Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The applicant in O.A.No.1062 of 2016 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short), filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2019 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, the petitioner entered Government service under the 2nd respondent as Overseer Grade II on 06.09.1983 on the advice of the Kerala Public Service Commission (‘KPSC’ for short) and superannuated on 30.04.2005 after the qualifying service of 21 years, 7 months and 25 days. Before entering the Government service, she worked as a Work Superintendent in the Municipal Common Service from 01.07.1981 to 05.09.1983, through the employment exchange.

                  2.1. The provisional service rendered by the petitioner in the Municipal Common Service was not reckoned for pension and Death Cum Retirement Gratuity, in view of Annexure A3 Government Order dated 25.11.1999. Though the petitioner submitted various representations in the matter, the respondents are taking a stand that the provisional service rendered by the petitioner cannot be reckoned for pension and other benefits, for the reason that the regular service, if any, in the Government Department alone can be reckoned for such benefits. The petitioner submitted Annexure A4 representation dated 04/2014 to the respondents, requesting to reckon her provisional service in the Municipal Common Service as qualifying service for pension. Vide Annexure A5 letter dated 09.02.2015, the Government agreed to the claim of the petitioner. Since nothing was heard in the matter, the petitioner queried the status of her Annexure A4 representation under the Right to Information Act, to which the 1st respondent replied by Annexure A6 letter dated 27.03.2005 informing that the direction in Annexure A5 letter is under review before the Government. Later, by Annexure A7 letter dated 11.12.2015, the Government informed the 2nd respondent that as the Municipal Common Service and Government service are quite different in qualifications, mode of appointment and scale of pay and also the service of the petitioner in Municipal Common Service was provisional, the past provisional Municipal Common Service of the petitioner cannot be reckoned for qualifying service for pension. It is further stated that as per Rule 4(a) of Part III KSR no claim for pension is admitted when an employee is appointed for limited time only or for specific duty on the completion of which she is to be discharged and hence the provisional service rendered by the petitioner in Municipal Common Service prior to her entry in Government service cannot be reckoned for pension along with her regular service. This fact was informed to the petitioner by the Government by Annexure A8 letter dated 08.01.2016. Contending that in a similar case, the Government reckoned the provisional service rendered by an Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD as Lecturer by Annexure A9 order dated 14.12.2009, the petitioner approached the Tribunal with the original application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, seeking the following reliefs;

                  “(i) Call for the records leads to Annexure A7 and A8 and quash the same.

                  (ii) Declare that the provisional service rendered by the applicant for the period from 01.07.1981 to 05.09.1983 (2 years, 2 months and 5 days) in Municipal common Service prior to her entry in government service on 06.09.1983 as qualifying service for pensionery benefits and consequentially direct the respondent to grant the applicant all the pensionery benefits with retrospective effect from the date of her retirement on 30.04.2005 with interest, reckoning all pay revisions in the meantime”.

                  2.2. In the original application on behalf of the 1st respondent, a reply statement dated 18.01.2017 was filed opposing the reliefs sought for. Paragraphs 2 to 10 of that reply statement read thus;

                  “2. Government decision No.2 under Rule 33 Part I, KSR has been deleted from KSR vide GO(Rt) No. 540/94/Fin dated 30.09.1994. As such those employees who got provisional service with or without break and who got regular employment before 01.10.1994 are eligible for increments reckoning their provisional service subject to the following conditions.

                  i the posts should carry same or identical scale of pay

                  ii. the qualifications and mode of appointment should be the same.

3. As per G.O(P) No. 2357/99/Fin dated 25.11.1999 it has been ordered that the provisional service with or without break rendered by the employees up to 30.09.1994 which qualifies for earning increments in terms of Government Decision No. 2 under Rule 33 Part I KSR will be reckoned as qualifying service for pension.

                  4. In the present case Smt. C. Suseela after rendering her provisional service in Municipal Common Service as Work Superintendent, commenced her regular service in PW (Buildings) Department as II Grade Overseer on 06.09.1983. Since the Government service and Municipal Common Service are two different service qualifications and mode of appointment of the above said posts are different. The scale of pay of Work Superintendent is Rs. 330-515 where as that of 2nd Grade Overseer is Rs. 370 - 600, they are not identical scale. Hence the past provisional Municipal Common Service period cannot be reckoned as qualifying service for pension.

                  5. As per proviso to Rule 20, Part III KSRs, (amended vide G.O(P) 269/08/Fin dated 21.06.2008) stated that the past Regular service put in by Government employees and Aided school/Aided college Teachers in Panchayath/Municipal Common Service and Universities prior to their entry in State Government service or Aided School/Aided College service shall be reckoned as qualifying service for pension and DCRG from Government. This shows that regular service in Panchayath/Municipal Common Service and Universities shall be reckoned as qualifying service for pension along with state Government Service. In this case, past service of Smt Suseela is only provisional service (not regular) in Municipal Common Service. Hence, her provisional service in the Municipal Common Service period from 01.07.1981 to 05.09.1983 cannot be reckoned as qualifying service for pension.

                  6. As per Rule 4(a) Part III KSR no claim to pension is admitted when an employee is appointed for limited time only or for specific duty on the completion of which she is to be discharged. Hence, the past provisional service rendered by Smt. C Suseela in Municipal Common Service prior to her entry in Government service cannot be reckoned for Pension along with her regular service.

                  7. In the circumstances, as the Municipal Common Service and Government service are quite different in qualifications, mode of appointment and scale of pay and also the service of the incumbent in municipal Common service is provisional, the post provisional Municipal Common service of Smt. C. Suseela (1st Grade Draftsman Rtd) cannot be reckoned as qualifying service for pension

                  8. As per Rule 4(a) Part III KSR no claim to pension is admitted when an employees is appointed for limited time only or for specific duty on the completion of which he is to be discharged. Hence the past provisional service rendered by Smt. C Suseela in Municipal Common Service prior to her entry in Government service cannot be reckoned for pension along with her regular service. In the circumstances, as the Municipal Common Service and Government service are quite different in qualifications, mode of appointment and scale of pay and also the service of the incumbent in Municipal Common Service is provisional, the post provisional Municipal Common Service of Smt.C Susheela (Ist Grade Draftsman (Rtd.) cannot be reckoned as qualifying service for pension.

                  9. Moreover, it is submitted that the provisional service rendered by Smt. TP Vijayalekshmy was reckoned for qualifying service for pensionary benefits on the basis of the G.O (P) No. 496/2007/Fin dated 11.10.2007 (Annexure II) which is not applicable to Smt.C.Susheela who has got provisional service in Municipal Common Service. As the Government service and Municipal Common Service are two different service, qualifications and mode of appointment are different the provisional service of Smt. C Susheela in Municipal Common Service cannot be reckoned as qualifying service for pension. Therefore, the stand adopted by the Government in Annexure A7 and A8 are not arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal and strictly in compliance with the decision No.2 under Rule 33 part I KSR.

                  10. The claim of the petitioner for reckoning the past service in Municipal Common Service as provisional service for pensionary benefits under the decision No.2 Rule 33 Part I KSR cannot be considered as the service rendered by the petitioner in Municipal Common service does not come under the purview of G.O (P) No. 383/89/Fin dated 28.09.1989 as the same is applicable only in the case of permanent absorption of employees from Government of India/Autonomous Bodies of State Government/State Autonomous Bodies. Therefore, the stand adopted by the Government in Annexure A7 and A8 are not arbitrary discriminatory and illegal and strictly in compliance with the decision No.2 under Rule 33 Part I KSR”.

                  2.3. After hearing both sides, the Tribunal by Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2019 dismissed the original application. Paragraphs 9 to 15 and the last paragraph of that order read thus;

                  “9. Relying on the judgment in Santhoshkumar v. Director of Panchayats (2013 (2)KHC 323), the learned Counsel for the applicant contends that service for the Panchayats and Municipalities are part of Government and public service and therefore the stand taken by the Government that the provisional service of the applicant was in a different service cannot be sustained. It is argued that the Municipal employees are to be treated as Government employees. But it should be noticed that the question arose in the above case for consideration of the Hon’ble Court was whether the members of the Municipal Common Service can agitate their service disputes before the Hon’ble High Court after the Constitution of this Tribunal and it was held that the jurisdiction in this regard stands transferred to the Tribunal. This decision does not say that both the services are the same for any service benefits. The definition of the term ‘service’ contained in Rule 2(15) of Part I of the K.S.&S.S.R. also supports the view that the Municipal Common Service and the Kerala Engineering Subordinate Service (General Branch) are separate services. In such circumstances, the decision in Santhoshkumar cannot be understood as laying down the proposition that both the Municipal Common Service and the service in the PWD are one and the same.

                  10. Learned Counsel also submitted that the Hon’ble High Court in Mohammed Basheer v. State of Kerala (2014(4) KHC 747) has held that the past service in the KSRTC and the Khadi & Village Industries Board were to be reckoned as qualifying service. It is therefore argued that the service of the applicant in the Municipal Common Service cannot be excluded saying that it was a different service. But here also, this decision would not suggest that the provisional services rendered in such other services can be reckoned as qualifying service for pension. One of the main objections raised by the respondents is that the applicant’s past service was only a provisional service and it was not a pensionable service.

                  11. Though the applicant heavily banked upon the proviso to Rule 20 of Part III of KSR, there is nothing in it to suggest that the provisional service in the Municipal Common Service can be taken as qualifying service for pension. It can also be inferred that the deletion of Note 2 under Rule 33 of Part I of KSR is a clear indication of the intention of the Government to decline any benefits for the provisional services.

                  12. The learned Counsel also brought to our notice the order of this Tribunal in Poly C.T. v. State of Kerala & another (KATR 2015 (2) 192. It is a case of a IIIrd Grade Overseer who was initially appointed provisionally and continued in service in the light of the judgments in Umayammal’s case (1982 KLT 829) and Narayani’s case (1984 KLT 17). Ultimately, as per the directions in Umadevi’s case (2006 (4) SCC 1), considering his long years of provisional service, Government regularised his service and also ordered, invoking the powers under Rule 39 of the K.S.&S.S.R., that 50% of his provisional service be treated as qualifying service. In the said case, the refusal to treat the entire provisional service on the ground that there were no provisions for the same was set aside. The matter was directed to be reconsidered stating that absence of rules cannot stand in the way since the Government has already directed to reckon 50% of the provisional service. But exercise of the power under Rule 39 of the K.S.& S.S.R. is within the discretion of the Government and nobody gets a right to claim for the exercise of the same.

                  13. But the thrust of the arguments of Sri Fathahudin, the learned Counsel for the applicant, is that there cannot be any distinction between the provisional service and regular service, especially in view of G.O. (P)No.543/89/Fin dated 20/11/1989. It was specifically ordered in the above G.O. that provisional service of an employee, with or without break, will be reckoned as qualifying service for pensionary benefits. The above G.O. which was issued at a time when Note 2 to Rule 33 of Part I of Kerala Service Rules was in force was later clarified in Annexure A3 G.O. to the effect that the provisional service rendered by the employees up to 30-9-1994 which qualifies for increments will be reckoned as qualifying service for pension.

                  14. But these contentions are only to be rejected since G.O. (P)No.543/89/Fin dated 20/11/1989 has been later cancelled by the Government with effect from 1/10/1994 as per G.O.(P)No.3116/98/Fin. Dated 15/12/1998. Hence, there are no Rules or orders which enable the applicant to claim the benefit of her past provisional service for purposes of pension.

                  15. The applicant has also produced Annexure A9 to show that one Smt. Vijayalakshmy, an Assistant Executive Engineer in the PWD was given the benefit of her past service in an aided College for pensionary benefits. But the order itself makes it clear that the said benefit is given as per Rule 14E(6) of Part I of KSR and there is nothing in Annexure A9 to suggest that the aided college service was provisional. Applicant cannot claim the benefit of the above Rule nor can he make out a case of discrimination based on Annexure A9. There is no merit in the contentions of the applicant and there are no grounds to interfere with Annexures A7 and A8 orders. The Original Application is therefore dismissed”.

3. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the original application, the petitioner is now before this Court with this original petition.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the past provisional service of the petitioner rendered in Municipal Common Service shall be reckoned as qualifying service for pensionary benefits in terms of decision No.2 under Rule 33 Part I KSR, which existed in the statute book up to 30.09.1994. The Government, as per Annexure A3 order, clarified that the service of the provisional service of the employees up to 30.09.1994, which qualifies for earning increment in terms of the Government decision No.2 under Rule 33 Part I KSR, will be reckoned as qualifying service for pension, irrespective of dates of retirement after 20.11.1989 and that the provisional service rendered on or after 01.10.1994 will not be reckoned as qualifying service for pension. As the petitioner rendered her provisional service before 01.10.1994 and retired after 20.11.1989, she is entitled to reckon her provisional service as qualifying service for pensionary benefits. The Tribunal failed to consider these aspects in its proper perspective.

6. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that provisional service is a foreign service as defined under Rule 12(9) of Part I KSR. Moreover, the service rendered by the petitioner is not a regular service in the Municipal Common Service. Therefore, the period of that service cannot be reckoned for pensionary benefits.

7. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

8. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;

                  "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."

9. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

10. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

11. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

12. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

13. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

14. The petitioner is claiming the period from 01.07.1981 to 05.09.1983, during which she worked provisionally in the Municipal Common Service, to be reckoned for the purpose of pension after her retirement from the Public Works Department, placing reliance on Annexure A3 Government order dated 25.11.1999. But as observed by the Tribunal in paragraph 14 of the impugned order, Annexure A3 Government order was later cancelled with effect from 01.10.1994 as per Government order dated 15.12.1998. As far as the case of Vijayalakshmy in Annexure A9 order is concerned, the Tribunal also found that the said order is not applicable to the case of the petitioner since the benefit was given as per Rule 14E(6) of Part I KSR and her service in the aided college was not proved as provisional.

15. In Santhosh Kumar [2013 (2) KLT 548], which is relied upon by the Tribunal, a Division Bench of this Court held thus;

                  “6. We, therefore, proceed to examine the manner in which the Panchayats could employ servants or staff. Adverting to Part IX of the Constitution, which deals with the Panchayats, it can be seen that the composition of Panchayats, the powers and functions of Grama Sabha and such other matters are required to be covered by legislation to be made by the respective State Legislatures. Looking into the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, for short, "KPR Act", made after the aforenoted constitutional amendment; what surges with abundant relevance to the issue in hand is Chapter XVI, which deals with officers and employees of Panchayats. Sub-section (1) of Section 179 of that Act provides for appointment of a Secretary for a Panchayat, who shall be a Government servant. Different aspects touching the Secretary of the Panchayat are cohesively provided in Section 179 so that the Panchayat concerned would also have a word in the matter to the extent statutorily provided. Now, going to Section 180, it can be seen that the said statutory provision makes it explicitly clear that all persons serving the Panchayat would be Government servants. We say so because, sub-section (1) of Section 180 provides that officers and employees of the Panchayat, other than contingent employees, would be Government servants. Sub-section (4) of Section 180provides that the Government shall, by rules made under the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968, - for short, 'KPS Act', regulate the classification, methods of recruitment, conditions of service, pay and allowances and discipline and conduct of officers and employees. Such rules shall be subject to the provisions of the KPR Act. Those rules may provide for the constitution of any class of officers or servants of panchayats into a separate service either for the whole State or for each district. This provision enjoins the making and classification of service to provide for officers and servants for the different panchayats. It also categorically shows that the rules are to be made under the KPS Act. Necessarily, therefore, it imports into the spectrum, Article 309 and Article 311 of the Constitution. This being the present statutory scenario in the backdrop of the constitutional position available after the 73rd amendment, there is no doubt that servants in the Panchayat/Municipal Common Service are Government servants and the position laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Balakrishnan Nair (supra) will continue to hold the field. Obviously, this does not relate to the contingent servants because the contingent servants are not treated as Government servants. We, therefore, completely agree with the views expressed in the reference order by the Hon'ble Mr.Justice P. N. Ravindran”. (Underline supplied)

16. From the principles laid down in Santhosh Kumar [2013 (2) KLT 548] as extracted above, it is clear that, contingent servants are not treated as Government servants. Since the service of the petitioner in the Municipal Common Service was only provisional, the petitioner cannot rely on the judgment in Santhosh Kumar [2013 (2) KLT 548] also in her advantage.

                  Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold the impugned Ext.P3 order of the Tribunal as perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

                  In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.