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CDJ 2026 SC 469 print Preview print print
Court : Supreme Court of India
Case No : Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 [arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2461 of 2026]
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
Parties : Arvind Walia Versus Directorate of Enforcement & Another\r\n
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: ------ For the Respondents: ------
Date of Judgment : 23-03-2026
Head Note :-
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 -
Judgment :-

1. Leave granted.

2. Appellant was arrested on 21st July, 2025 by the Directorate of Enforcement[ED] under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002[PMLA, 2002]. He filed a writ petition[CRWP No. 8667 of 2025] before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh challenging his arrest and various subsequent remand orders passed by the trial court. The said writ petition has been dismissed vide the impugned order dated 29th January, 2026. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has filed the present appeal.

3. On 11th February, 2026, we issued notice limited to the question of considering the prayer of the appellant for grant of bail.

4. Appellant is a promoter-director of M/s Ramprastha Promoters & Developers Pvt. Ltd. (RPDPL). Allegedly, he along with other co-accused / directors induced homebuyers to invest in various real estate projects but later failed to deliver flats / apartments. They also diverted the funds to other entities and, thus, cheated the homebuyers. In this connection, ECIR bearing no. ECIR/GNZO/14/2021 was registered by the ED on 9th August, 2021 for purported offences under the PMLA, 2002.

5. After three years of registration of the ECIR, the ED issued notice on 3rd May, 2024 under Section 50, PMLA, 2002 to the appellant to appear 'in person' and to 'give evidence' before it. Appellant, undisputedly, appeared physically before the ED on five different occasions (i.e., on 31.05.2024, 29.06.2025, 06.05.2025, 13.05.2025 and 15.05.2025).

6. After four years of registration of the ECIR, the appellant was arrested from his residence on 21st July, 2025. Soon after, on 18th September, 2025 to be precise, the ED filed prosecution complaint under Sections 44 and 45 of PMLA, 2002 against, inter alia, the appellant, alleging commission of offences under Sections 3 and 4 thereof. On 16th October, 2025, the appellant's application for interim bail on medical grounds was disposed of by the High Court with a direction to the jail authorities to ensure adequate medical treatment to the appellant.

7. We have taken note of the fact that prosecution complaint has already been filed by the ED and that the appellant (aged 65 years) has been in custody for over 8 months. We have also taken note of the fact that the appellant, prior to his arrest, physically appeared before the ED on five occasions. Presently, there seems to be no necessity to continue him in custody. What remains for consideration is the restrictions imposed by Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002.

8. Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002 cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite detention. In appropriate cases, the constitutional courts must intervene and have, in fact, intervened in the past to safeguard the right to personal liberty of the accused under Article 21. The twin conditions under Section 45 cannot override the constitutional safeguards under Article 21 of the Constitution (see: Manish Sisodia v Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920). Applying this principle, this Court has granted bail in appropriate cases irrespective of the period of custody[Mahesh Joshi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2633 (custody period - 7 months) and Param Chand Jain v. Enforcement Directorate, SLP (Crl.) No. 17476/2024 vide order dated 16.01.2025 (custody period - 6.5 months).].

9. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that further detention of the appellant pending trial is not necessary. The appeal, thus, deserves acceptance and the appellant may be admitted to an order for grant of bail.

10. The impugned order to the extent it upholds the arrest of the appellant is not disturbed but stands modified to the extent of grant of bail to the appellant for the reasons assigned above.

11. Appellant shall be released on bail, subject to furnishing of bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court and subject to such other terms and conditions as may be imposed by it.

12. Needless to observe, the appellant shall not, directly or indirectly, by making inducement, threat or promise, dissuade any person acquainted with the facts of the case from disclosing such facts to the court.

13. In the event there is any breach of the terms and conditions for grant of bail, the trial court shall be at liberty to cancel the bail of the appellant.

14. It is also ordered that the appellant shall diligently attend proceedings of the trial, unless exempted. If he abstains from attending the proceedings without justifiable cause, that could also be seen as breach of the conditions for grant of bail and the trial court will be free to pass appropriate orders.

15. We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case.

16. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms.

 
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