(Prayer: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased topleased to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the action of the 2nd respondent Vijayawada Municipal Corporation in not considering the petitioners representations dated 09.07.2014, 06.12.2017, 20.09.2018, 23.09.2019, 31.05.2022 and 11.12.2023 and in not releasing Transferable Development Rights (TDR) Bonds in respect of the land surrendered for road widening, as illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 300-Aof the Constitution of India and consequently direct the 2nd respondent corporation to issue and release the TDR Bonds in favour of the petitioner for the road- acquired land, in terms of the applicable Government Orders and in line with the orders passed by this Honble Court, and to pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to direct the 2nd respondent Vijayawada Municipal Corporation to consider and dispose of the petitioner’s representation dated 11.12.2023 within a time frame to be fixed by this Hon’ble Court, or alternatively to issue TDR Bonds provisionally, pending disposal of the present Writ Petition, and pass)

Oral Order:

1. Heard Sri Sk. Rafi, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri T.V.P. Sai Kumar, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner and Sri Goli G.V.S. Sai, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri S.V.S.S. Siva Ram, Ld. Standing Counsel for the VMC.

2. Ld. Counsel for the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation (Respondent No.2) has submitted three Endorsements dated 23.11.2017, 22.12.2023 and 21.01.2026 across the table. The References mentioned in the Endorsements would indicate that in response to the Representation of the father of the Writ Petitioner herein dated 09.07.2014, the Respondent Corporation has addressed an Endorsement on 23.11.2017 asking the Applicant therein to submit Registered Deed Documents for further action.

3. In response to the Representation dated 11.12.2023 submitted by the Writ Petitioner herein, the Respondent Corporation has addressed an Endorsement on 22.12.2023 directing the Writ Petitioner to submit the following documents:

                  (i) Notice issued by the Respondents

                  (ii) Consent Letter

                  (iii) Family Member Certificate.

                  It is also stated in the Endorsement dated 22.12.2023 that after submission of these documents, request of the Writ Petitioner would be considered.

4. It transpires from the facts and also the prayer that the father of the Writ Petitioner and the Writ Petitioner have been making Representation after Representation from the year 2014 upto the year 2023 without approaching the Court (Representations were made on :09.07.2014, 6.12.2017, 20.09.2018, 23.09.2019, 31.05.2022 and 11.12.2023). It is settled law that the parties are not entitled to make Representations year after year without approaching the Court.

5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Pan Singh and Others : (2007) 9 SCC 278 held in Para Nos.17 & 18 as under:

                  “17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 524] and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India [(1995) 5 SCC 628 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1273 : (1995) 31 ATC 186] .)

                  18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India [(2007) 9 SCC 274 : (2007) 2 Scale 325 : (2007) 1 Supreme 455] this Court held: (SCC p. 277, paras 9-10)

                  “9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore [AIR 1967 SC 993] . There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray [(1977) 3 SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 424 : AIR 1976 SC 2617] making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik [(1976) 3 SCC 579 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 468 : AIR 1976 SC 1639] .)

                  10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.”

6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Tripura and Others vs. Arabinda Chakraborthy and others : (2014) 6 SCC 460 held in Para No.18 as under:

                  “18. It is a settled legal position that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which the cause of action takes place. Had there been any statute giving right of appeal to the respondent and if the respondent had filed such a statutory appeal, the period of limitation would have commenced from the date when the statutory appeal was decided. In the instant case, there was no provision with regard to any statutory appeal. The respondent kept on making representations one after another and all the representations had been rejected. Submission of the respondent to the effect that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which his last representation was rejected cannot be accepted. If accepted, it would be nothing but travesty of the law of limitation. One can go on making representations for 25 years and in that event one cannot say that the period of limitation would commence when the last representation was decided. On this legal issue, we feel that the courts below committed an error by considering the date of rejection of the last representation as the date on which the cause of action had arisen. This could not have been done.”

7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and Others vs. Chaman Rana : (2018) 5 SCC 798 held in Para No.10 as under:

                  10. Mere repeated filing of representations could not be sufficient explanation for delay in approaching the Court for grant of relief, was considered in Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. Kasbekar [Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. Kasbekar, 1953 SCC OnLine Bom 64 : AIR 1954 Bom 202] , by Chagla, C.J. observing as follows: (SCC OnLine Bom : AIR p. 203, para 2)

                  “2. … Now, we have had occasion to point out that the only delay which this Court will excuse in presenting a petition is the delay which is caused by the petitioner pursuing a legal remedy which is given to him. In this particular case the petitioner did not pursue a legal remedy. The remedy he pursued was extra-legal or extra-judicial. Once the final decision of the Government is given, a representation is merely an appeal for mercy or indulgence, but it is not pursuing a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner. …”

8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Surjeet Singh Sahni vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others: (2022) 15 SCC 536 held in Para Nos.7 & 8 as under:

                  “7. Therefore, when such orders are passed by the High Courts either relegating the petitioner to make a representation and/or directing the appropriate authority to decide the representation, the High Courts have to consider whether the writ petition is filed belatedly and/or the same is barred by laches and/or not, so that in future the person who has approached belatedly may not contend that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Even in a case where earlier representation is rejected, the High Court shall decide the matter on merits.

                  8. As observed by this Court in a catena of decisions, mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within a reasonable time. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file a representation and/or directing the authority to decide the representation, once it is found that the original writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. Such order shall not give an opportunity to the petitioner to thereafter contend that rejection of the representation subsequently has given a fresh cause of action.”

9. While the present Writ Petitioner has made the first Representation way back on 09.07.2014, even assuming that the Writ Petitioner has not received the Endorsement in response to the said Representations dated 09.07.2014 and 23.11.2017, the Writ Petitioner is expected to wait only for a reasonable time, may be for about 4 months, and approach this Court for an appropriate legal remedy. The facts on record would clearly indicate that the Writ Petitioner and his father were only making Representations from time to time since 2014 without approaching this Court. The dates on which, the Writ Petitioner has presented the Representations itself would indicate that the claim of the Writ Petitioner is hopelessly barred by delay and laches. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the Writ Petition is bereft of any merit besides being hopelessly hit by delay and laches.

10. In this view of the matter, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

11. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.