1. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 07.11.2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katghora, District Korba in Criminal Case No. 1886/2000, whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 337 and 304-A of Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC") by extending the benefit of doubt.

2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 23.10.2000 at about 1:00 p.m., respondent/accused- Hiralal was driving a truck bearing registration No. CIL-5338 (hereinafter called as 'offending vehicle') near village Tanakhar and at the relevant time, several labourers were travelling in the offending vehicle. It is alleged that the respondent drove the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and caused it to overturn, as a result of which, Bhuwan Singh sustained serious injuries and subsequently died, and other persons travelling in the offending vehicle also sustained injuries. On the basis of the report (Ex.P-4) lodged by PW-2 Shaniram at Police Station Katghora, an offence under Sections 337 and 304-A IPC was registered against the respondent. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the trial Court.

3. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused/respondent under Sections 337 and 304-A IPC. The accused/respondent denied the charges, abjured the guilt, and prayed for trial.

4. The learned trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges leveled against him.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused/respondent despite there being sufficient and cogent evidence on record. He further submits that the prosecution witnesses have duly supported the case of the prosecution and have clearly stated that the accident occurred due to the fault of the driver/respondent. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned judgment of acquittal be set aside and the accused/respondent be convicted accordingly.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned judgment and submits that there is no cogent evidence on record to establish that accused/respondent was driving the offending vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. He further submits that the prosecution witnesses have themselves admitted that they were not aware of the speed of the offending vehicle. It is, therefore, contended that the learned trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitted him of the said charges, which calls for no interference by this Court.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

          "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."

9. It is not in dispute that the accident took place on 23.10.2000 at about 1:00 p.m. near village Tanakhar, and that in the said accident, one Bhuwan Singh, who was travelling in the offending vehicle, died, while other persons also sustained injuries. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the said accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the accused/respondent.

10. PW-2 Shaniram stated that he knew the accused/respondent and used to work as a labourer in the offending vehicle. On the date of the incident, about seven persons were travelling in the said vehicle and, near Kulhiriya, the offending vehicle overturned. He admitted that he did not know the actual speed of the offending vehicle and could not say how fast it was moving.

11. PW-3 Budhwar Singh stated that on the date of the incident, he was travelling in the offending vehicle and, near Rampur, the offending vehicle overturned, causing injuries to him and other passengers. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he could not clearly see who was sitting on the driver's seat and also admitted that he did not know the speed of the offending vehicle.

12. PW-6 Gopal stated that he and Bhuwan Singh were travelling in the offending vehicle and, before reaching Tanakhar, the vehicle overturned. He identified the respondent as the driver, as he had worked with him earlier. However, he did not state any specific act of rash or negligent driving on the part of the accused/respondent. Similarly, PW-7 Mehtter has not stated that the accused/respondent was driving the offending vehicle in a rash or negligent manner.

13. Thus, from the above evidence, it appears that although the witnesses have stated that on the date of incident, the offending vehicle overturned and that the accused/respondent was driving it, but none of them has clearly stated any specific act showing rash or negligent driving by accused/respondent. The prosecution has not brought any evidence on record regarding the exact speed of the vehicle, the condition of the road, any mechanical defect, or any other circumstance to show that the accused/respondent was driving the offending vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. The learned trial Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has rightly concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges by extending the benefit of doubt.

14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011 in case of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:-

          "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

          "(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

          (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

          (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

          (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

          (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

          (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."

15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jafarudheen & Mallappa (supra), the view taken by the learned trial Court appears to be a plausible and possible view. In the absence of any patent illegality or perversity, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court.

16. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of accused/respondent is hereby dismissed.