Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenging the judgment dated 26.10.2016 in Crl. Appeal No. 335/2012 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court–I, Thiruvananthapuram, which arose from the judgment dated 23.06.2012 in C.C. No. 653/2007 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Attingal. The revision petitioner herein is the sole accused in the above case.

2. The prosecution case is that on 10.03.2007 at about 3:30 p.m., the accused trespassed into the property of PW2, used abusive language against him, and inflicted injuries, including fracture on various parts of his body, using the blunt portion of a chopper. Thus, the accused is alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 447, 294(b), 324, and 326 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. After trial, the learned Magistrate found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 447, 294(b), 324, and 326 of the IPC and imposed separate sentences for each of the said offences. Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred an appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal, altered the finding as well as the nature and the extent of the sentence. The Appellate Court found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 447, 323, and 325 of the IPC and convicted. However, the Appellate Court set aside the conviction of the accused for offences punishable under Sections 294(b), 324 and 326 of the IPC.

4. By the said appellate judgment, the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the offence under Section 323 of IPC. For the offence under Section 447 of IPC, the accused was directed to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for two days. For the offence under Section 325 of IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for two months.

5. Heard Sri. Dinesh M., the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri. Sanal P., the learned Public Prosecutor, and also perused the records.

6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed against the accused are illegal and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. It was argued that both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court placed undue reliance on the testimony of PW2, the de facto complainant, without properly considering the contradictions and improvements in his evidence. It was further contended that the courts below failed to appreciate that there existed a bona fide dispute between the parties concerning a pathway, thereby giving rise to a possibility of false implication. The learned counsel also submitted that, in the absence of independent corroboration, it was unsafe to base a conviction solely on the uncorroborated testimony of PW2.

7. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned judgment to invoke the revisional power of this Court. According to the Public Prosecutor, it was mainly based on the evidence of PW2, who is the injured in this case, that the Trial Court, as well as the Appellate Court, entered into a finding of guilt of the accused. It was further submitted that the evidence of PW2 is well corroborated by the evidence of PW3, his wife, and the medical evidence adduced in this case; therefore, there is nothing to interfere with the judgment which is under challenge in this revision petition.

8. It is trite law that a court exercising revisional jurisdiction will interfere with orders or judgments of the courts below only if those orders and judgments are suffering from incorrectness, illegality, or impropriety. Unless the judgment passed by the learned Magistrate or by the Appellate Court is perverse or the view taken by the court is unreasonable, or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, or there is palpable misreading of records, the revisional court is not justified in interfering with the judgment. The revisional court cannot act like an Appellate Court.

9. In State of Kerala v. Jathavedan Namboodiri [AIR 1999 SC 981], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:

                  “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”

10. In Munna Devi v State of Rajasthan [AIR 2002 SC 107] the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 3 held thus:

                  “3. We find substance in the submission made on behalf of the appellant. The revision power under the code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers, the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner that the trial and the Appellate Courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the First Information Report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.”

11. In Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Others [2015 (3) SCC 123], it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thus:

                  “Revisional power of the court under S.397 to 401 of Cr.PC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction”.

12. This is a case in which a 45-year-old man was allegedly attacked with a chopper by the accused and sustained grievous injuries, including fracture. In order to establish the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined PW1 to PW9. Among them, PW1 is an attesting witness to the scene mahazar. PW2 is the injured/de facto complainant. PW3 is the wife of the injured and is stated to be an eyewitness to the occurrence. PW4 is the doctor who medically examined the injured immediately after the incident and issued Ext.P3 wound certificate. PW5 is the Orthopaedic Surgeon who conducted a detailed examination and treated the injured until his discharge from the hospital. PW6 was cited and examined as an occurrence witness to prove the incident; however, he turned hostile to the prosecution. PW7 is the Head Constable attached to Kilimanoor Police Station who recorded the First Information Statement. PW8 is the Sub Inspector of Police who conducted the investigation and laid the final report before the court. PW9 is the Assistant Sub Inspector who registered the First Information Report in this case. From the side of the defence, DW1 was examined.

13. The law was set in motion on the strength of the FIS given by the injured to the Head Constable of Police attached to Kilimanoor Police Station. Based on the FIS given by the injured, Ext.P5 FIR was registered. Subsequently, the investigation in this case was taken over by PW8, and it was he who filed the final report after the culmination of the entire investigation. In order to prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution is mainly relying on the evidence of PW2, the injured witness, and that of PW3, who is none other than the wife of PW2.

14. On examination before the court, PW2 had portrayed the entire matter that transpired in this case. It is to be noted that from his evidence, it is discernible that the genesis and origin of this case is a dispute that existed between PW2 and the accused with respect to a pathway which was allegedly constructed forcefully through the property of PW2 by the accused and another neighbour, one month prior to the incident in this case. The evidence of PW2 regarding the construction of the pathway is not seen seriously challenged in the cross- examination, though the accused denied the fact that the same was constructed forcefully. Therefore, it is apparent that the motive alleged for the commission of the offence stands fully established in this case.

15. The evidence of PW2 clearly reveals that in the incident, he had sustained several injuries, including a fracture of the femoral condyle. However, the evidence of PW2 is assailed by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner mainly on the ground that, as the existence of a dispute with respect to a pathway between the parties is established, the chance of false implication cannot be ruled out. According to the learned counsel, as the existence of such a dispute is established, the court has to act with much care and circumspection while evaluating the reliability of the evidence of PW2. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, when the existence of a previous dispute is established, a careful approach is highly required while evaluating the evidence of PW2. When a witness has a reason that would motivate him to falsely implicate another person, it is always prudent to look for independent corroboration for the evidence of such a witness. However, there is no inflexible rule that when there is an existence of a previous dispute, the evidence of such a witness must be viewed with suspicion under all circumstances, because when the prosecution alleges that the existence of a previous dispute itself is the motive for the commission of the offence, the said cause alone is not a reason to throw away the convincing testimony of a witness, particularly when he is an injured witness.

16. Undisputedly, the evidence of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. By a series of judicial pronouncements, it is well settled that an injured witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the crime scene, and in the normal course, he will not spare the actual assailant by pointing his finger towards an innocent person as the perpetrator of the offence.

17. Moreover, in the present case, from the evidence, it is established that immediately after the incident, PW2 sought medical aid from Chirayinkeezhu Taluk Head Quarters Hospital. The evidence of the Doctor, who clinically examined PW2 and issued Ext.P3 wound certificate, vouches the said fact.

18. Likewise, from the evidence, it is established that as part of the treatment, PW4, the doctor has referred PW2 for examination by an Orthopedic Surgeon, who is examined as PW5 in this case. On examination before the court, PW5 deposed that on 11.03.2007, he had examined one Biju and noted injuries including dislocation of the shoulder bone and a medical femoral condyle Fracture on the left leg.

19. It is significant to note that none of the injuries noted in the medical examination are of the nature that can be self-inflicted. Therefore, merely because of the existence of a dispute between the parties with respect to a pathway, it is not at all justifiable to discard the evidence of PW2 outright by finding that this case was falsely foisted against the accused.

20. From the records, it is further gatherable that the accused was faced with a charge under Section 326 of the IPC along with the offences for which presently he is convicted. However, on the appellate stage, he was acquitted of the said charge on a finding that the weapon allegedly used in the commission of the offence was not recovered in this case. In the case at hand, as already mentioned, although the learned Sessions Judge set aside the conviction under Section 326 IPC, convicted the accused under Sections 447, 323, and 325 of the IPC. As the accused has already been acquitted by the Sessions Judge for the offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC and no appeal has been preferred by the victim or the State, challenging the acquittal on the said charge, no further discussion is required as to the maintainability of the said finding.

21. However, there is a specific finding that the accused inflicted a fracture on the leg and dislocation of the shoulder bone of PW2. The said finding is mainly based on the evidence of PW2, the injured witness, which finds sufficient corroboration from the medical evidence adduced in this case. Therefore, I find no reason to disagree with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the act of the accused would certainly constitute an offence under Section 325 of the IPC. Similarly, the finding of the Appellate Court that apart from the offence under Section 325 of the IPC, the accused is guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 447 and 323 of the IPC is also on the basis of the convincing evidence adduced in this case.

22. Now, while coming to the sentence portion, it cannot be ignored that from the evidence and other materials, it is well established that the origin and genesis of this case is a dispute that existed between the accused and PW2 with respect to a pathway. Apparently, there is nothing to suggest that the offence was a premeditated one. Moreover, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, at the time of commission of the offence, the accused was aged 45 years. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred in the year 2007. Naturally, he would be around 64 years now. Likewise, no criminal antecedents are pointed out against the accused. Considering all these aspects, I am of the view that an interference is required with respect to the sentence imposed in this case.

23. In the result, the finding of guilt and conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 323, and 325 of the IPC are confirmed. The sentence imposed on the accused for the offence punishable under Section 447 of the IPC is found to be reasonable and justifiable and is accordingly upheld. However, the sentence imposed on the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 of the IPC appears to be somewhat harsh and is, therefore, modified as follows;

                  1. The accused is ordered to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court for offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC.

                  2. For offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a compensation of Rs.20,000/- to PW2 as provided under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C. If the compensation is not paid, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for two months.

                  The substantive sentences shall run concurrently. The revision petitioner/accused is directed to appear before the Trial Court on 01.06.2026 to undergo the modified sentence imposed by this Court. On failure to do so, the Trial Court is directed to execute the modified sentence.

                  With this affirmation and modification, the criminal revision petition is allowed in part.