1. The petitioner/appellant filed the present Interlocutory Application with a prayer to condone the delay of 1221 days in filing the Second Appeal against the Decree and Judgment passed in A.S.No.40 of 2011, dated 31.01.2013 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, (Fast Track Court), Kadapa at Rajampet, in partly allowing the appeal suit filed against the Decree and Judgment passed in O.S.No.61 of 2002, dated 24.02.2011, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rajampet.

2. The case of the petitioner as per the affidavit in brief is as follows:-

                  The plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 are the legal heirs of the brother of the petitioner by name Subbanarasaiah, and the father of the petitioner by name Penchalaiah got three sons namely Subbanarasimhulu, who is the husband of the plaintiff No.1 and the father of the plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3, and the petitioner is the 2nd son and the respondent No.4 herein is the 3rd son of Penchalaiah. While so, Subbanarasaiah got partitioned the joint family properties and having taken his share and got separated from the joint family, thereafter, the plaintiff No.1 and her late husband left the village and kept their family separately at her parents’ place. The petitioner pleaded that the suit schedule properties are the joint family acquired properties by them with joint nucleus after separation of the plaintiff family.

                  II. The petitioner herein further pleaded that after the demise of his brother Sri Subbanarasimhulu, the plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.61 of 2002, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rajampet, for partition. The trial Court dismissed the said suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove the identity of the suit property with correct boundaries and also failed to establish that the suit properties are ancestral properties and self-acquired property of the father of the petitioner, i.e., late Sri Penchalaiah, and Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-3 did not in any way establish the right of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment, the plaintiff filed an appeal in A.S.No.40 of 2011, on the file of the III Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Cuddapah at Rajampet. The petitioner pleaded that the First Appellate Court had partly allowed the first appeal vide A.S.No.40 of 2011 on 31.01.2011, holding that the item No.1 of the suit schedule property is liable for partition. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment passed by the First Appellate Court, the petitioner herein filed the present second appeal before this Court along with the Interlocutory Application vide I.A.No.1 of 2018, seeking to condone the delay of 1221 days in filing the second appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the respondents herein have received the notices very recently and he filed Vakalat before the Registry on 10.12.2025. He further contended that the First Appellate Court disposed of the appeal on 31.01.2013, but the petitioner herein, after a lapse of more than five (05) years, instituted a second appeal with a delay of 1221 days, and there are no tenable grounds to consider the request of the petitioner, and the abnormal delay of more than five (05) years in filing the second appeal is not at all explained by the petitioner in the affidavit enclosed to the petition and that the present application may be dismissed.

4. Heard learned counsel appearing on both sides on record.

                  “Now the point for determination is whether the petitioner has shown any sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1221 days in filing the Second Appeal?”

POINT:

5. The undisputed facts are that the legal heirs of the brother of the petitioner herein instituted a suit in O.S.No.61 of 2002 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rajampet, for partition of the plaint schedule property and the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment dated 24.02.2011, the petitioner herein filed the first appeal before the III Additional District Judge, (Fast Track Court), Kadapa at Rajampet vide A.S.No.40 of 2011. The First Appellate Court, after hearing both sides, partly allowed the appeal on merits on 31.01.2013. The petitioner/appellant has now filed the present Second Appeal along with I.A.No.01 of 2018, with a delay of 1221 days.

6. The petitioner contended that he is residing at Dubai since 2003 and recently he came back to India and he came to know that the appeal suit in A.S.No.40 of 2011 was partly allowed on 31.01.2013, and immediately his counsel applied for certified copies of the decree and judgment dated 31.01.2013, passed in A.S.No.40 of 2011 vide C.A.No.1492 of 2016, dated 13.12.2016. The very averments in the affidavit of the petitioner itself goes to show that the petitioner herein is residing at Dubai since 2003 itself and he instituted the appeal before the First Appellate Court by engaging a counsel from Dubai itself. There is no whisper in the affidavit of the petitioner herein that as to when he came to India from Dubai. As stated supra, the petitioner herein filed the appeal before the First Appellate Court from Dubai itself through engaging an advocate before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court disposed of the first appeal on 31.01.2013. The certified copy of the judgment of the First Appellate Court enclosed to the grounds of the second appeal shows that the copy application was filed on 13.12.2016 and the certified copy was delivered to the counsel for the petitioner on 13.02.2017. After obtaining the certified copy of the judgment of the First Appellate Court also there was a delay of nearly one (01) year in filing the said second appeal. The explanation offered by the petitioner herein is that he is not maintaining good health and that the said delay was happened.

7. As stated supra, the explanation offered by the petitioner for not filing the second appeal immediately after the disposal of the first appeal is that he is residing at Dubai since 2003 itself and recently he came back to India and he came to know about the disposal of the first appeal by the learned First Appellate Judge on 31.01.2013. As noticed supra, there is no whisper in the affidavit itself that “when the petitioner came back to India”. The very averments in the affidavit of the petitioner goes to show that the petitioner herein is residing at Dubai since 2003 and after dismissal of the suit, he filed a first appeal before the First Appellate Court by engaging a counsel before Rajampet from Dubai itself. Another explanation offered by the petitioner herein is that he is not maintaining good health. Admittedly, no scrap of paper or medical certificate was filed by the petitioner to prove his alleged ill-health and there is no whisper in the affidavit of the petitioner that the petitioner is suffering from which type of illness, it is also not the case of the petitioner herein that he was hospitalized due to the illness. Furthermore, the petitioner is not new to litigation, he is having experience in court proceedings i.e., he instituted an appeal suit before the Civil Court and the said appeal suit was partly allowed, he approached the First Appellate Court from Dubai itself by engaging a counsel in India in the year 2011 itself and later in the year 2011 itself, the appeal was partly allowed on contest by both the parties. For the reasons best known to the petitioner, the petitioner herein filed the second appeal with abnormal delay of more than five (05) years and the said delay is not at all explained by the petitioner.

8. It is well settled that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised judiciously, based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also equally well settled that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute, as the Courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.

9. In a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by L.Rs. and others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (L.A.)( 2024 SCC Online SC 513), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-

                  “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

                  (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

                  (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

                  (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

                  (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

                  (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

                  (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

                  (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

                  (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

10. In a case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-

                  “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute”

                  …

                  25. In the aforesaid case law, the Hon’ble Apex Court further held as follows:-

                  "15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

11. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws and I am of the considered view that the expression “sufficient cause” as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides are in favour of petitioner. In the present case, there are several laches on the part of the petitioner, and there is clear negligence and inaction in pursuing the matter. In such circumstances, the delay cannot be condoned liberally.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, there are no merits in the present Interlocutory Application. Resultantly, the Interlocutory Application vide I.A.No.01 of 2018 is dismissed. Since the petition to condone the delay of 1221 days in filing the Second Appeal vide I.A.No.01 of 2018 is dismissed, the Second Appeal is liable to be rejected.

                  As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending and the Interim Order granted earlier, if any, shall stand closed.