Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 29.11.2025, passed against one Abdul Samad, the detenu, under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The detention order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 30.01.2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months, from the date of detention

2. As evident from the records, it was based on a proposal dated 05.11.2025 of the District Police Chief, Malappuram, that the jurisdictional authority initiated proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act. For the purpose of initiating the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a "known rowdy" as defined under Section 2(p) (iii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.857/2025 of Perumbadappu Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 118(1), 351(3) and 110 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”).

4. We heard Sri. M. H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P1 order was passed without proper application of mind and on improper consideration of facts. According to the learned counsel, the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, and the conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail itself were sufficient to deter the detenu from being involved in further criminal activities. The learned counsel urged that as the conditions imposed on the detenu at the time of granting bail were sufficient to prevent him from repeating criminal activities, a detention order under the KAA(P) Act was not at all necessitated. The learned counsel further submitted that there occurred an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as passing the detention order, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped. On these premises, it was urged that the Ext.P1 order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Moreover, the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order after being fully satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu are not sufficient to prevent him from being involved in further criminal activities, and there is every likelihood that he will be involved in criminal activities again, violating the said bail conditions. According to the learned Government Pleader, the compelling circumstances that necessitated the passing of Ext.P1 order is reflected in the order itself, and therefore, the same requires no interference. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no undue delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order and therefore the petitioner cannot be heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped.

7. As evident from the records, the incident that led to the registration of the case with respect to the last prejudicial activity occurred on 21.09.2025, and the detenu was arrested on 22.09.2025. Subsequently, he got bail in the said case on 11.11.2025. It was on 05.11.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was forwarded by the sponsoring authority. Subsequently, on 29.11.2025, Ext.P1 detention order was passed. The sequence of the events narrated above clearly reveals that there was no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order.

8. However, we are not unmindful of the fact that the proposal was forwarded by the sponsoring authority after forty-five days from the date of the last prejudicial activity. While considering the said delay, it cannot be ignored that altogether four cases in which the detenu got involved have formed the basis for initiating proceedings under KAA(P) Act against the detenu. Therefore, some minimum time is naturally required for the collection and verification of the records of the cases registered against the detenu. Moreover, on the next day of the occurrence of the last prejudicial activity, the detenu was arrested, and he was under judicial custody till 11.11.2025. As the detenu was under judicial custody till 11.11.2025, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding the repetition of criminal activities by him, as he was already confined in jail. Moreover, the proposal was forwarded by the sponsoring authority before the detenu’s release from jail. Therefore, the short delay that occurred in forwarding the proposal is of little consequence. Likewise, after the date of the proposal, the detention order was passed without any undue delay. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that there is unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order will not be sustained. In essence, it could not be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped.

9. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order of detention. While considering the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing a detention order against a person who is already on bail. However, when a detention order has to be passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the jurisdictional authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to restrain him from being involved in criminal activities.

10. Undisputedly, an order of detention is a drastic measure against a person. Therefore, when there are other effective remedies available under the ordinary criminal law to deter a person from engaging in criminal activities, an order of preventive detention is neither necessitated nor legally permissible. Therefore, when a person is already on bail, the compelling circumstances that necessitated the passing of a preventive detention order should be reflected in the order itself.

11. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in Ext.P1 order, the fact that the detenu got bail in the cases registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions has been duly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the antecedents of the detenu show that he is a person having scant respect for the bail conditions imposed on him, and the present bail conditions imposed on him while granting bail to him in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity are insufficient to restrain the detenu from repeating criminal activities. A holistic reading of the impugned order further reveals that the previous acts of the detenu violating the bail conditions and being involved in criminal activities is one of the materials which the jurisdictional authority relied on to enter into a subjective satisfaction to pass the detention order. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the sufficiency of bail conditions imposed on the detenu was not considered by the jurisdictional authority cannot be sustained.

                  In view of the above discussion, we hold that the detenu has not made out any case warranting interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.