(Prayer in S.A.No.64 of 2014: The Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2013 passed in A.S.No.15 of 2013 on the file of the Additional District Court-III, Thiruvallore at Poonamalee, reversing the order and decreetal order dated 10.12.2012 passed in I.A.No.200 of 2012 in O.S.No.69 of 2011 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee.

In S.A.No.65 of 2014 The Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the judgment and decree passed Cross Objections in A.S.No.15 of 2013 dated 29.11.2013 on the file of the Additional District Court-III, Thiruvallore at Poonamalee, reversing the order and decreetal order dated 10.12.2012 passed in I.A.No.200 of 2012 in O.S.No.69 of 2011 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee.)

1. Both these Second Appeals have been filed by the same appellant. She was the first defendant in O.S. No.69 of 2011 and the petitioner in I.A. No.200 of 2012 filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee. Both appeals arise out of the common judgment and decree dated 29.11.2013 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Tiruvallur at Poonamallee, in A.S. No.15 of 2013. By that judgment, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order dated 10.12.2012 in I.A. No.200 of 2012 in O.S. No.69 of 2011 rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, restored the suit to file for disposal on merits, and dismissed the cross-objection filed by the appellant. S.A. No.64 of 2014 is directed against the reversal of the order rejecting the plaint, and S.A. No.65 of 2014 is directed against the dismissal of the cross-objection.

2. It is seen that the appellant has preferred two separate Second Appeals against the very same judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court one ostensibly assailing the reversal of the trial Court’s order rejecting the plaint, and the other challenging the dismissal of the cross objection. However, a careful scrutiny of the memoranda of appeal discloses that both the appeals are virtually identical in their pleadings and grounds, and that the reliefs sought therein are also one and the same.

3. Inasmuch as both the appeals arise out of the very same judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, albeit containing distinct findings on different points for consideration, ordinarily a single Second Appeal would have sufficed to challenge the same. In the present case, however, two separate second appeals have been preferred against the same judgment and decree, and from the grounds of appeal it is not possible to clearly segregate as to which appeal is specifically directed against the reversal of the order rejecting the plaint and which appeal is directed against the dismissal of the cross-objection.

4. This Court, while admitting both the Second Appeals on 28.01.2014, framed identical substantial questions of law in each of them. Since both the appeals arise out of the same judgment and decree dated 29.11.2013 passed in A.S. No.15 of 2013 by the learned III Additional District Judge, Tiruvallur at Poonamallee, and since the substantial questions of law framed in both the appeals are also identical, this Court is of the view that the appeals may conveniently be heard together and disposed of by a common judgment. Accordingly, both the Second Appeals were taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

5. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as they were arrayed before the trial Court.

6. Plaintiffs’ case, in brief is as follows: The plaintiffs instituted the suit seeking a declaration of title and consequential permanent injunction in respect of the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs and the third defendant, who is the husband of the first defendant, are brothers and sister, being the legal heirs of their father, late Murugesa Naicker, who died in the year 1970.

7. According to the plaintiffs, their father, Murugesa Naicker, had borrowed a hand loan from Kuppusamy Naicker and one Natarajan alias Ramadas, the latter having been arrayed as the second defendant in the suit. Pursuant to the said transaction, the second defendant obtained a decree and, in execution thereof, brought the suit property to sale in E.P. No.474 of 1963 in O.S. No.262 of 1962.

8. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that, thereafter, pursuant to a panchayat settlement, a sum of Rs.2,000/- was jointly paid by the plaintiffs and the third defendant to the second defendant, and, consequent thereupon, a sale deed came to be obtained in the name of the first defendant, who is the wife of the third defendant.

9. The plaintiffs contend that the sale deed standing in the name of the first defendant is merely sham and nominal, and that the defendants are now denying the plaintiffs’ rights over the property, attempting to alienate the same, and interfering with their possession and enjoyment. It is also alleged that, the sale deed reflects the entire extent of 1 acre and 07 cents, whereas the auction purchase related only to an extent of 32 cents, which, according to the plaintiffs, demonstrates the irregularity and invalidity of the transaction.

10. The plaintiffs further state that the first defendant had earlier instituted O.S. No.100 of 2009 on the file of the Sub Court, Poonamallee, seeking declaration of title, delivery of possession, and injunction as against them. According to the plaintiffs, they came to know of the material particulars relating to the disputed transaction only upon perusal of the records in the said suit.

11. In the above circumstances, the plaintiffs have instituted the present suit seeking:

                     a) a declaration of their ownership rights over the suit property;

                     b) a declaration that the sale deed dated 24.05.1974 is sham and nominal, illegal, void, and not binding on them; and

                     c) a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.

12. The first defendant filed I.A. No.200 of 2012 in O.S. No.69 of 2011 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that it does not disclose a cause of action and that the suit is barred by law, namely, the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, and the law of limitation, 1963.

13. According to the first defendant, title to the suit property had already passed to the second defendant by virtue of the Court auction sale, and a sale certificate dated 18.03.1965 had been issued in his favour. Pursuant thereto, delivery of possession was also effected through the Court Bailiff on 19.01.1966. Thereafter, the first defendant purchased the suit property from the second defendant under a registered sale deed dated 24.05.1974, bearing Document No.1231 of 1974, out of her own funds, and thereby became the absolute owner of the property. Hence, according to her, the plaintiffs have no subsisting right over the property, and the suit instituted in the year 2011 is hopelessly barred by limitation.

14. The plaintiffs filed a counter opposing the said application, contending that, while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is confined to the averments contained in the plaint. They further contended that the question as to whether the sale deed dated 24.05.1974, though standing in the name of the first defendant, had been obtained for her exclusive benefit or for the benefit of the joint family/coparceners, is essentially a question of fact that can be decided only on the basis of evidence adduced at a full-fledged trial. According to them, the transaction is not hit by the Benami Act and, in any event, would fall within the statutory exceptions. They also contended that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, and that the cause of action for the suit arose only in the year 2009, when their rights were denied. On the above grounds, they sought dismissal of the application.

15. The Trial Court held that the objections relating to cause of action and limitation are matters requiring adjudication at trial. However, it further held that the plaintiffs’ plea that the sale deed dated 24.05.1974, though standing in the name of the first defendant, was only a benami or nominal purchase, is barred by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, and that the exemption under Section 4(3)(a) would have no application, since the first defendant is not a coparcener. On that reasoning, the application was allowed and the plaint was rejected on the ground of statutory bar under the Benami Act.

16. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal challenging the rejection of the plaint. The first defendant, in turn, filed a cross-objection contending that the plaint ought to have been rejected on the two other grounds as well, namely, absence of cause of action and bar of limitation.The First Appellate Court held that the plaint could not have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, since, at that stage, the Court is confined to the averments contained in the plaint and cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact on the basis of the defence set up by the defendants. On a reading of the plaint, the Appellate Court found that the plaintiffs had pleaded a cause of action arising from the denial of their claimed rights, as well as the alleged interference with, and attempted alienation of, the suit property. The Appellate Court further held that the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence. It also observed that, though the plaint does not specifically employ the expressions “fiduciary capacity” or “Hindu Undivided Family,” the averments therein indicate that the purchase in the name of the first defendant was pleaded to have been made for the benefit of the family and not for her exclusive benefit. Therefore, according to the Appellate Court, the applicability of the bar under Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act could not be decided at the threshold. On such reasoning, the appeal was allowed, the cross-objection was dismissed, the order rejecting the plaint was set aside, and the suit was restored to file for disposal on merits.

17. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants have preferred the present Second Appeals contending that the First Appellate Court erred in setting aside the order rejecting the plaint. According to them, the plaint does not disclose any cause of action, the suit is barred by limitation even on the plaintiffs’ own averments, and the relief sought is clearly barred under Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, there being no specific pleading as to any fiduciary relationship, Hindu Undivided Family, or any other statutory exception. It is further contended that the Appellate Court proceeded on mere assumptions, overlooked the plaintiffs’ own averments indicating knowledge of the sale deed dated 24.05.1974, and failed to note that the suit is an abuse of process and is, therefore, liable to be rejected at the threshold.

18. At the time of admission of the Second Appeals, the following substantial questions of law were framed verbatim in both the appeals:

                     a) Is the suit for declaration of title declaring that the respondents/plaintiffs as true and lawful owners of the plaint schedule property maintainable when the respondents/ plaintiffs admit that the suit property was sold in execution of decree in favour of the second defendant and by reason of seeking a declaration that the sale by the second defendant under the sale deed 24.05.1974 is sham and nominal, when the sale certificate dated 18.3.1965 in favour of the second defendant and the Bailiff report dated 19.1.1966 are remain unchallenged ?

                     b) In the absence of any allegation in the plaint that the sale deed is sham and nominal, is the suit for declaration maintainable?

                     c) When the plaint proceeds on the basis that the respondents/plaintiffs had knowledge of sale in 1974 itself, is not the suit for declaration declaring that the respondents/plaintiffs 1 to 4 as true and lawful owners of the suit schedule property barred by Limitation ?

                     d) Is not the suit barred by law of limitation and as there is no subsisting cause of action disclosed on the date of filing the suit especially when the respondents/ plaintiffs admitted the facts that the cause of action arises in the year 1966/1974 itself?

19. The learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the plaintiffs have instituted the suit seeking declaration of title, a declaration that the sale deed dated 24.05.1974 in favour of the first defendant, bearing Document No.1231 of 1974, is sham and nominal or void, and consequential injunction. According to the learned counsel, the plaint proceeds entirely on the theory that the transaction is nominal/benami, but does not contain the essential pleadings relating to the source of consideration, custody of title deeds, motive for the transaction, and the nature of the relationship between the parties.It is further contended that, even assuming the sale deed is declared sham or nominal, title would in any event revert to the second defendant, and therefore the plaintiffs’ prayer for declaration of their title is not maintainable. The learned counsel would also submit that the plaint itself discloses knowledge of the sale deed of the year 1974 and, therefore, the suit instituted only in the year 2011 is clearly barred by limitation.The defendants also contend that the first defendant is not a coparcener and, therefore, Section 4(3)(a) of the Benami Act has no application. It is further submitted that the sale deed itself recites payment of consideration by the first defendant and that the title deeds are also in her custody. Importantly, it is also argued that, by virtue of the 2016 amendment to the benami law, Section 4(3), which contained the exemption/proviso sought to be relied upon by the plaintiffs, has been omitted, and therefore the plaintiffs cannot claim the benefit of any such exemption. On the above submissions, it is contended that the plaint is wholly meritless and vexatious, and is therefore liable to be rejected at the threshold.

20. It is well settled that, while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court must confine itself to the averments contained in the plaint, and the defence raised by the defendant cannot be taken into account at that stage.

21. In the present case, the appellant, who was the petitioner in I.A. No.200 of 2012, sought rejection of the plaint on three grounds, namely:

                     (i) that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action;

                     (ii) that the suit is barred by limitation; and

                     (iii) that the suit is barred by the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act

22. Insofar as the contention regarding absence of cause of action is concerned, the plaint, on its face, discloses the circumstances which gave rise to the institution of the suit. It is well settled that “cause of action” means the bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain a decree in his favour. In the plaint, it has been averred that the first defendant had already instituted O.S. No.100 of 2009 seeking declaration of title and recovery of vacant possession, and that the plaintiffs herein had earlier filed O.S. No.2879 of 2009 in respect of the very same property. The plaintiffs’ contention that the sale deed dated 24.05.1974 is sham and nominal is a matter that can be decided only upon trial and not in an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, the averments in the plaint clearly disclose the existence of a cause of action. At this stage, it cannot be held that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action so as to warrant rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC.

23. Substantial Questions of Law Nos.3 and 4: Insofar as the plea of limitation is concerned, it is well settled that the question of limitation, particularly in matters relating to title to immovable property, frequently involves a mixed question of law and fact, which ordinarily requires evidence. In the present suit, the principal relief sought by the plaintiffs is a declaration of title to the suit property, while the challenge to the sale deed dated 24.05.1974 is only incidental or ancillary thereto. The plaintiffs have also sought the relief of permanent injunction.

24. It is an admitted fact that the first defendant had already instituted O.S. No.100 of 2009 for declaration of title and recovery of possession as against the present plaintiffs. Thus, at this stage, the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property is not seriously in dispute. When the controversy relates to title to immovable property and the plaintiffs claim to be in possession and seek declaration of title, the provision that would arise for consideration is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Under the said Article, the period of limitation begins to run when the right to sue first accrues, namely, when the plaintiff’s right is denied. In the present case, the plaint specifically avers that the first defendant denied the plaintiffs’ title and instituted O.S. No.100 of 2009. Therefore, the present suit, having been filed within three years from the date of such denial of title by the first defendant, cannot, at this stage, be held to be barred by limitation.

25. According to the averments in the plaint, the cause of action for the present suit arose on 18.06.2009, when the first defendant instituted O.S. No.100 of 2009 denying the plaintiffs’ title, and the present suit came to be filed on 03.11.2011. Whether the plaintiffs’ possession is lawful, and whether the denial of their title by the first defendant in fact arose only upon the institution of the said suit, are matters that can be determined only upon appreciation of evidence at trial. Therefore, it cannot be held, at the threshold, that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation. Accordingly, substantial questions of law Nos.3 and 4 are answered against the appellant.

26. In the above circumstances, the Courts below were justified in holding that the issue of limitation cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Consequently, the dismissal of the cross-objection filed by the appellant by the First Appellate Court does not warrant interference. Accordingly, the Second Appeal No.65 of 2014 preferred by the appellant challenging the dismissal of the cross-objection is liable to be dismissed.

27. Substantial Questions of Law Nos.1 and 2: The question that arises is whether the suit is barred under Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The sum and substance of the plaintiffs’ case is that the suit property originally belonged to a Hindu Undivided Joint Family consisting of late Murugesa Naicker, the father of plaintiffs 1 to 3 and the third defendant, under the Hindu law as it then prevailed in the year 1974. It is their further case that the said Murugesa Naicker had borrowed money from the second defendant and, on his failure to discharge the same, the second defendant obtained a money decree, brought the suit property to sale in Court auction, and purchased it. Thereafter, the property came to be conveyed under a sale deed dated 24.05.1974 in favour of the first defendant

28. According to the plaintiffs, although the sale deed dated 24.05.1974 stands in the name of the first defendant, the sale consideration of Rs.2,000/- was in fact paid by the plaintiffs and the third defendant to the second defendant. It is further pleaded that the sale deed was taken in the name of the first defendant on the advice of the third defendant, who was the elder member of the family. This stand is specifically denied by the first defendant, who asserts that the sale consideration was paid by her and that she is the absolute owner of the property

29. The crucial issue that arises for consideration is whether, even assuming the averments in the plaint to be true, namely, that the sale consideration under the sale deed dated 24.05.1974 was paid by the plaintiffs while the property was purchased in the name of the first defendant, such a transaction would prima facie fall within the ambit of a benami transaction and, consequently, whether the suit would be hit by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.

30. The Trial Court, on a consideration of the pleadings, concluded that the suit is barred under Section 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, and further held that the exemption under Section 4(3)(a) is not attracted, since the first defendant is not a coparcener. On that basis, the Trial Court rejected the plaint.

31. The First Appellate Court, however, reversed the said finding and held that the exemption contemplated under Section 4(3)(b) of the Act would apply, observing that a reading of the plaint impliedly indicates that the property had been purchased in the name of the first defendant in a fiduciary capacity, and consequently directed restoration of the suit

32. When the matter was argued before this Court, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to the provisions of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, as amended by Act 43 of 2016, and contended that Section 4(3) stands omitted, and that the relevant exception is now incorporated under Section 2(9)(b)(ii). On that basis, it was submitted that the appeal is liable to be dismissed

33. The suit was instituted in the year 2011. The Trial Court rejected the plaint by order dated 10.12.2012, the First Appellate Court reversed the said order by allowing the appeal on 29.11.2013, and these Second Appeals were admitted on 28.01.2014. The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 came to be amended substantially and came to effect with 2016 during the pendency of these appeals. The said amendment is prospective in nature, and the present appeals, being a continuation of the suit, are governed by the law as it stood prior to the amendment. It is well settled that amendments affecting substantive rights operate prospectively unless the statute expressly provides otherwise. In R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan, (1995) 2 SCC 630, the Supreme Court held that Section 4 of the Benami Act creates a substantive bar to the maintainability of a suit. Further, in Mangathai Ammal (died) through LRs v. Rajeswari, (2020) 17 SCC 496, the H Supreme Court categorically held that the amendments introduced to the Benami Act in 2016 are prospective in operation.

34. It is a settled principle that the rights of the parties must be determined with reference to the law as it stood on the date of institution of the suit. Since the present suit was instituted in the year 2011, the subsequent statutory amendment cannot alter the legal position governing the suit as on the date of its institution.

35. A “benami transaction” is defined under Section 2(a) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, as follows:

                     “Benami transaction” means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person”.

Under Section 4(1) of the Act, no suit shall lie to enforce any right in respect of property held benami. Section 4(3)(a) of the Act, 1988 as it stood prior to the amendment, carved out a limited exception in respect of property held by a coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family for the benefit of the family.

36. In the present case, the property admittedly stands in the name of the first defendant, who is the wife of the plaintiffs’ brother, and she cannot be regarded as a coparcener within the concept of Hindu coparcenary. Therefore, the transaction as pleaded by the plaintiffs squarely attracts the statutory bar under Section 4 of the Act.

37. Under Section 4(3)(b) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, as it stood prior to the amendment, an exception was provided in cases where the property was held by a person standing in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another. The concept of fiduciary relationship has been preserved even under the amended enactment, namely, the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

38. A fiduciary relationship means a relationship of trust and confidence, wherein one person acts for the benefit of another and the beneficiary reposes special trust in that person. Illustrative instances recognised by Courts include the relationships of trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent and principal, director and company, partners inter se, and executor and estate. This principle has been explained by the Supreme Court in the following decisions.

39. In Marcel Martins v. M. Printer, (2012) 5 SCC 342, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a fiduciary relationship arises where one person is under an obligation to protect the interests of another by reason of the confidence reposed in him. Mere relationship or proximity, by itself, is insufficient to constitute a fiduciary capacity. A family relationship, without more, does not give rise to such a relationship, and the position of a sister-in-law is not, by itself, fiduciary in character. Therefore, the exception relating to fiduciary capacity would have no application in the present case. Consequently, the Trial Court was justified in holding that the claim is barred by Section 4 of the Benami Act.

40. On the side of the plaintiffs, reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. Babulal and others (2019) 4 SCC 367. In that case, the plaintiff, who was the son, had filed a suit for declaration of title against his father contending that the shop property, though purchased in the name of his father, had in fact been acquired out of the plaintiff’s own funds. The father, admitting the said factual position, had executed a document on stamp paper, in the presence of witnesses and duly notarised, acknowledging that the property had been purchased by the plaintiff. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the question whether the matter would fall within the scope of Section 4(3) of the Act is an aspect that must be examined on the basis of evidence on record and, therefore, could not have been decided in an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.However, the factual matrix of the said decision is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the relationship was one between father and son; the father was the elder member of the family, had been carrying on business in the shop as a tenant, and, when the landlord sold the property, the son purchased it in the name of the father. More importantly, the father had expressly acknowledged that the purchase had been made by the son. It was in that context that the Court prima facie found that the father was holding the property for the benefit of the son in a fiduciary capacity. The facts of the present case stand on an entirely different footing, and, therefore, the said decision does not advance the case of the plaintiffs.

41. A careful reading of the averments in the plaint shows that the plaintiffs themselves plead that, though the sale deed dated 24.05.1974 stands in the name of the first defendant, the sale consideration was allegedly paid by the plaintiffs and the third defendant, and that the property was purchased in the name of the first defendant on the advice of the third defendant, who is stated to be the elder brother of the plaintiffs. If such pleading is taken as it stands, the transaction would clearly fall within the ambit of a benami transaction, inasmuch as the property stands in the name of one person, while the consideration is alleged to have been paid by another. In view of the statutory bar contained in Section 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, a suit to enforce any right in respect of such property would not be maintainable unless the case falls within the limited exceptions provided under Section 4(3) of the Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 2016.

42. The First Appellate Court proceeded on the footing that the case may fall within the exception relating to property held in a fiduciary capacity. However, the plaint does not contain any specific averment that the first defendant stood in the position of a trustee, agent, or any other person legally obliged to hold the property for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Mere relationship as sister-in-law, or the circumstance that the plaintiffs reposed confidence in their elder brother, cannot, by itself, give rise to a fiduciary relationship within the meaning of Section 4(3)(b) of the Act. In the absence of specific pleadings establishing such fiduciary capacity, the said exception cannot be invoked to surmount the statutory bar contained under Section 4 of the Act.

43. It is also significant that the averments in the plaint indicate that the property was purchased in the name of the first defendant with a view to avoiding the consequences of the earlier transactions entered into by late Murugesa Naicker with Kuppusamy Naicker and to obviate further litigation arising therefrom. Such a pleading, by itself, suggests that the arrangement was intended to shield the property from creditor claims. Though the present suit is not one instituted by creditors under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the said averment nonetheless indicates that the plaintiffs seek to enforce rights founded upon a transaction structured to defeat or evade creditor claims. In such circumstances, the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to circumvent the statutory prohibition contained in Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Accordingly, these substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant.

44. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Trial Court was justified in holding that the suit is barred under Section 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The First Appellate Court committed an error in reversing the said finding by invoking the exception relating to fiduciary capacity, which is not borne out by the averments in the plaint. The reasoning of the First Appellate Court is, therefore, unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court allowing the A.S.No.15 of 2013 is set aside and the order of the trial court rejecting the plaint is restored, S.A.No.64 of 2014 is allowed.

45. In the result, the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2013 passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S. No.15 of 2013 are set aside, and the order and decree dated 10.12.2012 passed by the Trial Court in I.A. No.200 of 2012 in O.S. No.69 of 2011 are restored. Consequently, the plaint in O.S. No.69 of 2011 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee, stands rejected. Thus, S.A.No.64 of 2014 is allowed and S.A.No.65 of 2014 is dismissed. Consequently, connected Civil Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, are closed. Having regard to the close relationship between the parties, there shall be no order as to costs.