Common Judgment
K. Lakshman.
1. Heard Mrs. Monica P. Pole, learned counsel for appellant - accused and Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent - State.
2. Vide judgment dated 07.04.2025 in Sessions Case No.397 of 2022, learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Suryapet (hereinafter referred to as ‘trial Court’), found the appellant - accused guilty of the offence under Section - 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and accordingly imposed death penalty on her.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and death sentence imposed by learned trial Court, the accused preferred Criminal Appeal No.547 of 2025, while learned trial Court addressed a letter vide Dis.No.220 of 2025, dated 07.05.2025 to this Court seeking confirmation of death penalty under Section - 366 (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’). Pursuant to the said letter, this Court registered the same as Referred Trial (R.T.) No.2 of 2025.
4. The case of the prosecution is as follows:
i) The accused - Banothu Barathi @ Lasya @ Bujji is well educated as she studied B.Sc., B.Ed. Her parents are financially sound. She is the only daughter to her parents and she has two brothers.
ii) While she was studying 1st to 7th Class in ZPHS, Burkacherla Village, PW.1 was her classmate and both of them fell in love and ultimately, decided to marry as they belonged to the same community. However, the parents of the accused refused, as the family of PW.1 was financially unstable.
iii) In the year 2008, the parents of accused performed her marriage with one Mr. Venkanna. Later, the accused divorced him as she had no interest in continuing the marriage.
iv) Due to marital disturbances, she suffered from mental distress that affected her health. Her parents took her to an unknown face reader, who informed them that she had ‘Sarpadosham’, which negatively affected her marriage due to which she was suffering mentally and physically, and advised them to treat her with local treatments.
v) Thereafter, the accused was shown to different local and non-local magicians/face readers, and the accused also believed that due to sarpadosham her life was not settled despite her studying up to B.Sc., B.Ed. She also searched on YouTube etc. how to get rid of such sarpadosham.
vi) Since PW.1 was still unmarried, the parents of the accused performed the marriage of the accused with him in June, 2019. The accused used to perform pooja in her in-law’s house in front of dressing table in bed room. She spent more time for performing pooja in order to get rid of said dosham as she believed the Goddess Laxmi Devi, Lord Hanuman and Shiva-Parvathulu and also lightening in pramida by pouring oil.
vii) PW.1 and his family members suspected that the accused was suffering from mental illness and accordingly took her to Psychiatrist in Khammam, who examined her and informed that she was mentally stressed and has to take treatment for some days and also prescribed some medicines to be used.
viii) During the marital life, the accused was blessed with a female child, aged 7 months as on the date of incident, calling her as ‘potti’.
ix) By seeing YouTube videos, the accused came to a conclusion that to get ride off her sarpadosham, she has to offer human blood by killing her child.
x) On 15.04.2021 at about 11:00 hours, when PW.1 went to Vijayalaxmi Hospital, Suryapet, where his elder sister was admitted for treatment, at noon hours, LW.2 - mother of PW.1 went to their agricultural fields and LW.7 - father of PW.1 was bed-ridden in Verandah of their house, taking advantage of the loneliness at about 6.30 hours, the accused started pooja in front of dressing table in their bedroom by closing entrance door, laid her daughter in front of dressing table in supine position, took the vegetable cutting knife, cut the throat of her child and caused instantaneous death. Later, she also cut the tongue of child as a part of her plan, separated piece of tongue and threw it somewhere while escaping after the incident. Thereafter, she left the scene while saying “ammayya biddanu champinaka sarpadosham tholigi poyinadi”.
xi) When the child was crying while cutting her throat, LW.7 heard the same, raised from cot with the help of a stick and in the meanwhile, the accused came out carrying blood stained knife in her hand and wearing a hand bag on her shoulder with a blood stained Punjabi dress. On seeing this, LW.7 raised hue and cries, PW.2, LW.3 and LW.5 went into the house of PW.1 and saw the dead body of deceased in a pool of blood.
xii) Thus, the accused committed the aforesaid offences.
5. Basing on the report given by PW.1 on 15.04.2021 at 22:00 hours with Police of Mothey, PW.10 - Sub-Inspector of Police, registered a case in Crime No.64 of 2021 under Section - 302 of IPC.
6. On completion of investigation, PW.11 - Inspector of Police filed charge sheet against the appellant herein. Since the offence is triable by the Court of Sessions, concerned Magistrate committed the same to the Principal District and Sessions Court, Nalgonda, who in turn took the same on file as S.C. No.397 of 2022 and, thereafter made over to the trial Court.
7. The trial Court framed the charge for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC against the accused and then proceeded with trial.
8. During trial, PWs.1 to 11 were examined, Exs.P1 to P24 were marked and material objects MOs.1 to 21 were also exhibited. No evidence, both oral and documentary, was let in by the accused.
9. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the accused was examined under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, upon hearing both sides, the trial Court recorded conviction against the appellant herein for the aforesaid offence and accordingly imposed death sentence. Challenging the said conviction and death sentence, the appellant preferred the present appeal.
10. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant brought to the notice of this Court that the appellant was suffering from mental disorder at the time of incident and that the same was not considered by learned trial Court while imposition of death penalty. Having considered the said argument of learned counsel for the appellant and hearing both sides, considering the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2023) 2 SCC 353), vide order dated 25.08.2025 in R.T. No.2 of 2025, this Court appointed Ms. C.P. Shruthi, as Senior Mitigation Investigator, to assess the conduct and behavior of the accused and submit a mitigation investigation report. This Court also directed the Superintendent/ Professor of Psychiatry, Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad, to constitute a suitable team for the purpose of carrying out a psychological evaluation of the appellant - accused. Pursuant to the same, the said Mitigation Investigator filed mitigation investigation report dated 05.12.2025. Even, the Superintendent, Institute of Mental Health, Hyderabad, submitted his report vide letter No.2258/A&D/2025 A/o 286722/U-IV, dated 26.09.2025 to learned Public Prosecutor, who in turn produced the same before this Court.
11. In the said letter/report, it is mentioned as follows:
“Patient has been examined serially by a team of psychiatrists and has undergone psychological evaluation. On perusal of medical records from the private psychiatrists dated from 13-10-2017 to 17-03-2025 and history taken from the family members, patient in diagnosed to be suffering from Paranoid Schizophrenia.
Patient was taking medication before she came to us and under our observation and treatment the patient did not manifest any active signs and symptoms of mental illness during her stay and remained in remission. The patient is presently fit to stand trial. The patient is advised to continue medication and follow up with a psychiatrist once in a month.”
12. In this case, PW.1 is not only the complainant, who gave Ex.P1 report with the Police, but also, he is the husband of the appellant and father of the deceased child. During chief-examination conducted on 05.08.2024, he deposed with regard to the events that were narrated above. However, during cross-examination conducted on 07.08.2024, PW.1 resiled from his previous statement and, therefore, he was declared hostile. On 13.08.2024, he was cross- examined by learned Additional Public Prosecutor.
13. PW.1 in his chief-examination deposed that on 15.04.2021, the day of incident, he was in Suryapet and Mr. Ravi, his brother-in- law informed him that his baby’s head was bleeding and urged him to rush to home. His in-laws house is situated at the starting of the street and he noticed the accused was sitting outside the said house. At the time of her death, his daughter was with his wife, the appellant herein. His father, who is suffering from paralysis, was on the bed in the house. On seeing the blood, his father raised hues and cries and on hearing the same, PW.2 and LW.5 rushed to the house and found the appellant herein with blood stained clothes, holding knife with which she had cut the throat and tongue of his daughter. He came to know through his father on the next day that while he was on his bed, he heard the continuous crying of the baby, he got up from his bed, looked inside the room, where he found the appellant holding the baby in between her knees and slitting her throat. He went to the police station and lodged Ex.P1 - report.
i) However, during cross-examination, he has admitted that he and the appellant were classmates in school. The parents of the appellant consented to their marriage, but her brother was not in favour of their marriage. He also admitted that to his knowledge, the appellant did not have any ‘sarpadosham’ and no prayers/pooja was performed in their house. They used to place their daughter/deceased in a saree (cradle) tied to a hook. After the appellant was arrested, he engaged an advocate for her and applied for bail, got her released by producing sureties. He also admitted that the appellant was looking after the well-being of the baby and both of them were looking after her. The appellant is not responsible for the death of his daughter and she is not concerned with the said death. However, he denied the suggestion that he stated to police as “about 4 years back before his marriage, the accused met one unknown astrologist as she was suffering with psychological problem and he stated that she has ‘sarpadosham’ and if it is rectified her health would be normalized”.
14. PW.2 is the elder brother of PW.1. During chief- examination conducted on 05.08.2024, he deposed with regard to the day of incident, he heard his father crying loudly, and he and his wife Vinoda rushed to PW.1’s house, while approaching PW.1’s house, PW.2 claimed that he saw the accused coming out of the house, running towards her parents’ house, wearing blood-stained clothes and holding a knife.
i) During cross-examination by learned defence counsel, PW.2 admitted that the appellant was healthy and she had no health issues. She used to feed the deceased and took care the girl without causing any hardship to her. To his knowledge, the appellant had not offered and performed prayers/pooja in their house. He did not know whether the appellant had any involvement in the death of the child.
ii) Since PW.2 resiled from his previous statement during cross-examination by the learned defence counsel on 07.08.2024, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor declared him hostile. On 14.08.2024, he was cross-examined by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. During such cross-examination by learned Additional Public Prosecutor, PW.2 admitted that he had stated to the police that his father is bed ridden due to sickness and always lies in the bed in verandah and his mother goes to agriculture work.
15. PW.3 is the scribe of Ex.P1 - report and he deposed that the accused had superstitious beliefs related to snake (Nagadosham) and commission of offence by her.
16. PW.4 - Photographer deposed with regard to photographing the scene of offence and the dead body of the deceased.
17. PW.5 is the panch witness for the confession made by the accused with regard to commission of offence.
18. PW.6 is the panch witness for scene of offence and seizure panchanama and rough sketch. PW.7 is another panch witness for inquest panchanama and seizure of clothes of deceased panchanama, and so also PW.8. Since PWs.6 to 8 did not support the case of prosecution, they were declared hostile.
19. PW.9 is the doctor, who conducted autopsy of the dead body. PW.10 is the Sub-Inspector of Police, who deposed with regard to receipt of Ex.P1 - report form PW.1 and registration of the same as Crime No.64 of 2021 and issuance of FIR and thereafter handing over the CD file to PW.11 - Inspector of Police. PW.11 is the Investigating Officer, who deposed with regard to conducting investigation, examination of witnesses and recording their statements, recovery and seizure of material objects, drawing panchanamas and filing of charge sheet against the accused.
20. CONTENTIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT:
i) The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to law, evidence on record, and settled principles governing appreciation of circumstantial evidence, resulting in grave miscarriage of justice.
ii) The entire prosecution case rests solely on circumstantial evidence, including the alleged last-seen theory, recovery of the weapon, and post-occurrence conduct, in the absence of any direct eyewitness to the commission of the act.
iii) The prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing only to the guilt of the appellant - accused and excluding every hypothesis consistent with innocence, as mandatorily required in cases based on circumstantial evidence.
iv) The alleged last-seen theory is inherently doubtful, as the evidence on record indicates that the deceased child was not exclusively in the custody of the appellant - accused at the relevant time, and the failure of the prosecution to examine LW.7, a crucial witness admittedly present in the house, remains unexplained.
v) The recovery of the alleged weapon and other material objects does not conclusively establish guilt, as the prosecution failed to prove a clear nexus between the recovered articles and the actus reus and mens rea attributed to the appellant - accused.
vi) The prosecution failed to establish motive, and the alleged motive based on superstition and belief in “sarpadosham” is inconsistent and inadequately proved, particularly when key prosecution witnesses, including PW.1 and PW.2, resiled from their earlier statements and were declared hostile.
vii) The learned trial Court erred in ignoring material indicating that the appellant - accused was suffering from long-standing mental illness, including ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ and post partum paranoia, which was evident from the complaint itself, prosecution evidence, and surrounding circumstances.
viii) Despite the presence of such material, the trial Court proceeded with the trial without conducting any psychiatric evaluation or enquiry as mandated under Sections - 329 to 335 of Cr.P.C.
ix) The appellant - accused is entitled to the benefit of Section - 84 of IPC, as the evidence on record establishes, at the very least, a substantial and reasonable doubt regarding her cognitive capacity to understand the nature or wrongfulness of the act at the time of the occurrence.
x) The sentence of death imposed by the learned trial Court is constitutionally unsustainable, having been imposed without a meaningful and individualised mitigation enquiry and without satisfying the “rarest of rare” test.
xi) In view of the above infirmities, the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court is liable to be set aside.
21. CONTENTIONS OF LEARNED ADDITIONAL
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
i) The learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant - accused for the offence punishable under Section - 302 of IPC based on cogent and consistent circumstantial evidence available on record.
ii) The homicidal death of the infant child stands conclusively proved through medical evidence, and the prosecution has successfully established that the death was caused by a sharp-edged weapon (vegetable cutting knife).
iii) The chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, including the presence of the appellant - accused in the house at the relevant time, the last-seen theory, recovery of the weapon of offence, and post-occurrence conduct of the accused, clearly points to her guilt and excludes all other hypotheses.
iv) The failure to examine LW.7 does not vitiate the prosecution case, as sufficient other evidence has been adduced to establish the guilt of the appellant - accused beyond reasonable doubt.
v) The conduct of the appellant - accused after the incident, including leaving the scene and carrying the weapon, demonstrates consciousness of guilt and militates against the plea of unsoundness of mind.
vi) Mere existence of mental stress or belief in superstition does not amount to legal insanity, and the appellant - accused failed to establish that she was incapable of understanding the nature or wrongfulness of the act at the time of the occurrence.
vii) The provisions relating to enquiry into unsoundness of mind under Sections - 329 to 335 of Cr.P.C. are attracted only when the accused is incapable of making her defence, which was not the case herein, as the appellant - accused actively participated in the trial.
viii) The offence committed is extremely brutal and heinous, involving killing of a seven-month-old infant, and therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly concluded that the case falls within the category of the “rarest of rare”.
ix) The mitigation report filed at the appellate stage does not dilute the gravity of the offence or the culpability of the appellant– accused, and the sentence of death imposed by the trial Court warrants confirmation.
x) The Criminal Appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed, and the Reference made by the trial Court under Section - 366 of Cr.P.C. deserves to be answered in favour of confirmation of the death sentence.
22. In view above rival submissions, the point that falls for consideration by this Court is:
Whether the conviction and death sentence imposed by the trial Court for the charge under Section - 302 of IPC against the appellant herein - accused are sustainable, both on facts and in law?
23. LAW & ANALYSIS:
i) The principal issues that arise for consideration in the present Criminal Appeal and the connected Reference under Section - 366 of Cr.P.C. pertain to the sustainability of the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court, including the correctness of the finding on culpability, the applicability of the statutory exception under Section - 84 of IPC, and the propriety of the sentence imposed.
ii) Section - 84 of IPC embodies the fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence that penal liability presupposes the existence of a culpable mental state. The provision exempts from criminal responsibility a person who, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what she is doing is wrong or contrary to law. While it is well settled that the law draws a distinction between medical insanity and legal insanity and that not every mental disorder attracts the statutory exemption, it is equally recognized that legal insanity may be inferred from medical evidence when such evidence, read in conjunction with the surrounding facts and circumstances, establishes cognitive incapacity of the degree contemplated under Section - 84 of IPC.
iii) The Apex Court in Rupesh Manger (Thapa) v. State of Sikkim (2023 INSC 826) has reiterated that the burden cast upon the accused in invoking Section - 84 of IPC is not one that needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is required only to establish the plea on a preponderance of probabilities, or to create a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the requisite mens rea. The Court further clarified that where the material on record renders the prosecutions version doubtful with respect to the mental capacity of the accused at the relevant time, the benefit must necessarily endure to the accused.
iv) It is also well settled that the crucial point of time for determining unsoundness of mind is the time of commission of the offence, and that such mental condition may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and immediately after the occurrence.
v) In Shine Kumar v. State of Kerala (2024/KER/6621), the Kerala High Court exhaustively examined the scope of Section - 84 of IPC in the context of a serious intra-familial homicide and reiterated that unsoundness of mind is not a term of precise medical definition under the Indian Penal Code. The Court held that where there is credible material suggesting mental illness, the failure of the investigating agency or the prosecution to properly examine or place such material on record cannot operate to the prejudice of the accused. The judgment emphasises that legal insanity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, prior medical history, and the overall probabilities emerging from the record.
vi) In Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 577), the Apex Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the manner in which criminal Courts are required to assess culpability in cases where the factual matrix of the offence appears abnormal, disproportionate, or wholly inconsistent with ordinary human conduct. The Court emphasised that in such cases, the enquiry into mens rea cannot be superficial or mechanical. It was held that where the act complained of is “bizarre, motiveless, or defying normal behavioral logic”, the Court is under a heightened duty to probe whether the act may have been the result of mental disturbance or incapacity, even if such incapacity is not expressly pleaded by the defence. The Apex Court clarified that the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt extends not only to the physical act but equally to the mental element, and that Courts must be circumspect in inferring intention or knowledge merely from the nature of the act. Importantly, the Court recognized that unsoundness of mind under Section - 84 of IPC may be episodic or temporary, and that the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence does not, by itself, negate the plea, particularly where surrounding circumstances and conduct indicate cognitive disorientation.
vii) The judgment further underscores the proactive role of the trial Court in such situations, including its duty to invoke Section - 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where necessary, to ensure that the real issue of mental capacity is not eclipsed by the gravity of the offence. The decision in Chunni Bai4 thus affirms that in cases involving inexplicable intra-familial homicide, especially where vulnerable victims and accused persons with a history of mental illness are involved, judicial caution and constitutional sensitivity must prevail over instinctive condemnation.
viii) In Lalitha @ Latha v. State of Kerala (2021 SCC OnLine Ker 2426), the Kerala High Court dealt with a case involving matricide and filicide followed by an attempt to commit suicide, where the accused had a prior and subsequent history of mental illness, including schizophrenia. While the Court found that the homicidal acts were proved, it held that the failure of the Investigating Officer and the trial Court to conduct a timely psychiatric evaluation, despite clear indicators of mental illness emerging during investigation, constituted a serious infirmity. The Court reiterated that when the nature of the offence is bizarre or inexplicable and the record discloses prior psychiatric history, the statutory safeguards under Sections - 329 to 335 of Cr.P.C. must be invoked. The High Court ultimately held that such failure raises a reasonable doubt regarding mens rea and vitiates the conviction.
ix) In Krishnan Ramasamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2014 (12) SCC 279), the Apex Court cautioned that convictions based on circumstantial evidence must withstand strict scrutiny, particularly where the alleged conduct appears abnormal or inconsistent with ordinary human behaviour. The Court underscored that Courts must be alert to the possibility that unexplained or bizarre conduct may stem from mental disturbance rather than criminal intent.
x) In Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025 INSC 317), the Apex Court reiterated that where the prosecution case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, suspicion howsoever strong cannot take the place of proof. The Court emphasised that each incriminating circumstance must be established beyond reasonable doubt and must form an unbroken chain pointing only to the guilt of the accused.
xi) In Rishipal v. State of Uttarakhand ((2013) 12 SCC 551), the Apex Court reiterated that the doctrine of last-seen together cannot, by itself, sustain a conviction unless the time gap between the accused and the deceased being seen together and the occurrence is so small as to rule out any other possibility. The Court further held that the burden under Section - 106 of the Evidence Act does not arise unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie and complete chain of circumstances.
xii) In Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam (Crl.A. No.1330 of 2018 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2440 of 2018)), the Apex Court interfered with concurrent findings of conviction where the prosecution case was founded on circumstantial evidence marked by contradictions, unexplained recoveries, and improbable conduct. The Court held that where the chain of circumstances is incomplete or inconsistent with normal human probabilities, the benefit of doubt must necessarily follow.
xiii) In Mustakeem v. State of Rajasthan ((2011) 11 SCC 734), the Apex Court held that recovery of a weapon or material object under Section - 27 of the Evidence Act, even if proved, does not by itself establish guilt unless the prosecution demonstrates a clear and credible nexus between the recovered object and the commission of the offence. The Court further cautioned that in cases of circumstantial evidence, recoveries must be approached with circumspection, especially where independent corroboration is lacking. In the present case, the alleged recovery neither conclusively links the appellant - accused to the act with the requisite mens rea nor excludes the possibility that the act was committed in a state of psychotic impairment.
xiv) The duty of the criminal Court to actively participate in the truth-finding process has also been emphasised by the Apex Court in Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana (2023 LiveLaw (SC) 395), wherein it was held that a trial judge is not a mere umpire but has an obligation to ensure that justice is done. The Court further clarified that Section - 106 of the Evidence Act does not dilute the primary burden resting on the prosecution and that adverse inferences cannot be drawn merely from unexplained conduct without first excluding alternative hypotheses consistent with innocence or incapacity.
xv) In Dhanna Ram v. State of Haryana (2025: PHHC:016787-DB), the Punjab and Haryana High Court recognized schizophrenia as a serious mental disorder capable of impairing legal capacity, depending upon its manifestation at the material time. The Court clarified that unsoundness of mind need not be permanent and that recurring psychotic episodes, if shown to exist at the time of the offence, are sufficient to attract the protection of Section - 84 of IPC. The Court reiterated that the mental condition of the accused must be inferred from a cumulative assessment of medical evidence and surrounding circumstances.
xvi) The jurisprudence governing circumstantial evidence also assumes relevance in the present case. In Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984 AIR 1622), Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2003 SCC (Crl) 201), Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar (2021 SCC (Crl) 127), Padman Bibhar v. State of Odisha (2025 INSC 751), Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2014 Supreme (SC) 1289), and State of Rajasthan v. Hanuman, the Apex Court has consistently held that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be complete and must unerringly point only to the guilt of the accused. Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt, and where the circumstances are capable of more than one interpretation, the interpretation favorable to the accused must prevail. These principles apply with equal force where the alternative hypothesis relates to the absence of mens rea due to mental incapacity.
xvii) The decision in Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2024 INSC 56) of the Apex Court further reiterates that the brutality of the act or the recovery of incriminating material, by itself, cannot establish guilt unless the prosecution discharges its burden of proving the mental element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The gravity of the act cannot eclipse the legal requirement of culpability.
xviii) In the context of sentencing and confirmation proceedings, the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. Manjuben d/o Kasturbhai Nanjibhai (2025 Latest CaseLaw 4670 Guj) has held that where the record discloses indicators of serious mental illness, the trial Court is under a mandatory obligation to enquire into the mental capacity of the accused in terms of Chapter - XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court held that non-compliance with these safeguards vitiates the trial, particularly in cases involving the death penalty, as such omission strikes at the root of a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
xix) The judgment of the Meghalaya High Court in Bremingstar Mylliem v. State of Meghalaya (2022 Latest Caselaw 185 Meg), though rendered in the context of sentencing irregularities, serves as a reminder that once a conviction itself is rendered unsustainable in law, the question of sentence does not survive. Sentencing must follow, and cannot precede, a legally sustainable finding of guilt.
xx) In Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra (2002 (7) SCC 748), the Apex Court was confronted with a case where the homicidal act was clearly attributable to the accused, yet the defense of insanity was raised on the basis of a long-standing diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia supported by medical records and expert testimony. The Court reiterated that the crucial point of inquiry under Section - 84 of IPC is the mental state of the accused at the time of commission of the offence, which may be inferred from circumstances preceding, attending, and following the act. Notably, the Apex Court accepted that paranoid schizophrenia is a recurring mental illness, and that when a person is under paranoid delusions, “he is not fully aware of his activities and its consequences,” thereby impairing cognitive capacity. Applying the standard of preponderance of probabilities, the Court held that even if insanity is not conclusively proved, the evidence may raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea, entitling the accused to acquittal.
xxi) In Bapu @ Guraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan ((2007) 8 SCC 66), the Apex Court examined the scope of Section - 84 of IPC and clarified that the statutory protection extends only where unsoundness of mind renders the accused incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law. The Court emphasised that mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, by itself, may not be sufficient; however, where medical evidence establishes that the accused’s intellect and judgment were impaired due to mental illness, the protection cannot be denied merely because the accused appeared oriented or behaved normally at intervals. The Court further recognized that mental illness may manifest episodically, and that lucid intervals do not negate the existence of legal insanity at the material time.
xxii) In Prakash Nayi @ Sen v. State of Goa (2023 INSC 24), the Apex Court held that even where the homicidal act is attributable to the accused and the medical evidence establishes the cause of death, the conviction under Section - 302 of IPC cannot be sustained if the material on record establishes, on a preponderance of probabilities, that the accused was suffering from such unsoundness of mind at the time of the occurrence as to attract Section - 84 of IPC. The Court recognized paranoid schizophrenia as a serious, episodic mental illness capable of impairing cognitive capacity, clarified that lucid intervals or subsequent fitness to stand trial do not negate legal insanity at the material time, and reiterated that the burden under Section - 84 of IPC is not one of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court further underscored the mandatory nature of the safeguards under Chapter - XXV of Cr.P.C. and deprecated the failure to enquire into prior psychiatric history when such material is available.
24. As discussed above, in the present case, the accused is a well educated lady and she is the only daughter to her parents. The appellant and her husband belong to the same village and same street. While she was studying in ZPHS, Burkacherla Village, PW.1 was her classmate. Both of them fell in love, but the parents of the accused did not accept their love and got her married with one Mr. Venkanna against her will. However, later the accused divorced him as she had no interest in continuing the marriage. Due to marital disturbances, she suffered mental distress which affected her mental and physical health; she was advised by an unknown face reader that she had sarpadosham which negatively affected her marital life. Thereafter, the accused was shown to different local and non-local magicians/face readers also and the accused also believed that due to sarpadosham only her life was not settled despite her studying up to B.Sc., B.Ed. She also searched on YouTube etc., as to how to get rid of such sarpadosham.
25. Since PW.1 was unmarried, the parents of the accused got her married to PW.1 in June, 2019. In order to get rid of the sarpadosham accused used to perform pooja incessantly at her in- law’s house in front of dressing table in bed room. She spent more time performing pooja to get rid of said dosham as she believed the Goddess Laxmi Devi, Lord Hanuman and Shiva-Parvathulu and also lightening in pramida by pouring oil. PW.1 and his family members suspected that the accused was suffering from mental illness and accordingly took her to Psychiatrist in Khammam, who examined her and informed that she was mentally stressed and has to take treatment for some days and also prescribed some medicines to be used. During the marital life, the accused was blessed with a female child, aged seven months as on the date of incident 30.09.2020. By seeing YouTube videos, the accused came to the conclusion that to get ride off her sarpadosham, she has to offer human blood by killing her child.
26. On 15.04.2021 at about 11:00 hours, the accused started pooja in front of dressing table in their bed room by closing entrance door, laid down her daughter in front of dressing table at pooja place in supine position, took the vegetable cutting knife, cut the throat of her child and caused instantaneous death. Later, she also cut the tongue of child as a part of her plan, separated piece of tongue and threw somewhere while escaping after the incident.
27. In Ex.P1 - Telugu written report given by PW.1, the husband of the accused also specifically mentioned that about four years before, some unknown person told his wife that she has ‘sarpadosham’, since then she started performing pooja and other rituals, he suspected there she was suffering from some mental illness, since 4-5 months started doing untoward acts, saying that she has ‘sarpadosham’ , and she can predict future happenings, Therefore PW.1 and others took her to Khammam and provided treatment with psychiatrist, where the doctor revealed that she is suffering mentally due to stress and gave her medicine , But the appellant refused to take the medicine, she used to perform pooja putting Shiva Parvithulu paper photos and also used to light deepaam with oil, His depositions as PW.1 evidence is also in the same lines. However, during cross- examination, he was gained over by the defence and, therefore, learned Public Prosecutor declared him hostile and cross-examined him. During cross-examination, Ex.P9 - certified copy of deposition of PW.1, both examination-in-chief and cross-examination in C.C. No.13 of 2024 was marked.
28. Perusal of record would also disclose that while the accused was on bail in the present case, she and her father said to have committed an offence under Section - 307 of IPC against her husband (PW.1). A case in Crime No.91 of 2023 was also registered by Mothey Police Station against them. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was laid against them for the offences under Sections - 307 and 109 of IPC. The same was taken on file as S.C. No.13 of 2024. In the said case, the appellant - accused was arraigned as accused No.1, while her father as accused No.2. Vide judgment dated 09.04.2025, learned Assistant Sessions Judge at Suryapet found the appellant herein guilty of the said offence and accordingly sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence under Section - 307 of IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only), and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one (01) month. However, her father was found not guilty of the aforesaid offences and accordingly acquitted him of the said charges.
29. In the present case, the complainant, husband of the appellant was examined as PW.1. During cross-examination, he specifically admitted thus:
“when I questioned A1 as to why she killed our daughter, she reported that our daughter looked live (sic. Like) snake and so she killed….”
30. As discussed supra, even though the prosecution failed to examine LW.7, father of PW.1, who was suffering from paralysis and was bedridden, perusal of the evidence of PW.1 and PW.2 would reveal that there are contradictions with regard to the health condition of LW.7, while PW.2 deposed that LW.7 was not in the position to move from the bed due to paralysis, on the other hand, PW.1 deposed that although LW.7 was suffering from paralysis and was on the bed, on seeing the blood of the deceased infant, he raised hues and cries. However, PW.2 deposed that the appellant was in the house along with deceased child. It is borne out from the evidence on record that PW.1 had gone to his sister’s house, LW.2 - mother-in-law of the appellant went to the fields, leaving the appellant alone in the house and at the scene of the offence. Further, there was no plausible explanation given under Section - 106 of Indian Evidence Act, by the appellant with regards to the circumstances in which the deceased child sustained the fatal injuries.
31. It is also apt to note that, the motive attributed by the prosecution, founded on alleged superstition and belief in “sarpadosham”, is inconsistent and inadequately proved, particularly when key prosecution witnesses, including PW.1 and PW.2, resiled from their earlier statements and were declared hostile. More importantly, the very nature of the alleged motive, rooted in irrational beliefs and bizarre conduct, does not support an inference of a conscious or calculated design, rather, it shows that the appellant - accused was acting under a disturbed mental state and unsoundness of mind at the time of the occurrence. In such circumstances, the absence of a rational motive assumes significance, as it reinforces the reasonable doubt regarding the existence of the requisite mens rea and strengthens the applicability of the protection under Section - 84 of IPC.
32. In the considered view of this Court, the material on record establishes that the appellant - accused did commit the offence, however, the circumstances attending the occurrence, coupled with the evidence indicating her long-standing mental illness, clearly demonstrate that at the relevant time she was suffering from such unsoundness of mind as rendered her incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that what she was doing was wrong or contrary to law. The case, therefore, squarely falls within the protective ambit of Section - 84 of IPC, and the act, though physically attributable to the appellant - accused, does not constitute an offence in the eye of law. Consequently, the appellant - accused is entitled to the benefit of acquittal under Section - 334 of Cr.P.C. It is astonishing to note that the trial Court ignored the mental and health condition of the appellant and even did not take any steps for sending her to Psychiatrist to assess her mental condition in terms of Sections - 328 and 329 of Cr.P.C.
33. It is apt to note that ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ is a chronic psychiatric disorder characterized by prominent and relatively stable delusions, often of a suspicious or persecutory nature, accompanied by hallucinations, especially auditory, and significant perceptual disturbances. In its classical presentation, individuals may hear voices or misinterpret external events in a manner that is not grounded in reality, and they may experience strong, fixed beliefs that others intend to harm or deceive them. According to ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision) by the World Health Organization ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ is defined as follows
“Paranoid schizophrenia is dominated by relatively stable, often paranoid delusions, usually accompanied by hallucinations, particularly of the auditory variety, and perceptual disturbances. Disturbances of affect, volition and speech, and catatonic symptoms, are either absent or relatively inconspicuous.”
34. The condition frequently involves profound disruptions in perception, thinking, and reality testing, resulting in misinterpretations of ordinary situations and persons, which may lead to unpredictable or harmful behavior when the individual is unable to differentiate internal percepts from external reality. Such perceptual distortions and belief systems are reflected in the medical and psychiatric literature, which notes that persons with schizophrenia may experience hallucinations (often auditory) and accompanying delusions that are resistant to contradictory evidence, affecting their ability to understand the nature and consequences of their acts and impairing judgment and insight. External authoritative sources such as the Mayo Clinic describe schizophrenia as involving a constellation of symptoms including hallucinations, delusions, and impaired cognition that interfere with normal functioning, while epidemiological data from the National Institute of Mental Health underscores that schizophrenia affects thought processes and emotional responsiveness, further contributing to misinterpretations of reality and disrupted social engagement. In its paraphrenic form, when the delusional system is elaborate and accompanied by well-formed hallucinations, the individual’s grasp on reality is further compromised. Such clinical features are material to the question of legal capacity under Section - 84 of IPC, as they bear on the accused’s ability to appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of her actions
35. In Rupesh Manger (Thapa)2, the Apex Court has authoritatively held that the burden on the accused under Section – 84 of IPC is only to establish the plea on a preponderance of probabilities and that, even where insanity is not conclusively proved, the evidence may still raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea, entitling the accused to acquittal.
36. The Kerala High Court in Shine Kumar3 has further clarified that where there is a prior history of schizophrenia and no meaningful investigation into the mental condition of the accused, the benefit of Section - 84 of IPC cannot be denied merely because the accused did not formally plead insanity or because certain post- occurrence conduct suggests awareness.
37. In the present case, the conduct of the appellant - accused before and during the occurrence, as reflected in the prosecution narrative itself namely obsessive ritual behavior, belief in supernatural forces, irrational religious practices, and the absence of any rational motive is more consistent with psychotic ideation than with criminal design.
38. The post-occurrence conduct relied upon by the prosecution does not conclusively establish legal sanity, as observed by the Apex Court in Chunni Bai4, which cautions that instinctive or fear-driven conduct, even if appearing purposeful, does not necessarily negate unsoundness of mind, particularly where the circumstances of the crime are bizarre and inexplicable. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence, this Court is satisfied that the appellant - accused has, raised a substantial and reasonable doubt regarding her mental capacity at the time of the offence, thereby attracting the statutory protection under Section - 84 of IPC. At the cost of repetition, it is apt to note that PW1 is the husband of the appellant, in his Ex.P1 complaint itself specifically mentioned that the Appellant is suffering from mental illness and that they had taken her to a Psychiatrist at Khammam, and his deposition is also in the same lines.
39. The record unmistakably discloses that the issue of the appellant’s mental illness surfaced at the very inception of the criminal process, including in the complaint and the prosecution evidence; notwithstanding the same, the trial Court proceeded to conduct the trial without ordering any psychiatric evaluation or enquiry as contemplated under Sections - 329 to 335 of Cr.P.C.
40. The Gujarat High Court in Manjuben19 has categorically held that once material indicating unsoundness of mind is available on record, the Court is under a mandatory obligation to conduct the statutory enquiry, irrespective of whether the defence formally raises such a plea. Non-compliance with this mandatory procedure, particularly in a case involving capital punishment, strikes at the root of a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and constitutes a serious procedural illegality, thereby rendering the conviction legally unsustainable.
41. The question of capital punishment in the present case requires the strictest judicial scrutiny, having regard to the irreversible nature of the sentence and the constitutional limitations governing its imposition. It is well settled that the death penalty can be awarded only in the “rarest of rare” cases, where the alternative option of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed and where the culpability of the offender is of the highest degree. In the present case, the record discloses multiple mitigating circumstances which substantially diminish culpability, including long-standing and severe mental illness, demonstrable cognitive impairment at the relevant time, absence of prior criminal antecedents, and the lack of any rational or calculated motive. The offence, though grave and tragic, arises in a factual matrix marked by psychiatric vulnerability rather than deliberate criminal design. The mitigation investigation report further indicates a potential for treatment and rehabilitation, thereby negating the conclusion that the appellant - accused is beyond reform. In such circumstances, the constitutional threshold for confirmation of the death sentence is not met, and the imposition of capital punishment would be disproportionate and inconsistent with the settled principles governing sentencing in cases involving diminished mental capacity.
42. Even otherwise, the sentence of death imposed in the present case cannot be sustained. The mitigation investigation report placed before this Court discloses severe and long-standing mental illness, absence of criminal antecedents, substantially diminished culpability, and a demonstrable potential for treatment and rehabilitation. The Apex Court has consistently recognised that mental illness of such gravity constitutes a powerful mitigating circumstance which, by itself, is sufficient to exclude the imposition of the death penalty. Applying the principles laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab ((1982) 3 SCC 24) and the subsequent line of decisions governing capital sentencing, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case does not fall within the category of the “rarest of rare” so as to warrant confirmation of the death sentence.
43. Turning to the facts of the present case, the record placed before this Court discloses that the appellant - accused was diagnosed with ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ as early as the year 2017 and had undergone psychiatric treatment, including medication. PW.1, husband of the appellant, specifically mentioned the said facts in his EX.P1 complaint.
44. The material further indicates recurrent episodes of relapse, discontinuation of medication, and progressive worsening of symptoms in the backdrop of psychosocial stressors. Significantly, the occurrence took place during a period of postpartum vulnerability, a medically recognized phase during which individuals with pre- existing psychiatric disorders are at an enhanced risk of acute psychotic episodes.
45. In this context, the Mitigation Investigation Report records that during the relevant period the appellant - accused was experiencing severe psychotic symptoms, including perceptual distortions and delusional beliefs, and specifically notes her statement that the infant “appeared to her like a snake,” a manifestation consistent with psychosis-induced hallucinations and loss of reality testing. Such material bears directly on the question of the appellant’s capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of her actions at the material time.
46. The prosecution narrative itself records conduct on the part of the accused prior to the incident which includes obsessive religious rituals, belief in “sarpadosham”, and intense preoccupation with supernatural explanations. The act in question involves the killing of a seven-month-old infant, her own child without any discernible rational motive, gain, or antecedent hostility. The post-occurrence conduct relied upon by the prosecution, such as changing clothes or movement away from the scene, cannot, in isolation, be treated as determinative of legal sanity, as instinctive or fear-driven behavior is not uncommon in individuals suffering from psychotic disorders.
47. It is also a matter of record that no contemporaneous psychiatric evaluation of the accused was conducted immediately after the incident, despite the presence of indicators suggestive of mental illness.
48. As stated above, this Court after hearing both sides, vide order dated 25.08.2025 in R.T. No.2 of 2025, appointed Ms. C.P. Shruthi, as Mitigation Investigator, to assess the conduct and behavior of the accused and submit a mitigation investigation report, and also directed the Superintendent/Professor of Psychiatry, Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad, to constitute a suitable team for the purpose of carrying out a psychological evaluation of the appellant - accused. Pursuant to the same, the said Mitigation Investigator filed mitigation investigation report dated 05.12.2025. Even, the Superintendent, Government Hospital for Mental Care, Hyderabad, also submitted his report vide letter No.2258/A&D/2025 A/o 286722/U-IV, dated 26.09.2025 mentioning that the appellant is suffering from ‘paranoid schizophrenia’, the details of which are extracted above.
49. Vide the aforesaid order dated 25.08.2025, this Court also directed the Superintendent of Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, to submit a report regarding the work, if any, done by the appellant - accused while in jail and also submit a report regarding her conduct and behaviour while in jail. Pursuant to the said order, the Superintendent, Special Prison for Women, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, submitted his report vide letter No.SPW/HYD/JA/3061/ 2025, dated 08.10.2025, wherein it is mentioned as under:
“She is on regular follow-ups to Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad and is on daily medication.
As per the observations of officers, staff, and inmates,
1. She doesn’t talk much with anyone. She would only speak when someone talks to her.
2. She was silent most of the time which is observed by prison staff.
3. During thunderstorms and heavy rains, she gets little anxious and fears.
4. No complaints have been received against her from the fellow inmates so far.”
50. In the report submitted by the Senior Mitigation Investigator, after interviewing the family and the appellant accused, has confirmed the report submitted by Superintendent/Professor of Psychiatry, Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad, the mitigation report further sheds light on the condition of the appellant accused.
51. Relevant paragraphs titled as ‘summary of findings’ from the report of the Senior Mitigation Investigator are extracted below
“The MIR reveals that Bharathi's life circumstances and actions are best understood within the trajectory of a long- standing, severe mental illness associated with paranoid schizophrenia and postpartum psychotic episodes, which developed in the context of significant psychosocial vulnerabilities she was faced with all through her life. Bharathi's life and illness cannot be understood in isolation but are a cumulative result of marked by lifelong vulnerabilities. Bharathi's early life was developmental delays, emotional sensitivity, and social withdrawal, physically and sexually abusive marital life all of which constitute recognised predisposing traits for a mental illness. Her family history shows multiple relatives with serious psychological disturbances, untreated psychiatric symptoms, and developmental disabilities, indicating intergenerational vulnerability to mental illness. From 2015 onwards, Bharathi exhibited clear symptoms such as sleep disturbance, paranoia, excessive religiosity, emotional numbing, and thought disorganisation, which intensified into a full psychotic episode in 2017, culminating in a clinical diagnosis of Paranoid Schizophrenia documented in her medical records.
6. Bharathi's psychiatric history from 2017 to 2025 shows continuous, well-documented episodes of psychosis, lapses in treatment due to lack of awareness of family members, repeated medication adjustments, and multiple instances of requiring inpatient care and Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) sessions or what also known as "shock treatment". Since her incarceration, Bharathi has been on regular medication and is currently in partial remission, exhibiting residual symptoms such as flat affect, thought disorganisation, and memory gaps. The jail authorities consistently describe her as quiet, gentle, and never involved in disciplinary violations. The report also notes that she gets anxious and scared when there are thunderstorms. She engages meaningfully in simple, structured tasks through the day and expresses a deep emotional connection to her young daughter, indicating her probability of reformation.
7. Bharathi's life history, mental-health trajectory, and prison conduct demonstrate
That her actions arose from severe psychotic compulsion rather than volitional control, placing her far from the category of "extreme culpability" contemplated under Buchan Singh and later Manoj, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
b. Her psychiatric condition, documented across nearly a decade of records, also indicates her diminishing responsibility to fully assess accurately her actions, due to the unusual perceptions that she had at the time of the incident.
c. Bharathi's current mental health and conduct in prison indicates that, when provided with medication and a structured environment, Bharathi is functional and has strong emotional ties with the family.
Bharathi's longstanding mental illness, diminished culpability, and demonstrated probability for reformation strongly support the imposition of the lowest possible sentence.”
52. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence, the medical history, the surrounding circumstances, and the mitigation material placed on record, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant - accused has succeeded in establishing, at least on a preponderance of probabilities, that at the time of the occurrence she was suffering from such unsoundness of mind as rendered her incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what she was doing was wrong or contrary to law. The statutory requirements of Section - 84 of IPC are, therefore, attracted, and the benefit of the General Exception must enure to the accused.
53. In the light of the above discussion this Court accepts the plea of insanity made by the appellant and in terms of Section - 334 of Cr.P.C. that the appellant -accused committed the act but was incapable of understanding the nature or wrongfulness thereof at the relevant time, the consequential procedure mandated under Section - 335 of Cr.P.C. necessarily follows. Having regard to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the accused hails from a financially stable and well-placed family and that her brother has expressed willingness to assume responsibility for her care, but keeping in mind the nature of the offence, her mental condition and the fact that when she was released on bail, she committed another violent offence by trying to kill PW.1, her husband, and was convicted of such offence, the Court is of the considered opinion that releasing the appellant into the society would be dangerous, and that she would be better cared for in a mental institution.
54. In the present case, the appellant - accused is presently lodged in Special Prison for Women, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, and is stated to be taking regular psychiatric treatment from the Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad, and is presently in her psychological remission period. Accordingly, under Section - 335(b) of Cr.P.C, this Court is ordering to send her to the Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad.
55. CONCLUSIONS:
i) This Court holds that the act resulting in the death of the deceased child is physically attributable to the appellant- accused.
ii) However, the evidence on record, assessed on a preponderance of probabilities, establishes that at the time of the occurrence, the appellant - accused was suffering from such unsoundness of mind as rendered her incapable of knowing the nature of the act and that what she was doing was wrong, contrary to law, thereby attracting the protection of Section - 84 of IPC.
iii) Consequently, though the act is attributable to the appellant - accused, the same does not constitute an offence in the eye of law, and she is entitled to be acquitted by extending the benefit of the General Exception under Section - 84 of IPC to her.
iv) Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed in Sessions Case No.397 of 2022 are unsustainable in law and are liable to be set aside.
56. The present Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed setting the judgment dated 07.04.2025 in S.C. No.397 of 2022, recording the conviction against the appellant herein - accused and the imposition of death penalty on 11.04.2025 by the learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge at Suryapet. The appellant - accused is acquitted of the aforesaid charge. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by her stand cancelled. Fine amount, if any, paid by the accused is also ordered to be returned to the accused after expiry of appeal time.
57. Reference is answered accordingly, declining to confirm the death penalty imposed on the appellant - accused by learned trail Court on 11.04.2025 vide judgment dated 07.04.2025 in S.C. No. 397 of 2022.
58. The Superintendent, Special Prison for Women, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, is directed to hand over/transfer the accused to the Superintendent, Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad, forthwith, for safe custody in terms of Section - 335 (1) (a) of Cr.P.C. The Superintendent, Institute of Mental Health, Erragadda, Hyderabad, shall make necessary arrangements for her care and treatment, strictly in accordance with the provisions of Section - 103 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, under intimation to the District Collector/Magistrate concerned, who in turn shall supervise periodically as contemplated under Chapter - XXV of Cr.P.C., and ensure compliance with statutory safeguards.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in the Criminal Appeal, stand closed.




