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CDJ 2026 Ker HC 509 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : Crl.Rev.Pet No. 301 of 2020
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON JOHN
Parties : K.T. Razak Versus The Secretary, Kodiyathur Grama Panchayat, Kodiyathur, Kozhikode & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Revision Petitioner: P.V. Anoop, Phijo Pradeesh Philip, M.P. Priyeshkumar, K.V. Sreeraj, Advocates.
Date of Judgment : 06-04-2026
Head Note :-
Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 - Section 210 -

Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 29978,
Judgment :-

 Johnson John, J.

1. This revision petition is filed by the accused against the concurrent findings of the trial court and the appellate court that he is guilty of the offence under Section 210 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (‘Act, 1994’ for short) and sentencing him to imprisonment till rising of the court and to pay Rs.40,322/- to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C and in default of payment, to undergo simple imprisonment for two months.

2. The prosecution case is that the accused participated in the competitive auction for conducting ferry service at Parayangotte Kadavu for the period from 01.04.2002 to 31.03.2003. As he was the highest bidder for an amount of Rs.46,000/-, an agreement was executed on 03.04.2002. But, after executing the agreement, he committed default in paying the amount as per the agreement and even after issuance of demand notice, he failed to pay the amount. As he was not having any assets within the limits of the Panchayat, recovery of the amount by distraint warrant was found impracticable and hence, the criminal prosecution was initiated.

3. Heard Sri. Junaid S., the learned counsel representing the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, Sri. Jacob Abraham, the learned counsel for the first respondent Panchayat and Sri. Sanal P. Raj, the learned Public Prosecutor for the second respondent, State of Kerala.

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that the Panchayat has not complied with the conditions as required under the second proviso to Section 210 of the Act, 1994 before initiating the prosecution and therefore, the complaint itself is not maintainable. It is also argued that the Panchayat has not initiated any proceedings against the country boat owned by the revision petitioner and that there is no proper explanation regarding the difference in the amounts mentioned in Exhibits P3 to P5 notices issued by the Panchayat.

5. The learned counsel for the first respondent Panchayat argued that Exhibits P3 to P5 notices and Exhibit P6, distraint warrant, are documents filed along with the complaint and it is specifically stated in the complaint that the Secretary of the Panchayat was satisfied that recovery of the amount by issuance of the distraint warrant is impracticable and therefore, the argument against the maintainability of the complaint is not legally sustainable. It is also argued that apart from making a vague suggestion while cross examining PW1 that the accused owns a country boat, no document is produced to show that the accused is in ownership of any country boat.

6. Section 210 of the Act, 1994 is extracted below for reference:

                  “210. Recovery of arrears of tax, cess, etc. - Any arrear of cess, rate, surcharge or tax imposed or fees levied under this Act shall be recoverable as an arrear of public revenue under the law relating to the recovery of arrears of public revenue for the time being in force:

                  Provided that the Secretary of a Village Panchayat may directly recover by distraint, under his warrant, and sale of movable properties of the defaulter subject to such rules as may be prescribed:

                  Provided further that, if for any reason the distraint or a sufficient distraint of a defaulter’s property is impracticable, the Secretary may prosecute the defaulter before a Magistrate.”

7. The fact that the revision petitioner/accused was the highest bidder and he executed Exhibit P2 agreement dated 03.04.2002 is not in dispute. Exhibits P3, P4 and P5 are the demand notices issued by the Panchayat. The distraint warrant dated 17.2.2003 is marked as Exhibit P6 and the endorsement dated 19.2.2003 on the reverse side of Exhibit P6 by Abdurahman S., L. D Clerk, Kodiyathoor Panchayat, shows that the defaulter is residing outside the jurisdiction of Kodiyathoor Grama Panchayat and therefore, attachment of the property is impracticable. Further Rule 24 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Taxation, Levy and Appeal) Rules, 1996 provides that distraint to be confined to properties within the Panchayat area.

8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the order of this Court in Crl. M.C Nos. 431 of 2020 and 1385 of 2020 and argued that initiation of revenue recovery proceedings and impracticability to realise the amount by issuance of a distraint warrant are essential pre-requisite for launching the prosecution. But, as noticed earlier, there is specific averment in the complaint regarding the impracticability in effecting recovery by issuance of distraint warrant and further, the endorsement on the reverse side of Exhibit P6 distraint warrant also shows the impracticability in realising the amount through distraint warrant and in that circumstance, I find that the facts and circumstances in the decisions relied on by the revision petitioner are different from the facts and circumstances involved in this case and hence, not applicable.

9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that in Exhibit P3 notice, the exact amount due is not stated and in Exhibit P4 notice, the amount mentioned as due is Rs.46,000/-. Whereas, in Exhibit P5, the amount due is shown as Rs.35,317/- and in Exhibit P6 distraint warrant and the complaint, the amount due is shown as Rs.35,322/-. The learned counsel for the first respondent argued that the trial court has elaborately considered this aspect in paragraph 8 of the judgment and also pointed out that in Exhibit P3 notice, it is specifically stated that 3 instalments as per Exhibit P2 agreement dated 03.04.2002 is due.

10. It is also pointed out that in Exhibit P5 notice dated 28.01.2003, the total amount due with interest and notice charge is shown as Rs.35,317/- and in Exhibit P6 distraint warrant, the warrant fee of Rs.5/- is also added and hence, the total amount was shown as Rs.35,322/- and in the absence of any specific challenge in cross examination of PW1 regarding the exact amount due, the revision petitioner is not entitled to raise such a contention before the revisional court.

11. It is well settled that the revisional court cannot act as an appellate court and the power of the revisional court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [(1999) 2 SCC 452 = 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], the Honourable Supreme Court held thus:

                  “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinizing the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ”

12. In Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [(2015) 3 SCC 123 = (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], the Honourable Supreme Court held thus:

                  “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

13. In the present case, the trial court and the appellate court found that the complaint is maintainable under Section 210 of the Act, 1994, in as much as the complaint was filed after the issuance of Exhibits P3 to P5 notices and Exhibit P6 distraint warrant. As noticed earlier, Exhibit P6 distraint warrant was returned with a report that the defaulter is residing outside the jurisdiction of Kodiyathoor Grama Panchayat and it is impracticable to effect recovery through distraint warrant. Therefore, I find that the judgment under challenge is not vitiated due to any illegality, irregularity or error of law.

                  For the aforesaid reasons, I find that this revision petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. In the result, this Crl. R.P is dismissed.

 
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