(Prayer: Appeal Suit filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against the Judgment and decree dated 30.06.2020 made in O.S.No.69 of 2011 on the file of the IV Additional District & Sessions Court, Coimbatore.)

1. This First Appeal is preferred by the 2nd defendant / purchaser against the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2020 made in O.S. No. 69 of 2011 on the file of the IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, whereby the suit for specific performance and permanent injunction was decreed in favour of the plaintiff.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as they were arrayed before the Trial Court.

3. The case of the Plaintiff: The plaintiff sought specific performance of the sale agreement dated 13.08.2010 (Ex. A2) and consequential permanent injunction. According to him, after the earlier agreement dated 06.07.2010 (Ex. A1) under which Rs.2,00,000/- had been paid as advance, a fresh agreement, Ex. A2, was executed on payment of a further Rs.3,00,000/-, making the total advance Rs.5,00,000/-. Under Ex. A2, the balance sale consideration of Rs.17,00,000/- was payable, of which Rs.15,00,000/- was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed and the remaining Rs.2,00,000/- after harvest of turmeric, with two months fixed for completion. The plaintiff pleaded that time was not the essence of the contract, that he was always ready and willing to perform his part, and that the 1stdefendant, despite redeeming the mortgage, failed to appear for registration on 11.10.2010, compelling him to issue telegrams and legal notices. He further alleged that, during the pendency of the suit, the 1st defendant executed a sale deed dated 25.02.2011 in favour of the 2nd defendant, who in turn created a mortgage in favour of the 3rd defendant and executed a power of attorney in favour of the 4th defendant. According to the plaintiff, all these transactions were sham and were hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.During the pendency of the suit, the first defendant died, and his legal representatives, namely his wives, were impleaded as defendants 5 and 6.On these pleadings, he sought execution and registration of the sale deed by defendants 5 and 6, delivery of possession and permanent injunction.

4. Case of the Defendants: The 1st defendant contested the suit as false and not maintainable. Though admitting his title, the agreements dated 06.07.2010 and 13.08.2010, and receipt of Rs.5,00,000/- in all, he contended that time was the essence of the contract and that the plaintiff failed to perform within the stipulated period by not coming with funds on 11.10.2010. He denied the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness, questioned his financial capacity, alleged suppression of material facts.In the additional written statement the 1st defendant disputed the genuineness of the agreement dated 13.08.2010 by claiming that his signature had been obtained in a drunken state, he further contended that the mortgage had already been discharged in 2007, attacked the plaintiff’s version regarding the telegrams and payments, described the property particulars as vague, suggested that the transaction was in substance only a loan transaction, and sought dismissal of the suit.

5. The 2nd defendant who is the lispendent lite purchaser also challenged the maintainability of the suit and pleaded suppression of material facts. He relied on an earlier agreement of sale dated 07.06.2009 (Ex. B6) said to have been entered into with the 1st defendant, contended that the plaintiff was aware of the same, and claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value under the sale deed dated 25.02.2011, pursuant to which he was in possession and patta and chitta stood in his name. He alleged that the plaintiff’s agreements were forged and fabricated, referred to the subsequent mortgage deed and power of attorney, and sought dismissal of the suit.

6. The 6thdefendant, wife of the 1st defendant, contended that the 5thdefendant had long since deserted the 1stdefendant, had no subsisting relationship with him, and was therefore not a necessary party to the proceedings.She denied the plaint averments and contended that she had accompanied the 1st defendant to the Registrar’s Office on 11.10.2010, but that the plaintiff neither appeared in time nor had sufficient funds. She supported the subsequent sale in favour of the 2nd defendant, asserted that he was in possession and that revenue records stood in his name, questioned the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness, and sought dismissal of the suit with costs.

7. At trial, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and another witness as PW2, and marked Exs.A1 to A34. On the side of the defendants, the 6th defendant was examined as DW1 and the 2nd defendant as DW2, and Exs.B1 to B10 were marked, besides Exs.C1 and X1.

8. The Trial Court treated the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act as the pivotal issue and, upon consideration of the contemporaneous telegrams, notices, admissions and other documentary evidence, found that the 1st defendant had taken inconsistent stands. It held that the execution of Exs.A1 and A2, receipt of an advance of Rs.5,00,000/-, and the balance sale consideration of Rs.17,00,000/- stood admitted, and that the plaintiff had proved his continuous readiness and willingness, while the defendant was responsible for the non-completion of the transaction. The plea that the agreement had been obtained when the 1st defendant was under the influence of alcohol was rejected for want of proof.

9. As regards the purchase by the 2nd defendant, the Trial Court held that the sale deed dated 25.02.2011 and the subsequent mortgage and power documents dated 25.03.2011, having come into existence after presentation of the suit on 21.02.2011, were hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and further held that the 2nd defendant was not a bona fide purchaser thereby decreed the suit with costs, granting the reliefs of specific performance and permanent injunction, besides one month’s time for payment of the balance sale consideration and execution of the sale deed.

10. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the 2nd defendant, claiming title as a subsequent purchaser under the sale deed dated 25.02.2011 registered on 28.02.2011, preferred the present appeal contending that the Trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the time stipulations in Exs.A1 and A2, the plaintiff’s lack of continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the absence of deposit of the balance sale consideration, and the insufficiency of the bank deposits and fixed deposit receipts to prove financial capacity. The appellant further claimed that he was a bona fide purchaser without notice, having obtained an Encumbrance Certificate on 24.02.2011 showing no encumbrance, and sought to rely on additional documents in support thereof. He also contended that the pre-suit notices disclosed absence of consensus ad idem as to the terms of sale and that the relief sought against defendants 5 and 6 was not maintainable. On these grounds, he prayed that the judgment and decree under appeal be set aside.

11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/second defendant contend that the judgment and decree of the trial Court granting specific performance are unsustainable both on facts and in law. According to the learned counsel, in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff’s continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is the foundational requirement; yet, the trial Court proceeded to decree the suit without framing a specific issue on that vital aspect. It was further submitted that the document dated 06.07.2010 was only in the nature of a receipt/acknowledgment for the amount paid towards redemption of the mortgage and could not, by itself, be treated as a concluded agreement of sale. The subsequent unregistered agreement dated 13.08.2010, on the other hand, specifically fixed the period for completion of the sale and, therefore, time had to be treated as an essential term of the arrangement between the parties. Despite such stipulation, the plaintiff neither completed the transaction within the agreed period nor sought extension of time, and there was no acceptable evidence to show that he had the balance sale consideration readily available at the relevant point of time.

12. Learned counsel would further argue that the financial documents relied upon by the plaintiff did not establish his capacity to mobilise the requisite funds within time and that his overall conduct, both prior and subsequent to the stipulated date, clearly indicated reluctance and lack of preparedness to conclude the transaction. It was also contended that, in the absence of a specific prayer, no decree for refund could have been granted and maintained that he is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice, and therefore his rights could not have been defeated by a decree passed without strict proof of the statutory requirements governing specific performance.

13. In support of the above submissions, reliance was placed on J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects, U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, Pydi Ramanna v. D. Vararasetty Manmadha Rao, V.S. Ramakrishnan v. P.M. Muhammed Ali, Makhan Lal Bangal v. Manas Bhunia, Ram Kali (Barman) (D) v. Md. Mahim Ali, B. Nemi Chand Jain v. G. Ravindran, Bylamurthy v. M.G. Gangalakshmamma, Veena Singh (D) v. District Registrar/Additional Collector, R. Sharma v. G. Srinivasan, Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daulat, Kadupugolla Varalakshmi v. Vudagiri Venkata Rao and T.P. Latha @ Hemalatha v. V.P. Sukumar.

14. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff contended that the appellant/2nd defendant, being a purchaser pendente lite, could not defeat the plaintiff’s contractual rights or the decree for specific performance, as the sale in his favour and the subsequent mortgage and power transactions had all come into existence after presentation of the suit and were therefore hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. He further submitted that the time stipulations in Exs.A1 and A2 were not decisive, since, in contracts for sale of immovable property, time is ordinarily not of the essence, and that the Trial Court had rightly relied on the plaintiff’s telegrams, notices, replies and financial documents to hold that he had continuously been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It was also contended that the appellant, being only a transferee after institution of the suit, could not claim any better title than the vendor, and that the decree of the Trial Court therefore deserved to be confirmed. In support of the above submissions, reliance was placed on Shingara Singh v. Daljit Singh and Another, Bhavyanath represented by power of attorney v. K.V.Balan(Dead) Through Legal Representatives, Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani,Vedachari v. Narasimha Mudali, Smt.Ram Peary and others v. Gauri and other, P.Lakshmi Ammal v. S.Lakshmi Ammal and others, Guruswamy Nadar v. P.Lakshmi Ammal (Dead) and others, Chander Bhan (D) v.Mukhtiar Singh and others, P.Daivasigamani v. S.Sambandan, Narinderjit Singh vs North Star Estate promoters Limited.

15. Points for determination:

                   (1) Whether the plaintiff proved continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific performance Act, 1963and whether the contractual time limits defeat specific performance?

                   (2) Whether disputes on extent/appurtenances (well/kalam/salai) show uncertainty, want of consensus, disentitling specific performance?

                   (3) Whether the appellant is a bona fide purchaser based on Encumbrance Certificate, or whether the 2011 sale and subsequent documents are governed by Section 52 Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (lis pendens) and cannot affect plaintiff’s rights?

                   (4)Whether decree against legal heirs and consequential injunction/possession directions are sustainable, and whether discretion was properly exercised?

Point no 1:

16. The plaintiff’s case on continuous readiness and willingness is built on (i) his own testimony as PW1 that he paid advance amounts, repeatedly demanded completion, and remained willing to pay the balance, and (ii) contemporaneous documents issued immediately after the disputed registration date. The most proximate proof shown as Ex. A5 telegram dated 11.10.2010, where the plaintiff asserts that under the agreement dated 13.08.2010 the vendor failed to execute the sale deed, that the plaintiff was ready and willing and had waited at the Sub- Registrar office on 11.10.2010, and called upon immediate execution; it is followed by Ex. A6 postal proof, Ex. A7 notice, Ex. A8 acknowledgement, and the vendor’s Ex.A9 reply. These documents are significant because they arise immediately after the alleged breach event and show prompt insistence rather than silence or abandonment, which is a key aspect of “willingness” under Section 16(c) of the Specific performance Act, 1963.

17. The defence version through DW1 is that the plaintiff fixed the registration plan and did not come prepared with funds on 11.10.2010. That oral version creates a direct conflict on the narrative on who had defaulted; in such conflicts, courts commonly look for contemporaneous conduct and consistency. Here, the plaintiff’s immediate telegram/notice supports a finding that he maintained an active demand for performance and continued to assert readiness.

18. Section 16(c) requires that the plaintiff plead and prove continuous readiness (capacity) and willingness (conduct). The test is not confined to the mere presence of a time clause; rather, the court assesses the totality of conduct before and after the critical date and whether the plaintiff’s conduct is consistent with performance. In contracts for sale of immovable property, even where a period is stipulated, the decisive inquiry remains whether the plaintiff remained ready and willing and whether failure to complete within the period is attributable to the plaintiff’s default or to circumstances on the vendor side. On the evidence here, PW1’s narrative supported by immediate post-event communications (Ex. A5 to A9), the plaintiff’s conduct is consistent with continuous willingness, and the contractual time stipulation, by itself, does not defeat specific performance.

19. The plaintiff’s financial capacity is supported by a combination of deposit/FD exhibits and banking records, together with PW1’s sworn assertion that he had arranged funds and was capable of paying the balance. The FD/deposit receipts Ex. A19 to Ex. A25 show fixed deposits/deposits in the names of the plaintiff and his wife (family unit resources) and are relied upon to show “means.” This court also notes that deposit/FD series (Ex. A18 onwards) were produced as proof of financial capacity. Additionally, banking records such as Ex. A34 (Syndicate statement) show withdrawals corresponding to the advance payments (Rs.2,00,000 on 06.07.2010 and Rs.3,00,000 on 13.08.2010) and later deposits around October 2010, which is used to corroborate that the transaction payments were actually mobilised through banking channels.

20. The defence attacks this by arguing: (i) FD receipts do not equal “cash in hand” on the exact registration day, (ii) some deposits are not in the plaintiff’s name, and (iii) the plaintiff did not deposit the entire balance in court earlier. These are legitimate lines of cross-examination, but they do not automatically negate capacity. Deposits in the spouse’s name are not irrelevant as evidence of means; courts consider whether the plaintiff could command resources within the immediate family, especially when supported by conduct showing persistent attempts to complete. Similarly, non-deposit before final adjudication is not, as a matter of law, invariably fatal; what matters is whether the plaintiff had the capacity and maintained willingness, and whether he is able to comply with payment directions when ordered. The legal standard under Section 16(c) is proof of capacity and conduct; it does not impose a universal rule that pre-decree deposit is always mandatory. Further Section 16 Explanation (i) of Specific Relief Act clearly stated that it is not necessary to the plaintiff to actually tender the money to the defendant or deposit the amount into the court, unless so ordered by the court.

21. The plaintiff proved financial capacity by deposit/FD materials and bank records, and the FD/bank documents support readiness when read with his contemporaneous conduct; non-deposit before decree does not, on law or on the evidence, defeat relief.

22. The plaintiff proved continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c), and the contractual time limits do not, on these facts and conduct, defeat specific performance. Thus, Point no. 1 is answered against the 2nd defendant/appellant.

Point no 2:

23. The question on certainty arises because the vendor side, during notice exchange and later pleadings, raised disputes regarding the extent (1.50 acres versus 1.35 acres) and appurtenances (well, kalam, salai, etc.). The plaintiff’s evidence through PW1 is that these were later excuses to avoid performance and that the agreement covered the suit lands as described. The evidence relevant to certainty is whether the essential terms of the contract remain identifiable: the parties, the property, and the total consideration (Rs.22,00,000) with advance paid and balance fixed. Those essential elements are consistently asserted by PW1, supported by the agreement narrative and the notice chain.

24. Further, the plaintiff’s conduct, as reflected in his reply notice (Ex.A13) includes willingness to proceed even while leaving disputed items, which is conduct typically used to show that the plaintiff sought completion rather than insisting on collateral disputes as a condition precedent. The defense’s arguments on no consensus would have greater force if the property itself or the core extent were incapable of identification or if the bargain shifted fundamentally; but on the evidence presented, the conflict is substantially about appurtenant rights/space and alleged later objections, while the core sale bargain remained fixed.

25. Specific performance is refused for uncertainty where essential terms are vague or incapable of enforcement. Disputes on incidental appurtenances do not necessarily destroy consensus if the core bargain is clear and the court can identify the subject-matter and enforce the main conveyance.

26. The disputes on well/kalam/salai do not render the contract uncertain on essential terms and do not disentitle specific performance on the evidence.Thus, Point no. 2 is answered against the 2nd defendant/appellant.

Point no 3:

27. The 2nd defendant claims bona fide purchase based on an Encumbrance Certificate (EC) said to show no encumbrance as on 24.02.2011 and his purchase deed dated 25.02.2011 (registered 28.02.2011). However, the decisive basic facts for lis pendens is the chronology: the suit was presented on 21.02.2011, while the appellant’s sale deed Ex. A15 is dated 25.02.2011, and further dealings Ex.A16 (mortgage) and Ex.A17 (GPA) are dated 25.03.2011, i.e., after institution.

28. Section 52 Transfer of property Act, 1882 operates from the date of presentation of the plaint and binds transferees pendente lite to the result of the litigation. The doctrine does not depend on whether the Encumbrance Certificate reflected the suit; it prevents parties from defeating adjudication by transfers during pendency. The record explicitly sets out Section 52 and the explanation as to when pendency commences. Therefore, even if the appellant asserts absence of notice via Encumbrance Certificate, the purchase during pendency is, in law, subject to the plaintiff’s rights as determined in the suit, and cannot be used to defeat those rights.

29. The 2011 sale and subsequent documents are governed by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Lis pendens) and cannot affect the plaintiff’s rights; the Encumbrance Certificate based bona fide purchaser plea cannot prevail against lis pendens.Thus, Point no. 3 is answered against the 2nd defendant/appellant.

Point No 4:

30. The original vendor( 1st defendant ) died during the proceedings and legal heirs were brought on record. The plaintiff sought a decree for specific performance against the defendants (including heirs) and consequential injunction/possession reliefs, and also challenged the effectiveness of third-party dealings created after dispute/suit. The appellant’s objection that the heirs have “no title” to convey rests on the premise that his purchase overrides the plaintiff’s claim; once lis pendens applies, that premise fails because the transferee cannot improve his position over the vendor in a pending suit.

31. Specific performance decrees commonly include consequential directions, execution/registration, delivery of possession, and injunction to create 3rd party interest are alleged during pendency. The court’s discretion is exercised by weighing statutory compliance (Section 16(c)), conduct of parties, and equities. Where the plaintiff has established readiness/willingness and the subsequent transfers fall within lis pendens, reliefs against the vendor side/legal heirs and consequential protective injunction are legally sustainable.

32. Reliefs against legal heirs and consequential injunction/possession directions are sustainable on law and facts, and discretion is properly exercised when Section 16(c) compliance and lis pendens consequences are satisfied. Thus, Point no. 4 is answered against the 2nd defendant/appellant.

33. For the reasons above, it is concluded that the plaintiff’s continuous readiness and willingness is supported by his oral evidence and contemporaneous conduct (Ex. A5 to A9), his capacity is supported by deposit/bank materials, the contract is not rendered unenforceable by the appurtenance disputes, the appellant’s purchase is governed by lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the consequential reliefs against the vendor side/legal heirs and the protective injunction are legally sustainable.

34. Accordingly, A.S. No. 63 of 2021 is dismissed with cost and confirming the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2020 made in O.S. No. 69 of 2011 on the file of the IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Coimbatore. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.