(Prayer: Appeal Suit filed under Section 96 of C.P.C., against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.21 of 2015 on the file of the Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Tenkasi, dated 21.09.2023.)

Dr. G. Jayachandran J

1. In view of the conflicting judgments regarding the interpretation of Section 21(1) of the Registration Act, 1908, the Division Bench of this Court while considering the Appeal Suit under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code directed against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.21 of 2025 on the file of the Additional District Judge, FTC, dated 21.09.2023, had framed the following question for reference to the larger bench:   “Whether the registration of a universal release deed, which does not contain any description of property is void for not being no conformity with Section 21(1) of the Registration Act?”

2. The learned counsel appearing for the parties have placed their arguments in detail tracing the legislative intent of Section 21 of the Registration Act citing judicial pronouncements of the various High Courts and Hon'ble Supreme Court.

3. Before adverting to the question referred, it is pertinent to state in brief the facts of case under consideration in the first appeal.

4. The suit for partition was filed by one of the daughters of Thiru.A.S.A.Rathnasamy Nadar, against her brothers and sisters questioning the validity of release deed, dated 20.05.1991 executed by her and others as void, since it is vague and illegal.

5. The respondents had contested the suit stating that there is no uncertainty or illegality in the release deed. The parties have understood the recital and acted upon the released deed dated 20.05.1991 and they are enjoying the properties as per the deed. The partition suit is filed 24 years after the release deed, hence, it is barred by limitation and also bad for partial partition. It was specifically contended by the defendants that after the release deed, the respective parties have acted in terms of the release deed, therefore the plaintiff is estopped from questioning the validity of the release deed.

6. The trial Court after examination of oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the suit on the ground of estoppel and limitation. Challenging the same, the Appeal Suit is filed by the aggrieved plaintiff.

7. In the course of argument, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that the deed of release marked as Ex.A3 in this case, does not contain any description of the immovable properties covered therein. Therefore, the very registration of the document is void in view of the non-compliance of the mandate set out under Section 21 of the Registration Act.

8. The learned Judges after hearing the above submission and after referring the following judgments, to highlight the divergent views of the Court, referred the matter to larger bench, framing the question for consideration:

                  1. Valliammal vs. Tamil Selvi [A.S.No.189 of 2013 etc, batch dated 16.12.2022];

                  2. Hoosein Abdul Rehman vs. Lakhmichand Khetsey [AIR 1925 Bombay 34];

                  3. T.Shankaranarayan Nair vs. Achuthan Nair [1982 KLJ 61]; 5/31

                  4. Paul Varghese Vs. C.C.Annie [2020 SCC Online Kerala 24100];

                  5. P.A.J.Seetharamam Raju vs. Lala Gopikrishna Gokuldoss Agency Department [1962 (75) LW 358];

                  6. Saiyed vs. Muhammad [1909 31 All 523];

                  7. Thomas vs. Sub Registrar [2025 SCC Online Ker 563];

                  8. Sab Mukhun Lall vs. Sah Koondun [1875 2 IA 210].

9. As the reason for referring the matter to larger bench, the Division Bench has observed as below:

                  “17. In our experience, we notice that invariably such universal releases are obtained only from female members of the family. The male members of the family want to deprive the female members of their right in the family properties. Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India envisages making special provisions for women. We need not go that far. If certain provisions are strictly applied, they would go a long way in upholding the rights of women. Ex.A3 itself states that the details of the properties belonging to the joint family were not being mentioned. Section 21(1) of the Act envisages that a document should contain description that is sufficient to identify the property. But the case on hand is not one of sufficiency or deficiency. It is a case of absence of description. The moot question is whether even such document can be saved.

                  18. We are however clear that breach of Section 21(1) of the Act cannot be taken advantage by a vendor who has received consideration for the property sold by him. We therefore confine the scope of reference only to cases of universal release deeds where the consideration is nill or nominal. We are of the view that the issue has to be authoritatively settled by a Larger Bench. We therefore frame the question for reference in the following terms:-

                  “Whether the registration of a universal release deed which does not contain any description of property is void for not being in conformity with Section 21(1) of the Registration Act?”

10. Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant referring to Sections 21(1), 22(2) and 87 of the Registration Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for brevity), submitted that the scheme under the Act, at the very threshold of the registration process, the registering authority shall not accept a non-testamentary document in the absence of description of property sufficient to identify the same. The mandate prescribed in Section 21(1) of the Act is further reinforced under Section 22(2) of the Act, which expressly provides that failure to comply with sub Sections (2) and (3) of Section 21 of the Act, shall not disentitle the document to be registered, if the description of the property is nevertheless sufficient to identify the same.

11. The intention of the legislature is, while certain imperfection in the mode of description of the property is found, if identification of the same is possible, then such imperfection is condonable and the registering authority can accept document for registration. Contrarily, if there is total absence of description of the property, it is not condonable and even if it is accepted for registration, such document for the breach of Section 21(1) of the Act has to be held as void. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius has to be applied in this case while interpreting Section 21(1) of the Act. Saving clause under Section 22(2) of the Act is concisely omitted under Section 21(1) of the Act. Therefore, the mandate of describing the property for identification of the same is absolute and any defect is non curable.

12. The learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Raghavachari, appearing for the appellant further submitted that the release of relinquishment deed, which contains no description of the immovable property, fails meet the basic condition of territorial jurisdiction of the registration authority. Therefore, Sections 17, 21 and 28 of the Act have to be read conjointly. As a consequence, the universal release deed, which does not contain any description of the property, is void.

13. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 87 of the Act, which saves document from invalidation on account of defects in procedure, will not apply to documents registered in breach of the mandate under Section 21(1) of the Act. Section 87 of the Act protects only those documents registered in deviation of the procedure. It does not and cannot validate a document registered in the direct violation of express statutory mandate.

14. The following judgments are relied upon by Mr.V.Raghavachari, to buttress the above submission.

                  1. Baiji Natch Tewari vs. Sheo Sahoy Dhagut and others [Special Appeal No.596 of 1890];

                  2. Somasundaram Mudaliar and others vs. K.S.Rajappa Mudaliar [S.A.No.1606 of 1923];

                  3. Narasamma vs. Subbarayadu and others [Manu/TN/0052/1895 @ Paras 6];

                  4. Valliammal vs. Tamilselvi [A.S.No.189 and 207 of 2013 and 1049 of 2012];

                  5. Nahar Singh vs Harnak Singh [(1996) 6 SCC 699];

                  6. Pawan Kumar Dutt vs. Shakuntala Devi [(2010) 15 SCC 601].

15. Mr.S.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the firt respondent submitted that as far as the facts of the case is concerned and the recital found in Ex.A3, the relinquishment deed is not in breach of Section 21(1) of the Act and therefore, the Division Bench ought not to have been referred this case for a Larger Bench to decide the question formulated. The recitals in Ex.A3 refer about the extensive properties held by Rathnasamy Nadar and his death intestate. The parties having understood about the identity and nature of the properties, had executed the deed on 20.05.1991.

16. Preceding to the execution of the release deed and its registration, there was an oral partition among parties and memorandum of oral partition was executed. The properties held by Rathnasamy Nadar are identifiable through documents. The statute does not mandate that each and every property must be described with boundaries, extent, Survey numbers and other details. The only requirement under statute (Section 21(2) of the Act) is a description sufficient to identify. The registering authority cannot deny registration of non testamentary document, if the description of the property is adequate to identify the same.

17. According to Thiru.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel, terming Ex.A3 as universal release deed without description itself is erroneous. Recital of Ex.A3, clearly states that vast properties at various places, were left intestate by Rathnsasamy Nadar and after receiving consideration, the right in those properties are released. The release deed was executed on 20.05.1991. Challenge to this deed was in the year 2015 in the suit for partition. The said suit came to be dismissed on the ground of laches, estoppel and limitation. The issue regarding validity of this document with reference to Section 21(1) of the Act was not raised either before the trial Court nor in the grounds of appeal, but only in the course of argument to sidetrack, the appellant has raised this plea.

18. Though the question referred is settled and no more res integra, in view of the spate of judgments, nonetheless, the matter is referred to a Larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement, though the issue is irrelevant to the facts of the case in hand.

19. The prime contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is that Ex.A3 does not suffer any defect in description incapable of identifying the property. The suit for partition containing list of properties left by Rathnasamy Nadar, the oral partition effected between the parties prior to the release deed, the purchase of one item of property by the plaintiff herself subsequent to the release deed, are all in unison, will prove that there was no ambiguity in the release deed regarding identification of the property and the parties have accepted the release deed and acted upon it.

20. In support of his arguments, Mr.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following judgments:

                  1. Parasharampantsadashivpant vs. Rama Bin Yellappa and another in S.A.No.3 of 1809.;

                  2. Somasundara Mudaliar and others vs. K.S.Rajappa Mudaliar [1927 25 LW 429];

                  3. Rajagopal Ayyar and another vs. Avadai Velar and others [1961 2 LW 29];

                  4. P.A.J.Seetharama Raju and others vs. Messers, Lala gopirishna Gokuldoss Agency Department [(1962) 75 LW 358];

                  5. Prem Singh and others vs. Birbal and others [2006 5 SCC 353].

21. In the course of the arguments, the learned counsels on either side, to explain the sufficiency to identify, draw the attention of the Court, the illustrations given under Section 29 of the Indian Contracts Act. While the learned counsel appearing for the appellant referred to illustration (a) given under Section 29 of the Indian Contracts Act, which deals with agreements void for uncertainty submitted that universal release deed is like an agreement to sell 100 tones of oil without any indication to show what kind of oil intended to be sold.

22. Whereas, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that releasing all the properties of the father is akin to agree to  sell all the grains in my granary at Ramnagar as illustrated in (d) of Section 29 of the Indian Contracts Act, which says that if 'A' agrees to sell to 'B' “all the grain in my granary at Ramnagar, there is no uncertainty to make the agreement void.

23. Heard the learned counsels appearing on either side and perused the materials placed.

24. Before proceeding further, Section 21 and 22(2) of the Registration Act is extracted below for easy reference:

                  “21. Description of property and maps or plans.—(1) No non-testamentary document relating to immovable property shall be accepted for registration unless it contains a description of such property sufficient to identify the same.

                  (2) Houses in towns shall be described as situate on the north or other side of the street or road (which should be specified) to which they front, and by their existing and former occupancies, and by their numbers if the houses in such street or road are numbered.

                  (3) Other houses and lands shall be described by their name, if any, and as being the territorial division in which they are situate, and by their superficial contents, the roads and other properties on to which they abut, and their existing occupancies, and also, whenever it is practicable, by reference to a Government map or survey.

                  (4) No non-testamentary document containing a map or plan of any property comprised therein shall be accepted for registration unless it is accompanied by a true copy of the map or plan, or, in case such property is situate in several districts, by such number of true copies of the map or plan as are equal to the number of such districts.

      22. Description of houses and land by reference to Government maps or surveys.—(1) Where it is, in the opinion of the [State Government], practicable to describe houses, not being houses in towns, and lands by reference to a Government map or survey, the [State Government] may, by rule made under this Act, require that such houses and lands as aforesaid shall, for the purposes of section 21, be so described.

                  (2) Save as otherwise provided by any rule made under subsection (1), failure to comply with the provisions of section 21, subsection (2) or sub-section (3), shall not disentitle a document to be registered if the description of the property to which it relates is sufficient to identify that property.”

25. The scheme of the Act as we read, says, any immovable property worth about more than Rs.100 has to be registered compulsorily as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act. The Sub Registrar within whose jurisdiction, whole or some of the properties is situated, can receive the document for registration. In the light of the powers conferred on the registering authority under Sections 21(1) and 22(2) of the Act, which mandates that any non-testamentary documents relating to immovable property is presented, the Sub Registrar should satisfy himself that the description shown in the document is sufficient to identify. Therefore, the litmus test for Sub Registrar to accept nontestamentary document in respect of immovable property, is description of the property sufficient to identify.

26. No doubt, Sections 64 and 65 of the Act lay down procedure for registration in one sub-registration districts, where documents relating to land in several sub-districts and districts, respectively. However, if any lapse in the procedure contemplated under Sections 64 and 65 of the Act, the lapse is curable under Section 87 of the Act, which says 'nothing done in good faith pursuant to this Act or any Act hereby repealed, by any registering officer, shall be deemed invalid merely by reason of any defect in his appointment or procedure'. The object of registering document is to give notice to the world that such document has been executed and is in force.

27. In Valliammal's case, when an almost similar issue came up for consideration, the Bench of this Court has held that a person, who is a party to the document cannot challenge the same on the ground that the registration is not in accordance with Section 21 of the Act. Law by now is settled that the person executing the document, who is capable of understanding the document, is bound by the recitals of the document, unless it is proved that the same was obtained by fraud or force or misrepresentation.

28. The implication of Section 21(1) of the Act is discussed at para 20 of the Valliammal's case as below:

                  “20.Though Section 21 specifically requires the documents of conveyance to contain the description of the property to identify it, there is no provision which would invalidate the document if the description of the property is not given. The requirement under Section 21 as per plain language indicates that description of property is mandatory and it is introduced, probably with an avowed object to serve public interest so that anyone can easily find out from the Register all the transactions in relation to particular property. However, absence of specific description of property in a document would not invalidate the conveyance or  registration as there is no specific provision either in the Registration Act or in any other statute. Section 54 of the Registration Act defines -sale- as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. The Deed of Release involves transfer of ownership and in the present case, it is for a consideration paid. The intention of the parties to the document can be seen from the recitals of the document where plaintiffs 1 and 3 have agreed to convey their right in all the properties of their father whether it is movable or immovable. The specific recitals would indicate in unambiguous terms that the document is in respect of all the properties of Vaiyapuri Gounder. Though the Deed of Sale is different from the Release Deed, the Release Deed is not defined under the Transfer of Property Act. If a person conveys interest either by a Release Deed or by a Deed of Exchange, the document of conveyance by any description if it conveys an interest in immovable property that will satisfy the definition of -sale- and if it is in relation to immovable property of the value of Rs.100/-, it can be made only by a registered instrument. Since the document-Ex.A2 is registered, the transfer is complete by execution of the Release Deed upon registration.”

29. In the case in hand under consideration, the Bench has recorded reasons for differing with the above observations and had relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hoosein Abdul Rehman vs. Lakhmichand Khetsey [AIR 1925 Bombay 34], in which, it has been observed as follows:

                  “ .........Sections 21(1) and 22(3) plainly contemplate that the description of the property shall be sufficient to enable the property to be identified, if not entirely at any rate mainly from that description and not from outside information such as other documents or statements by witnesses. No doubt sections 28, 64 and 65 also, I think, clearly intend that the Sub-Registrar should have the means of ascertaining from the document itself whether the immovable property to which it relates is wholly or partly situate in his sub-district. Therefore a general description like “my family property” without any details enabling a person to identify from the document itself or a schedule attached to it the particular items of property included in that general expression is not in my opinion sufficient to entitle a document relating to immovable property to be registered. With due respect, therefore, I venture to differ from the contrary ruling in Narasimha Nayanevaru v. Ramalingama Rao (199 (10) MLJ 104) and the case which follow it. In support of this opinion I may cite the authority of my learned brother, Mulla J., who in his recent commentary on the Indian Registration Act after referring to these cases says at page 104:—

                  “This decision as well as the decision in the case where the words of description were ‘my family property’ may be supported on the ground that there was nothing on the face of the document to show that the document related to immovable property.”

                  Obviously he does not consider those decisions sound and suggests that they can only be supported on a ground which practically deprives them of all relevancy on the point I have been considering.”

30. The Bombay High Court, in a case where the document presented for registration was refused by the Sub Registrar on the ground that the description of the property was added subsequently and remained without the signature of the executant.

31. All the judgments referred by the learned counsel on either side indisputably, reiterates the fact that the description of the immovable property must be sufficient to identify and this is a litmus test for accepting the document for registration. The facts of the individual case have been dealt in the cases referred and Courts have decided according to the recital in the respective documents.

32. In view of Section 87 of the Act, if there is any violation of the procedure contemplated under Sections 64, 65 and 66 of the Act, that will not vitiate the legality of the document. Hence, it is also necessary to examine whether a document presented for registration suffers inherent defects of non-disclosure of the identity of the property or any procedural lapse. In case of former, the defect is incurable and registration is invalid. In case of latter, the registration is valid and curable.

33. It is incorrect to plead that Section 22(2) of the Act will not save any defect in describing the property. We are of the view that Sections 21(1), 21(2) and 22(2) of the Act had to be interpreted by harmonious construction of the provisions and to be read together and not in isolation.

34. The question for reference in this case has been answered atleast 65 years ago by the most revered Chief Justice of this Court Thiru.Rajamannar along with Justice Thiru.Veeraswamy in Rajagopala Ayyar and another vs. Avadai Velar and others [1961 2 LW 29]. In that case, the sale deed in respect of undivided 1/3 share out of certain 'pangus' in that village was challenged on the ground that the property was not properly described for identification and also on the ground that there was some material alteration in the documents. The learned Judges after going through the recital in the said sale deed and provisions of Sections 21(1), 21 (2), 21(3) and 22 has held as follows:

                  “This section appears to be more or less complementary to the provisions of Section 21 which require that the description in a non-testamentary document" relating to immovable property should be such as may be sufficient to identify the property conveyed or dealt with by the document and that whenever it is practicable the description of the property should also be by reference to a Government map or survey. But if a description sufficient to identify the immovable property conveyed is contained in a sale deed, Section 21 does not appear to warrant a refusal of its registration on the ground that the description of the property in the document, though practicable, was not by reference to a Government map or survey. In other words, 'the provisions of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 21 are only directory. That was the view taken by this court in one of the earliest cases which is now supported by the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 22. .......

                  As we said, the sale deed had already been registered and considerations which bear upon the question whether the document was entitled to be registered, have no longer any bearing in the present case. We find, therefore, that there is no substance in the contention of the appellants that the sale deed was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of S. 22 and the Notification made thereunder.”

35. In Rajagopala Ayyar's case, the judgment of this Court rendered in Somasundaram Mudaliar and others vs. Rajappa Mudaliar [(1927 52 MLJ 140] has been referred. In Somasundaram Mudaliar's case, the learned Judge of this Court has observed as follows:

                  “5. The above being the facts of the case as found by the District Judge and as restated by me for being more intelligible, what is the law that is applicable to the case. First it seems to me under Section 21(1) of the Registration Act the description of the properties should be sufficient to identify the same. To carry out the policy of Section 21(1), Clauses 2 and 3 are also enacted. Clause (3) says whenever it is practicable survey numbers are to be given. It is clear that the word "practicable" was used with reference to the parties. Here the parties thought it is not practicable. Therefore the clause loses its apparently compulsory nature by the use of the words "whenever it Is practicable." But to remedy this defect and to add to the degree of compulsoriness the Local Government Has made rules under Section 22(1) saying that survey numbers are to be given where the lands are surveyed. Pausing here the question arises what is the effect of this rule. Section 22(2) deals with the effect of such a rule made by the Local Government under Section 22(1). It says non-compliance with such rules shall not disentitle a document to be registered if the description of the property to which it relates is sufficient to identify that property unless otherwise provided by Rule 26. I understand this exception to mean the rule itself while saying the property shall be described in a particular way should also say if it is not so described if should not be registered and where the latter part is not in the rule, the document may still be registered provided the description is sufficient to identify the property notwithstanding the particular direction in the rule. This is the view which the Judges who decided the decision in Appalacharyulu v. Ramachandracharyulu (1922) 16 LW 287 were inclined to take though it was not necessary to decide in that particular case. Notwithstanding the breach of the direction to give the survey numbers, that the description is sufficient to identify the property is clear not only from the facts as given above but also from the view of the Local Government from Rule 17, Ch. VI of its rules which says:

                  If property is described in a document by a specific reference to an instrument which has been already registered... and if that instrument contains the particulars required by Rule 16 and such a description of the property as is required by the rules in force, the description need not be repeated in the document.” (emphasis added)

36. These two judgments cited above, with adequate clarity and felicity, in our view are sufficient to hold that not only the universal release deed, but any release deed which fails to contain description of the property sufficient to identify, will suffer breach of Section 21(1) of the Act. The description of the property is however, need not be a complete description mentioned separately under scheduled or to be expressly mentioned in the recital with all details. Wherever practicable full details shall be given. Where it is not practicable for the parties, details sufficient to identify is adequate. Sufficiency to identify depends on how the property is described in the document presented for registration. It all depends upon the recital and expression used in the recital of the document and how parties to the document understood it and acted after execution of the document.

37. The difficulty for the Registrar to enter transaction in Index No.2 against any specific Survey number, in case of omission to mention survey numbers of the property, is at the most, only a procedural lapse, which is curable under Section 87 of the Act. For that reason, the validity of the registration cannot be questioned, if particulars of the property provided in the deed is sufficient to identify.

38. The statutes regarding registration had undergone changes since Act XVI of 1894 dated 23.04.1964. However, the words and expression used in Section 21(1) of the Act, 1908 had been almost consistent in respect of the essential part of the provision. Section 21(1) of the Act can be pressed into service only in case of non- testamentary document relating to immovable property, is accepted for registration without certainty and insufficient to identify. If it is certain and sufficient to identify, Section 21(1) of the Act is not applicable.

39. In case of documents, which do not reveal the identification of the property or nature of the property and an omnibus expression like 'my family property' alone is mentioned in the recital, then such document is to be held as void for lack of description and identification. However, if recital discloses nature of the property and same is sufficient of being identified, same cannot be considered as breach of mandate specified under Section 21(1) of the Act.

40. For better clarity, we wish to add that there is a vast difference between the expression 'my family properties' and 'all the properties of my father'. Family includes parents, spouses, the parents of the spouses and children. So when anyone say “my family properties”, it may trace to any one of the relationship mentioned above, thus, it becomes uncertain and ambiguous. Whereas, when the son or daughter convey the property of their father, it is a single source capable of identification. Therefore, even universal release deed will be valid, if immovable properties referred in the deed is identifiable without complete description.

41. Section 29 of the Indian Contracts Act illustrates what is certainty and what is uncertainty. Illustration 'c' to Section 29 of the Indian Contracts Act, reads as below:

                  “(c) A, who is a dealer in cocoanut-oil only, agrees to sell to B “one hundred tons of oil”. The nature of A’s trade affords an indication of the meaning of the words, and A has entered into a contract for the sale of one hundred tons of cocoanut-oil.”

42. Like the dealer, who deals with coconut oil alone, if he agrees to sell 100 tones of oil, considering the nature of the goods he trade, it is certain that he has entered into a contract for the sale of 100 tones of coconut oil akin to the release deed which mentions that one of the party to the deed agrees to release all the right in the properties of their father to other parties for certain consideration, that description is sufficient to identify and it is in compliance of Section 21(1) of the Act. It is profitable to look at the illustrations to Section 29 of the Indian Contracts Act, though connected with movables and goods, it greatly assists us to understand about the expression 'certainty' and 'identity'. In the case in hand case Ex.A3, release deed speaks about the right in the properties of the father, who died intestate. It also says describing all he properties in detail is not practicable, hence the categories of properties lone referred. Thus, the description is neither uncertain nor incapable of identification. The properties of the father can be ascertained from the documents, which confers title and right to the father. In case any dispute regarding his right or share in the properties arises, same are question of facts, which has to be decided in the Court of law.

43. As an epilogue, we hasten to add if universal release deed without full description and without adequate consideration is to be held as invalid, it will lead to fallacy of generalization. No transfer for inadequacy of consideration be held per se invalid. It depends on whether such transfer suffers any deceit, fraud, coercion, undue influence etc., which will vitiate the transfer.

44. Likewise, identification of an immovable property is not solely depends on its full and complete description. By circumstantial narration, the property can also be identified. For the registration of a deed, description adequate to identify is sufficient. Identification of the properties mentioned in the deed is to be tested from the parties' view. It depends on whether there was consensus ad idem among the parties in respect of the property they deal. If any of the party to such document, after due registration, pleads that there was no consensus ad idem in respect of identification of the properties mentioned in the deed, he should take the said plea at the earliest point of time after he/she realises the lack of consensus ad idem.

45. For the reasons stated above, following Somasundaram Mudaliar's case, Valliammal's case and Rajagopal Iyer's case, the question of reference is answered accordingly. In other words, in an universal release deed, if description of the property is sufficient to identify, such deeds are valid and the Sub Registrar cannot refuse registration quoting his power under Section 21(1) of the Act.

46. In the result, the Appeal Suit is remitted back to the Division Bench to decide on other questions of law and facts raised in the Appeal Suit.