Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 26.09.2025 passed against one Sheron Najeeb (herein after referred to as 'detenu'), under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The said order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 29.11.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 10.07.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kottayam, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority. Altogether, six cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1147/2025 of Changanassery Police Station, alleging commission of the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)B of the NDPS Act.

3. We heard Sri. Jerry Mathew, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order is illegal, arbitrary, and was passed without proper application of mind. According to the learned counsel, the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, and the conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail itself were sufficient to deter the detenu from being involved in further criminal activities. According to the learned counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and passed the impugned order in a casual manner. It is further contended that there is an unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal and in passing the detention order after the date of commission of the last prejudicial activity, and the said inordinate delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. On these premises, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that the jurisdictional authority passed the Ext.P1 order after taking note of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu are not sufficient to prevent him from being involved in criminal activities. According to the learned Government Pleader, there occurred no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order. The learned Government Pleader submitted that after the commission of the last prejudicial activity, the detenu was in jail in connection with the said case for a considerable period. Therefore, the short delay that occurred in mooting the proposal is only liable to be discarded, particularly since the detenu was in jail and there was no possibility of his engaging in criminal activities while under custody. The learned Government Pleader further urged that the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, warrants no interference.

6. The records reveal that the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in narcotic peddling activities. As already stated, six cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.1147/2025 of Changanassery Police Station, alleging commission of the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)B of the NDPS Act. The detenu was caught red-handed with the contraband in the said case on 29.05.2025, and he was arrested on the same day. As evident from the records, he was granted bail in the said case only on 05.08.2025. It was on 10.07.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was forwarded by the sponsoring authority. Subsequently, on 26.09.2025, the detention order was passed.

7. One of the main contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, the jurisdictional authority passed the the impugned order. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to restrain him from being involved in criminal activities. Undisputedly, an order of detention is a drastic measure against a person. Therefore, when there are other effective remedies available under the ordinary criminal law to deter a person from engaging in criminal activities, an order of preventive detention is neither necessitated nor legally permissible. Therefore, when a person is already on bail, the compelling circumstances that necessitated passing an order of detention should be reflected in the order itself.

8. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the cases registered against him is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that the present bail conditions imposed are not sufficient to curb his criminal activities, since he has violated similar bail conditions multiple times in the past. Similarly, in Ext.P1 order, it is further stated that the detenu is an active drug peddler and his activities are really a threat to society and the future generation. Hence, preventive detention of the detenu is imperative for preventing him from committing further crimes under the NDPS Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will fail.

9. Now, coming to the contention raised by the petitioner regarding the delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, it is first to be noted that, as already stated, the detenu was arrested in connection with the last prejudicial activity on 29.05.2025, the very date on which the crime occurred. As evident from the records, the sponsoring authority initiated the proposal for action under the PITNDPS Act only on 10.07.2025. Thereafter, the detention order was passed on 26.09.2025. Evidently, the forwarding of the proposal occurred while the detenu was in judicial custody. Since the detenu was in jail, there was no basis for any apprehension of an imminent repetition of criminal activities during the intervening period. Moreover, altogether six cases in which the detenu got involved have formed the basis for passing the detention order. Therefore, some minimum time is naturally required for the collection of the details of the cases in which the detenu got involved and for its verification. Hence, the minimum delay that occurred in initiating the proposal and in issuing the detention order is liable to be discarded, and it cannot be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.