Common Judgment:
Muralee Krishna, J.
1. The applicant in O.A.No.1683 of 2022 filed O.P.(KAT)No.38 of 2026 and the applicant in O.A.No.1633 of 2021 filed O.P.(KAT)No.56 of 2026, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the common order dated 07.11.2024 passed by the Kerala Administrative Tribunal at Thiruvananthapuram, (the ‘Tribunal’ for short).
2. The petitioner in O.P.(KAT)No.56 of 2026 is currently working as a Sub Inspector (Grade) at Koothuparamba Police Station. The petitioner in O.P.(KAT)No.38 of 2026 joined service on 24.07.1984 as a Police Constable of District Armed Service, Kannur and retired from service on superannuation on 31.05.2017. While the petitioner in O.P.(KAT)No.56 of 2026 was working as Police Constable attached to the Crime Squad of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Panoor Circle and the petitioner in O.P.(KAT)No.38 of 2026 was working as Police Constable at Kolavalloor Police Station, both of them, as authorized by Deputy Superintendent of Police, proceeded to arrest one Vinodan who was an absconding accused in LP Case Nos.38 of 1998 and 39 of 2001 on the file of the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thalassery, which arose from Crime Nos.108 of 1996 and 112 of 1996 of Kolavalloor Police Station. On execution of the non- bailable warrant by the petitioners on 17.08.2004, the arrested person was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thalassery and was remanded in judicial custody. The arrested person was later released on bail. However, subsequently it came to the knowledge that the arrested person was in fact not Vinodan but his younger brother Manojan, which, according to the petitioners, is due to the impersonation done by the said Manojan, in order to avoid the arrest of his brother Vinodan and to facilitate his marriage scheduled.
3. Consequent to the above incident, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioners, and both of them were suspended from service and an oral enquiry was initiated as provided under Rule 8(1)(iii) of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 (‘KPDIP & A Rules’ for short). The disciplinary proceedings were finalised, vide order dated 24.02.2005, by awarding a minor penalty of withholding of one increment without cumulative effect. The appeal and review petition submitted by the petitioners was rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kannur and the Inspector General of Police, North zone, by the orders dated 31.10.2005 and 24.04.2006, respectively.
4. The petitioners plead that in respect of the incident, Crime No.329 of 2004 under Section 419 of IPC was registered against said Manojan, and he was convicted by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for the said offence as per the judgment dated 15.03.2012 in C.C No.79 of 2007. After the said judgment, the petitioners submitted a review petition before the State Police Chief, but the same was returned stating delay. The petitioner in O.P.(KAT)No.56 of 2026 filed a review under Rule 36A of KPDIP & A Rules, which was rejected by the Government as per the order dated 26.02.2018. Thereafter, the petitioners filed the respective original applications under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, before the Tribunal challenging the adverse orders against them and also seeking a direction against the District Police Chief, Kannur to regularise the suspension period of the petitioners as duty for the purpose of increment in addition to the regularisation already done for the purpose of pension and gratuity.
5. In O.A.No.1633 of 2021, the 5th respondent filed a reply statement dated 13.12.2021 opposing the reliefs sought for. The said reply statement was adopted by the 2nd respondent by filing a memorandum dated 03.06.2022. To the reply statement filed by the 5th respondent, the petitioner filed a rejoinder dated 30.12.2023. Similarly, in O.A.No.1683 of 2022, the 5th respondent filed a reply statement dated 02.12.2022, opposing the reliefs sought for in that original application, which was adopted by the respondents 1 and 2 by filing separate adoption memorandums dated 14.12.2023 and 07.12.2022, respectively. To the reply statement filed by the 5th respondent, the petitioner in O.P.(KAT)No.38 of 2026 filed a rejoinder dated 02.02.2024.
6. After hearing both sides, the Tribunal, by the impugned common order dated 07.11.2024, dismissed the original applications. Paragraphs 9 to 11 and the last paragraph of that order read thus;
“9. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicants were with respect to the wrongful arrest of Manojan, who impersonated himself as Vinodan against whom LP Warrants were pending execution. It was much later, even after the Judicial remand, it came out that Manojan impersonated as his brother Vinodan. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicants under Rule 8 (1) (iii) of the KPDIP & A Rules were concluded through awarding a final punishment of barring of one increment without cumulative effect for one year. The enquiry contemplated under Rule 8 (1)(iii) is with respect to major penalty whereas the punishment finally awarded was a minor penalty. AS argued by the learned Government pleader, the oral enquiry was completed as per the procedure laid down in the Rules. The applicants had sufficient opportunities to defend their side. The decision in Rajashree Ajith's case (supra) is with respect to initiating disciplinary proceedings for imposing major penalty under Rule 15 of KCS (CC&A) Rules and the Enquiry Officer completing the enquiry without following the procedure laid down under this Rule The contention of the respondents therein was that the penalty imposed was only minor in nature and therefore the petitioners could not insist compliance of procedure for imposing major penalty. After considering the earlier Judgments of the Hon'ble High Court on the subject, in paragraph 14, the Hon'ble High Court came to the following conclusion;
"14. After hearing the Counsels on either sides, I find from Ext.P5 Memo of Charges and Ext.P7 Order appointing Enquiry Officer that the second respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings as contemplated under Rule 15 of the KCS (CC&A) Rules. It is well settled by the aforesaid decisions cited by the Counsel for the petitioner in Raveendranathan and Vaijayanthi (supra) that after initiating proceedings for imposition of a major penalty, the disciplinary authority cannot take short cut by not following the procedure prescribed under Rule 15 for infliction of the major penalty and choose to inflict a minor penalty without properly completing the enquiry following the procedure prescribed in that behalf. Even though the Counsel for the second respondent contended that there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of the fact that only a minor penalty imposed on her, in view of the aforesaid settled law, imposition of a minor penalty after choosing to initiate proceeding for imposition of major penalty and without following and completing the procedure for the same is illegal and unsustainable."
10. This is different from the facts of this case so far as the disciplinary authority came to the decision to impose major penalty only after the procedure for Oral Enquiry was duly completed. The applicants had taken up the matter before the appellate authority as well as the review authority both of which were declined. However, neither of the applicants have produced their appeal / review petition showing that they had challenged the imposition of the penalty without issuing the Show Cause Notice. In fact the review petition said to have been declined by the 2nd respondent and produced as Annexure-A10 in OA.No.1633 of 2021 pertains to the applicant in the O.A.1683 of 2022 Even in the orders declining the appeal and review petition, only the final order in the disciplinary proceedings is shown as reference indicating that the applicants had not challenged the decision regularising their period of suspension. The disciplinary proceedings concluded once was reopened by the applicants through the Mercy Petitions much after the impersonator was convicted. One of the arguments of the petitioners is that the impersonator was successful in misleading the other Police personnel as well as the Judicial authority. Contrary to the contention of the applicant, this is not in any manner augmenting their case against the punishment as the primary dereliction was committed by the applicants themselves by not ensuring through proper verification of documents and witnesses that the arrested person was the accused person himself. Convicting the impersonator does not in any manner erase the dereliction of duty committed by the applicants which is admitted by them also.
11. Going through the facts and circumstances of the case presented before us, this tribunal is of the view that the final order passed in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicants as well as the regularisation of the suspension period of the applicants do not warrant any judicial interference.
Accordingly, the Original Applications are dismissed”.
7. Being aggrieved, the respective applicants are now before this Court with these original petitions.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Senior Government Pleader.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioners by ordering an oral enquiry under Rule 8 (1) (iii) of the KPDIP & A Rules, which is applicable to major penalty proceedings. However, after completing the enquiry, the disciplinary authority imposed a minor penalty, without furnishing the enquiry report or issuing a show cause notice, which is a clear violation of Rule 17(i)(b) of KPDIP & A Rules and the principles of natural justice. The petitioners' suspension period was regularised only for pensionary benefits, resulting in the denial of increments and causing continuing financial loss amounting to a disguised major penalty. The learned counsel relied on the judgments of this Court in Raveendranathan v. District Collector, Palghat [1984 KLJ 268], Vaijayanthi v. State of Kerala [2003 (3) KLT 1055] and Rajashree Ajith (Dr.) v. Principal Secretary, Transport (A) Department [2024 KHC Online 602] in support of his arguments that imposition of a minor penalty after choosing to initiate proceeding for imposition of major penalty and without following and completing the procedure of the same is illegal and unsustainable.
10. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the aforesaid judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts of the instant case, since the minor penalty was imposed on the petitioners after the completion of the enquiry proceedings, whereas in the judgments relied by the petitioners, the enquiry proceedings were not completed. The learned Senior Government Pleader further pointed out that though the enquiry report was submitted on 13.02.2005 and the review petition filed by the petitioner in O.P.(KAT) No.56 of 2026 was finally rejected on 26.02.2018, the original application was filed only in the year 2021. This delay is not properly explained by the petitioners. All the contentions taken by the petitioners against the disciplinary proceedings were considered by the Government while passing the order dated 26.2.2018 in the review petition filed by the petitioner in O.P.(KAT) No.56 of 2026. The Tribunal also considered the contentions of the petitioners on merit, and there is no illegality in the said order.
11. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
12. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;
"The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."
13. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.
14. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.
15. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
16. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.
17. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
18. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners were pursuant to the wrongful arrest of one Manojan, who is the brother of the actual absconding accused in the criminal case against whom non bailable warrants were pending from the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thalassery, Kannur. It is true that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners were one for the imposition of a major penalty under Rule 8(1)(iii) of KPDIP & A Rules. But the penalty imposed was a minor penalty. Though the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgments of this Court in Raveendranathan [1984 KLJ 268], Vaijayanthi [2003 (3) KLT 1055] and Rajashree Ajith (Dr.) [2024 KHC Online 602] as cited above, those judgments are not applicable to the facts of the instant case as rightly submitted by the learned Senior Government Pleader for the simple reason that in the present case the minor penalty was imposed after the conclusion of the departmental enquiry initiated against the petitioners and the submission of the enquiry report; and whereas in the cited judgments the minor penalty was imposed without completing the procedure for imposition of the major penalty.
19. From the impugned order of the Tribunal, we notice that the Tribunal also considered the aforesaid aspects with reference to the judgment in Rajashree Ajith’s case. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold the impugned order of the Tribunal as perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction.
In the result, these original petitions stand dismissed.




