.089 decimals of land with two concrete rooms and one tin-roofed room, clearly reveals that there is no separate dwelling house constructed in the said area. This indicates that the petitioners were occupying a part of the house built by the opposite party no. 1.

               d. Since the petitioners were occupying a part and portion of the premises built by the opposite party no. 1, as held by the Supreme Court in Rajeswar Prasad Roy (supra), the Tribunal is bestowed with the power to direct errant children in order to prevent misuse, harassment and assault against senior citizen, in the instant case, the opposite parties.

               e. The Tribunal has also sufficiently addressed the rights of the petitioner no. 2 , being the daughter - in - law , by issuing directions to the petitioner no. 1 herein to provide her monthly maintenance of Rs. 5000/- and protecting the rights of the petitioner no. 2 in the manner as stipulated in the order.

41. In view of the aforestated findings and observations, C.O. 26 of 2026 is dismissed.

42. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

43. An urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.