1. The Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’), seeking to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused on bail in Crime No.650 of 2025 of P.M.Palem Police Station, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate, registered against the Petitioner/Accused herein for the offences punishable under Sections 318(4) and 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNS Act’).

2. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and the learned Legal Aid Counsel for Respondent No.2 Perused the record.

3. As seen from the record, on 05.11.2025 at 16.00 hours, the complainant lodged a report stating that she married her distant relative, Indigibilli Santhosh, in the year 2018 at Simhachalam Devasthanam, and that they later obtained a legal divorce in 2022 due to marital disputes, which was not informed to her parents. Thereafter, the accused again approached the complainant with false promises of remarriage, lived with her in a live-in relationship for about one year, and repeatedly postponed the marriage, leading to a complaint before the Mahila Police Station, Visakhapatnam City. During counselling, the accused stated that his parents were unwilling for the marriage, and an unregistered settlement was entered into, wherein the accused paid Rs.4 lakhs to the complainant and agreed not to interfere in her life. In November 2023, when the complainant was planning to marry another person, the accused again approached her with false promises of marriage, induced her to invest Rs.4 lakhs in an SA App assuring high returns, and established physical relations with her. Ultimately, he refused to marry her, thereby cheating her with dishonest intention. The petitioner was sent to judicial custody pursuant to his surrender before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate on 06.11.2025. He has been in judicial custody for the past 62 days. The petitioner is a permanent resident of Chinthapalem, Kothavalasa, Vizianagaram District. He has a fixed abode. If he is enlarged on bail with some stringent conditions, he may not evade the process of law.

4. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra(MANU/SC/0787/2025) wherein at para No.9 it is held as under:

                  “9...In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly³ to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC”.

5. In Kunal Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal(Spl Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7004 of 2025) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

                  “We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned counsel appearing for the State has relied upon the definition of 'Rape' and would argue that the consent given by the minor is no consent and it would still be a rape. In our considered opinion, as regarding the rape being committed by the appellant when the prosecutrix was a minor, there is absolutely no evidence, and definitely no forensic evidence with the prosecution. It is only an allegation in the FIR after more than 03 years, in order to make out a case under the POCSO Act, that such an act of rape was committed three years back when she was a minor. She also categorically states that she consented to the act as there was a promise of marriage by the appellant”.

6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Naim Ahmed v. State of (NCT) of Delhi((2023) SCC Online SC 89) at para No.21 and 22 it is held as under:

                  “”21... The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.

                  In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375IPC”.

7. In Bhawar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh(@SLP (Crl.)No.3475 of 2025) the Hon’ble Apex Court set aside the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh rejecting the request for grant of pre-arrest bail to the petitioner therein, and granted pre-arrest bail to the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 69 of ‘the BNS’.

8. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kunal Chatterjee case supra also in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, granted the relief of quashing the proceedings.

9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions held that promise to marriage and subsequent physical relationship between the two with consent would not amount to rape.

10. In Prithivirajan v. State(2025 SCC OnLine SC 696) at para Nos.6 and 7 it is held as under:

                  “6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied : first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage.

                  7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted”.

11. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra ((2019) 9 SCC 608) at para Nos.12, 18, and 21 it is held under:

                  “12... This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action.

                  18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.

                  21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 IPC has occurred”.

12. In Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand ((2020) 10 SCC 108) at para Nos.10, 12, 13, 14, and 18 it is held as under:

                  “10...The appellant belonged to the Scheduled Tribe while the prosecutrix belonged to the Christian community. They professed different religious beliefs in a traditional society. They both resided in the same Village Basjadi and were known to each other. The nature and manner of allegations, coupled with the letters exchanged between them, marked as exhibits during the trial, make it apparent that their love for each other grew and matured over a sufficient period of time. They were both smitten by each other and passions of youth ruled over their minds and emotions. The physical relations that followed was not isolated or sporadic in nature, but regular over the years. The prosecutrix had even gone and resided in the house of the appellant. In our opinion, the delay of four years in lodgement of the FIR, at an opportune time of seven days prior to the appellant solemnising his marriage with another girl, on the pretext of a promise to the prosecutrix raises serious doubts about the truth and veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix. The entire genesis of the case is in serious doubt in view of the admission of the prosecutrix in cross- examination that no incident had occurred on 9-4-1999.

                  12. The prosecutrix acknowledged that an engagement ceremony had also been performed. She further deposed that the marriage between them could not be solemnised because they belonged to different religions. She was therefore conscious of this obstacle all along, even while she continued to establish physical relations with the appellant. If the appellant had married her, she would not have lodged the case. She denied having written any letters to the appellant, contrary to the evidence placed on record by the defence. The amorous language used by both in the letters exchanged reflect that the appellant was serious about the relationship desiring to culminate the same into marriage. But unfortunately for societal reasons, the marriage could not materialise as they belonged to different communities.

                  13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage which the appellant never intended to keep since the very inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged offence her consent was obtained under fear of injury.

                  14. Under Section 90 IPC, a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. It hardly needs any elaboration that the consent by the appellant was a conscious and informed choice made by her after due deliberation, it being spread over a long period of time coupled with a conscious positive action not to protest. The prosecutrix in her letters to the appellant also mentions that there would often be quarrels at her home with her family members with regard to the relationship, and beatings given to her.

                  18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case and are of the considered opinion that the appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship between the parties. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the church or in a temple and ultimately failed. It is not possible to hold on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with her. The prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant's family was always very nice to her”.

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prithivirajan supra observed that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that merely because physical relations were established on a promise to marry, it would not, by itself, amount to rape. In the present case also, the relationship between the petitioner/Accused and respondent No.2 appears to have been consensual.

14. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amol Bhagawan Nehul supra observed that a consensual relationship that later turns sour, or partners subsequently becoming distant, cannot by itself justify invoking the criminal machinery of the State. The alleged misconception of fact of the petitioner has spread over a period of three years.

15. Considering the ratio lay down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kunal Chatterjee, Prithivirajan, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar, Naim Ahmed, and Maheshwar Tigga supra, the gravity and nature of the allegations levelled against the petitioner/Accused is entitled for grant of bail, but with some stringent conditions.

16. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed with the following stringent conditions:

                      i. The Petitioner/Accused shall be enlarged on bail subject to his executing bond for a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned XVI Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Bheemunipatnam.

                      ii. The Petitioner/Accused shall appear before the Station House Officer concerned, on every Saturday in between 10:00 am and 05:00 pm, till filing of the charge sheet.

                      iii. The Petitioner/Accused shall not leave the limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh without prior permission from the Station House Officer concerned.

                      iv. The Petitioner/Accused shall not commit or indulge in commission of any offence in future.

                      v. The Petitioner/Accused shall cooperate with the investigating officer in further investigation of the case and shall make himself available for interrogation by the investigating officer as and when required.

                      vi. The Petitioner/Accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the Court.