(Prayer: This criminal petition is filed under Section 528 of BNSS, praying to allow this petition and quash the Fir bearing cr.no.9/2026 registered by the Shidlaghatta town P.S., for the offences p/u/s 132, 224, 352, 351(3), 56 of BNS, 2023 and complaint dtd 14.01.2026, pending on the file of the Learned Prl. civil judge (sr.dn) and CJM court, Shidlaghatta, Chikkaballapura District, vide annexure a and b respectively.)

This criminal petition is filed under Section 528 of BNSS., praying to allow this petition and quash the fir bearing cr.no.10/2026 registered by the shidlaghatta town p.s., for the offences p/u/s 352, 353(2) of bns, 2023 and complaint dtd 14.01.2026, pending on the file of the learned Prl. civil judge (sr.dn) and CJM court, shidlaghatta, chikkaballapura district and compliant dated 14.01.2026 vide annexure a and b.)

Cav Order:

1. The accused is common in both these petitions and the complainants are different. The crimes arises out of a solitary incident. The crimes are Crime Nos. 9 of 2026 and 10 of 2026. In Crime No.9 of 2026, the offences alleged are the ones punishable under Sections 132, 224, 352, 351(3) and 56 of the BNS and in Crime No.10 of 2026, the offences alleged are the ones punishable under Sections 352, 353(2) of the BNS.

2. Facts adumbrated are as follows:

Crl.P.No.716 of 2026:

                  2.1.    The root of the dispute traces itself to the publicity and promotion of a motion picture titled “Cult”. A film promotion programme was proposed to be conducted on 13-01-2026 at Nehru Stadium, Shidlaghatta Town which is said to be under the leadership of the petitioner. Banners with the portrait of the petitioner are said to have been installed all over the city Fort area. The banners and placards that were hanging for the film promotion fell down and are said to have hit certain vehicles. In this connection oral complaint comes to be made to the complainant. The complainant along with the Health Inspector cleared the banners, as they were disturbing the public. On 12-01-2026 at 3. 45 p.m., the petitioner over his mobile No.9900004501 calls the complainant and hurls abuses which were not in good taste. The complainant is said to have been terrified, mentally traumatized, as it was in utter defamation of a woman and the staff. Then, on the incident, the complainant registers a complaint, which becomes a crime in Crime No.9 of 2026.

Crl.P.No.721 of 2026:

                  2.2. The complainant in this case is said to be the Vice- President of a political party of Shiddalagatta Taluk, Chikkaballapura District. The allegation is that on 12-01-2026 at about 3.45 p.m. the petitioner calls the public servant/the Municipal Commissioner, the complainant in the companion petition, from his mobile number and is said to have hurled abuses on her. This recording goes viral on all social media platforms. On the allegation that the petitioner without obtaining any permission or approval has put up banners, flexes in the port area and had spoken bad words against the sitting MLA of the constituency, in the telephonic conversation with the complainant in the companion petition, the crime comes to be registered. The registration of crime in both these cases in Crime Nos. 9 of 2026 and 10 of 2026 has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

3. Heard in both the cases Sri Vivek Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional Special Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1.

4. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the offences alleged in Crime No.9 of 2026 are all bailable offences, except the one which is Section 132 of the BNS. Section 132 of the BNS does not get attracted in the case at hand at all, as there is no criminal force used by the petitioner to stop a public servant from performing his/her duties. The offence is erroneously laid against the petitioner. If that offence is stayed, the petitioner is prepared to cooperate with the investigation/enquiry, with certain protection from the hands of the Court. He would also submit that petitioner is ready and willing to tender public apology to what has been uttered against the complainant in the fit of anger. He would seek protection at the hands of this Court, as anticipatory bail has not been considered still and is yet to be considered and therefore, there is threat of arrest.

5. Per contra, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor representing the State would contend that the crime under Section 132 of the BNS may have been registered now. FIR is not an encyclopedia. Appropriate crime may emerge after the investigation. If it is not Section 132, it could be 74 or it could be 79 of the BNS, as admittedly the petitioner has spoken such words that would undoubtedly outrage the modesty of the woman, apart from the fact that he has stopped the public servant from performing her duties. He would submit that investigation, in the least, must be permitted to be continued and has produced transcript of the conversation between the petitioner and the complainant in Crime No.9 of 2026. He would seek dismissal of the petitions.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.

7. The afore-narrated facts and the link in the chain of events are not matters of conjecture, they rest firmly upon the record. A Kannada film titled ‘Cult’ appears to have provided the genesis of the present controversy. It is alleged that, for the purpose of promoting the said film, banners and flexes were erected in and around the Nehru Stadium, Shidlaghatta town in contemplation of a promotional programme proposed to be held on 13-01-2026. The petitioner stated to be a politician and a contestant in the legislative assembly elections 2023, albeit unsuccessful, has allegedly caused flexes and banners to be displayed extensively throughout the City Fort area, thereby leading to disturbance of public tranquility and inconvenience to road users.

8. In view of the said disturbance, the Municipal Commissioner, who is the complainant in Crime No. 9 of 2026, is said to have caused removal of certain placards, banners and flexes, which were allegedly erected in an accident prone area and were obstructing vehicular movement. The complainant being a public servant, was evidently performing her official duties in accordance with law. The removal of the banners is alleged to have provoked the petitioner, who, in a fit of anger, is said to have called/telephoned the Municipal Commissioner from his mobile number and hurled abuses at her. The conversation between the petitioner and the complainant is necessary to be extracted to notice whether, there is some substance in the allegation. The conversation as produced by the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor reads as follows:



















                9. The allegation against the petitioner presently stand for offences punishable under Sections 132, 224, 352, 351(3) and 56 of the BNS. Subsequently, with the permission of the learned Magistrate, an offence under the provisions of the Karnataka Open Places (Prevention of Disfigurement) Act, 1981 has also been invoked. What is of significance is that, the petitioner even before the ink on the crime could metaphorically dry, has approached this Court calling in question the very registration of the crime, primarily on the ground that the facts would not attract Section 132 of the BNS, which is Section 353 of the earlier regime, the IPC. On the score that the Apex Court has interpreted the scope and ingredients of Section 353 and has held that the use of criminal force against a public servant during execution of his duty alone would constitute an offence thereunder. Be that as it may. Whether the offences presently invoked are impeccably laid or whether alteration/addition of sections is warranted, is not a matter for adjudication at this threshold stage. What is presently before the Court is merely a registration of the crime. It is always open to the Investigating Officer, in the course of investigation, to seek appropriate permission from the jurisdictional Court, for addition of offences, should the material so warrant.

10. A plain reading of the complaint and the conversation, however, would unmistakably reveal that the petitioner has spoken in a manner that strikes at the dignity of a woman or even other public servants. Whether the remarks were made against a public servant or otherwise is not determinative for that purpose. The language and tenor attributed to the petitioner would, prima facie, disclose offences under Section 79 of the BNS. Section 79 of the BNS corresponds to Section 509 of the IPC. Section 79 of the BNS reads as follows:

                  “79. Word, gesture or act intended to insult modesty of a woman - Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any words, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object in any form, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine.

                  The provision is explicit and unequivocal. Section 79 indicates that whoever by words, sound, gesture or act intends to insult the modesty of a woman would be punishable with imprisonment which may extend upto 3 years besides fine. It is a cognizable offence. It is difficult to comprehend as to how the prosecution has not invoked this offence, notwithstanding the nature of the conversation attributed to the petitioner, as it was against a woman who is a public servant. A person who once held the status of a lawmaker is expected to be circumspect and restrained in his speech, particularly when addressing a woman, a public servant who is only discharging her statutory duty.

11. It is in public domain ora matter of public knowledge that   banners and flexes, whether for film promotion or otherwise, erected indiscriminately across cities create menace to the public, impede movement, and erode civic aesthetics. The State appears to have remained blissfully indifferent to the rampant proliferation of such banners and flexes across public spaces. Such acts would squarely fall within the ambit of Karnataka Open Places (Prevention of Disfigurement) Act, 1981, yet action is seldom taken against such disfigurement. It is high time that the State wakes up and enforces the law in earnest against unauthorised banners, placards, and flexes.

12. The complainant in Crime No.9 of 2026, has prima facie diligently performed her duty. When a public servant performs lawful duties, no individual can claim license to intimidate or abuse such public servant for mere discharge of public functions. Therefore, abuse directed at a public servant, with a view to deter or obstruct them from performing official duties, would undoubtedly attract penal consequences. In the present matter, the complainant is not merely a public servant, but also a woman and no man can be permitted to speak in the language so offensive, so as to be beyond the pale of civility and lawful tolerance. At the very least, the language employed deserves investigation, as it is settled principle of law that an FIR is not an encyclopedia of offences. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KUNWAR SINGH (2021 SCC OnLine SC 3668) , wherein the Apex Court holds as follows:

                  “….     ….      ….

                  8. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and the respondent, we are of the view that the High Court has transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC by enquiring into the merits of the allegations at the present stage. The fact that the respondent was a signatory to the cheques is not in dispute. This, in fact, has been adverted to in the judgment of the High Court. The High Court has also noted that a person who is required to approve a financial proposal is duty bound to observe due care and responsibility. There are specific allegations in regard to the irregularities which have been committed in the course of the work of the ‘Janani Mobility Express’ under the National Rural Health Mission. At this stage, the High Court ought not to be scrutinizing the material in the manner in which the trial court would do in the course of the criminal trial after evidence is adduced. In doing so, the High Court has exceeded the well-settled limits on the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. A detailed enquiry into the merits of the allegations was not warranted. The FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia, particularly, in a matter involving financial irregularities in the course of the administration of a public scheme. A final report has been submitted under Section 173 of CrPC, after investigation.”

                  (Emphasis supplied)

                  The Apex Court in KUNWAR SINGH has held that FIR is not an encyclopedia. Investigation must ordinarily be permitted to proceed, save in exceptional circumstances carved out by judicial postulates.

13. This Court also notices that Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC/now 79 and 352 of BNS have been interpreted by the Apex Court in a manner that, even use of filthy language depending upon the context and intent, may constitute an offence of insulting the modesty of a woman. The modesty of a woman is an attribute associated with womanhood as a class and that the ultimate test is, whether the act is capable of shocking the sense of decency or dignity of a woman, gazed by contemporary societal standards. The abuses hurled in the facts and circumstances, require investigation in the least.

14. In the light of the aforesaid, this Court cannot at this stage, embark upon an evaluation of whether Section 132 BNS or any other section is ultimately sustainable, since the investigation has hardly commenced. The crime was registered on 14-01-2026 and the petition is preferred on 19-01-2026 within 5 days. The petitioner, therefore, seeks interference at this stage when investigation is yet to meaningfully unfold. The Apex Court in NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ((2021)19 SCC 401) , lays down the principles of interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under 482 of the Cr.P.C. The conclusions laid down by the Apex Court are as follows:

                  “….     ….      ….

Conclusions

                  33.     In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

                  33.1.   Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence.

                  33.2.   Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.

                  33.3.   It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.

                  33.4.   The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest of rare cases” (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

                  33.5.   While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.

                  33.6.   Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.

                  33.7.   Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule.

                  33.8.   Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.

                  33.9.   The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping.

                  33.10.Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.

                  33.11.Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.

                  33.12.The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.

                  33.13.The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court.

                  33.14.However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self- restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.

                  33.15.When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.

                  33.16.The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438CrPC before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/charge- sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

                  33.17.Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

                  33.18.Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

                  The Apex Court in NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE has comprehensively laid down the principles governing interference by the High Court under 482 of the Cr.P.C. The conclusions emphasize that if the FIR discloses commission of cognizable offence, the Court should not ordinarily stifle investigation and interference is permissible only in the narrowest exceptional circumstances.

15. In view of the above, the investigation at the least, in the case at hand, is indispensable. Consequently, Crl.P.No.716 of 2026 does not merit entertainment at this stage. For the very reasons indicated in dealing with Criminal Petition No.716 of 2026, the petition in Criminal Petition No.721 of 2026 also is found meritless.

16. For the aforesaid reasons, finding no merit in these petitions, the petitions stand rejected. Consequently, pending applications/I.A.No.1 of 2026, also stand disposed.

                  It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for considerering the case under Section 528 of BNSS and would not bind or influence the investigation.