Suddala Chalapathi Rao, J.

1. The present Contempt Appeal is filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short ‘the Act, 1971’) against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CC.No.2707 of 2023, dt.11.09.2024.

2. The 1st respondent herein is the contempt petitioner in the underlying contempt case, which has been filed for willful disobedience of the orders in IA.No.323 of 2022 in OS.No.141 of 2022 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Suryapet. The appellant herein is the Contemnor-2nd respondent in the said contempt case and 2nd respondent in the said interlocutory application.

3. The parties hereinafter will be referred to as they are arrayed in the Contempt Case.

Brief facts of the case:

4. The contempt petitioner is the owner and possessor of the house property bearing No. 2-1-169/3/1, admeasuring 328 sq. yards, situated at Polytechnic College, Thallagadda, Suryapet Town and District, and the contemnor-2nd respondent, who is the daughter-in-law of the contempt petitioner, having strained relations with her husband, alleged to have interfered with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 1st respondent over said property. The Contempt Petitioner then filed the above mentioned suit before the jurisdictional Civil Court seeking perpetual injunction and along with the suit, she filed IA.No.323 of 2022 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’) for ad interim injunction retraining the respondents therein from interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule house property, which was granted vide order, dt.09.05.2022, and was being extended from time to time.

5. While the said ad-interim injunction is in operation, the contemnor-2nd respondent alleged to have violated the said ad- interim injunction order, for which, the contempt petitioner filed an application vide I.A.No.30 of 2023 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC and the said application is pending adjudication before the said Court. Thereafter, the 1st respondent has also filed the underlying Contempt Case No.2707 of 2023 before this Court under Section 10 of the Act, 1971, for punishing the respondents, and the learned Single Judge, after issuing notice to the respondents and having heard both sides, by order dt.11.09.2024 partly allowed the contempt case, sentencing the 2nd respondent alone to undergo imprisonment for a term of 15 days and further directed to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-.

6. Assailing the said order in CC.No.2707 of 2023, dt.11.09.2024, the present Contempt Appeal is filed.

7. We have heard Sri V.Brahmaiah Chowdary, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Baglekar Akash Kumar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent and have given earnest consideration for their submissions. Perused the material on record.

Submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant:

8. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that, for the very same relief as sought in the contempt case, the 1st respondent, who is the mother-in-law of the appellant, had filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC in the month of December, 2022, for breach of injunction order, dt.09.05.2022, and the same is pending consideration before the jurisdictional Civil Court. While the said application is pending for adjudication before the jurisdictional Civil Court, the 1st respondent, by suppressing the said fact, has filed the underlying Contempt Case under Sections 10 & 12 of the Act, 1971, in the month of December, 2023, contending that the appellant has flouted the order passed by the jurisdictional Civil Judge, dt.09.05.2022, in IA.No.323 of 2022 in OS.No.141 of 2022.

9. Learned counsel further contended that since the 1st respondent has suppressed the fact of having already invoked the contempt jurisdiction of the Civil Court, before this Court in the Contempt Case, both the contempt cases i.e., one filed before the jurisdictional Civil Court invoking jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC, and another before this Court vide CC.No.2707 of 2023, cannot be maintained parallelly and simultaneously for punishing the alleged contemnor for the same alleged act.

10. Learned counsel further contended that the learned Single Judge was mislead by the 1st respondent by the aforesaid suppression of filing of application under Order XXXIX Rule 2Aof CPC and the learned Single Judge under misconception of law and facts allowed the Contempt Case instead of relegating the party to pursue remedies before the jurisdictional Civil Court and thus contended that the learned Single Judge grossly erred in sentencing the appellant/2nd respondent for imprisonment for a term of 15 days and also to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-. Hence, urged that the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is ex facie illegal and liable to be set aside.

Submissions of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent:

11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC deals with consequences of disobedience of orders passed by the Civil Court, whereas Section 10 of Act, 1971 empowers this Court to punish for willful disobedience of the orders of the subordinate Courts, and thus, as both the reliefs stand on different footing, both proceedings can be maintained simultaneously, and the 1st respondent has rightly invoked the jurisdiction of both Civil Court as well as this Court, and contended that as there is no statutory bar for filing both the applications simultaneously, the contention of the appellant is untenable and liable to be rejected.

12. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent further contended that non-mentioning of the filing of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC in the affidavit filed in support of the contempt case cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as suppression of a material fact, which would influence the decision making and contended that learned Single Judge, upon due consideration of the factual matrix, recorded a categorical finding of willful disobedience of the order passed by the jurisdictional Civil Court and has rightly punished the 2nd respondent- Contemnor, and therefore, the impugned order is sustainable in law.

13. In support of the said submissions, leaned counsel for the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. V. State of Bihar and Others ((2004) 7 SCC 166), wherein it was held that non-disclosure of previously filed suit by one of the Directors of the Company would not amount to suppression of material fact, affecting the final disposal of the writ petition on merits, and thus, contended that non-mention of filing of an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC cannot be construed as material suppression, in the teeth of the orders passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court (mentioned supra), as non-mention of filing of the said application would not have impact on the disposal of the application filed under Section 10 of the Act, 1971 before the learned Single Judge.

14. The learned counsel further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Limited and Others (AIR 221 Supreme Court 3723 = (2022)1 SCC 209) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:

               “61. It is one thing to say that the power exercised by a court under Order 39 Rule 2-A is punitive in nature and akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is quite another thing to say that Order 39 Rule 2-A requires not “mere disobedience” but “wilful disobedience”. We are prima facie of the view that the latter judgment in adding the word “wilful” into Order 39 Rule 2-A is not quite correct and may require to be reviewed by a larger Bench. Suffice it to say that there is a vast difference between enforcement of orders passed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and orders made in contempt of court. Orders which are in contempt of court are made primarily to punish the offender by imposing a fine or a jail sentence or both. On the other hand, Order 39 Rule 2-A is primarily intended to enforce orders passed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, and for that purpose, civil courts are given vast powers which include the power to attach property, apart from passing orders of imprisonment, which are punitive in nature [When an order for permanent injunction is to be enforced, Order 21, Rule 32 provides for attachment and/or detention in a civil prison. Orders that are passed under Order 21, Rule 32 are primarily intended to enforce injunction decrees by methods similar to those contained in Order 39 Rule 2-A. This also shows the object of Order 39 Rule 2-A is primarily to enforce orders of interim injunction.]…….”

15. Further reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner, on the decision of the Apex Court in Welset Engineers and Another v. Vikas Auto Industries and Others ((2015) 10 Supreme Court Cases 609) wherein it was held that the power of the High Court under the Act, 1971, emanate not only from the said enactment but also from Article 215/129 of the Constitution of India, and such power cannot either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down or can there be control or limitation on this right by any statute or by any provision of the Code or any Rules, and the power under Section 10 of the Act stands on a different footing with that of the provision under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC, both being independent to each other and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent thus contended that there is no bar under any law and as such, both applications are maintainable simultaneously.

16. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner also placed reliance on Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Capital General Store & Others (AIR 2023 Delhi 139) wherein the High Court of Delhi applying the ratio of Amazon.com’s case(supra) reiterated that proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC intend to secure enforcement of injunction orders, whereas contempt proceedings under Section 10 of the Act are punitive in nature.

17. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner, in the light of the above judicial precedents contended that both the proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC and under Section 10 of the Act, are independent to each other, and urged that this Court to draw an inference that both proceedings are maintainable simultaneously and that there is no error committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the impugned order, and prayed to dismiss the contempt appeal by confirming the orders passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court.

18. In the light of the above stated facts and circumstances and having heard both the counsel and having given earnest consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel on either side, in our view, the points that would fall for consideration before us are:

               1) Whether the application filed by the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC vide I.A.No.30 of 2023 on the file of the jurisdictional Civil Court and the Contempt Case filed under Section 10 of Act, 1971, are both simultaneously maintainable? and

               2) Whether the non-mention of application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC vide I.A.No.30 of 2023 in the underlying contempt petition amounts to material suppression?

Consideration by the Court:

19. As seen from the record, the order passed by the jurisdictional Civil Judge, dt.09.05.2022 in IA.No.323 of 2022 in OS.No.141 of 2022, interim protection was granted in favour of the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner restraining the appellant/Contemnor from interfering with her peaceful possession enjoyment over the petition schedule property. Upon the alleged breach of the said orders, admittedly, the 1st respondent has invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by filing I.A. No. 30 of 2023 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC.

20. Before delving into the merits of the case, the relevant provisions are extracted as under:

               “Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction—

               (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.

               (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.

               Section 10 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 –

               Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts—

               Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself:

               Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”.

21. It is suffice to note that Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC is the provision under Civil Procedure Code intended not only to secure obedience to injunction orders to maintain the possession of the party, but also as deterrence to the violation or breach of such injunction order, against the person violating the order. As is categorically held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amazon.com’s case(supra) that the power under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC is not only intended to enforce the orders passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of CPC, but also to protect the possession of the party, as such the Civil Courts are given vast powers including the power to attach the property apart from imposition of imprisonment for willful disobedience of the said orders, which are also punitive in nature.

22. Insofar as Section 10 of the Act, 171, this provision deals with the powers of this Court to punish the contemnor for willful disobedience of the order of the subordinate Courts.

23. In the instant case, after invoking remedy under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC by the 1st respondent vide application in IA.No.30 of 2023, the underlying Contempt Case has been filed invoking Section 10 of the Act before this Court seeking the very same relief for punishing the appellant for violating the orders of the jurisdictional Civil Court in IA.No.323 of 2022 in OS.No.141 of 2022, dt.09.05.2022. More so, the said fact of filing application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC is suppressed by the contempt petitioner in the underlying contempt petition.

24. In the considered opinion of this Court, though the reliefs claimed in both the applications are independent to each other, both the provisions of law i.e., Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC and Section 10 of the Act, deal with punishing the contemnor for willful disobedience of the orders passed by the Sub-Ordinate Courts and if the said applications are simultaneously maintainable before both the Courts i.e., one before this Court and the other before the jurisdictional Civil Court, they would result in two distinct punishments for the same act of willful disobedience, resulting in violation of the principle of double jeopardy i.e., trying or punishing a person more than once on the same set of facts and offence.

25. It is well settled that the Courts are not meant to settle the scores between the parties, rather, their powers are meant to ensure fair and just administration of justice to the litigants, in a broader sense, for the public at large, and though the said provisions under Civil Procedure Code and under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, are independent to each other, in our considered view, they cannot be availed simultaneously.

26. Further, in S.J.S. Business Enterprises’ case (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the interim order, which was passed therein by the High Court was though obtained by not mentioning the filing of the suit by one of the directors, but by the time the writ petition was heard, the suit had already been withdrawn, but in the instant case the application filed by the 1st respondent under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC for breach of injunction was pending before the jurisdictional Civil Court by the time the underlying Contempt Case was heard and disposed of. Thus, the instant case is distinguishable on facts in S.J.S. Business Enterprises’ case (supra).

27. We had an occasion to peruse the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Shrikrishna v. Ajay Gupta (Contempt Petition Civil No.709 of 204, dt.11.02.2025), wherein it was held that the application filed under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, alleging non-compliance of the interim order passed in a second appeal, is not maintainable in view of the civil remedy available under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC, and the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh has relegated the party to approach the jurisdictional Civil Court to avail the remedy under CPC.

28. On a perusal of the judgments relied upon by the counsel for 1st respondent indicates that they only interpret the provisions under CPC and Act, 1971, and there was no finding in respect of the issue that has fallen before us, and the Apex Court has only held that both the proceedings i.e., application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC as well as the contempt case under Section 10 of the Act, 1971, are independent to each other and the jurisdictional Civil Court has wider power to address the grievances of the parties, and thus, the judgments relied upon by the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner are distinguishable to the facts of the instant case.

29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by Lrs. V. Jangannath (Dead) by Lrs. & Others (1994 (1) SCC 1) held as under:

               “6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage………………..……………………………………………………….……………… A litigant, who approaches the Court is bound to produce all the documents executed by him, which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.”

30. Also, in Government of NCT of Delhi and Another v. BSK Realtors LLP and Another ((2024) 7 SCC 370), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

               “37. Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be material in the sense that it would have an effect on the merits of the case. The concept of suppression or non- disclosure of facts transcends mere concealment; it necessitates the deliberate withholding of material facts— those of such critical import that their absence would render any decision unjust. Material facts, in this context, refer to those facts that possess the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory. This principle is not intended to arm one party with a weapon of technicality over its adversary but rather serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the judicial process.”

31. In the facts of the instant case and in the light of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead)’s case and BSK Realtors LLP’s case, we are of the considered view that non-mention of filing of an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC by the 1st respondent in the contempt case, is a material suppression, and had the said fact been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge of this Court, learned Single Judge would have definitely appreciated and undoubtedly dismissed the contempt case, relegating the contempt petitioner to approach the jurisdictional Civil Court as was done by the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Shrikrishna’s case (supra). Thus, the 1st respondent has deliberately suppressed the said fact for gaining advantage, and on this count alone the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CC.No.2707 of 2023 is liable to be set aside.

32. In view of the above findings, we are of the considered view that the 1st respondent having availed the remedy before the jurisdictional Civil Court by filing an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC for breach of the interim protection, more so pending the said application, cannot once again invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 10 of the Act, 1971.

33. Accordingly, the point No.2 is answered against the 1st respondent/contempt petitioner. Further, though we thought it a fit case to impose penalty on the 1st respondent for material suppression, as the matter arises under a family dispute, we refrained to do so.

Conclusion:

34. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order, dt.11.09.2024 in CC.No.2707 of 2023, is hereby set aside. However, since the 1st respondent has already availed the remedy under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC, she is at liberty to pursue the said application before the jurisdictional Civil Court. No order as to costs.

35. Needless to say, the jurisdictional Civil Court shall dispose of the application vide I.A.No.30 of 2023 uninfluenced by the findings of this Court as well the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case.

Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.