Anil K. Narendran, J.

1. The respondent in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025 has filed this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the interim order dated 16.12.2025 of the learned Single Judge in that writ petition, which was one filed by the respondent herein-petitioner, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding Union Bank of India, the respondent therein, to permit the petitioner to pay off the entire outstanding liability in respect of an agricultural loan for Rs.1,50,000/-, availed from the Attingal Branch of the said Bank, after creating equitable mortgage of 2.02 Ares of land comprised in Re.Sy.No.9/9-B at Edacode Village in Chirayinkeezu Taluk, in 20 monthly installments.

2. The document marked as Ext.P1 is a copy of order dated 19.11.2025 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Thiruvananthapuram, in M.C.No.1592 of 2025, in a proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (SARFAESI Act) seeking assistance of the Court to take possession of the secured asset. Ext.P2 is a copy of notice dated 29.11.2025 issued by the Advocate Commissioner appointed in M.C.No.1592 of 2025 (wrongly dated as 29.12.2025).

3. In W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025, the respondent Bank filed a counter affidavit dated 15.12.2025, producing therewith Ext.R1(a) sale certificate dated 15.09.2025. In the said counter affidavit, it is stated that, due to the default in repayment of the loan amount and interest, the account was classified as Non Performing Asset (NPA) on 31.12.2017. In the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act, the secured asset was sold on 13.06.2025, and Ext.R1(a) sale certificate dated 15.09.2025 was issued. Thereafter, the Bank obtained Ext.P1 order dated 19.11.2025 from the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Thiruvananthapuram in M.C.No.1592 of 2025 for physical dispossession and the Advocate Commissioner issued Ext.P2 notice dated 29.12.2025. Upon receipt of Ext.P2 notice, the respondent-petitioner filed W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025 before this Court seeking installment facility for repayment of the loan amount together with interest. As on 30.11.2025, after giving credit to the sale price, the total amount outstanding comes to Rs.2,51,783/-, in addition to interest and cost.

4. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit, the respondent Bank has pointed out that the secured asset, which is covered by Ext.R1(a) sale certificate dated 15.09.2025, is lying adjacent to the residential house of the petitioner, and for ascertaining the mortgaged/sold property by metes and bounds, the Bank has filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Thiruvananthapuram.

5. It is after the filing of the counter affidavit dated 15.12.2025 by the respondent Bank, that the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order dated 16.12.2025 in W.P.(C) No.46815 of 2025, which reads thus;

                  “The petitioner shall remit an amount of Rs.75,000/-(Rupees seventy five thousand only) within a period of one month from today. It is also brought to notice that part of the secured assets were sold on 13.06.2025, and an amount of Rs.1,56,550/- is the sale amount, which has already been appropriated to the loan account. The amount is now shown as Rs.2,51,783/- after deducting the sale amount. The coercive steps against the petitioner shall be deferred for a period of six weeks. It is made clear that if the payment is not made, the respondent will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.”

6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-respondent Bank and also the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant-respondent Bank would submit that the learned Single Judge committed a grave error in granting an interim order on 16.12.2025 in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025, after the filing of the counter affidavit dated 15.12.2025 by the Bank, which was placed on record on 15.12.2025 itself. As stated in paragraph 5 of that counter affidavit the secured asset is lying adjacent to the residential house of the petitioner. The secured asset, having an extent of 0.02 Ares in Re.Sy.No.9/9-B of Edakkodu Village, has already been sold on 13.06.2025, as evident from Ext.R1(a) sale certificate dated 15.09.2025. Dispossession of the petitioner from her residential house is not necessary for handing over physical possession of the secured asset to the purchaser in Ext.R1(a) sale certificate. Without challenging the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act by approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal, invoking the provisions under Section 17 of the said Act, the respondent-petitioner has chosen to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8. The learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner would submit that the petitioner proposes to challenge the sale of the secured asset by the Bank, in appropriate proceedings, by approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal, invoking the provisions

under Section 17 of the said Act. Since the only relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025 is an order directing the Bank to permit the petitioner to pay off the entire outstanding liability in respect of the loan account in 20 monthly installments, the petitioner is legally entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

9. In the instant case, as already noticed hereinbefore the loan account was classified as NPA by the Bank on 31.12.2017, due to the default on the part of the respondent-petitioner in repayment of the loan amount together with interest and costs. In the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the secured asset was sold on 13.06.2025, as evident from Ext.R1(a) sale certificate. In order to take physical possession of the secured asset, the Bank approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court in M.C.No.1595 of 2025, invoking the provisions under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and obtained Ext.P1 order dated 19.11.2025, pursuant to which, the Advocate Commissioner issued Ext.P2 notice dated 29.11.2025. It is without challenging the action taken by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, by approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal, invoking the provisions under Section 17 of the said Act, the respondent-petitioner has chosen to approach this Court in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that if the 1st respondent guarantor had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14, then he could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The expression ‘any person’ used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

11. In Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], on the facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noted that the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. While dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves, inasmuch as, they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

12. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds that the process does not conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are also primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4 SCC 311]. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including repossession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression ‘any person’, who could approach the Tribunal.

13. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act, approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the said power in the absence of any legal right. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023) 2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide, but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.

14. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] and Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], if the respondent-petitioner is aggrieved by the notice issued by the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14 of the said Act, he could have availed the statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of the said Act by approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal. When the statute prescribes a particular mode, by approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal, any attempt made by the borrower to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by the writ court. Such a practice has been deprecated by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to in Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311].

15. On the question of maintainability of a writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, against an interim order passed by the learned Single Judge during the pendency of the writ petition, the Larger Bench in K. S. Das v. State of Kerala [1992 (2) KLT 358] held that the word ‘order’ in Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act includes, apart from other orders, orders passed by the High Court in miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petitions provided the orders are to be in force pending the writ petition. An appeal would lie against such orders only if the orders substantially affect or touch upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. The nature of the ‘order’ appealable belongs to the category of ‘intermediate orders’ referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551]. The word ‘order’ is not confined to ‘final order’ which disposes of the writ petition. The ‘orders’ should not however, be ad-interim orders in force pending the miscellaneous petition or orders merely of a procedural nature.

16. In Thomas P. T. and another v. Bijo Thomas and others [2021 (6) KLT 196], a Division Bench of this Court noticed that the view that was upheld by the Larger Bench in K.S. Das [1992 (2) KLT 358] was that even though an appeal could be filed against an interlocutory order passed in a writ petition, in order to be qualified for challenge in an appeal, the order shall be either substantially affecting or touching upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or which are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. According to the Larger Bench, the nature of the order appealable belongs to the category of intermediate orders referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye [(1977) 4 SCC 551]. It was, however, clarified by the Larger Bench that such orders should not, however, be ad interim orders or orders merely of a procedural nature.

17. In the instant case, it is without challenging the action taken by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, by approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal, invoking the provisions under Section 17 of the said Act, the respondent-petitioner has chosen to approach this Court in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the Bank to permit the petitioner to pay off the entire outstanding liability in the loan account, in 20 monthly installments. The loan account was classified as NPA by the Bank, as early as on 31.12.2017. In the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the secured asset was sold on 13.06.2025, as evident from Ext.R1(a) sale certificate. Ext.P1 order dated 19.11.2025, marked as Ext.P1 in the writ petition, is an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court in M.C.No.1595 of 2025, invoking the provisions under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, pursuant to which, the Advocate Commissioner issued Ext.P2 notice dated 29.11.2025.

18. As stated in the counter affidavit dated 15.12.2025 filed by the Bank in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025, the writ petition is delaying tactics intended to frustrate the recovery proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. The right title and interest of the secured asset have been transferred to the auction purchaser, vide Ext.R1(a) sale certificate dated 15.09.2025. In the writ petition filed on 12.12.2025, the petitioner has not chosen to implead the auction purchaser as a respondent, who is a necessary party. In paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit dated 15.12.2025, the respondent Bank has raised a specific contention that W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025 is not maintainable in view of the efficacious and adequate statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, as well settled by the decisions of the Apex Court. It is without considering the aforesaid contentions raised in the counter affidavit, on the maintainability of the writ petition, that the learned Single Judge granted the impugned interim order dated 16.12.2025 in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025, the said interim order, which touches upon the substantial rights of the appellant Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, is an order appealable under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, as held by the Larger Bench in K. S. Das [1992 (2) KLT 358].

                  In such circumstances, we find no reason to sustain the interim order dated 16.12.2025 of the learned single Judge in W.P.(C)No.46815 of 2025 and the Writ Appeal is accordingly allowed by setting aside the aforesaid order dated 16.12.2025 of the learned Single Judge; however, without prejudice to the legal right, if any, of the respondent-petitioner to challenge the sale of the secured asset before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.