Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The petitioner herein is the mother of one Vishnu V. Gopal ('detenu' for the sake of brevity), and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P4 order of detention dated 19.12.2025, passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS Act for brevity).

2. The records reveal that, on 24.09.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kottayam, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, three cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1399/2025 of the Vaikom Police Station, alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 22(b) of the NDPS Act.

3. We heard Sri. V. Vishal Ajayan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128], the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the learned counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, such a satisfaction is not entered into by the jurisdictional authority while passing the Ext.P4 detention order. The learned counsel further submited that Ext.P4 detention order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. Moreover the learned counsel urged that there occurred an unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, and the said delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. On these premises, it was submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext. P4 detention order was issued by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all procedural requirements and upon arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned Government Pleader contended that, at the time of issuing the detention order, the authority was fully aware that the detenu was already in judicial custody in connection with his most recent prejudicial activity. It was only after being satisfied that there existed a real and imminent likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and that, if so released, he would, in all probability, engage in further criminal activities, that the authority proceeded to pass the detention order. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, the detention order remains legally sustainable notwithstanding the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody when the impugned order was issued. The learned Government Pleader further contended that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order as claimed in this writ petition.

6. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PINDPS Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a mechanical manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the PITNDPS Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu is on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. In short the circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

7. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

8. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

9. In view of the said decisions, in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decisions by the Supreme Court.

10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime 1399/2025 of the Vaikom Police Station, alleging the commission of the offence punishable under Section 22(b) of the NDPS Act. The detenu, who is arrayed the accused in the said case, was caught red-handed with the contraband on 27.08.2025. It was on 24.09.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that Ext.P4 detention order was passed.

11. In Ext.P4 order, the fact that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Similarly, it is mentioned that the bail application filed by the detenu is under consideration by this Court. Likewise, in the order, it is stated that as the seized contraband is of intermediate quantity, there is a likelihood of getting bail, and if the detenu is released on bail with conditions, he is likely to violate those conditions, and there is a high propensity that he would indulge in drug peddling activities in the future. The order further reads that it is absolutely imperative to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities in the event of getting bail. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the likelihood of the detenu being released on bail was not considered by the jurisdictional authority will not be sustained.

12. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, and the said delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. While considering the contention of the petitioner regarding the delay in passing the impugned order, it could not be ignored that an order under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS has a significant impact on the personal as well as the fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, such an order could not be passed in a casual manner; instead, it can only be passed on credible materials and upon arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. Furthermore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring a detention order to be issued within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. However, when there is undue delay in making the proposal and passing the detention order, the same would undermine its validity, particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay.

13. Keeping in mind the above, while coming to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the incident which led to the registration of the case with respect to the last prejudicial activity occurred on 27.08.2025, and the detenu, who is the accused in the said case, was arrested on the same day. It was on 24.09.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was initiated, and finally, the impugned order of detention was passed on 19.12.2025. Virtually, the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was mooted, and the detention order was passed while the detenu was under judicial custody. As the detenu was under judicial custody during that period, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding repetition of criminal activities by him, and therefore, the short delay that occurred in mooting the proposal and in passing the detention order is of little consequence. Moreover, altogether three cases formed the basis for passing Ext.P4 detention order. Therefore, some minimum delay in mooting the proposal is natural as the sponsoring authority needs a reasonable time for the collection and verification of the records of the cases registered against the detenu. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order that would sever the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the detenu has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.