1. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal dated 29.03.2010, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.6, Vadodara, in Sessions Case No.139 of 2008, for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306, 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the appellant - State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Code").

2. The prosecution case as unfolded during the trial before the trial Court is that the complainant's daughter Rekhaben married Accused No.1 on 01.05.2004 and the marriage initially remained smooth for two years, but thereafter the accused persons started subjecting her to mental and physical cruelty by taunting and beating her, due to which she returned to her parental house and complained. In an attempt to preserve the marriage, she was again sent back, but the accused demanded Rs.50,000/- from her parental side on the pretext that their shop was not running well; as this demand could not be fulfilled, Rekhaben stayed at her parental home for about one and a half years. Later, upon assurance from a villager that Accused No.1 had changed, she was again sent to her matrimonial home, but on 29.03.2008 she returned alleging repeated demand of Rs.50,000/- whereupon the complainant assured arranging the amount within 15 days and sent her back on 04.04.2008. Subsequently, on 08.04.2008, the complainant came to know that Rekhaben had committed suicide by setting herself on fire, following which he lodged a complaint at Vaghodiya Police Station therefore, the complaint was filed against the respondent/s-accused.

3. After investigation, sufficient prima facie evidence was found against the accused person/s and therefore charge- sheet was filed in the competent criminal Court. Since the offence alleged against the accused person/s was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court where it came to be registered as Sessions Case No.139 of 2008. The charge was framed against the accused person/s. The accused pleaded not guilty and came to be tried.

4. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution documentary evidence before the trial Court, which are described in the impugned judgment.

5. After hearing both the parties and after analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused for the offences for which the charge was framed, by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Learned APP for the appellant - State has pointed out the facts of the case and having taken this Court through both, oral and documentary evidence, recorded before the learned trial Court, would submit that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in true sense and perspective; and that the trial Court has committed error in acquitting the accused. It is submitted that the learned trial Court ought not to have given much emphasis to the contradictions and/or omissions appearing in the evidence and ought to have given weightage to the dots that connect the accused with the offence in question. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has erroneously come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. It is also submitted that the learned Judge ought to have seen that the evidence produced on record is reliable and believable and it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed an offence in question. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may allow this appeal by appreciating the evidence led before the learned trial Court.

7. As against that, learned advocate for the respondent/s would support the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court and has submitted that the learned trial Court has not committed any error in acquitting the accused. The trial Court has taken possible view as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal by confirming the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court.

8. In the aforesaid background, considering the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, independently and dispassionately and considering the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, the following aspects weighed with the Court :

          8.1. In view of the fact that respondent no.1-husband has expired, in view of the order passed by this Court dated 19.02.2026, the appeal is abated qua respondent no.1, i.e. the husband and the present appeal is heard for the offence under Section 498(A), 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against respondent no.2 i.e. the mother-in-law of the deceased.

          8.2. The entire case of the prosecution is based on the complaint filed by the father of the deceased, which is produced vide exhibit 16, is that the marriage of the deceased with accused no.1 had taken place on 01.05.2004 and that there was no disturbance during the initial two years of marriage between the deceased and the husband and thereafter the accused used to taunt the deceased Rekhaben and used to physically and mentally harass her and the deceased used to talk to her parental house and thereafter the husband of the deceased used to demand an amount of Rs.50,000/- as he was not doing well in his business at his shop and on 29.03.2008, the deceased had come to her parental home and had returned to the matrimonial home on 04.04.2008 and thereafter the deceased had committed suicide on 07.04.2008 at around 21.45 hours. It is also the case of the prosecution that the husband of the deceased had also intimated the Police on 08.04.2008, which is produced vide exhibit-56 and in the said intimation it has been stated by the husband that the deceased had burned herself because of the blast in the stove which was used by the deceased.

          8.3. The prosecution has examined Dr.Neha Desai as P.W.1, vide exhibit-10, the said Doctor had conducted the post-mortem and the post-mortem report is produced vide exhibit 11 and the cause of death as per the post-mortem report is neurogenic shock due to burn, which was to be confirmed after chemical analysis of viscera. The cause of death certificate which has been issued by the said Doctor is also produced vide exhibit-12. The said Doctor in the post-mortem report has also stated that the whole body of the deceased was burned because of the said incident.

          8.4. The panchnama of the scene of offence is produced vide exhibit-38 and the panch witness, of the said panchnama, Narsinhbhai Vasava had been examined vide exhibit-31 and Noor Muhammad Sheikh, P.W.11 has been examined vide exhibit 33. Both the witnesses have turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution.

          8.5. The prosecution has examined the complainant, the father-Ratilal Chavda as P.W.2, vide exhibit-15, wherein it has been stated that the deceased was harassed and physically assaulted by the accused. Moreover, in the said deposition, it has been stated that the family of the deceased had asked the accused husband for divorce and the accused husband did not agree to give divorce to the deceased. The mother of the deceased, Bhavnaben Ratilal has been examined as P.W.3, vide exhibit-18. In her examination-in- cheif, she has stated that the matrimonial life of the deceased and the accused no.1 was going on well and she is not aware as to why the deceased committed suicide.

          8.6. In her cross examination, she has stated that she is not aware of any talks of divorce being discussed by the deceased and the accused no.1. The prosecution has examined vide exhibit-20-Ranjitbhai Parmar. He has not supported the case of the prosecution and has turned hostile. He has stated that he is selling tea in a lorry and he denies his Police Statement dated 07.04.2008. The cousin of the complainant, Balwantbhai Chavda has been examined as P.W.5 vide exhibit-21. The said witness talks about harassment done by accused no.1-husband on the deceased but does not state anything about the harassment that was done by the mother- in-law, i.e. accused no.2. The aunt of the deceased, Kokilaben Chavda has been examined at exhibit 22 as P.W.6. The prosecution has examined the uncle of the deceased, Rasikulal Chavda vide exhibit-24 as P.W.7.

          8.7. The body panchnama of the accused is produced vide exhibit 30 and the witnesses of the said panchnama, Narsinhbhai Vasava has been examined as P.W.9 and accused no.1 has been examined as P.W.10. Both have turned hostile and have not turned the case of the prosecution.

8.8. The inquest panchnama which was admitted has been produced vide exhibit-28. The scientific officer of crime investigation Mr.Hasmukhbhai Patel has been examined vide exhibit-25 as P.W.8. The prosecution has examined vide exhibit-35-as P.W.12-Shantilal Chavda, who is a relative of the deceased. On considering his deposition, only general statements of cruelty have been stated by the said witness. The prosecution has examined the P.S.I.-Narwatsinh Baria vide exhibit-37 as P.W.13. The other Police Officer- Chandrahas Parmar has been examined as P.W.14 vide exhibit-53. The station diary at Vagodiya Police Station is produced vide exhibit-54, wherein the intimation given by the accused no.1 is noted as 2:15 hours and the complaint filed by the father of the deceased is stated as 18.30 hours. If the entire case of the prosecution is taken into consideration, the father himself has deposed that during the initial two years of marriage there was no trouble in the matrimonial home of the deceased and the accused. Thus, the father has also stated in his deposition that after the initial two years, for one and a half year the deceased had stayed at her parental home. The prosecution has not been able to prove the case against the accused by any other independent witnesses.

          8.9. If the entire case of the prosecution is taken into consideration the Prosecution Witness No. 1, Dr. Nehaben Desai, was examined during the trial. In her deposition, she stated that while she was serving as a Medical Officer at Primary Health Care Center Vaghodia, on 08/04/2008 at about 13:00 hours (1:00 PM), the dead body of Rekhaben was brought for post-mortem examination. According to her, the cause of death of the deceased was shock resulting from burn injuries. In her cross-examination, she has stated that the burn injuries found on the front portion of the body of the deceased woman could not have been caused accidentally due to a hole or crack in the stove resulting in accidental burning. Therefore, considering the facts stated in the above discussion, it is clear that the deceased committed suicide.

          8.10. The PW No. 2, Ratilal Tribhuvanbhai Chavda, the father of the deceased Rekhaben, has been examined on oath vide exhibit 15. According to him, the accused no.1 used to consume liquor and physically assault his daughter. He repeatedly demanded Rs.50,000/- from her. As a result, Rekhaben came to reside at her parental home and stayed there for about one and a half years. Thereafter, members of the community came and assured them that the accused no.1 had reformed, and upon such assurance, they sent their daughter back to her matrimonial home. It has been put forward by the said witness that the marriage of his daughter Rekhaben was performed as per customary rites and ceremonies with her free will and consent, and that for the initial two years the marital life was cordial and peaceful. During those two years, Rekhaben did not make any complaint against her matrimonial family. The complainant has admitted that, during the lifetime of his daughter, he had not made any complaint that his daughter was being assaulted or that she was being pressurized to bring Rs.50,000/-. In his deposition before the Court, he has stated, as a new allegation, that his daughter was killed on the terrace of the house and thereafter set on fire.

          8.11 The evidence of PW 3 Bhavanaben Ratilal, the mother of the deceased, has been recorded at Exhibit 18. According to her, the accused used to subject her daughter Rekha to severe harassment and cruelty. She has further stated that her daughter used to say that she did not want to contract a second marriage. In her cross-examination, this witness has admitted that after the marriage of her daughter Rekha, she continued to visit her parental home until her death. Accused No. 1 also used to accompany her on certain occasions. She further stated that her husband and other relatives had made efforts to persuade accused no.1 to grant a divorce to Rekha, but accused no.1 did not agree to give her a divorce. Further, in her cross-examination, this witness has stated that her husband had instructed her as to what she should depose before the Court.

          8.12 The prosecution examined witness Ranjitbhai Chhitubhai Parmar at Exhibit 20. He has not supported the case of the prosecution and was therefore declared hostile. He has refused to identify the muddamal articles allegedly seized and shown to him.

          8.13 The prosecution examined Witness No. 5, Balvantbhai Jesingbhai Chavda, vide exhibit 21. He is the cousin of the complainant. In his cross-examination, this witness has stated that he resides separately from his brother i.e. Complainant, And Rekhaben had not personally informed him about any harassment; rather, his brothers had told him about the alleged ill-treatment. Thus, this witness has deposed regarding the alleged physical and mental cruelty on the basis of hearsay evidence.

          8.14 The prosecution has examined witness Kokilaben Shantilal Chavda, who is an aunt of the deceased. Her deposition has been recorded at Exhibit 22. In her deposition before the court, she has narrated the same story as other prosecution witnesses. In her cross examination she stated that she is not aware whether the complainant had discussed the issue of divorce of Rekha with the accused. Further, She has not stated in her police statement that, in the incident, Rekha was killed and then set on fire, nor that her husband accused no.1 and his relatives used to quarrel, or that accused no.1 used to consume liquor and subject her to harassment. It is further evident that this witness resides at a considerable distance from the complainant's house and would come to know about any events there only if someone informed her. She is a family member and an interested witness therefore her testimony is not reliable.

          8.15 PW No. 7, Rasikbhai Tribhuvanbhai Chavda, who is the brother of the complainant and engaged in the catering business in Vadodara, has been examined vide Exhibit 24. This witness has admitted in his cross-examination that from the time of Rekha's marriage until her death, she had never personally complained, during her lifetime, that the accused used to assault her or demand Rs.50,000/- from her. Thus, this witness has deposed in a manner to support the complainant's case, without having any personal knowledge, and has given evidence based on what others told him. Therefore, his deposition is hearsay and cannot be considered reliable.

          8.16 The prosecution has examined witness Narsinhbhai Garbadbhai Vasava, who is a panch witness, and his deposition is recorded at Exhibit 31. This witness had attested to the seizure of the clothes (muddamal) as a panch witness. However, he has not supported the facts of the prosecution's case and was therefore declared hostile.

          8.17 The prosecution has examined Witness No. 10, accused no.1, whose deposition has been recorded at Exhibit 32. This witness is one of the Panch witnesses regarding Panchnama of the physical condition of Accused No. 2. He has not supported the facts of the prosecution's case and has therefore been declared hostile.

          8.18 The prosecution has examined Witness No. 11, Nur Mohammad Pir Mohammad Sheikh, whose deposition has been recorded at Exhibit 33. This witness is the witness of Panchnama to the crime scene. He has not supported the prosecution's case and has therefore been declared hostile.

          8.19 The prosecution has examined Witness No. 8, Hazmukbhai Patel, Scientific Officer, and his deposition has been recorded at Exhibit 25. This witness visited the accused's house and inspected the scene on 08/04/2008. In his deposition he stated that upon entering the house, the body was found lying on the RCC floor near the door. To the left side of the body, in the kitchen, there was a stove containing approximately 20 ml of kerosene. When he checked the house, he found that the incident had taken place at the terrace. He saw the stove with some holes in it, but the stove was not broken. From the testimony of this witness, it appears that the deceased committed suicide.

          8.20 The investigating officer, N. D. Bariya, has been examined as Prosecution Witness No. 13. It appears that this witness, who investigated the crime, has not recorded statements from the neighboring residents, and it only appears that the case was registered and a charge-sheet filed.

          8.21 Considering the above evidence, there is no indication that the accused did anything to cause the deceased to commit suicide or facilitated it in any way. From the available evidence, there is also no proof that the deceased was subjected to any harassment or that there was a demand for Rs.50,000/- as dowry. Moreover, no such facts were reported by the neighboring residents, and therefore they have not been mentioned as witnesses in the charge sheet.

          8.22 According to the report produced vide exhibit 52, an opinion has been given regarding the stove. The report states that the stove itself was not cut, but two cuts had been made on its lid using a sharp instrument. Therefore, there is no evidence to show that the accused killed the deceased by strangling her on the terrace of their house and then set her on fire.

9 The evidence on record and the glaring omission on the prosecution as pointed out above leaves no room of doubt that the order passed by the trial Court is as per law. The trial Court has rightly held that there was no positive evidence on record to prove that the accused by way of the conduct or spoken words, overtly or covertly, actually aided and abetted or instigated the deceased in such a manner that it leaves no other option for the deceased but to commit suicide. In the present case, the prosecution has also not been able to prove the clear motive of the accused to commit offence of abatement. There is also no close connection between the accused's action and the deceased's choice to commit suicide. In view of the said fact, the prosecution has not been able to prove that the accused have stimulated the deceased to commit suicide.

          9.1 The prosecution has not proved that there was a clear motive to commit the offence of abatement. The prosecution has also not proved that the accused proceeded to encourage and/or irritate the deceased through words or insults and that the accused intended to urge the deceased to end it all by committing suicide. The prosecution has also not been able to prove the direct connection between the incitement and committal of suicide. The prosecution has also not been able to prove direct or indirect act of incitement to the commitment of suicide. The prosecution has also not been able to prove by accusation of harassment without any positive action on the part of the accused close to the time of occurrence that led and forced the deceased to commit suicide.

          9.2 The present matter turns on whether the conduct attributed to the accused satisfies the legal threshold of abetment of suicide. Therefore, read as a whole, it can be said that mere occurrence of a suicide does not automatically trigger rigours of the Section. The penal consequences under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code arise when the prosecution is able to establish that the accused abetted and had a role in provoking or facilitating that suicide. Therefore, this twin test distinction is required to be borne in mind.

          9.3 Abetment, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, is not a broad moral expression but a term of precise statutory meaning. Section 107 IPC delineates its contours: instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aiding. Each of these modes presupposes active involvement. The law does not punish omission except in some cases, it punishes intentional encouragement or positive facilitation of a prohibited act.

          9.4 It is therefore not sufficient to show that the deceased was unhappy, distressed, or subjected to unpleasant treatment. The jurisprudence developed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently underscored that routine domestic disagreements, suspicion between spouses, or episodes of harassment do not ipso facto amount to instigation. Rigours of this Section intervene only where there is clear evidence of mens rea and a direct causal link between the accused's conduct and the decision of the deceased to commit suicide.

          9.5 The concept of instigation demands something more than mere reproach or accusation. It connotes an active suggestion, an incitement, or conduct of such intensity that it operates upon the mind of the victim and pushes him or her toward this drastic and unfortunate step. The prosecution therefore, must demonstrate either a deliberate intention to drive the deceased to suicide or knowledge that the conduct in question was likely to produce that consequence. Equally indispensable is the requirement of proximity. The law insists on a live and immediate nexus between the acts complained of and the suicide. A remote or generalized allegation is insufficient. There must be evidence showing that the accused engaged in conduct so closely connected in time and effect with the suicide that it can reasonably be said to have triggered the fatal act.

          9.6 No material has been brought on record demonstrating any proximate act immediately preceding the suicide which could be construed as instigation. Nor is there evidence of a positive act amounting to intentional aid. The essential ingredients of abetment -namely, culpable mental state coupled with active or proximate conduct-are not established.

          9.7 On an overall assessment of the evidence, the prosecution has failed to demonstrate the existence of the foundational elements necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC.

10. In the case of Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka and another, [(2022) 2 SCC 129], it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the essence of abetment lies in instigating a person to do a thing or the intentional doing of that thing by an act or illegal omission. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.

          10.1 In the case of Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 (1) Crimes 347 (SC), the observations are made with regard to abetment of suicide. It has been held that in order to bring a case within purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in commission of said offence, person who is said to have abetted commission of suicide must have played active role by act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate commission of suicide. It has been further observed that the act of abetment by person charged with said offence must be proved and established by prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. It is further observed that to satisfy requirement of instigation, accused by his act or omission or by a continued course of conduct should have created such circumstances that deceased was left with no other option, except to commit suicide.

          10.2 In the case of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu versus State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707, it has been held that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable.

          10.3 In the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2020) 15 SCC 359, after considering the provisions of Sections 306 and 107 of IPC, the Court held that conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide.

          10.4 In the case of Amudha v. State, 2024 INSC 244, it was held that there has to be an act of incitement on the part of the accused proximate to the date on which the deceased committed suicide. The act attributed should not only be proximate to the time of suicide but should also be of such a nature that the deceased was left with no alternative but to take the drastic step of committing suicide.

11. Further, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence to take a contrary view in the matter or that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored the material evidence on record. In above view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Court below was completely justified in passing impugned judgment and order.

12. Considering the impugned judgment, the trial Court has recorded that there was no direct evidence connecting the accused with the incident and there are contradictions in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. In absence of the direct evidence, it cannot be proved that the accused are involved in the offence. Further, the motive of the accused behind the incident is not established. The trial Court has rightly considered all the evidence on record and passed the impugned judgment. The trial Court has rightly evaluated the facts and the evidence on record.

13. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasoning, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under:

          "... This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary (1967)1 SCR 93: (AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice."

14. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary.

15. In the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 280, Supreme Court has held as under:

          "The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal."

16. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394, while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view.

17. In the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:

          "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

          (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

          (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

          (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.

          Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

          (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

          (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

18. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a recent decision, in the case of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and Another V/s State of Uttarakhand reported in (2025) 5 SCC 433, has held in paragraph 24 as under:

          "24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

19. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

20. In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, on my careful re-appreciation of the entire evidence, I found that there is no infirmity or irregularity in the findings of fact recorded by learned trial Court and under the circumstances, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent/s - accused for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and I also endorse the view/finding of the learned trial Court leading to the acquittal.

21. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. Record & Proceedings be remitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith.