A.P. Sahi, J., President

The complainant/respondent no.1 in both the cases, namely, Ganesharam, had purchased a Tavera Car in 2011 from the Dealer Sunehri Cars Pvt. Ltd., the petitioner in Revision Petition No. 213 of 2022. The car suffered defects, as a result whereof repairs were carried out during the warranty period. According to the complainant, the car had to be repeatedly taken to the garage and ultimately the entire engine of the car had to be replaced.

2. It is in this background and with other details that the complainant instituted Complaint Case No. 194 of 2014 before the DCDRC Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as the District Commission). The dealer/opposite party no.1 in the complaint filed its written statement contesting the said position and the opposite parties no. 2 and 3 in the complaint, namely, the Manufacturers, who are the petitioners in Revision Petition No. 257 of 2022, also filed their separate written version contending that there was no manufacturing defect, and, as a matter of fact after replacement of the engine, the vehicle was running efficiently and there was no complaint whatsoever of any kind. The warranty conditions were complied with and the complaint had been filed without any existing cause only with a view to harass the petitioners/opposite parties.

3. The complaint was allowed by the District Commission holding that since the entire engine had to be replaced, the deficiency was established and consequently either the opposite parties should replace the car with a vehicle of the same model or in the alternative refund a sum of Rs.7,30,000/- with 9% interest to the complainant. Apart from this, a sum of Rs.25,000/- was awarded as compensation for mental and physical harassment and Rs.7,000/- as litigation costs.

4. The Dealer as well as the Manufacturers preferred appeals being Appeal No. 108 of 2018 and 87 of 2018 respectively before the SCDRC Rajasthan (hereinafter referred to as the State Commission). The appeals were dismissed holding that the order of the District Commission was correct. The stand of the Dealer, that they cannot be held liable as the allegation was of manufacturing defect only, was also rejected.

5. As noted above, the Dealer has filed Revision Petition No. 213 of 2022 and the Manufacturers have preferred Revision Petition No. 257 of 2022.

6. Adv. Vipin Singhania has appeared for the Manufacturers and has advanced his submissions and Adv. Udit Gupta has appeared for the Dealer. Adv. Vijay Pal Sharma has been heard for the Complainant/respondent no.1 in both the revision petitions.

7. The petitions were heard earlier on 16.09.2025 and the following order was recorded:

                   "Heard Mr. Singhania, learned counsel for the Petitioner in RP/257/2022, and for the Respondents in RP/213/2022. He has advanced his submissions contending that the finding of the District Commission as confirmed by the State Commission are against the weight of evidence and the inferences drawn are perverse keeping in view the fact that the running of the vehicle, as recorded in the respective invoices, and also that the repairs had been undertaken whenever the vehicle arrived for any other complaint. The contention therefore, is that the defects had already been removed during the warranty period itself with the change of Engine parts in two phases.

                   The vehicle was used as a taxi and otherwise also, the conclusion drawn in para-11 of the Complaint that there was a defect in the chassis or any other design defect, could not be proved by the Complainant by any evidence.

                   He further submits that an application had been moved by the Dealer during the pendency of the Complaint itself to call for an expert report that was opposed by the Complainant and therefore, the said application was dropped by the District Commission on the ground that since the Complainant has himself chosen to prove the facts as alleged, it is not necessary to proceed further with that application. Mr. Singhania submits that this approach of the District Commission was erroneous inasmuch as a manufacturing defect has to be proved by the opinion of an expert or by some material so as to establish that the vehicle was suffering from a manufacturing defect. A mere allegation of defect in design or in chassis remained a bald allegation without any further evidence led by the Complainant and hence, the allowing of the complaint for replacement of the vehicle was a finding contrary to the evidence on record.

                   He submits that the vehicle had gone for repairs but that by itself cannot be conclusive to construe that there was a manufacturing defect so as to order a replacement more so when the defects had already been removed. He therefore, submits that the order of the District Commission cannot be sustained and the same findings having been confirmed by the State Commission also is unsustainable.

                   While going through the impugned order, we have gathered that the District Commission has recorded a finding with regard to the change of the entire engine on 27.01.2014. We have not been able to find any evidence to support the said date pertaining to the change of the entire engine which has been questioned on the ground that there is no such change of entire engine on 27.01.2014.

                   Learned counsel for the Respondent, while addressing the Commission, will point out as to the said fact as to how the engine was changed on 27.01.2014.

                   Mr. Udit Gupta has advanced his submissions in RP/213/2022 on behalf of the Dealer and has urged that there is no deficiency whatsoever worth the name so as to hold the Dealer liable inasmuch as prompt service was rendered to the Complainant whenever the vehicle was brought to the Dealers. In the absence of any such material so as to warrant any adverse inference against the Dealer, the District Commission and the State Commission have committed an error in fixing the liability on the Dealer when the entire case of the Complainant is only of manufacturing defect.

                   The arguments could not conclude today due to paucity of time today.

                   Let the matter be listed on 09.02.2026 at 02:00 pm."

8. This is how the matter has come up once again today and we have heard the learned counsel at length and also examined the records.

9. The argument on behalf of the Manufacturers is that in the absence of any evidence of manufacturing defect, the complaint could not have been entertained and allowed on mere assumptions, that too even after the entire engine had been replaced long before the filing of the complaint. Mr. Singhania submits that the warranty was fully complied with and as a matter of fact after the replacement of the engine there is nothing to indicate any defect, much less a manufacturing defect as on the date of institution of the complaint. At the best, if there were any running minor repairs and services, they have been done thereafter, but so far as the vehicle is concerned, the same was being satisfactorily utilized and the complainant was using it as a taxi. The vehicle had run more than 50,000 kilometres and in fact the vehicle is running even till today. Mr. Singhania has pointed out to the fitness certificate document that is filed on record through an affidavit to confirm that the vehicle has been given a fitness certificate by the competent Regional Transport Officer till 2026 and continues to be in the ownership of the complainant. The vehicle had run more than 54,000 kilometres in 2014 itself.

10. He then contends that the Dealer during the pendency of the complaint had moved an application on 26.10.2015 requesting the District Commission to appoint an expert in order to discover and report, if at all the vehicle had any manufacturing defect, and get it inspected. This application was opposed by the complainant himself and he undertook the onus to prove the defect through his own evidence. Accordingly, an order was passed to that effect on 28.06.2016 whereby the application to invite an expert opinion had been rejected.

11. He then submits that no evidence worth the name was led by the complainant to prove his case. It is submitted that the District Commission, and even the State Commission, have applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur to conclude that there was a manufacturing defect in the vehicle.

12. Mr. Singhania therefore submits that this principle has been incorrectly invoked, inasmuch as the running of a vehicle is a matter of pure technical assessment and even otherwise once the vehicle stood fully repaired with the replacement of engine, there was no occasion for the District Commission to have directed replacement of the vehicle. He has relied on two decisions of this Commission in the cases of Krishan Lal Vs. Tata Motors & Anr. (Revision Petition No. 3103 of 2015), decided on 17.11.2025, and Branch Manager, Oberoi Motors Vs. Nishant Garg & Anr. (Revision Petition No. 4 of 2022), decided on 19.12.2025, to support his contentions.

13. Mr. Udit Gupta has also adopted these arguments but has urged that there was no deficiency on the part of the Dealer who had serviced the vehicle regularly and as a matter of fact carried out the replacement of the engine of the vehicle that was free of cost. In such circumstances, no liability can be fixed on the Dealer.

14. It is also urged by Mr. Udit Gupta that as a matter of fact after having rendered satisfactory service in a vehicle purchased in 2011, which had run for three years and had crossed over 54,000 kilometres mileage, the complainant, who was running it as a taxi, could not have sought any compensation or damages in 2014 which has been erroneously awarded by the Fora below.

15. Learned counsel for the complainant Mr. Vijay Pal Sharma has responded by advancing his submissions and supporting the impugned orders to urge that the harassment is obviously established when the vehicle had to be repeatedly taken to the garage for repairs and the very replacement of the engine establishes the fact that the vehicle was defective. He submits that this itself was sufficient to infer manufacturing defect which is obvious from the job cards of the vehicle which have not been disputed by the petitioners/opposite parties.

16. He submits that this harassment had to be compensated and therefore no interference is called for with the findings of fact recorded by the Fora below. He submits that the revisional jurisdiction is limited and should not be invoked for the purposes of setting aside the orders that are based on appreciation of facts.

17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, at the outset we may point out that the revisional jurisdiction in this case can be exercised in terms of Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as this is a complaint arising out of the said Act. However, the law on this subject as to the scope of limited application is no longer res integra as held by the Apex Court in the cases of Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 11 SCC 269 and Sunil Kumar Maity vs. SBI, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 77.

18. However, on the facts of the present case, the first issue is as to whether there was any manufacturing defect that could be located. It is a fact that the repairs made and the changes carried out in the engine at the initial stage and then the replacement of the entire engine subsequently does indicate some defect which was rectified under the warranty period. The question is as to whether it was a manufacturing defect or not.

19. As to what is a manufacturing defect has been dealt with by this Commission in several decisions, namely, in the cases of Anand Kumar Bansal Vs. Premier Ltd. and Anr. 2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1048; Maruti Udyog Limited Vs. Hasmukh Lakshmichand and Anr. 2009 SCC OnLine NCDRC 74; Hyndai Motor India Ltd. Vs. Harjinder Singh & Ors. (NC/RP/1037/2016) and Kishor N. Shah Vs. M/s Mercedes Benz India Pvt. Ltd.

20. In the instant case, it is only on the basis of an inference on the replacement of the engine that a manufacturing defect is being inferred. No evidence was led by the complainant to that effect. This had been clearly questioned by the petitioners/opposite parties by moving an application on 26.10.2015 before the District Commission requesting for appointment of an expert. This application was rejected by the District Commission on 28.06.2016 on the opposition of the complainant who stated that he would lead evidence to prove the same. In this background, we have to examine what was the evidence that was led by the complainant. There is no evidence led nor any expert evidence on record and the argument of the learned counsel for the complainant is that facts speak for themselves. He submits that the very act of the petitioners/opposite parties in replacing the engine should be deemed to be an acceptance of manufacturing defect. We are unable to agree with this absolute proposition, inasmuch as, the engine may have been defective and was therefore replaced but to construe that it had a manufacturing defect, an expert opinion was necessary. Replacement at times is also to protect reputation and goodwill. The District Commission therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in proceeding to reject the application that had been moved by the petitioners/opposite parties requesting for an expert opinion to be obtained in order to ascertain any manufacturing defect. Even otherwise, the Commission has the power to investigate such issues and obtain reports as contemplated under Section 13(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The District Commission did not adopt this procedure. We find this to have been incumbent on the District Commission, but instead it rejected the application that was moved by the petitioners/opposite parties. In this background, we find that the procedure for investigating and confirming an allegation of a manufacturing defect has not been followed, even though it may not be necessary in all cases to obtain an expert opinion.

21. This case in particular directly involved a mechanical assessment of the alleged defect of the vehicle. The complainant seems to have after the replacement of the engine not found any fault, much less a manufacturing defect, to pursue before the District Commission. The complaint was instituted after the defects stood completely rectified and in effect was pursued without any evidence of existing defects. The vehicle was running and it ran as a taxi and continues to be utilized as such even today. In the given circumstances, this itself is res ipsa loquitur to infer that the vehicle was running without defects since 2014. Both the District Commission and the State Commission have therefore erroneously applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur by consciously omitting and avoiding any expert opinion, and this finding therefore is a perversity, hence the revision petitions preferred by the petitioners/ opposite parties are maintainable and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside to that extent.

22. However, there is one issue which needs to be answered in favour of the complainant, namely, that it is a fact that the vehicle suffered defects repeatedly after its purchase in 2011 with complaints regarding the engine, the consumption of fuel and other related defects. The engine parts were replaced once but the vehicle did not improve and consequently again had to be brought to the garage when the entire engine was replaced under the warranty conditions which therefore establishes that the complainant having purchased a new car had to visit the garage several times from 2011 to 2014. These visits were not just for running repairs of the vehicle. This, in our opinion, calls for imposition of some compensation for harassment on the petitioners/opposite parties as the repairs were carried out by the Dealer and the engine was replaced under the warranty conditions of the Manufacturers. Therefore, they both are jointly and severally liable for the same.

23. There is however a technical issue, namely, that the amount of compensation awarded for mental and physical harassment to the tune of Rs.25,000/- and the costs of Rs.7,000/- by the District Commission, as confirmed by the State Commission, has not been challenged as inadequate by the complainant, but on the facts of the present case we find it to be justified that the said amount may be reasonably enhanced keeping in view the harassment faced by the complainant. The several visits of the vehicle for repairs and then finally replacement of the engine did not only cause inconvenience but also harassment immediately after purchase and lasted till the engine was finally replaced. This did continue for about a couple of years. This repeated visit for repairs and replacement reflects deficiency and defects that deserves to be compensated. On the other hand, the vehicle being used as a taxi has not been denied but no evidence to establish any income generated or its quantification has either been pleaded or demonstrated. Vague assertions about losses have been made. The complainant had demanded a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation and Rs.10,000/- as costs.

24. We therefore on the facts of the present case find it expedient to increase the amount of compensation as well as the costs in a lump-sum manner on consolidated basis to the extent of Rs.1,00,000/- only, out of which Rs.50,000/- shall be paid by the Manufacturers and Rs.50,000/- by the Dealer.

25. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel that deposits had been made during the pendency of this entire litigation, including under the interim order dated 25.03.2022, which is extracted hereunder:

                   "Issue notice on the Memo of Petition as also on the Applications to the Respondents, returnable on 21.07.2022.

                   The operation of the Impugned Order dated 21.12.2021 passed by the Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Circuit Bench at Bikaner in First Appeal No. 108 2018 and 87 of 2018 as also the Order dated 04.05.2018 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Bikaner, Rajasthan in Consumer Complaint No. 194 of 2014, shall remain stayed, till the next date of hearing. However, each of the two Petitioners shall deposit the entire amount, either fully or 50%, awarded by the District Forum as upheld by the State Commission, within 30 days from today, before the District Forum, which shall be put in the Fixed Deposit, initially for a period of one year. In the event of non-depositing of the amount the operation of the Interim Orders shall automatically stands discharged."

26. The award as modified by us hereinabove will therefore be calculated and the amount released to the complainant from the said deposits lying with the District Commission within one month from today. After payment to the complainant, the balance of the amount, as may be available, shall be refunded to the depositors, namely, the petitioners before us in the proportion that they have been deposited before the District Commission or the State Commission. In case any statutory deposit or otherwise is lying with the State Commission, the same shall also be transmitted to the District Commission for its disbursement as directed hereinabove.

27. The revision petitions are therefore disposed of in terms of the findings recorded hereinabove and the directions given. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.