Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The respondents in O.A.No.2181 of 2022 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P6 order dated 19.12.2023 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, the respondent had been working as a part-time Casual Sweeper at the Government Press, Meppadi, Wayanad District, since 01.11.2004 without any break till 15.12.2022. On 15.12.2022, the 3rd petitioner served the respondent with Annexure A6 order dated 06.02.2022 terminating her from service. The respondent is entitled to regularisation of her service as Part Time Sweeper as per Annexure A2 order dated 25.11.2005. The Sweeping area of the Government Press, Meppadi Wayanad District, was above 1228.78 sqm, and that of the Form store is 132.64 sqm. There is one full-time sweeper other than the respondent in the office. They are sweeping the Press and the Form Store. Hence, the case for regularisation of the respondent as a regular Part-time Sweeper on the basis of Annexure A2 government order ought to have been taken up immediately after 25.11.2005, the date of Annexure A2 order. The petitioners have failed in their duty. The termination of the service of the respondent as per Annexure A6 order by the 3rd petitioner on the basis of Annexure A7 order dated 22.11.2022 of the 2nd petitioner is illegal, without any authority of law, and is against Annexures A2 order dated 25.11.2005 and A4 order dated 09.02.2010 and Annexure A8 circular dated 19.11.2010 issued by the Government. With these pleadings, the respondent - applicant approached the Tribunal with the original application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, seeking the following reliefs;

                  “(i) To issue a declaration that Annexure A6 and A7 issued by the 2nd and 3rd respondents respectively, are illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and is against Annexure A2 and A4 government orders, and against Annexure A8 Government Circular.

                  (ii) To issue a further declaration that the applicant is entitled to regularisation as Regular Part-time Sweeper in the higher scale in terms with Annexure A2 and Annexure A4 government orders with effect from 01.11.2004, i.e, from the original date of appointment of the applicant as Part-time Casual Sweeper at Government Press Meppadi, Wayanad District, consequential benefits.

                  (iii) To call for the records leading to Annexure A6 and A7 and set aside Annexure A5, A6 and A7.

                  (iv) To issue a direction, directing the 3rd respondent to forward the proposal and the first respondent to regularize the service of the applicant as Regular Part-time Sweeper in terms with Annexure A2 and A4 government orders from 01.11.2004, i.e, from the original date of appointment of the applicant as Part-time Casual Sweeper at Government Press, Meppadi, Wayanad District, with all consequential benefits”.

3. The 2nd petitioner filed a statement dated 02.02.2023 in the original application opposing the reliefs sought for and producing therewith Annexure R2(a) document. Thereafter, the 2nd petitioner filed another reply statement dated 23.05.2023, producing therewith Annexures R2(b) and R2 (c) documents. To the reply statements filed by the 2nd petitioner, the respondent filed a rejoinder dated 18.09.2023, producing therewith Annexures A10 to A12 documents. Again, the 2nd petitioner filed an additional reply statement dated 16.11.2023 in the original application. After considering the rival contentions raised by the parties, the Tribunal, by Ext.P6 order dated 19.12.2023, allowed the original application.

4. Being aggrieved, the State and its officials are now before this Court with this original petition.

5. Heard the learned Senior Government Pleader for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent.

6. The learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the respondent was initially engaged as a casual scavenger at the Government Press, Meppadi, Wayanad. She was appointed as a casual sweeper on a temporary basis from the year 2014 onwards. The respondent was paid honorarium for cleaning the washroom attached to the office in the absence of a sanitary worker. The acquittance roll produced by the respondent reveals the fact that the payment made to her was as a scavenger. The guidelines for regularisation issued by the Government on 25.11.2005 make it clear that the said guidelines are applicable only to those existing casual sweepers as on the said date, eligible for regularisation, subject to the conditions prescribed therein. The said scheme does not provide any regularisation of casual scavenger and hence the respondent does not come under the purview of Annexure A2 Government Order. Moreover, there were casual sweepers engaged from time to time to do the sweeping works of the said institution, and Annexure R2(b) document reveals that the appointment of the respondent was necessitated in the absence of a sanitary worker in the said institution and not that of a casual sweeper. According to the learned Senior Government Pleader, the Tribunal failed to consider these aspects in their proper perspective while allowing the original application.

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the duties of a part-time scavenger as well as a part-time sweeper are the same. By the notification dated 14.08.1986, the word ‘scavenger’ was substituted with ‘sanitation worker’, and at present, there is no post of scavenger. From Annexure A10 letter of the 2nd petitioner, it is clear that the petitioners themselves admit that the duties of scavengers and part-time sweepers are one and the same. Under those circumstances, the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Annexure A2 Government Order need not be interfered with.

8. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

9. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;

                  "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."

10. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

11. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

12. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

13. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in  proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

14. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

15. The specific case of the respondent-applicant in the original application is that the respondent is appointed as part- time sweeper cum sanitation worker in the Government press, Meppadi and she has been working from 01.11.2004 onwards without any break till 06.12.2022, on which date her service was terminated by the impugned Annexure A6 order of the 3rd petitioner. The respondent is relying on Annexures A2 and A4, Government orders dated 25.11.2005 and 09.02.2010, respectively, which were issued setting out detailed guidelines for regularising the existing sweepers who were appointed other than by following the rules and also the subsequent clarification pertaining to such appointments in excess of the sanctioned post on or before 25.11.2005. On the other hand, the petitioners are contending that the initial appointment of the respondent in the year 2004 was as a casual scavenger, and her appointment as part-time sweeper was with effect from 2014 and therefore, Annexures A2 and A4 Government orders are not binding on her.

16. As noticed by the Tribunal in the impugned order, the post of scavenger occurring in category 2 of part-time contingent service was substituted by the words ‘sweeper’, ‘sanitation worker’ and ‘sweeper cum sanitation worker’ by the Government order dated 14.08.1986. Similarly, the word ‘scavenger cum gardener’ was substituted as ‘sanitation worker cum gardener’ as per the said Government order. If the post of scavenger in contingent service was substituted, then how the petitioners can appoint the respondent as a casual scavenger on an honorarium basis is not explained in the reply statements filed by the petitioners. Though the petitioners contend that the respondent was appointed in the absence of a sanitary worker and there were casual sweepers engaged from time to time to do the sweeping works of the said institution, neither the details of the same are pleaded in the reply statements nor proved by producing any documentary evidence. From the materials placed on record, the conclusion is irresistible that the respondent was appointed as a part-time scavenger, without considering the deletion of the said nomenclature by the Government order dated 14.08.1986 in the institution concerned. However, she was doing the duties of a part-time sweeper, apart from that of a sanitation worker, from the date of her initial appointment, that is, from 01.11.2004 onwards, in the absence of any other part-time sweepers. Therefore, the appointment of the respondent from 01.11.2004 can only be treated as a sweeper cum sanitation worker. In such circumstances, we find no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order of the Tribunal that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Annexure A2 government order.

                  In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.