A.S. Gadkari, J.

1) Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and with the consent of learned Advocates for respective parties taken up for hearing.

2) By this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: -

                   “(a) This Hon’ble Court may, to direct the Additional Collector, Satara to prepare the report regarding the Petitioner’s proposal and send to the Additional Collector, Raigad.

                   (b) This Hon’ble Court may, by way of appropriate writ Order or direction, direct the Additional Collector, Raigad to process the Petitioner’s application dated August 08, 2022 and allot land as prayed for, if the Petitioner is entitled to get alternate land as prayed for, within a period of three weeks from the date of Order of this Hon’ble Court;”

                   2.1) In our view, the above prayers are ambiguous, rather unusual. The pleadings in the Petition are equally vague and do not disclose the legal basis for the reliefs sought particularly after a lapse of or inordinate delay of 63 years.

3) It is the case of the Petitioner that, the lands of his predecessors were acquired for Koyna Project, Satara and an Award in respect thereof was declared on 15th April 1959.

                   3.1) Once land is acquired under the Land Acquisition proceedings and an Award is declared, it must ordinarily be presumed that the compensation determined under the Award was received by the landowners and that the acquisition proceedings attained finality.

                   3.2) The present Petition has been filed after an extraordinary delay of more than six decades from the date of the Award. The Petitioner now seeks to invoke the provisions of the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 (said Act) (later replaced by The Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999) for allotment of alternate land.

4) It is well settled that, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and cannot be invoked by a litigant who approaches the Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, reported in (AIR 1964 SC 1006) has held that, though the Limitation Act does not strictly apply to writ proceedings, the doctrine of delay and laches is nevertheless applicable and relief may be refused where the petitioner approaches the Court after an unreasonable lapse of time.

5) This claim is wholly misconceived. The Award in the present case was declared in 1959, whereas the said Act came into force only on 11th March 1977. It is well settled that a statute does not operate retrospectively unless such intention is expressly provided in it. The 1976 Act does not contain any provision given it retrospective operation so as to reopen acquisition or Awards that had already attained finality decades earlier.

6) In these circumstances, the Petitioner, claiming to be successor-in-title of Laxman Atmaram Niman (Pawar), cannot seek to reopen or derive further benefits from an acquisition which had concluded long prior to the coming into force of the rehabilitation legislation. Permitting such a claim after the lapse of more than sixty years would defeat the principle of finality in land acquisition proceedings and cannot be countenanced in writ jurisdiction.

7) In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, the Supreme Court reiterated that, a person who sleeps over his rights for a long period cannot seek relief in writ jurisdiction, particularly where the claim seeks to unsettle matters that have attained finality.

8) We have also observed that several similar Petitions have been filed in this Court and appear to be clearly speculative in nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Goel v U.P State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 279, while imposing costs of ₹ 2 lakhs on each of the Appellants, categorically observed that litigation in Court is not like buying a lottery ticket in the hope that, if luck favours, it may yield an undeserved windfall, even though illegitimate, at the cost of little more than litigation expenses.

9) Similarly, in the case of Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik v Pradnya Prakash Khadekar reported in (2017) 5 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that, the Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the judicial process. The sanctity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court must be left in no doubt about the consequences that follow. Others should not be encouraged to tread the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. The imposition of exemplary costs is often inevitable and necessary to ensure that abuse of the judicial process is effectively discouraged.

10) We therefore find that, the Petition is devoid of any merit and does not warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Petition is accordingly dismissed.