(Prayer: Writ Appeal filed To set aside the Order passed by this Honble Court made in W.P. No. 26616 of 2022 dated 12-11-2025 and allow this Writ Appeal and thus render justice.)

C. Kumarappan, J.

1. The appellant and the respondent are the petitioner and the respondent respectively before the Writ Court.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to according to their litigative status before the Writ Court.

3. It appears that the 2nd respondent has raised an industrial dispute in respect of one reserve driver R.Jothi Basu, as his duty was deferred for a period of six months. When the matter was referred to the Labour Court by the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.340 dated 25.05.2018, the Labour Court after elaborate enquiry has ultimately found vide order dated 13.10.2020 that the deference of the employee R.Jothi Basu for a period of six months is not justifiable and ultimately issued necessary, consequential directions. Aggrieved with the same, the petitioner-Management preferred a writ petition, wherein the learned Single Judge having found that the Management is not entitled to approbate and reprobate their stand one before the Labour Court and other before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, and ultimately dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved with the order of the Writ Court, the present appeal is filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

4. Heard Mr.T.Chandrasekaran, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms.H.Nandhini, learned counsel for the respondent.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant would vehemently contend that though the petitioner-Management has taken a defence before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal that the driver R.Jothi Basu was not rash and negligent, the Tribunal ultimately found against them and fixed the liability. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel that the mere defence put forth before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal will in no way constitute an estoppel or cannot be put against the petitioner/Manangement in a disciplinary proceedings against their employee. He would further contend that the counter statement filed by them in MCOP.No.72 of 2014 cannot be construed as an admission of fact so as to deprive them to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee. In support of his contention, he relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in WP.No.39563 of 2004 [V.Syril Sundararaj Vs. The Presiding Officer and others] dated 01.04.2024. Hence, prayed to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would vehemently contend that before the Motor Accident Tribunal, the petitioner has taken a specific stand that the workman/driver was not rash and negligent. However, the Management having taken such defence that their driver was not negligent in total disregard to the above stand has no locus to frame charge for negligent driving against the workmen, which is in violation to the fairness of the procedures. In support of her contention, she relied upon the judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2012) 5 SCC 242 and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mahadeo Krishna Naik reported in (2025) 4 SCC 321. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ appeal.

7. We have given our anxious consideration to either side submissions.

8. It is an admitted fact that the Management has taken a defence that the workman was not at all negligent, and it was only due to the poor road condition, the accident has occurred. For ready reference, this Court deems it appropriate to extract paragraph 5 of the counter statement:-

               “5.The respondent does not admit the manner of accident as narrated by the petitioners in Col.23 of the petition to be true and genuine. This respondent humbly states below the actual facts of the accident. The driver of this respondent drove the bus bearing Regn.No.TN38N1041 on 26.12.2013 in its 6.25 AM trip from Mettupalayam to Puliampatti with much care by observing traffic rules and regulations. While so at about 7.20AM when the bus was nearing Mathampalayam A.D.Colony the driver of this respondent drove the bus slowly and carefully. At that time due to poor road condition the bus dragged into right side of the road and digged pit caused the accident. It is an inevitable accident and an Act of God. Hence the driver of this respondent is not responsible for the accident. So this respondent is not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner even under “NO FAULT LIABILITY”.”

9. Now let us consider whether the above stand of the Management will bar them to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the workman for rash and negligent driving. A similar issue was dealt by the Full Bench of this Court and the reference before the Full Bench was as follows:-

               “Whether the Management is precluded from initiating disciplinary proceedings against its driver on the allegation that he had caused the accident due to his rashness and negligence in driving the vehicle, in view of the contrary stand taken before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, wherein the Management has taken a plea that the driver was neither negligent nor rash in driving the vehicle?”

10. The Full Bench of this Court after having considered various aspect, has held that the stand captured in the counter statement of the Management should be construed as an attempt to resist the motor accident claim made against it and such defence cannot operate as an estoppel, and the principles of estoppel would applicable only upon certain conditions enumerated in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chhaganlal Keshavlal Mehta v. Patel Narandas Haribhai, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 223. In the above backdrop, the Full Bench ultimately, held that the Management’s counter before MACT proceedings by defending their driver, does not preclude them from initiating disciplinary proceedings against him.

11. However in a recent decision; subsequent to the above Full Bench judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Krishna Naik’s case [cited supra] in a similar set of facts has held as follows:-

               29. We are conscious that the law of evidence per se does not apply to industrial adjudication. Nevertheless, the general principles do apply. In any event, in industrial adjudication, principles of natural justice have to be complied with. Fairness in procedure has developed as the third limb of natural justice. The manner in which the Corporation conducted itself before the Labour Court does not behove a creature of a statute. It has been far from fair in its dealings with Mahadeo

               30. The Corporation did not deliberately refer to the award of MACT at two different tiers, and thereby actively suppressed relevant material from a court of law. We do not propose to enter the arena of controversy as to whether the award of MACT is binding on the Labour Court. However, the Corporation could not have at any rate resiled from what it pleaded in its own written statement before MACT on a sworn affidavit and deliberately withhold the same. This Court has always taken a serious view against suppression of evidence in a judicial proceeding

               31. In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed : (SCC p. 706, para 164)

               “164. It is a settled proposition of law that a false statement made in the court or in the pleadings, intentionally to mislead the court and obtain a favourable order, amounts to criminal contempt, as it tends to impede the administration of justice. It adversely affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. Every party is under a legal obligation to make truthful statements before the court, for the reason that causing an obstruction in the due course of justice ‘undermines and obstructs the very flow of the unsoiled stream of justice, which has to be kept clear and pure, and no one can be permitted to take liberties with it by soiling its purity’.

               32. Even if we keep the award of MACT aside, it is clear from the pleadings of the Corporation before MACT and the Labour Court that the Corporation has attempted to get the best of both worlds. The contradictory nature of the stances taken by the Corporation before the Labour Court and MACT reeks of the Corporation trying to approbate and reprobate on the same issue. It is bound to cause immense prejudice to Mahadeo if the Corporation is allowed to reverse its stance to suit its own interests.

               33. This Court in Union of India v. N. Murugesan [Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 : (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 711 : (2022) 1 SCC (L&S) 328] while holding that it will be inequitable and unfair if a party is allowed to challenge a position while enjoying its fruits, ruled : (SCC pp. 38-39, para 26)

               “26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle.”

               (emphasis supplied)

12. In the above judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Corporation cannot resile from their pleading submitted before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, while initiating disciplinary proceedings. It is further held that it would become an unfair practice, and in the industrial adjudication, apart from principles of natural justice, fairness in procedure is essential as a third limb of natural justice. Therefore, from the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is amply clear that if the Management has taken a particular stand before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, they are bound by the same and they cannot resile from the stand while taking disciplinary proceedings against workman.

13. Though, the Full Bench of this Court has answered that notwithstanding the stand of the Management before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal still they can initiate the disciplinary proceedings, the same becomes no longer good law in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Krishna Naik’s case [cited supra]. In the instant case, the Management has taken a specific stand that their workman was not at all negligent and the accident had taken place only due to the poor road condition. Therefore, by virtue of the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Krishna Naik’s case [cited supra], the very framing of charge regarding the rash and negligent driving against the workman is illegal. Therefore, we absolutely concur with the findings of the learned Single Judge and we do not find any merits in the present Writ Appeal.

14. In the result, this Writ Appeal stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected CMP is also closed.