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CDJ 2026 TSHC 111 print Preview print print
Court : High Court for the State of Telangana
Case No : Writ Petition No. 6915 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE E.V. VENUGOPAL
Parties : Alluri Sitarama Raju Versus The State of Telangana & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: Sureddy Priyanka, Advocate. For the respondents: M. Srinivas, learned Assistant Government Pleader, Sri Mahesh Raje, learned Government Pleader for Home.
Date of Judgment : 06-03-2026
Head Note :-
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 - Section 18(1)(a) -
Judgment :-

1. The present writ petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following relief :

               “…to declare the action of the respondents in sealing/attaching the premises bearing Plot No.117, VR Royal Vista, Sy.No.12, 12/A & B, Guttala Begumpet Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy pursuant to proceedings in C.No.54/AMTU/Cyb/2025 dated 25.09.2025 under Section 18(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, as illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional and consequently direct the respondents to forthwith de-seal, unlock and restore possession of the said premises to the petitioner, who are the lawful owners thereof ”

2. Heard Mrs.Sureddy Priyanka, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.Srinivas, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of Government Pleader for Home Sri Mahesh Raje.

3. The case of the petitioner in brief is that he is the absolute owner and possessor of premises bearing Plot No.117, VR Royal Vista, situated in Sy.No.12, 12/A & B, Guttala Begumpet Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, consisting of a stilt and five upper floors with about 40 rooms. With a view to earn livelihood, the petitioner’s wife, along with others, leased out the said premises to two tenants under a lease agreement dated 19.03.2024 for a period of three years for running a hostel/guest house in the name and style of “BSR Guest Inn”. As per the terms of the lease agreement, the tenants were solely responsible for the day-to-day management of the guest house and for any illegal activities occurring during the tenancy period.

               (a) Further on 13.08.2025 the police conducted a raid in the said premises alleging prostitution activities and registered a case in Crime No.1530 of 2025 for the offences under Sections 143 and 144 of BNS, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 arraying Hamer Singh @ Amid Singh, Thammi Srinivas, Pokala Venkateshwarlu, Nikhil, Sonia Singh, Vishal Bhiya, Sruthi @ Anju, Rohit, Ramesh Punna, Bekmetova Gulshat, Rakhmanova Malika @ Lovina Boara Rakhmanova Malika @ Lovina Bora, Lakshman Tumu, Akash Bajaj, Gora Mohammed Wasim and K.Parthiban as accused. At the time of the raid, the police authorities sealed the premises without issuing any notice or affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, though the petitioner was neither present at the spot nor arrayed as an accused in the said crime.

               (b) Subsequently, the 2nd respondent issued a show cause notice dated 25.09.2025 under Section 18(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 proposing attachment of the premises. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation on 15.10.2025 stating that the premises had been leased out for lawful purposes and that he had no knowledge or involvement in any alleged illegal activities carried out by the tenants. However, without properly considering the said explanation and without recording any finding regarding the petitioner’s knowledge or involvement, the respondents continued the sealing/attachment of the premises.

               (c) The petitioner contends that mere ownership of the premises cannot be construed as consent or knowledge of the alleged activities and that the action of the respondents in sealing the premises is arbitrary, illegal and violative of the provisions of Section 18 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act as well as Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300- A of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by the said action, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking a direction to de-seal the premises and restore possession of the same.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the action of the respondents in sealing and attaching the subject premises under Section 18(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the said Act. It is contended that such drastic action can be taken only when there is material to establish that the owner had knowledge of, or had knowingly permitted, the premises to be used as a brothel or for carrying on prostitution.

               (a) The learned counsel further submits that Section 18 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 empowers the Magistrate, upon receiving information that any house, room, place or portion thereof within a specified area is being used as a brothel or for carrying on prostitution, to issue a notice to the owner, lessor, landlord, tenant, occupier or agent calling upon them to show cause within a stipulated time why the premises should not be attached for improper use. After giving an opportunity of being heard and being satisfied that the premises is being used as a brothel or for prostitution, the Magistrate may pass orders directing eviction of the occupier and closure of the premises for a specified period. The provision thus mandates adherence to due process and requires the competent authority to record satisfaction regarding the improper use of the premises before passing any order of attachment or closure.

               (b) The learned counsel submits that in the present case a show cause notice in C.No.54/AMTU/Cyb/2025 dated 25.09.2025 was issued alleging that the owners had leased out the premises to certain tenants under a lease agreement dated 19.03.2024 for running a guest house and that they had failed to monitor the activities of the tenants, which allegedly resulted in illegal activities in the premises and therefore called upon them to show cause as to why the premises should not be attached under Section 18(1)(a) of the Act.

               (c) It is further submitted that, in response to the said notice, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation stating that the premises was leased out to the tenants for running a hostel/guest house under a valid lease agreement and that the tenants alone were responsible for the day-to-day management of the establishment. The petitioner also explained that the alleged illegal activities came to their knowledge only after the police raid conducted by the Madhapur Police and that they had no knowledge, consent or involvement in such activities. The petitioner also brought to the notice of the authority that the property is the only source of livelihood for the family and that attachment of the premises would cause severe financial hardship.

               (d) The learned counsel submits that despite submission of the above explanation, the respondents failed to properly consider the same and proceeded to continue the sealing of the premises without recording any finding that the petitioner had knowingly permitted the premises to be used for immoral trafficking activities. It is contended that mere ownership of the premises or failure to supervise the day-to- day activities of the tenants cannot be construed as knowledge or consent as required under Section 18 of the Act.

               (e) The learned counsel therefore submits that the impugned action is wholly disproportionate, violative of the principles of natural justice and also infringes Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India. Hence, it is prayed that this Court may set aside the action of the respondents and direct them to de-seal the premises and restore possession of the same to the petitioner.

5. The learned Assistant Government Pleader opposing the present writ petition would submit that the action of the respondents in sealing and attaching the premises was taken strictly in accordance with the provisions of Section 18(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, after credible information was received and a police raid revealed that prostitution activities were being carried on in the premises.

               (a) It is contended that the object of Section 18 of the Act is to prevent the use of any premises for immoral trafficking and to safeguard public order and morality in the locality. Once it is found that the premises is being used as a brothel or for prostitution, the competent authority is empowered to initiate proceedings for attachment or closure of the premises in order to prevent continuation of such illegal activities.

               (b) The learned Assistant Government Pleader would further submit that a show cause notice was duly issued to the owners of the premises calling upon them to explain as to why the premises should not be attached for improper use, thereby affording them an opportunity to submit their explanation. Hence, it cannot be said that the respondents acted in violation of the principles of natural justice.

               (c) It is also submitted that a criminal case has already been registered and the matter is under investigation and would ultimately be subjected to trial before the competent Court. Unless and until the criminal proceedings are concluded and the trial is conducted, the authorities are justified in continuing preventive measures such as sealing of the premises to ensure that the property is not again used for similar illegal activities. If the petitioner has any grievance, he ought to have approached the concerned trial Court. However, without resorting to such steps, the petitioner has rushed to this Court, which is nothing but a misconception.

               (d) The learned Assistant Government Pleader therefore contends that the impugned action is a lawful exercise of statutory powers intended to curb immoral trafficking and maintain public order and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

6. Having considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader and upon perusal of the material placed on record, this Court finds that the primary issue that arises for consideration is whether the action of the respondents in sealing and attaching the subject premises is in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Section 18 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.

               Sections 18(1), 18(1)(a) and 18(1)(b) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 read as follows:

               “18. Closure of brothel and eviction of offenders from the premises.

               (1) A Magistrate may, on receipt of information from the police or otherwise, that any house, room, place or any portion thereof within a distance of two hundred yards of any public place referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 is being run or used as a brothel by any person or is being used by prostitutes for carrying on their trade, issue notice on the owner, lessor or landlord of such house, room, place or portion or the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord or on the tenant, lessee, occupier of, or any other person in-charge of such house, room, place or portion to show cause within seven days of the receipt of the notice why the same should not be attached for improper user thereof; and if, after hearing the person concerned, the Magistrate is satisfied that the house, room, place or portion is being used as a brothel or for carrying on prostitution, then the Magistrate may pass orders—

               (a) directing eviction of the occupier within seven days of the passing of the order from the house, room, place or portion;

               (b) directing that before letting it out during the period of one year immediately after the passing of the order, the owner, lessor or landlord or the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord shall obtain the previous approval of the Magistrate.”

               (a) A plain reading of the above provision makes it clear that the Magistrate alone is empowered, upon receipt of information from the police or otherwise that any house, room, place or portion thereof is being used as a brothel or for carrying on prostitution, to issue a show cause notice to the owner, landlord, occupier or person in charge of such premises. The statute specifically mandates that the notice shall call upon the concerned person to show cause within seven days as to why action should not be taken for improper use of the premises.

               (b) The provision further makes it clear that only after affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned person and upon recording satisfaction that the premises is being used as a brothel or for prostitution, the Magistrate may pass orders directing eviction of the occupier and imposing restrictions on letting out the premises for a specified period.

               (c) Thus, the statutory scheme under Section 18 of the Act clearly indicates that the initiation of proceedings, issuance of show cause notice and passing of consequential orders are powers specifically vested in the jurisdictional Magistrate, who must act upon receipt of information from the police or otherwise and follow the procedure prescribed under the Act.

               (d) In the present case, the material placed on record discloses that the impugned show cause notice was issued by the Commissioner of Police under Section 18(1)(a) of the Act. However, under the statutory scheme of Section 18 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, the competent authority to initiate such proceedings and issue a show cause notice is the Magistrate, and not the police authorities. The record further reveals that no such notice has been issued to the petitioner by the concerned Magistrate. In the absence of initiation of proceedings by the competent authority as contemplated under the statute, the action taken by the official respondents cannot be sustained in law and is arbitrary and unsustainable. Therefore, the very initiation of the proceedings by the respondents is contrary to the procedure prescribed under the statute.

               (e) Further, the record indicates that the petitioner had submitted an explanation denying any knowledge or involvement in the alleged illegal activities and stating that the premises had been leased out to tenants who were responsible for the day-to-day operations. However, there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was properly considered or that any finding was recorded regarding the petitioner’s knowledge or conscious permission for the alleged activities.

               (f) It is well settled that mere ownership of the premises cannot, by itself, be construed as knowledge or consent to the alleged activities unless there is material to establish such involvement. The power under Section 18 of the Act, being drastic in nature and resulting in deprivation of the use of property, must be exercised strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the statute.

               (g) In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the action of the respondents in issuing the impugned notice and continuing the sealing/attachment of the premises is not in conformity with the mandate of Section 18 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and therefore the same cannot be sustained in law.

7. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed and the action of the respondents in sealing/attaching the premises pursuant to proceedings in C.No.54/AMTU/Cyb/2025 dated 25.09.2025 under Section 18(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 is set aside. The respondents are directed to forthwith de-seal the premises and restore possession of the same to the petitioner.

               However, it is made clear that this order shall not preclude the competent Magistrate from initiating appropriate proceedings in accordance with law, if circumstances so warrant.

8. There shall be no order as to the costs. Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.

 
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