Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 05.12.2025 passed against one Muhammed Habeeb Rahman (herein after referred to as 'detenu'), under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti- Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the said order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 13.02.2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 29.10.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known goonda' as defined under Section 2(o)(ii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, two cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.83/2025 of Thrissur Excise Range Office, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 22(c) r/w 8(c) of the NDPS Act.

4. We heard Smt. Reeha Khaderk, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [1991 (1) SCC 128], contends that when a detenu is already in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly issued only if the authority satisfies the triple test laid down in the said judgment. According to the counsel, since the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the detaining authority was required to satisfy itself, on the basis of reliable material placed before it, that there existed a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, upon such release, he would in all probability engage in prejudicial activities. The counsel further contends that although Ext.P1 order records that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the question of the likelihood of the detenu being released on bail has not been properly considered. It was further submitted that while passing Ext.P1 order, the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of around one year between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and the said time gap itself would show that the detenu is not a person having the propensity to be involved in criminal activities repeatedly. On these premises, it was urged that the detention order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, the detention order was passed by the competent authority upon being fully satisfied that such detention was the only effective means to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity and it was only upon being satisfied that there was every likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and that, if so released, he would in all probability indulge in further criminal activities, that the order of detention came to be passed. According to the learned Government Pleader, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. Therefore, it was submitted that no interference is warranted with the impugned order.

7. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this Writ Petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a causal manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu will be released on bail, and if so released, he will indulge in prejudicial activities again, if not detained. In short, the circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

8. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

9. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.83/2025 of Thrissur Excise Range Office, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 22(c) r/w 8(c) of the NDPS Act. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 29.08.2025, and the detenu was arrested on the same day. Since then, he has been under judicial custody. The impugned order was passed on 05.12.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody.

11. In Ext.P1 detention order, it is specifically stated that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, it is decipherable that the detaining authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was in custody at the time when it passed Ext.P1 order. Similarly, in Ext.P1 order, it is further recorded that the detenu has applied for bail in the said case, and even if he is released on bail with stringent conditions, the said bail conditions are not sufficient to curb the detenu’s criminal activities, since he violated similar conditions in the past. Likewise, the detention order itself records that the detenu is a person who has scant regard for the bail conditions imposed upon him and that such conditions are insufficient to prevent him from indulging in further anti- social activities. Evidently, the impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities undermining the bail conditions.

12. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of around one year between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. It is true that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 29.08.2025, whereas the date of occurrence of the last but one case registered against him (crime No.869/2024) is on 22.08.2024. Thus, there is indeed a gap of around one year between the two incidents. However, it cannot be ignored that the incidents that led to the registration of both cases occurred within seven years of the date of the detention order, and hence, both cases are qualified to classify the detenu as a ‘known goonda’. Therefore, the time gap between the two cases highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of little consequence in the context of the impugned order.

                  In the result, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not made out any ground for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.