Common Order

1. Since in all these writ petitions, the petitioners are challenging the termination of their appointments as Additional Public Prosecutors, Special Public Prosecutors and the issues involved in batch of writ petitions are identical, they are being taken up for analogous hearing with the consent of learned counsel for the parties for disposal.

2. W.Ps. No.1612, 1615 OF 2024 (Learned counsel Sri V.Rohith, for the petitioners on record, represented by the learned Senior Counsel Sri V. Ravi Kiran Rao)

3. These writ petitions are filed seeking Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the order passed by the respondent No.1, Principal Secretary to Government, Home (Courts A-1) Department, dated 04-01-2024 terminating the services of the petitioners as Additional Public Prosecutors (Tenure) for the Court of V Additional District and Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan and Senior Civil Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan, respectively, alleging that they have violated Model Code of Conduct during the Telangana State Legislative Assembly Elections-2023, without issuing any notice and without causing any enquiry and seeking to quash the said proceedings dated 04.01.2024 duly declaring the same as arbitrary, illegal, as gross violation of principles of natural justice and violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India and contrary to Clause 9 of Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000.

W.Ps. No.28817, 29224, 29238, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29630, 29658, 29677, 30033 and 30574 of 2024

4. The learned counsel Sri M.A.K.Mukheed appearing for the petitioners in W.Ps. No.28817, 29224, 29238, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29630 and 30574 of 2024 and the learned counsel Sri V.Rohith appearing for the petitioners on record in W.Ps. No.29658 of 2024 and the learned counsel Sri S.Rama Mohan Rao, appearing for the petitioners on record in W.Ps. No.29677 and 30033 of 2024.

5. These writ petitions are filed seeking a Writ of Mandamus declaring the orders passed by the respondent No.1, Special Chief Secretary to Government, vide G.O.Rt.No.773, 842, 844, 724, 739, 839, 722, 760, 767, 738, 714 and 715, Home (Courts A-1) Department dated 10-09-2024, 25-09-2024, 25-09-2024, 29-08-2024, 31-08-2024, 25-09-2024, 28-08-2024, 05-09-2024, 10-09-2024, 31-08-2024, 27-08-2024 and 27-08-2024, relieving the Petitioners from their posts as Additional Public Prosecutor, IV-ADJ-cum-IV AMSJ Court-cum-I Additional Family Court, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, Ranga Reddy; Public Prosecutor, Principal District and Sessions Judge-cum-Family Court at Malkajgiri, Medchal Malkajgiri District; Additional Public Prosecutor, Family Court-cum-II Additional District Judge Court, Hanumakonda; Additional Public Prosecutor, I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jogulamba Gadwal District; Additional Public Prosecutor, I Additional District & Sessions Judge, at Bhongir, YadadriBhuvanagiri District; Additional Public Prosecutor, V Additional District and Sessions Judge Court, Ranga Reddy District-cum-V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at L.B. Nagar, Ranga Reddy District; Special Public Prosecutor, Fast Track Special Court for Expeditious Trial and Disposal of Rape and Protection of Children against Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act Cases, Kothagudem; Additional Public Prosecutor, I Additional Assistant Sessions Court at Bhongir, YadadriBhuvanagiri District; Additional Public Prosecutor for the court of Assistant Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan; Special Public Prosecutor (Tenure) for the Fast Track Special POCSO Courts at Narayanpet, Narayanpet District; Additional Public Prosecutor (Tenure) for the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Jogulamba, Gadwaland Additional Public Prosecutor, Principal Senior Civil Judge-cum- Assistant Sessions Judge, Wanaparthy, respectively, by invoking proviso to Instruction No.9 of the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000 even though the said instruction is not applicable for disengaging their services as Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutors and Special Public Prosecutors (as applicable) before completion of their tenure as they were appointed as per the proviso under Section 18 (3) of BNSS 2023 (Section 24(3) of Cr.P.C.1973) as being illegal, arbitrary, and violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India and contrary to the provisions of Section 18 of BNSS 2023 (Section 24 of Cr.P.C.1973).

6. W.P. No.30856 of 2024 is filed seeking a Writ of Mandamus declaring the Circular vide DC.Bhpl/Admn.Endt/Dis No.1119 dated 05.10.2024, wherein and whereby invited applications from eligible advocates for sending a fresh panel of advocates for appointment of tenure Public Prosecutors, Additional and Assistant Public Prosecutors, issued basing on the requisition of the Respondent No.3, Director of Prosecution, as illegal, arbitrary, and violation of principles of natural justice and set aside the same.

FACTS:

Facts in W.P.No.1612 and 1615 of 2024 briefly stated are as follows:

7. The petitioners in these writ petitions would submit that they are practicing advocates having considerable years of experience of practice at the Bar with no adverse remarks against them. The petitioners were appointed as Additional Public Prosecutors (Tenure) in the Court of V Additional District and Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan and Senior Civil Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan, respectively, vide G.O.Rt.No.1955 and 2560, Home (Courts-A1) Department dated 07-10-2023 and 19-12-2022, respectively, for a period of three years each from the date of taking charge of the post or till termination of their services, whichever is earlier with a specified consolidated honorarium per month. Since their appointments, petitioners have been discharging their functions as Law Officers, adhering to the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000. While so, the Respondent No.1, Principal Secretary to Government, terminated the petitioners’ services as Additional Public Prosecutors (Tenure) with immediate effect vide G.O.Rt.No.09, Home (Courts-A1) Department dated 04-01-2024, alleging that the petitioners have violated Model Code of Conduct during the Telangana State Legislative Assembly Elections-2023. Challenging the same, petitioners filed the present writ petitions.

Facts in W.Ps. No.28817, 29224, 29238, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29630, 29658, 29677, 30033 and 30574 of 2024 are as follows:

8. The petitioners in these writ petitions were appointed as Public Prosecutors, Special Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors at various Courts for a tenure of three years vide G.O.Rt.Nos. 1973, 1978, 518, 1781, 266, 1728, 1332, 696, 2560, 1958, 1644 and 1900 dated 08-10-2023, 08-10-2023, 02-03-2023, 08-09-2023, 03-02-2023, 01-09-2023, 04-07-2023, 29-03-2023, 19-12-2022, 07-10-2023, 19-08-2023 and 30-09-2023, respectively. The petitioners joined their services immediately and were discharging their duties without any remarks. While so, the Respondent No.1, Special Chief Secretary to Government issued orders relieving the petitioners from their posts vide G.O.Rt.Nos.773, 842, 844, 724, 739, 839, 722, 760, 767, 738, 714 and 715 dated 10-09-2024, 25-09-2024, 25-09-2024, 29-08-2024, 31-08-2024, 25-09-2024, 28-08-2024, 05-09-2024, 10-09-2024, 31-08-2024, 27-08-2024 and 27-08-2024, respectively, by duly paying one-month honorarium, and appointed in-charges vide the same orders, without assigning any reasons. Challenging the said relieving orders, petitioners filed these writ petitions.

Facts in W.P. No.30856 of 2024

9. The petitioner in W.P. No.30856 of 2024 was appointed as Public Prosecutor for the Court of Principal District & Sessions Judge, Jayashankar Bhupalpally for a tenure of three years vide G.O.Rt.No.1730 Home (Courts.A1) Department dated 01.09.2023. The petitioner joined the services immediately and was discharging his duties without any remarks. While so, a circular was issued vide DC.Bhpl/Admn.Endt/Dis No.1119 dated 05.10.2024 basing on the requisition of the Respondent No.3, Director of Prosecutions, inviting applications from eligible advocates for sending a fresh panel of advocates for appointment of tenure Public Prosecutors, Additional and Assistance Public Prosecutors, despite the fact that a period of 1 year 11 months is remaining in the Petitioner's tenure. Challenging the above said circular, petitioner filed the present writ petition and prayed to suspend the same.

COURT PROCEEDINGS:

10. From a perusal of the proceedings of this Court, on the earlier occasion on 23.01.2024 and 24.01.2024 in W.Ps. No.1612 and 1615 of 2024, this Court passed an interim order. Operative portion of the said interim order reads as under:

               “…. A perusal of the impugned order would show that no notice was issued to the petitioner calling for any explanation nor conducted any enquiry before passing impugned order, which amounts to gross violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, pending filing of the counter-affidavit, there shall be interim suspension, as prayed for.”

11. Subsequently, in W.P. No.28817 of 2024 on 18.10.2024, this Court granted interim suspension of the impugned order. The operative portion of order reads as under:

               “…. Prima facie, relieving the petitioner from the post of Additional Public Prosecutor appears to be illegal. In the circumstances, there shall be interim suspension of the impugned G.O.Rt.No.773 dated 10.09.2024 and consequentially, respondent No.3, the Director of Prosecutions, Telangana State, is directed to permit the petitioner to continue as Additional Public Prosecutor for the Sessions Court, until further orders.”

12. Following the said interim order passed in W.P. No.28817 of 2024 on 18.10.2024, similar orders were passed in W.P.No.28817, 29224, 29238, 28817, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29658, 29677, 30033 and 30574. Thereafter, this Court on 28-01-2025, in these batch of writ petitions, passed the following order, which reads as under:

               “Ms. A. Divya, learned Special Government Pleader representing the learned Advocate General, submitted that preparation of panel for recommending the advocates as new Public Prosecutors is under process. Necessary instructions have been issued to the concerned Judges to prepare the panel. In view of the interim orders passed by this Court, the Government is not able to finalize the selection of new Public Prosecutors.

               In the circumstances, it is made clear the respondents are at liberty to go ahead with the preparation of panel and selection process of appointment of new Public Prosecutors. However, appointment orders shall not be issued. The preparation of panel and selection of Public Prosecutors will be subject to further orders of this Court.”

13. Seeking to vacate the said interim orders passed by this Court, vacate petitions/counters have been filed by the respondents.

COUNTER AFFIDAVITS:

14. The respondent No.1 filed counter in W.P. No.1612 of 2024, while denying the writ averments, inter alia, would submit that the Commissioner of Police, Nizamabad District addressed a letter bearing Lr.No.G1-01/Elec- Ptn/CPO-NZB/2023, dated 17.11.2023 to the Respondent No.1 and marked a copy to the Respondent No.2 stating that the ACP, Bodhan Sub-Division has submitted a report vide Enquiry Report No.230/ACP-NZB/2023, dated 14.11.2023 stating that on 13.11.2023 at 2.30 PM Sri L.Shivanandam, Dy.Executive Engineer, Municipal Council, Bodhan, in-charge for flying squad has filed a petition wherein he contended that one Sri Mohammed Ghouse, Advocate, Bodhan has given information that the Telangana Government has appointed the following three advocates as Public Prosecutors for three years on fixed salary and they are drawing salary from the Government. (1) Sri G. Sham Rao, Addl. PP, V ADJ Court, Bodhan, (2) Sri P. Samaiah, Addl. PP, ASJ Court, Bodhan and (3) Sri Mohammad Abid Ahmed, Addl. GP, V ADJ Court, Bodhan. It is further reported that the above three Public Prosecutors though they are well aware that the Model Code of Conduct is in force, have participated in Election campaign on behalf of contesting candidate Sri ShakeelAmer from BRS Party and Smt.KalvakuntlaKavitha, MLC. Further the above Sri Mohammad Ghouse, Advocate has sent photos and videos related to the above incident and requested the Returning Officer to cause enquiry into the above matter and report. It is further submitted that as per rules of Model Code of Conduct, the petitioner Sri L.Shivanandam, Dy. Executive Engineer, Municipal Council, Bodhan, in-charge flying squad was nominated by the Returning Officer, Bodhan to cause enquiry into the above matter and in compliance to the instructions of Returning Officer, the petitioner Sri L.Shivanandam, Dy.EE/MCP has secured the presence of above three Public Prosecutors and on his enquiry, the above three Public Prosecutors stated that they have met politely to greet the contesting leader. But after carefully examining the photos and videos, it was clearly established that the above three Public Prosecutors have participated in election campaign at Bellal Village and Bodhan area along with contesting candidate Sri Shakeel Ameer from BRS Party and SmtKalvakuntlaKavitha, MLC. Thus, the above Public Prosecutors have violated the election rules (Model of Code of conduct) and sought for necessary legal action into the above matter. Thereafter, the Inspector of Police (SHO) Bodhan PS has registered a case in Cr.No.619/2023, u/s.188, IPC and Sec.129 of RP Act, 1951, date 13.11.2023 and took up investigation. The Commissioner of Police, Nizamabad District has enclosed a copy of the enquiry report date 14.11.2023 of the ACP, Bodhan together with its enclosures for taking necessary action against the three Public Prosecutors that being Government appointed officers and on deputation to Election Commission of India are bound to assist the district administration in conduct of free and fair elections, instead have participated in election campaign in favour of a candidate and violated the Model Code of Conduct. It is further submitted that based on the letter of the Commissioner of Police, Nizamabad District, Respondent No.2 addressed letter to the Respondent No.1 forwarding the letter requesting to take appropriate action against the Writ Petitioner, as the Respondent No.1 is the appointing authority. Thereafter, respondent No.1 vide GO Rt.No.09, Home (Courts.A1) Department, dated 04.01.2024 had issued orders terminating the services of the Writ Petitioner and the same was communicated by the Respondent No.2 vide Endt.201/A2/2023, dated 06.01.2024. It is further submitted that as far as the termination of services of the writ petitioners, there is no violation of the instructions of A.P. Law Officers rules, 2000 issued vide GO Ms.No.187, Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000, and after due enquiry, the concerned authority came to the conclusion that the Writ Petitioner has participated in election campaign and thus, the Writ Petitioner has violated the election rules (Model of Code of conduct). Moreover, their presence at the election campaign was admitted by the Writ Petitioner.

15. It is to be noted that similar stands have been taken in the counter/ vacate filed on behalf of the respondent No.2 in W.P. No.1615 o 2024.

16. On behalf of the respondent No.3, Director of Prosecution, in W.P. No.28817 of 2024 had filed counter while denying the writ averments, inter alia, stating that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of lack of bona fide and non-joinder of necessary parties. It is submitted that the petitioner was appointed as Additional Public Prosecutor, IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Family Court, Ranga Reddy at L.B.Nagar (Law Officer) vide G.O. Rt. No.1973 Home (Courts.A) Department dated 08.10.2023, issued by respondent No.2 for a period of three years from the date of taking charge or until the termination of his services, whichever is earlier. Subsequently, the Government issued orders vide G.O. Rt. No.773, dated 10.09.2024, withdrawing the services of the Writ Petitioner from his post as Additional Public Prosecutor and the in-charge arrangements were made with immediate effect, whereby Smt. Santoshi, Additional Public Prosecutor-Gr.I, has been placed as in-charge and she took charge. However, the Writ Petitioner has failed to include the person who took charge of the post as the in-charge Additional Public Prosecutor in this petition. As a result, the petition suffers from non-joinder of a necessary party as such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. It is further submitted that the Government has issued G.O.Rt.No.842, Dated 25.09.2024 in compliance with Instruction No.9 of the Telangana Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) issued under G.O.Ms. No.187 (Law) Department, dated 06.12.2000, specifically stating that the Writ Petitioner would be entitled to a one-month honorarium upon his termination. Therefore, the conditions set forth in the aforementioned rules have been fully complied with as the petitioner was appointed for a tenure period of three years only on monthly honorarium basis. It is further submitted that the term of the writ petitioner’s appointment clearly provide that his services can be terminated at any time before the expiry of the three years term. The Government has the discretion to choose any Advocate to represent in legal matters and the Writ Petitioner, having accepted the terms of his appointment cannot claim an absolute right to continue in the position of Additional Public Prosecutor and would refer to the orders passed by this Court in W.Ps.No.16935 and batch dated 19.08.2024, wherein it was held that interference in the matters concerning termination of Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors was unwarranted and the said decision was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.1138 of 2024 dated 27.11.2024. It is further submitted that the respondents have initiated process whereby this Court directed the respondents to go ahead with the preparation of panel and selection process for appointment of new Public Prosecutors. Further, the Government has recently promoted over 60 cadre Prosecuting Officers to various Sessions Courts across the State and Prosecuting Officers are available on tenure basis as well and there is no disruption in the prosecution work at the Sessions Court level in the State and eventually prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

17. It is to be noted here that the stands taken in the counter affidavit filed in W.P. No.28817 of 2024 similar stands have been taken in the separate counters filed in W.Ps.No.29224, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29630, 29658, 29677, 30033 and 30574 of 2024 by the Director of Prosecutions, State of Telangana.

18. On behalf of the respondents No.1 and 2 in W.P. No.29238 of 2024, counter affidavit has been filed by the Special Chief Secretary to Government, Home Department, while reiterating the stand taken in the said counters, inter alia, it is submitted that it is not a case of misconduct for which the petitioner services were terminated so that reasons to be assigned. Being a practicing lawyer, the petitioner is aware of the fact that it is as per the choice of the client that a lawyer can be continued as either Government Pleader, Assistant Government Pleader or Public Prosecutor and the Advocate cannot thrust himself on the Government to continue him as Additional Public Prosecutor. As such the respondent No.2 had not committed any illegality in terminating the services of the petitioner and it is not the case of petitioner that he alone is picked and his services are terminated. It is further submitted that it is not a case of the Government that the petitioner or other Public Prosecutors were not discharging duties properly. It is a policy decision of the Government to dispense with the service of the existing Public Prosecutors and in accordance with the said policy decision, the services of the petitioner were terminated. It is further submitted that the petitioner has no vested right to continue as Additional Public Prosecutor when the Government has invoked Instruction 9 of the Telangana Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions 2000. It is further submitted that the appointment and tenure of any Law Officer is purely at the discretion of the Government and the Government can choose the Law Officer and take appropriate decision for disengagement for effective administration. Further, like any other client, it is the pleasure and discretion of the Government to choose the Advocate to represent the Government. Furthermore, when the Law Officer is appointed by the Government by issuing a G.O., such Law Officer/Additional Public Prosecutor accepts the appointment only after giving their consent after binding themselves to the terms and conditions of the appointment. Eventually, it is submitted that the scope of judicial review is limited and the petitioner cannot call upon the Court to interfere with the policy decision of the Government.

Submissions:

19. The learned Senior Counsel Sri V.Ravi Kiran Rao, representing the learned counsel Sri V.Rohith on record for the petitioners, would submit that in all the Writ Petitions, except W.Ps. No.1612 and 1615 of 2024, the Writ Petitioners are questioning the order passed by the State Government relieving their services as Additional Public Prosecutors, who were appointed in various Courts by invoking Executive Instruction No.9 of Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06.12.2000.

20. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the W.Ps. No.1612 and 1615 of 2024 were filed questioning the order passed by the respondent No.1, Principal Secretary to Government, Home (Courts A-1) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad, terminating the services of the Petitioners as Additional Public Prosecutors (Tenure) for the Court of V Additional District and Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan and Assistant Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan, respectively, alleging that they have violated Model Code of Conduct during the Telangana State Legislative Assembly Elections-2023 without issuing any notice and without causing any enquiry even before expiry of tenure of appointment which is contrary to Clause 9 of Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000.

21. The learned Senior Counsel Sri V.Ravi Kiran Rao would further submit that this Court in Criminal Petition No.2108 of 2024 while allowing the criminal petition quashed the proceedings against the petitioners in Crime No.619 of 2023 of Bodhan Town Police Station, Nizamabad District, which was registered against the petitioner alleging the offences under Sections 188 of IPC and Section 129 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and would further submit that as on date no new Public Prosecutors have been appointed and now the petitioners are holding dispensation of public justice and terminating them would cause stigma.

22. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the respondents cannot pick and choose to appoint and terminate the Public Prosecutors/ Additional Public Prosecutors as per their choice and there was no reference in the counter regarding the orders passed by this Court in Criminal Petition No.2108 of 2024 whereby the criminal case registered against the petitioners was quashed. Therefore, the Model Code of Conduct is not applicable to the Law Officers and is only applicable to the political parties and the Government officials and such aspect has not been dealt with by the respondents.

23. Insofar as the W.P. No.29658 of 2024 is concerned, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the said writ petition is filed questioning the order passed by the respondent No.1, Special Secretary to Government, Home (Courts A-1) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad, vide G.O.Rt.No.767 Home (Courts A-1) Department dated 10-09-2024 relieving the Petitioner from the post of Additional Public Prosecutor for the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge Court, Bodhan even though interim order granted by this Hon'ble Court suspending the termination order in W.P. No.1615 of 2024 is subsisting and the matter is pending.

24. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the State Government has not made any rules for appointment of Public Prosecutors/Additional Public Prosecutors with reference to Section 24 of Cr.P.C., though referred in the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000, but the State Government by invoking Article 162 of Constitution of India issued executive instructions i.e. Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 and issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000 and such executive instructions are not rules framed with reference to any provisions of Act or Code.

25. Learned Senior Counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the Executive Instruction No.2, which deals with definitions. Executive Instruction No.2 (iv) defines Law Officers. "Law Officer" means a Government Pleader or an Assistant Government Pleader or a Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor or Special Public Prosecutor or a Special Counsel. Section 2 (u) deals with "Public Prosecutor". - "Public Prosecutor" means any person appointed under Section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor; Section 24 of Cr.P.C. deals with appointment of Public Prosecutors. The relevant provisions i.e. sub-section (3), (4) and (5) of Section 24 reads as follows:

               “Section 24 (3).

               For every district, the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors for the district: Provided that the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor appointed for one district may be appointed also to be a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, for another district.

               Section 24 (4)

               The District Magistrate shall, in consultation with the Sessions Judge, prepare a panel of names of persons, who are, in his opinion fit to be appointed as Public Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutors for the district.

               Section 24 (5)

               No person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district unless his name appears in the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4).”

26. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that for termination of services of Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors, the State Government relied on Executive Instructions 8 and 9 of Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000. However, the State Government cannot remove Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors without possessing any definite material for such removal/termination unless there is material on record to show that Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor not taking proper stand on behalf of the State Government in Courts.

27. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the Public Prosecutors have great responsibility and they are required to perform the statutory duties independently having regard to various provisions contained in Code of Criminal Procedure and they assist the Court for advancing criminal justice under the frame work of Criminal Procedure code, Indian Evidence Act and Indian Penal Code and the Petitioners, being Public Prosecutors, will not defend any policy matters of State Government. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that Section 321 of Cr.P.C., empowers the State Government for withdrawal of prosecution of any accused and even in such circumstances, the Public Prosecutors, while filing any application for withdrawal of prosecution, would apply their mind independently, but cannot carry out the contents of the G.O. or any instructions issued by the State Government for withdrawal of prosecution and further contends that the role of Law Officer i.e. Government Pleader is different from the role of Public Prosecutor in administration of justice. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the State having appointed Public Prosecutors/Additional Public Prosecutors for particular tenure by invoking sub sections (3) and (4) of Section 24 of Cr.P.C., cannot abruptly terminate the services of Public Prosecutors/Additional Public Prosecutors without there being any material on record more so mere change of Government in power, the State is not empowered to terminate the services of Public Prosecutors/Additional Public Prosecutors by invoking the instruction No.9 of the G.O. as they are appointed under the provisions of Cr.P.C which gives them a distinctive position by which they discharge their duties in accordance to the provisions of criminal law. Whereas the Government Pleaders appears in important civil and constitutional matters, service and tax matters and every other matter where substantial stakes are involved or matters of grave and substantial importance at times touching public policy and where security of State is involved and they act in tune with the State Government interest.

28. The learned Senior Counsel in support of his submissions draws the attention of this Court to the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mahabir and others Vs. State of Haryana (Crl.A.No.5560-5561 of 2024 dated 29-01-2025) wherein it was elaborately dealt with regard to appointment of Public Prosecutors and the role of Public Prosecutors. (Relevant paragraphs are 94, 95, 96 and 97, extracted hereunder for reference:

               “94. Public Prosecutor holds a "Public Office". The primacy given to him under the Scheme of CrPC has a "special purpose". Certain professional, official obligations and privileges are attached to his office. His office may also be termed as an office of profit as he remains disqualified to contest the election so long he holds the office though permanency is attached to the office and not to the term of his office. His duties are of public nature. He has an "independent and responsible character". He holds the public office within the scope of a "quo warranto proceedings". Prosecutor is not a part of investigating agency but is an "independent statutory authority". He performs statutory duties and functions. He holds an office of responsibility as he has been enclothed with the power to withdraw the prosecution of a case on the directions of the State Government.

               95. The Criminal law enforcement system investigates crimes and prosecutes offenders. It must also protect valued rights and freedoms, and convict only the guilty. The prosecutor must recognize these different and competing interests. He should strike a fair balance between the competing interests of convicting the guilty, protecting citizens' rights and freedoms and protecting the public from criminals. Prosecutors should ensure that prosecutions are conducted in a diligent, competent and fair manner. The importance of the office of the Public Prosecutor cannot be overemphasized. The Public Prosecutor must be a person of high merit, fair and objective, because upon him depends to a large extent the administration of criminal justice. The office of the Public Prosecutor is a public office and the incumbent has to discharge statutory duties. The person appointed as Public Prosecutor must, therefore, be one who is not only able and efficient, but also enjoys a reputation and prestige which satisfy his appointment as a Public Prosecutor. The duty of the prosecutor is to assist the Court in reaching a proper conclusion in regard to the case which is brought before it for trial. The prosecutor has to be fair in the presentation of the prosecution case. He must not suppress or keep back from the court evidence relevant to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. He must present the complete picture, and not a one sided picture. He must not be partial to the prosecution or to the accused. He has to be fair to both sides in the presentation of the case.

               96. A Public Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts of the case. The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the Court to the investigation agencies but to the accused as well. If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during trial, the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it. On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused. Even if the court or defence counsel overlooked it, the Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it to the notice of the Court, if it comes to his knowledge.

               97. Law Officers are one of the important wheels of the chariot, driven by the Judges to attain the cherished goal of human being to secure justice against the wrong doers. The main object of the State is to curb the crime, investigate and prosecute the offenders and punish them, with a view to maintain law and order, amity and harmony, tranquillity and peace. The various provisions of the CrPC and the Rules provide the manner and procedure by which the Public Prosecutor should be appointed and provide assistance to the Courts. The object of the CrPC and the Rules is to appoint the best among the lawyers as the Public Prosecutor to provide assistance to the Court. The people have the vital interest in the matter.”

29. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to the order passed in the case of Gajendra Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and others, (Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.10661 of 2017) by the High Court of Patna, which dealt with the case of appointment of Public Prosecutors wherein at un- numbered para held as under: (Un-numbered paragraph 4 at Page 142 of compilation of Judgments).

               “An appointment of a Public Prosecutor under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not ordinary appointment rather is of a Special kind and is made in consultation with the Sessions Judge in so far as the appointment in district is concerned and similarly consultation is made with the High Court where the appointments are to be made in the High Court. The appointment orders of the two petitioners present at Annexures 2 and 3 series to the first Writ Petition and Annexure 1 to the Second Writ Petition confirms that the appointment was for a period of 3 years. The Supreme Court in the Judgment of Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (Supra) has very exhaustively dealt with the nature of appointment of a Public Prosecutor together with the procedure to be followed therein which mandates consultation with the District Judge concerned and though the present appointments in question has been made in such manner i.e. with consultation of the District Judge, but surprisingly when it is the matter of removal, the District Magistrate while making hisrecommendations has bypassed this essential step. In my opinion until such time that the view formed by the authorities of the State for removal of the Public Prosecutor is either endorsed by the District Judge concerned or the State is in possession of materials to differ therefrom, no removal can be carried out midway through the tenure of a Public Prosecutor”

30. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that when a similar situation arose, while dealing with removal of Public Prosecutor, the Hon'ble Division Bench of Patna High Court in Uday Nath Roy Vs State of Bihar (1991 Law Suit (PAT) 348) clearly held that the termination cannot be done unless there are some cogent reasons for removing the appointment of Public Prosecutor. Mere change of Government cannot be a cogent reason for the removal of a Public Prosecutor and nothing to show that he had acted in such a manner as to lose the confidence of the Government. In one of the Judgments rendered by Madras High Court in M. Prakasam Vs. the Inspector of Police (MANU/TN/0137/2015) observed as under:

               "Law officer should be law knowing person and not political leader knowing person. Law Officer post is not a political post, but, it is a public post with greater responsibility in the administration of justice…”

31. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the power of Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised when the services of the petitioners are disengaged of their professional service or their services are terminated without assigning any reasons arbitrarily. In support of his submissions, placed reliance on the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others (AIR 1991 SC 537), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the judicial review of State action is permissible even when the engagement of Government counsel is contractual in nature. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court at para 24 held that “...we find no reason why the requirement of Article 14 should not extend even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the State activity.”

32. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that all the Judgments cited on behalf of Petitioners clearly dealt with appointment of Public Prosecutors made under Sections 24(3) and (4) of Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, it is laid down by the Hon'ble Courts that mere change of Party in Power or by change of policy, the Public Prosecutors, who were appointed under a Statute i.e. under Section 24 (3) and (4) of Cr.P.C., cannot be terminated unilaterally without any valid reasons and without any cogent material on record to that effect.

33. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor shall be appointed in consultation with District and Sessions Judge who is able to assess merit, knowledge in the branch of law, honesty and other character of the person who is to be recommended for appointment to the post of Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor. Therefore, the merit is the criteria for appointment of Public Prosecutors. Whereas there is no such merit criteria for appointment of Government Pleaders. However, in these cases, terminations were done unilaterally without consulting the District and Sessions Judge who recommended the names of the petitioners found to be fit for appointment as Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor. But the State Government invoked the executive instruction No.9 of Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06-12-2000 which is not traceable to any power. Further, Executive Instruction No.9 can be invoked in the event any Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor commits any misconduct or failed to protect the public interest in administration of justice or misconducted himself in conducting the case. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the Executive Instruction No.9 is un-channelised and unfettered power which has to be exercised by stating cogent reasons otherwise it warrants judicial review and would further submit that the appointment of Petitioners is in statutory nature and petitioners were appointed under a statute under Section 24(3) of Cr.P.C. for a period of three years from the date of assuming charge and a notification was issued and published in Telangana Gazette. However, after change of party in power, the Petitioners are terminated before completion of their tenure. Though the Executive Instruction No.9 of Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06.12.2000 empowers the State Government for termination of the petitioners, but such termination should disclose valid reason based on some cogent material on record for such termination and if the petitioners are terminated from the post of Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor prematurely without any valid cause or cogent reason on record, except change of the Government would effect their career and it is not only a stigma and would be a dent on the career of the Petitioners and they cannot live with dignity in life as an Advocate hit by Article 21 of Constitution of India.

34. Learned Senior Counsel had also drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that the petitioners in W.P. No.1615 and 29658 of 2024 were appreciated by the respondent No.2, Director of Prosecutions, Government of Telangana, Hyderabad, by issuing certificates titled “Award of Appreciation” recognising the petitioner’s contribution for convictions secured in 2023 (on occasion of 76th Independence Day) and for delivering a lecture in 4th Saturday Online Orientation Lecture held on 25.11.2023.

Submissions in W.Ps. No.28817, 29224, 29238, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29630, 30574 and 30856 of 2024

35. The learned counsel Sri M.A.K. Mukheed, appearing for the petitioners in these writ petitions would submit that under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C., the appointments of Public Prosecutors are to be done in consultation with Sessions Judge with the preparation of a panel of names of persons who are in his opinion suitable to be appointed as Public Prosecutors or additional Public Prosecutors for the District and would further submit that the Government has power to appoint on the provisions of Cr.P.C. and not on G.O.’s and in the petitioners case notification was issued for appointments under statutory provisions. He would further rely on the provisions of Advocate Act, 1961 and would submit that the petitioners cannot be removed unilaterally. That apart the petitioners were only relieved and not terminated. Further, the State Government without settling the salaries of the Petitioners and without any notice to the petitioners and without consultation of the Hon'ble Courts, simply had issued the impugned relieving orders and the impugned circular in W.P. No.30856 of 2024 in the above mentioned writ petitions and withdrew the services of the Petitioners, which is illegal, arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice. In support of his submissions, relied on State of U.P. and another Vs. Johri Mal (2004(4) SCC 714)

               “Submissions of biodata

               79. During hearing of the matter, a question arose as to whether submission of biodata pursuant to issuance of a notice therefor by the District Magistrate or the District Judge would amount to soliciting briefs within the meaning of Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India Rules or not.”

36. The learned counsel Sri M.A.K. Mukheed would further submit that since only temporary arrangements have been made, the writ petitioners would not be effected for non joinder of the parties as the counter is silent to the extent whether the new appointees have been taken charge or not. Since the petitioners are appointed by the Government orders and their termination is bad in law and questioning the very G.O. does not arise and as per the provisions of Section 24 (4)(5) of the Cr.P.C. the Government has no role in appointment of the petitioners as Public Prosecutors/Additional Public Prosecutors.

Submissions in W.P. No.29677 and 30033 of 2024

37. The learned counsel for the petitioners Sri S. Rama Mohan Rao submitted that the impugned orders were issued without proper reason and without issuing any notice or opportunity to the Petitioner, which is illegal, arbitrary and violation of principles of natural justice. The learned counsel would further submit that the appointment of the Petitioners is under the provisions of the Cr.P.C., which had been specifically quoted in the appointment orders of the petitioners. The impugned relieving orders were issued under the provisions of the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service instructions), is not applicable to the case of the Petitioners.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED ADVOCATE GENERAL:

38. The learned Advocate General Sri A. Sudarshan Reddy would submit that the writ petitioners in the present batch of matters were law officers appointed in accordance with the executive instructions issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 (Law) Department, dated 06.12.2000. The appointments of the writ petitioners as Additional Public Prosecutors and Special Public Prosecutors clearly mentions "for a period of 3 years from the date of taking charge of the post or till termination of his services, whichever is earlier".

39. The learned Advocate General would submit that as the similar issues fell for consideration before this Court in all these batch of writ petitions, W.P. No.28817 of 2024 is taken as a lead writ petition and made common submissions in all the writ petitions.

40. Learned Advocate General would submit that the petitioner in W.P. No.28817 of 2024 was appointed as per the G.O.Rt.No.1973 dated 08.10.2023 referring to G.O.Ms.No.187, Law(L) Department, dated 06.12.2000, for a period of three years as Additional Public Prosecutor (Tenure) for the Court of IV Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-I Additional Family Court at L.B.Nagar, Ranga Reddy, from the date of taking the charge of the post or till termination of his services, whichever is earlier with a consolidated honorarium of Rs.40,000/- per month and would further submit that as per the notification, the appointment was made under the provisions of the Section 24 Sub Section (3) of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (Central Act No.2 of 1974) read with G.O.Ms.No.187, Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000. Having appointed under the said G.O. the petitioner cannot say that the said G.O. is not applicable since the appointment of the petitioner as Additional Public Prosecutor is only on tenure basis. The learned Advocate General had also drawn the attention of this Court to the G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 06.12.2000 which defines the Law Officer who would be selected with consultation under Section 24 (3) of Cr.P.C. whereas the appointment would be made by the State Government. Further, Section 24(4) refers to the mode of consultation and that the appointment of Government Pleaders and the Public Prosecutors would stand on the same footing and the termination orders were issued whereby the petitioner was relieved and in-charge arrangements were made vide G.O.Rt.No.773 dated 10.09.2024 after duly paying one month honorarium to the said Officer as per the proviso to Instruction No.9 of the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000, issued vide G.O.Ms. No.187 dated 06.12.2000. Further, the Government has appointed one Smt. S.Shoba Rani, Additional Public Prosecutor, as in-charge with immediate effect and would further submit that in all the writ petitions in-charge appointees are necessary and for non-joinder of the necessary parties, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.

41. To substantiate the case of the respondents, the learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the order dated 25.07.2018 passed in W.P. No.4444 of 2018 by this Court wherein the writ petition was filed questioning the action of the respondents therein in removing the petitioner’s name from the panel for appointment to the post of Additional Public Prosecutor wherein the learned counsel for the petitioner had relied to the Executive Instructions issued in G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 06.12.2000 to contend that an Additional Public Prosecutor can be appointed for a third term, and non-inclusion of the petitioner’s name solely on the basis of an anonymous complaint, is wholly unjustified. G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 06.12.2000 titled as the “Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appintment and Conditions of Services) Instructions, 2000”, are administrative/executive instructions issued in the exercise of the power conferred on the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution of India and the executive instructions do not have statutory sanction and cannot, ordinarily, be enforced in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reference was made to (J.R. Raghupathy Vs. Station of A.P. (AIR 1988 SC 1681 and Union of India Vs. S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357).

42. Learned Advocate General would submit that the Division Bench of this Court while disposing of the W.P. No.4444 of 2018, observed the following at para No.8:

               “8. It must be borne in mind that the legal profession is essentially a service-oriented profession. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer for personal reasons, and is at liberty to leave him also, for the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give reasons for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The lawyer, in turn, is not an agent of his client but his dignified, responsible spokesman. The relationship between a lawyer and a private client, is equally valid between him and the Government or public bodies which engage the services of lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period. The nature of the contract is of professional engagement, and not that of employment. The lawyer of the Government or a public body is not its employee, but a professional practitioner engaged to do the specified work. (State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Pushpindar Kaur). Lawyers, on the full-time rolls of the Government or public bodies cannot be compelled to continue their assignment merely because a particular term is stipulated. A lawyer, whose services have been engaged by the Government, can at any time withdraw from a particular case, and may even refuse to serve in case of any crisis of confidence. (Pushpindar Kaur). Conversely the Government or public bodies can, at their choice, disengage the services of their Counsel.

               9. Just as in the case of a private individual, the Government, inchoosing its Counsel, must have some play in the joints, though it may be lesser in the case of choosing Government Counsel. Freedom of action, to continue or terminate the engagement, is an essential part of such relationship. (Vilas Rao v. State of A.P; Pushpindar Kaur). The State Government has discretion in the matter of appointment of Law Officers.

               (U.P. State Law Officers Association; Pushpindar Kaur).

               10. No Advocate can claim, as of right, that his name should be included in the panel for being appointed as an Additional Public Prosecutor, that too for a third term which, even in terms of Clause (8) of the Executive Instructions, is only in “exceptional” cases. Self- certification of the petitioner notwithstanding, the executive instructions require the Principal District Judge of the District to form an opinion as to whether the Advocate, who seeks appointment for a third term, falls under the “exceptional” category.

               11. Sri O.Swaroop, learned counsel for the 5th respondent, submits that the petitioner’s allegation of his name being deleted on the basis of an anonymous compliant is not true; and, as he had already worked for two terms, it was decided not to recommend his name for a third term, as he was not found to fall in the “exceptional” category. It is wholly unnecessary for us to dwell on this aspect, as the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be invoked by an Advocate seeking a mandamus that his name should be included in the panel, as that would require this Court to substitute its views for that of the Principal District Judge, or the District Collector, which is impermissible.

               12. We see no reason, therefore, to interfere with the process of selection, being undertaken, for appointment of Additional Public Prosecutors, at the behest of an Advocate who claims that he should be appointed as an Additional Public Prosecutor for a third term.”

43. The learned Advocate General would further submit that the petitioners have no legally vested or enforceable right. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W.A No.1138 of 2024 dated 27.11.2024 with respect to law officers appointed as per G.O. Ms. No.187 dated 06.12.2000 has upheld the termination of the law officers holding that it is for the Government to choose its counsel and the relationship between the Government and Law officers is purely contractual and the same can be terminated without giving any reasons. The Hon'ble Court has upheld that the Petitioners have no legally vested right to continue. The learned Advocate General would further submit that the Hon'ble Apex Court disposed of the appeal filed challenging the orders in W.A. No.1138 of 2004 vide its order dated 15.09.2025 in SLP No. 7524 of 2025 (Yendala Pradeep & Ors. v. State of Telangana &Ors.) Therefore, the matter has attained finality.

44. The learned Advocate General would further submit that the relationship between the State and its law officers is only in the nature of professional engagement with State being the client can engage or disengage a law officer and relied on State of U.P. v. Rakesh Kumar Keshavi (reported in (2011) 5 SCC 341). The relevant paras 16, 17, 31, 34, 36 are extracted hereunder:

               16. The vital issue raised in the appeal relates to the right of the State Government to engage, disengage and renew the terms of its counsel and Law Officers in keeping with the need to best safeguard the public interest, monetary consideration, suitability of the incumbent and the interest of the Government as the client. It may be mentioned that the entire gamut of this exercise is governed by the Legal Remembrancer's Manual which is governing the conduct of legal affairs of the State of Uttar Pradesh since last several decades, in matters relating to the engagement, disengagement and renewal of the Government Counsel and Law Officers for the State Government.

               17. The specific issue raised in the appeal involves the question as to whether a legally enforceable right to claim renewal of appointment to the post of ADGC (Criminal) is available to the respondents and what is the scope of judicial review in this regard. As observed earlier the High Court has regarded the right to renewal of appointment as a legally enforceable one and therefore has chosen to interfere with the decision of the State Government seeking to fill the post by direct selection instead of renewing the terms of the respondents as was claimed by them in the writ petition.

               31. This Court in the said case has further ruled that so long as in appointing a counsel, the procedure laid down in the L.R. Manual is followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the court would normally not interfere with the decision. What is emphasised by this Court is that the nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-à-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagement, the courts are normally chary to overturn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. According to this Court the question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel and the extension of tenure of the Public Prosecutor or the District Counsel should not be compared with the right of renewal under a licence or permit granted under a statute. What is laid down as firm proposition of law is that an incumbent has no legally enforceable right as such and the action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia only on the ground that the same was arbitrary. It is also held that the court normally would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the State not to renew the tenure of the Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel and the jurisdiction of the courts in a case of this nature would be to invoke the doctrine of “Wednesburyunreasonableness”

               34. Applying the principles of law laid down by this Court in the abovequoted decision, this Court finds that the decision of the State Government not to accept the recommendation made by the District Magistrate cannot be said to be arbitrary. There is no manner of doubt that the ADGC (Criminal) are not only officers of the court but also the representatives of the State. They represent the interest of the general public before a court of law. The holders of the post have a public duty to perform. However, in the matter of engagement of ADGC (Criminal) the concept of public office does not come into play. The choice is that of the Government and none can claim a right to be appointed because it is a position of great trust and confidence. Article 14, however, in a given case, may be attracted to a limited extent if the State fails to discharge its public duty or acts in defiance, deviation and departure of the principles of law.

               36. Thus it was not open to the respondents to file writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for compelling the appellants to utilise their services as advocates irrespective of choice of the State. It was for the State to select its own counsel. In view of the poor performance of the respondents in handling/conducting criminal cases, this Court is of the opinion that the High Court committed a grave error in giving direction to the District Magistrate to forward better particulars of 10 candidates whose names were included in the two panels prepared pursuant to the advertisement dated 16-1-2004 and in setting aside the order dated 7-9-2004 of the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, U.P. calling upon the District Magistrate to send another panel/list for appointment to the two posts of ADGC (Criminal).

45. Further, the learned Advocate General had made elaborate submissions on various aspects and to substantiate the case of the respondents relied on the following judgments:

               (i) Appointment of the law officers is at the pleasure of the Government:

               Referred to the case of Tholu Thirumaavalavan v. Principal Secretary as reported in (2023) SCC online Mad 7756 (para 24, 25).

               24. The relationship between an advocate and his client is uberrima fides, i.e., one of active confidence and trust. The government is the custodian of public interest. It is the obligation and the duty of the government to protect the public interest to its optimum extent and in the best possible manner. This duty mandates the government to engage the most proficient, competent and capable persons to represent it, inter alia, the public interest. Ergo, in the selection of Law Officers, the government is duty bound to make earnest efforts to choose the best. In view of that, while selecting the Law Officers, merit ought to be the sole consideration. The methodology adopted for selecting the Law Officers naturally has to be transparent and the invitation of the applications should be broad-based, so as to enable the government to select the most competent, capable and meritorious lawyers to represent it as Law Officers. Eventually, they would be safeguarding the public interest.

               25. The relationship between the government and the Law Officer is purely a professional relationship and not that of a master and servant. The Law Officers engaged by the government, during their performance of the duty, are not holding any civil post. They are also not government servants and/or government employees. The appointment of these Law Officers is at the pleasure of the government. The sine qua non is that the Law Officers selected by the government should be duly qualified, competent and worthy to represent it. The determination of their engagement is also at the pleasure of the government. So also, the Law Officer engaged by the government has a right to terminate his services with the government. It cannot be said that their appointment is a tenure appointment.

               (ii) Judicial review in the matter of appointment of law officers is limited: Referred to the case of State of U.P. v. Johri Mal as reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714 (Paras 28, 36, 40, 60, 61)

               28. The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. The limited scope of judicial review, succinctly put, is:

               (i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies.

               (ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds.

               (iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal.

               (iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a court is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice.

               (v) The courts cannot be called upon to undertake the government duties and functions. The court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies. (See Ira Munn v. State of Illinois [94 US 113: 24 L Ed 77 (1876)] .)

               ….

               36. A writ of or in the nature of mandamus, it is trite, is ordinarily issued where the petitioner establishes a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal duty in the public authorities.

               ….

               40. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the court will normally not interfere with the decision. The nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-à-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagements, the courts are normally chary to overturn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not speak of renewal or extension of tenure. The extension of tenure of Public Prosecutor or the District Counsel should not be compared with the right of renewal under a licence or permit granted under a statute. The incumbent has no legal enforceable right as such. The action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia on the ground that the same is arbitrary. The courts normally would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the State not to renew the tenure of a Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel. The jurisdiction of the courts in a case of this nature would be to invoke the doctrine of “Wednesburyunreasonableness” as developed in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. WednesburyCorpn. [(1947) 2 All ER 680: (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)]

               ….

               60. In KumariShrilekhaVidyarthi [(1991) 1 SCC 212: 1991 SCC (L&S) 742] , the Court sought to draw a distinction between the powers of public authorities vis-à-vis the private authorities referring to Wade's Administrative Law, 6th Edn., p. 401 to the following effect and stating: (SCC p. 238, para 25)

               “For the same reasons there should in principle be no such thing as unreviewable administrative discretion, which should be just as much a contradiction in terms as unfettered discretion. The question which has to be asked is what is the scope of judicial review, and in a few special cases the scope for the review of discretionary decisions may be minimal. It remains axiomatic that all discretion is capable of abuse, and that legal limits to every power are to be found somewhere.”

               61. We have our own reservations about the aforementioned principles of law, but for the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to advert thereto.

               The learned Advocate General also relied on State of UP Vs. Rakesh Kumar Keshavi (2011) 5 SCC 341.

               (iii) Clause 9 of the G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 06.12.2000 is held to be a wholesome provision; Reference was made to the case of Vilas Rao v. State of A.P. as reported in 1993 Supp (1) ALT 588.

               (iv) Termination/discontinuance of Law Officers would not cause stigma:

46. In the case of Government of A.P. v. Smt. Pushpender Kaur as reported in (2003) 6 ALD 214 (Paras 20-25, 29), has considered that whether the impugned order of termination of engagement of the writ petitioner as Government Pleader suffers from any infirmities and whether the writ petitioner is entitled for a notice and hearing before her termination of engagement as Government Pleader under the instructions of the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued in G.O. Ms. No. 187, dated 06.12.2000 and held that the order of termination does not cast any stigma on the professional abilities and integrity of the writ petitioners.

               20. Concededly the executive instructions regulating the appointment and conditions of service of the Law Officers of the Government of Andhra Pradesh are not statutory in their nature. The executive instructions were obviously issued by the Government to structure the discretion of those who are involved in the process of making appointments of the Law Officers to represent the State and its instrumentalities and other authorities in various Courts including the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The executive instructions clearly provide that the Law Officers, i.e., Government Pleader or Assistant Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor or Special Counsel, are required to be appointed by the Government in consultation with the Advocate General. The Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years and that engagement may be terminated with one month's notice or by paying one month's honorarium in lieu of one month's notice. The Law Officers so appointed in the High Court, other Courts and Tribunals at the State level shall function under the general superintendence and control of the Advocate General and they shall be wholly responsible for ensuring all cases entrusted to them are properly prepared and represented in the Courts.

               21. That a cumulative reading of the Instructions and the order of appointment in unmistakable terms reveal that the Law Officers are engaged to represent the State and its instrumentalities and other authorities in the cases entrusted to them for and on behalf of the Government and other authorities. They are not recruited and appointed into any service as such. The services of the Advocates are engaged and hired by the Government for a specified period and some cases are entrusted to them to represent the State and its agencies in the Courts. They are not paid any salary. The Government Pleaders appointed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal or in any State level Court or Tribunal are paid a consolidated honorarium of Rs. 20,000/- per month.

               22. In State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers' Association, AIR 1994 SC 1654, the Apex Court while considering the scope of its earlier decision and the ratio in KumariShrilekhaVidyarthi (AIR 1991 SC 537) (supra), in which it was held that the wholesale termination of the District Government Counsel was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, observed that since the appointment of District Government Counsel is made strictly on the basis of comparative merit and after screening at different levels, the termination of their services is not consistent with the public interests. The ratio of the said decision can hardly be applied to the appointments of the Law Officers in the High Court whose appointment was not made strictly on the basis of any comparative assessment of merit. The Supreme Court noted that the State Government had the discretion in the matter of appointment of Law Officers in the High Court and found that the method of appointment was not calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will always be appointed or that the appointments made will not be on considerations other than merit. It is observed (Para 6 of AIR 1994 SC 1654):

               “The appointment of lawyers by the Government and the public bodies to conduct work on their behalf, and their subsequent removal from such appointment have to be examined from three different angles, viz., the nature of the legal profession, the interests of the public and the modes of the appointment and removal. Legal profession is essentially a service-oriented profession. The ancestor of today's lawyer was no more than a spokesman who rendered his services to the needy members of the society by articulating their case before the authorities that be. The services were rendered without regard to the remuneration received or to be received. With the growth of litigation, lawyering became a full-time occupation and most of the lawyers came to depend upon it as the sole source of livelihood. The nature of the service rendered by the lawyers was private till the Government and the public bodies started engaging them to conduct cases on their behalf. The Government and the public bodies engaged the services of the lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period. Although the contract in some cases prohibited the lawyers from accepting private briefs, the nature of the contract did not alter from one of professional engagement to that of employment. The lawyer of the Government or a public body was not its employee but was a professional practitioner engaged to do the specified work. This is so even today, though the lawyers on the full-time rolls of the Government and the public bodies are described as their law officers. It is precisely for this reason that in the case of such Law Officers, the saving clause of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules waives the prohibition imposed by the said rule against the acceptance by a lawyer of a full-time employment. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer for personal reasons and is at liberty to leave him also, for the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give reasons for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The lawyer in turn is not an agent of his client but his dignified, responsible spokesman. He is not bound to tell the Court every fact or urge every proposition of law which his client wants him to do, however irrelevant it may be. He is essentially an adviser to his client and is rightly called a counsel in some jurisdictions. Once acquainted with the facts of the case, it is the lawyer's discretion to choose the facts and the points of law which he would advance. Being a responsible officer of the Court and an important adjunct of the administration of justice, the lawyer also owes a duty to the Court as well as to the opposite side. He has to be fair to ensure that justice is done. He demeans himself if he acts merely as a mouthpiece of his client. This relationship between the lawyer and the private client is equally valid between him and the public bodies.”

               22A. In Vilas Rao v. State of A.P., 1993 Supp (1) Andh LT 588, Sivaraman Nair, J., held:

               “………… It is necessary that there shall be some play in the joints in the matter of Government choosing its Counsel just as in the case of a private individual. There may be public employment element involved in the appointment of Government Counsel. The play in the joints may be lesser in the case of choosing Government Counsel because of that element. I am of the opinion that the Government order under which the petitioner was appointed as a Government Pleader had put him on notice of the possibility of termination of service at any time by giving one month's notice. In the special nature of the relationship between the Government and its Counsel, I am of the opinion that this provision under which advance notice is contemplated is a wholesome provision which gives either party some amount of freedom of action to continue or terminate the engagement which is so essential in such relationships. Petitioners cannot be heard to say that the above provision is arbitrary or discriminatory.”

               23. Explaining the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in KumariShrilekhaVidyarthi (AIR 1991 SC 537) (supra), the learned Judge observed:

               “It is true that in KumariShrilekhaVidyarthi (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down in very general terms that in case where instances of public employment is involved, the employer is bound to act within reasonable limits. It appears to me that the above case is an extreme one on facts. What happened in that case was that consequent on the change of the party in power, the Government issued a general instruction that all Law Officers of the State Government shall immediately demit office. The situation that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was—

               “by one stroke, seemingly resorting to the Spoils system” alien to our constitutional scheme, the Government of State of Uttar Pradesh has terminated by a general order the appointments of all Government Counsel (Civil, Criminal, Revenue) in all the districts of the State of U.P. w.e.f. 28-2-1990 and directed preparation of fresh panels to make appointments in place of the existing incumbents. This has been done by Circular G.O. No. D- 282 — Seven — Law Ministry dt. 6-2-1990, terminating all the existing appointments w.e.f. 28-2-1990, irrespective of the fact whether the term of the incumbent had expired or was subsisting.”

               It was the validity of that general action — slaughter, if I may call it — which was the question for consideration by the Supreme Court. A situation like the present one whereby appointment or engagement of individual was terminated in accordance with the provisions contained in the conditions governing the orders of his appointment did not arise in that decision. The Supreme Court took care to observe that if there were reasons in existence, even if they were not disclosed, there would be no occasion for the Court to interfere with the order terminating engagement of the Government Counsel. It was a wholesale termination of engagement of all Government Pleaders all over the State by one stroke of the pen on one day entirely due to the political reasons and justified if at all, only by the Spoils System which was unknown to our constitutional scheme which the Supreme Court frowned upon. No such situation arises in the present case, though it is suggested that it was only the fact that the petitioner had submitted his nomination for election as a member of Parliament on behalf of BharathiyaJanatha Party, subsequent to his initial appointment, that provoked the order dt. 1-7-1991 and the impugned order.”

               24. In the instant case, we have already noticed that no advance notice was given to the writ petitioner as provided in clause 9 of the Instructions, but the appellants sent a cheque to the writ petitioner towards one month's honorarium in lieu of one month's notice, which the writ petitioner declined to accept and returned the cheque. The appellants have scrupulously followed the prescribed procedure and in such a situation the principles of natural justice cannot be pressed into service to invalidate the order.

               25. We are not impressed by the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner that the executive instructions contained in the Government Order themselves are arbitrary and capricious enabling the Government to exercise the power in a discriminatory manner.

               Be it noted that the writ petitioner obtained the order of appointment under the very same instructions and now seeks to challenge the same instructions, which cannot be countenanced. The writ petitioner with the eyes wide open accepted the appointment subject to various terms and conditions incorporated therein, which inter alia provides for termination of the engagement by giving one month's notice or payment of one month's emoluments in lieu of notice. The writ petitioner having accepted the appointment subject to such terms and conditions cannot have any legitimate grievance when her engagement as Government Pleader has been terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment itself.

               ….

               29. In the instant case, the Government merely expressed its intention not to continue the client and counsel relationship with the writ petitioner. It is under those circumstances, the Government having invoked Clause 9 of the Instructions sent one month's honorarium to the writ petitioner in lieu of one month's notice and accordingly terminated the professional engagement, which, in our considered opinion, does not suffer from any legal infirmities. The order of termination, in no manner, casts any aspersion or stigma on the professional abilities and integrity of the writ petitioner.

               (v) One month honorarium in compliance with rule 9 of G.O.Ms No.187 dated 06.12.2000 is paid:

47. Learned Advocate General would submit that the termination of all the Writ Petitioners in the present batch of matters was done in accordance with Instruction 9 G.O Ms. No.187 (Law) Department, dated 06.12.2000 by paying one-month honorarium and would further submit that in pursuance of the Orders of this Court dated 28.01.2025 that the "Respondents are at liberty to go ahead with the preparation of panel and selection process of appointment of new public prosecutors. However, appointment orders shall not be issued". Panels have been received and appointment orders are awaited to be issued.

(vi) NON-JOINDER OF NECESSARY PARTIES.

48. The learned Advocate General would further submit that the Respondents have issued G.Os. terminating the services of the Petitioners and making interim arrangements to the post clearly mentioning the in- charge appointee in the termination order. (Referred to W.P No. 28817 of 2024, Pg.13). The writ petitioners have approached this Court challenging the said termination order and failed to make the in-charge appointee, who is a necessary party as a party respondent to the writ petitions and would further submit that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in limine on this ground alone for non-joinder of necessary parties. In this regard, the learned Advocate General has referred to the case of Girjesh Shrivastava & Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 10 SCC 707. (Para 20, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32):

               20. The next point urged by the appellants, that they had never been impleaded in the two petitions, even as orders passed by the High Court had a direct effect on their livelihood, also goes to the root of the matter as it violates the principle of audialterampartem.

               21. This Court in PrabodhVerma v. State of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704] held: (SCC p. 273, para 28)

               “28. … A High Court ought not to decide a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents….”

               22. Similarly, this Court in Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. [(2004) 2 SCC 76 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 337] , SCC at pp. 86-87 said: (SCC para 27)

               “27. … An order issued against a person without impleading him as a party and, thus, without giving him an opportunity of hearing must be held to be bad in law. The appellants herein, keeping in view the fact that by reason of the impugned direction, the orders of promotion effected in their favour had been directed to be withdrawn, indisputably, were necessary parties. In their absence, therefore, the writ petition could not have been effectively adjudicated upon.”

               23. Also in B. Ramanjini v. State of A.P. [(2002) 5 SCC 533 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 780] , where selection of certain teachers was challenged without impleading them, this Court held: (SCC pp. 542-43, para 19)

               “19. Selection process had commenced long back as early as in 1998 and it had been completed. The persons selected were appointed pursuant to the selections made and had been performing their duties. However, the selected candidates had not been impleaded as parties to the proceedings either in their individual capacity or in any representative capacity. In that view of the matter, the High Court ought not to have examined any of the questions raised before it in the proceedings initiated before it. The writ petitions filed by the respondents concerned ought to have been dismissed which are more or less in the nature of a public interest litigation.”

               ….

               31. More importantly, in deciding these issues, the High Court should have been mindful of the fact that an order for cancellation of appointment would render most of the appellants unemployed. Most of them were earlier teaching in non-formal education centres, from where they had resigned to apply in response to the advertisement. They had left their previous employment in view of the fact that for their three-year long teaching experiences, the interview process in the present selection was awarding them grace marks of 25%. It had also given them a relaxation of 8 years with respect to their age. Now, if they lose their jobs as a result of the High Court's order, they would be effectively unemployed as they cannot even revert to their earlier jobs in the non-formal education centres, which have been abolished since then. This would severely affect the economic security of many families. Most of them are between the age group of 35-45 years, and the prospects for them of finding another job are rather dim. Some of them were in fact awaiting their salary raise at the time of quashing of their appointment by the High Court.

               32. With utmost respect to the High Court, we are constrained to observe that equities were not properly balanced in the exercise of discretion by the High Court. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments of the High Court are quashed. The selection proceedings are upheld.

49. The learned Advocate General further submitted that in W.Ps. No.30033 and 30574 of 2024 regular cadre of prosecuting officers have been appointed as per Section 24 of Cr.P.C in the place of tenure appointment of Writ Petitioners therein. None of the Writ Petitioners before this Court are 'regular cadre of prosecuting officers' but are only tenure appointments. The learned Advocate General would further submit that insofar as the W.Ps.No.1612 and 1615 of 2024 are concerned the termination is simpliciter and is not based on any allegations as such no stigma would cast to the petitioners and the State Government cannot be compelled to continue their services. Eventually, would submit that the Government has the power to terminate the services of the Law Officers in accordance with the instructions 9 of the Telangana Law officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 with one month’s notice or by paying one month’s honorarium to the terminated Law Officers in lieu of one month’s notice as per the said instruction.

COURT PROCEEDINGS:

50. This Court on 22.09.2025 made the following observations:

               “Ms. Divya Adepu, learned Special Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the learned Advocate General, seeks time to file the detils of number of Public Prosecutors, who are appointed and who are in continuation of their services, and also the details of the Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors whose tenure is coming to an end. Learned Special Government Pleader seeks time to get further instructions with respect to the letter dated 20.11.2023 from theDirector of Prosecutions, Telangana State, referred in G.O.Rt.No.09, Home (Courts-A1) Department, dated 04.01.2024 recommending to terminate the petitioners.”

51. In pursuance to the above directions, the learned Special Government Pleader has placed a copy of the letter dated 22.09.2025 addressed by the Director of Prosecutions (FAC), Telangana DGP Office to the learned Advocate General, wherein details were furnished with respect to the tenure of Prosecuting Officers list as on December, 2023. As per the details, as on December, 2023, there were 121 Tenure Prosecuting Officers working in the State of Telangana out of which, Public Prosecutors in Principal Sessions Court in the State are 24, Additional Public Prosecutors in Additional Sessions Courts in the State are 72 and Additional Public Prosecutors in Assistant Sessions Courts in the State are 25 working. Further, the Government, after review, has terminated/relieved 34 Tenure Prosecutors from service. Out of these, 18 Prosecutors have approached this Court challenging the termination orders, while the remaining 16 Prosecutors have complied with the Government orders and relieved themselves.

52. The learned Special Government Pleader would further submit that the writ petitioner, P.Samaiah, in W.P. No.1615 and 29658 of 2024 was appointed on 19.12.2022 for a tenure period of three years, which is coming to an end on 19.12.2025. It is further submitted that out of 15 writ petitioners, 13 writ petitioners were appointed in the year 2023 for a tenure period of three years and their term would be coming to an end by 2026 between the months of February, 2026 to October, 2026.

53. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record.

ANALYSIS:

54. As per the Section 24 (3) of Cr.P.C, the State Government shall appoint Public Prosecutors/Additional Public Prosecutors and Special Public Prosecutors in terms of Section 24(4) wherein the District Magistrate shall in consultation with the Sessions Judge prepare a panel of names who are fit to be appointed as Public Prosecutors, Additional Public Prosecutors for the district and in terms of Section 24 (5) unless his/her names appears in the panel of names prepared by the district Magistrate under Section 25(4). The provisions of Cr.P.C. would be applicable to the extent of consultation only for consideration of appointment of the Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutors. However, the conditions of appointment are governed by the Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000, G.O.Ms.No.187, Law (L), dated 06.12.2000, Clause 2 Definitions of Sub Clause (iv) deals with “Law officer”, which means a Government Pleader or an Assistant Government Pleader or a Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor or Special Public Prosecutor or a Special Counsel. Clause 3 deals with “Appointment of Law Officers:- (1) Government shall appoint such number of Law Officers on behalf of the State, to conduct cases before various Courts and Tribunal as they may consider necessary: Further, Clause 5 deals with “Appointment of Law Officers in the District Courts and City Courts Subordinate to the High Court:- (1) Appointment of Law Officers in all the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to the High Court shall be made on the basis of the recommendations of the District Collector concerned who shall ascertain the views of the concerned District and Sessions Judge before making the recommendations.” Further, Clause 6 deals with “Appointment of Public prosecutors, Additional Public Prosecutors and Special Public Prosecutors:- Public Prosecutors, Additional Public Prosecutors and Special Public Prosecutors shall be appointed as per the provisions of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973.” Clause 8 deals with “Term of Law Officers:- Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. The Law Officers so appointed may be considered for a second term, if the Government are satisfied that he has proven efficiency, high rate of success and good performance and for a third term in exceptional cases: Provided that Government Pleaders, Assistant Government Pleaders, Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors in Subordinate Courts may be considered for appointment for a second term if their performance is very good and in the case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes if their performance is satisfactory.” Clause 9 deals with “Termination of Service:- Notwithstanding anything contained in instruction 8, either the Government of the Law officer may terminate the engagement with one month’s notice. Provided that the Government may terminate the engagement by paying one month honorarium in lieu of one month’s notice.” Clause 17 deals with “Review of Performance:- (1) The performance of the Law Officers in the High Court and other Courts and Tribunals at the State Level shall be reviewed by a Committee headed by the Advocate-General with the Law Secretary (Legal Affairs), concerned Secretary of the Administrative Department and concerned Head of the Department as members once in every three months. The review committee may meet as and when convenes by the Advocate-General. (2) The District Collector shall review the performance of the Law Officers in the District once in two months and send his report to the Law Department in the Secretariat for necessary action. (3) Every Law Officer should attend the review meetings with all necessary material.”

55. In the case on hand, the petitioners are appointed on the basis of consultation under the provisions of Section 24 Cr.P.C., however, the terms and conditions of their appointments are governed by the G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000. As such, the consultation of the State Government with the District and Sessions Judge for considering the eligibility of Public Prosecutors, Additional Public Prosecutors and the Special Public Prosecutors is only to frame an opinion for selection and the appointment of the said Public Prosecutors, Additional Public Prosecutors and the Special Public Prosecutors are in terms of the A.P. Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000. As such, the consultation and mode of appointment are different and distinct. The petitioners having accepted the terms and conditions, including discontinuation and termination, at this point of time, cannot challenge their termination, which is only a termination in simpliciter being carried out as per the agreed terms. That apart, most of the similarly situated Additional Public Prosecutors have accepted and left. The newly elected Government is entitled to implement its policy including changes in Law Officers and may revisit appointments. Since the Law Officer is defined under the Telangana Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department dated 06.12.2000 and the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the order dated 27.11.2024 passed in W.A. No.1138 of 2024 took the stand on the same footing with respect to Law Officers appointed under G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000 and has upheld the termination of the Law Officers holding that it is for the Government to choose its counsel and relationship between the Government and Law Officer is purely contractual in nature and the same can be terminated without giving any reason. The said order of the Hon’ble Division Bench was upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP. No.7525 of 2025 in its order dated 15.09.2025. The writ petitioners are appointed on the terms of G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000 and having accepted the same now they cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. Since most of the Additional Public Prosecutors have accepted and left, the termination is not punitive and there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The continuation of the office of the said Public Prosecutors/Additional Public Prosecutors would continue at the pleasure of the State Government in order to give effective implementation of the administration of criminal justice and such a privileged relationship cannot be interfered by the Courts and discretion to continue their services is exclusively to the Government as per their appointment conditions. Moreover, the Cr.P.C. does not contain provisions of tenure, pay-scale, renewal, disciplinary proceedings, termination with respect to such appointments whereas the appointment and the service conditions are governed by the executive instructions issued vide G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000 and the nature of the contract is of professional engagement and not that of employment and these said appointments are not in regular cadre category as such the service Rules does not apply.

56. Therefore, in the light of the judicial pronouncements, impugned orders of termination/relieving the petitioners from their respective posts does not suffer from any legal infirmity and warrants no interference by this Court. As such, W.Ps. No.1612, 1615 of 2024 and 28817, 29224, 29238, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29630, 29658, 29677, 30033 and 30574 of 2024 vide G.O.Rt.No.09, Home Courts-A1) Department dated 04.01.2024 and vide G.O.Rt.Nos.773, 842, 844, 724, 739, 839, 722, 760, 767, 738, 714 and 715 dated 10.09.2024, 25.09.2024, 25.09.2024, 29.08.2024, 31.08.2024, 25.09.2024, 28.08.2024, 05.09.2024, 10.09.2024, 31.08.2024, 27.08.2024 and 27.08.2024, respectively, are liable to be dismissed.

57. Insofar as the W.P. No.30856 of 2024 is concerned, this writ petition is filed challenging the Circular issued vide DC.Bhpl/Admn.Endt/ Dis.No.1119, dated 05.10.2024, inviting applications from eligible advocates for sending a fresh panel of advocates for appointment of tenure Public Prosecutors, Additional and Assistant Public Prosecutors and this Court vide order dated 28.01.2025 granted liberty to the respondents to go ahead with the preparation of panel and selection process of appointment of new Public Prosecutors. However, appointment orders shall not be issued and the preparation of panel and selection of Public Prosecutors will be subject to further orders of this Court. Consequent upon dismissal of the batch of writ petitions, this Court is of the considered opinion that the respondents may proceed further in terms of Circular dated 05.10.2024 and may finalise the panel and process the appointment of new Public Prosecutors/ Additional Public Prosecutors.

58. In the result, accordingly, W.Ps. No.1612, 1615, 28817, 29224, 29238, 29272, 29275, 29285, 29626, 29630, 29658, 29677, 30033 and 30574 of 2024 are dismissed and W.P. No.30856 of 2024 is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.