Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 11.06.2025, passed against one Vishnu @ Vishnu Pullani (herein after referred to as detenu), under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAAP Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 22.08.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that it was on 13.05.2025 that a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, nine cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.725/2025 of Angamally Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 296(b), 329(4), 351(3), 118(1) and 110 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

3. We heard Sri. Anto Thomas Palatty, the learned counsel appearing  for  the  petitioner,  and  Sri.  K.  A.  Anas,  the  learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order of detention was passed without proper application of mind and on improper consideration of facts. The learned counsel contended that an application seeking cancellation of bail was already pending and, therefore, there was no necessity to invoke the provisions of the KAA(P) Act in haste, as cancellation of bail itself would have been an effective remedy to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the detenu is not involved in the last case registered against him. It was further submitted that in the said case, the detenu approached this Court with Crl.M.C No.5404/2025 to quash the proceedings in the said case, and the de facto complainant filed an affidavit before this Court stating that the case with the detenu has been settled. Anyhow, this Court declined to quash the FIR in the said case, considering the antecedents of the detenu. Hence, the learned counsel submitted that the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity ought not to have been considered by the jurisdictional authority while passing the detention order. On these premises, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was issued by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all procedural requirements and upon arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned Government Pleader contended that mere pendency of a bail cancellation application does not preclude the detaining authority from passing a detention order, as cancellation of bail is not always an effective remedy to curb the criminal activities of habitual offenders. According to the Government Pleader, the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, warrants no interference.

6. As already stated, nine cases in which the detenu got involved have formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.725/2025 of Angamally Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 296(b), 329(4), 351(3), 118(1) and 110 of the BNS. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 06.04.2025. The detenu was arrested on 16.04.2025, and since then, he has been under judicial custody. It was on 13.05.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was initiated. Later, on 11.06.2025, the detention order was passed. The sequence of the events narrated above reveals that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order.

7. Moreover, in the impugned order, it has been specifically noted that the detenu was under judicial custody at the time of passing the detention order. It is further recorded therein that there exists a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail, and that, upon such release, he is likely to indulge in criminal activities. Therefore, it is apparent that the jurisdictional authority had duly applied its mind and considered all the relevant aspects while passing a detention order against a person who is under custody.

8. As evident from the records, the present detention order is the 4th one among a series of detention orders passed against the detenu. It was on 26.02.2025, that the detenu came out of jail after serving the period of detention in terms of the 3rd detention order. However, within two months of his release from jail, he again involved in anti-social activities and hence, the proceedings under the KAA(P) Act were again initiated against him, which ultimately resulted in issuing the last detention order, which is under challenge in this writ petition.

9. From the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is discernible that the main grievance of the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority passed the order without considering the fact that the matter involved in the last case against the detenu was amicably settled between the de facto complainant and the detenu. According to the counsel, after the registration of the said case, the detenu approached this Court with Crl.M.C.No. 5404/2025 to quash the FIR in the said case, and the de facto complainant in the said case filed an affidavit stating that the matter involved in the said case is compounded between him and the detenu. Relying on the said aspect, the learned counsel submitted that the said case ought not have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order.

10. However, while considering the above facts, it must first be noted that, as evident from the records, the detenu is the sole accused in the said case. The allegation is that on 06.04.2025 at about 6:30 p.m., the accused trespassed into the courtyard of the de facto complainant’s house and attacked him with an iron rod. There is a specific allegation that the accused attempted to commit the murder of the de facto complainant. Therefore, even if an affidavit, as claimed by the counsel for the detenu, was filed by the de facto complainant after the registration of the case, the same cannot be a ground to conclude that the detenu is innocent of the offence alleged. It is a matter of common knowledge that, in several cases, the de facto complainant and the accused enter into compromises after the registration of the crime for various reasons such as threat, coercion, or financial inducement.

11. Further, in the present case, it is discernible from the pleadings in the writ petition itself that this Court was not inclined to quash the FIR, having regard to the antecedents of the accused. Therefore, the mere filing of such an affidavit cannot, by itself, lead to an inference that the detenu did not commit the alleged offence. Moreover, the jurisdiction under the KAA(P) Act is one based on suspicion. It is also well settled through a catena of judicial pronouncements that, while dealing with a writ petition challenging an order of detention, the Court is not expected to substitute or displace the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the competent authority. Hence, the contention of the petitioner in this regard will certainly fail.

12. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, though in the detention order it is mentioned that an application has been submitted for cancellation of bail granted to the detenu in one of the cases registered against him, the jurisdictional authority passed Ext.P1 order without considering the said fact properly. According to the learned counsel, as an alternative remedy of bail cancellation was available to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities, a drastic measure of preventive detention was not at all necessitated. We are not oblivious to the fact that when an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to detention under preventive detention laws is neither warranted nor permissible. However, merely because a bail cancellation petition is pending, it cannot be said that an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act cannot be passed. When there is an imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who can be classified as ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’, cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. The reason is that, first of all, the purpose and scope of an application for cancellation of bail and preventive detention are different. That apart, the bail cancellation procedure, having regard to the ground realities, is a time-consuming one. There is no assurance that an order of cancellation of bail could be secured in time before the person concerned indulges in another criminal activity. Preventive detention laws are enacted to address such exigencies. It is on account of these reasons that it has been held by the courts consistently that the authorities under the preventive detention laws need not wait till orders are passed on the application for cancellation of bail, for passing an order of detention. If it is held that, if there is an option for cancellation of bail, a detention order cannot be passed, it would render the preventive detention laws ineffective. Moreover, even after the cancellation of bail, there is no legal impediment in granting bail subsequently. Therefore, the pendency of the bail cancellation petition has no much significance and the same, by itself, will not constitute a valid ground to interfere with the detention order. Moreover, the impugned order specifically records that applications for cancellation of bail have been filed before the concerned courts in each case, but have not yet been considered. From a holistic reading of the impugned order, it is evident that the detaining authority passed the detention order only after being fully satisfied that the proceedings under ordinary criminal laws do not constitute an effective or immediate remedy to prevent the detenu from continuing his criminal activities.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.