(Prayer: This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.p.c., praying to 1.quash the entire proceedings in c.c.no.20653/2023 arising out of cr.no.116/2023 for the offences p/u/s 323, 341, 504, 506 of IPC instituted vide order dated 18.08.2023 currently pending before the learned v A.C.J.m Bengaluru city annexure-b; 2.to direct the court of the learned v a.c.j.m bengaluru city to complete and conclude the trial in c.c.no.20653/2023 expeditiously within an outer limit of 3 months, if at all the petitioner fails in securing the aforesaid relief sought in 55(a).)
Cav Order:
1. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question proceedings in C.C.No.20653 of 2023 pending before the V Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru arising out of crime in Crime No.116 of 2023 registered for offences punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504 and 506 of the IPC.
2. Heard XXXXXXXXX, party-in-person for the petitioner, Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri Chiranjeevi K.R., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
3.1. The 2nd respondent is the complainant. The petitioner is said to be the nephew of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent had availed an overdraft facility in the name of his business M/s Tunga Agencies from Syndicate Bank, J.C. Road Branch on 16-08- 1999 to the tune of ₹5,00,000/- by executing an agreement of hypothecation of certain goods and moneys receivable. The co- obligant was one Smt. Vishalamma, the mother of the petitioner. The 2nd respondent is said to have closed down the business and not paid back the money i.e., the loan that was availed. Recovery proceedings were initiated by the Bank on 27-01-2005 in O.S.No.733 of 2005 both against the borrower and the guarantor for recovery of a sum of about ₹6,00,000/-. Money is not paid despite the settlement arrived at by the parties before the Lok- Adalat then. 18 years passed by.
3.2. A communication is sent from J.C.Road Branch of Canara Bank, as Syndicate Bank had merged with Canara Bank, that an amount of ₹20,00,000/- is outstanding and has to clear the dues. The petitioner then approaches the Bank to take steps towards settlement of dues, at which point in time, the complainant and the mother of the petitioner, as also the petitioner, had some squabbles. A complaint comes to be registered before the jurisdictional police alleging that on 02-06-2023 at around 4 p.m. the 2nd respondent who was on his motorcycle had been abused with filthy language, assaulted and was voluntarily restrained by use of criminal force. This becomes a crime in Crime No.116 of 2023. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner. The concerned Court then takes cognizance and registers C.C.No.20653 of 2023 against the petitioner. Registration of criminal case is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.
4. The petitioner who appeared in person would vehemently contend that there are serious inconsistencies in the statement of the complainant and at the time when the alleged incident took place, the petitioner was in the Canara Bank trying to sort out the manner in which the loan was to be cleared. He would submit that there is no offence that would become punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504 or 506 of the IPC. He would seek quashment of the proceedings.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/complainant would vehemently refute the submissions in contending that the Police after investigation have filed a charge sheet. The charge sheet clearly points out voluntary restraint by the petitioner of his uncle, the complainant. The reasons may be manifold. But, since charge sheet is filed, it is for the petitioner to come out clean in a full-blown trial.
6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would also toe the lines of the complainant by seeking dismissal of the petition, on the score that the charge sheet records the statement of persons who were around and there is wound certificate also appended to the charge sheet.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The relationship between the parties is an admitted fact. The petitioner on 02-06-2023 is said to have restrained the complainant and also assaulted the complainant. The complainant then registers the complaint on 03-06-2023. It becomes a crime in Crime No.116 of 2023 for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504 and 506 of the IPC. Since the entire issue has now sprung from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows:
The complaint is that the petitioner on 02-06-2023 at about 4.00 p.m. comes near the shop of the complainant which is in front of a Urdu school, stopped the complainant from moving in any direction and assaulted him. The police conduct investigation and after recording statements of the complainant and others, file a charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in Column No.17 reads as follows:
9. The issue now would be, whether the ingredients of the offences so laid are met or otherwise?
10. The relationship between the parties is, petitioner is the nephew and petitioner’s mother is the sister of the complainant.
The two had an issue with regard to who should clear the loan that was taken in the year 1999 which had grown up to ₹20,00,000/- in the year 2023. The complainant narrates that the petitioner is an independent businessman and not relative. The petitioner has also produced documents to demonstrate, apart from CCTV footage, that on 02-06-2023 between 4 p.m. and 4.10 p.m. he was at the Canara Bank. Noticing this fact of the petitioner that he was not around the complainant, the complainant while rendering his statement changes the version that he was assaulted between 3.25 p.m. and 3.40 p.m. The further statement of the complainant is as follows:
The petitioner, to demonstrate that he was in recovery section of the Canara Bank on the said date and time, has produced adequate documents. The documents are perused which clearly indicate that the petitioner was nowhere near the complainant. Visitors pass is produced and the CCTV footage is also produced by the petitioner. Therefore, whether the offences alleged against the petitioner would meet the ingredients that are necessary to drive home the crime is also necessary to be considered.
11. One of the offences alleged is punishable under Section 341 of the IPC. Section 341 of the IPC reads as follows:
“341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.—Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.”
Section 341 has its ingredients in Section 339 of the IPC. It reads as follows:
“339. Wrongful restraint.—Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.
Illustration
A obstructs a path along which Z has a right to pass, A not believing in good faith that he has a right to stop the path. Z is thereby prevented from passing. A wrongfully restrains Z.”
The purport of this provision need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in KEKI HORMUSJI GHARDA v. MEHERVAN RUSTOM IRANI ( (2009) 6 SCC 475) has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
11. It is in the aforementioned backdrop of events, the statement made by the first respondent that Accused 1 to 5 were managing the affairs of the Company and had instigated Accused 6 to construct the road must be viewed. It is one thing to say that the Company had asked Accused 6 to make construction but only because Accused 1 to 5 were its Directors, the same, in our opinion, would not be sufficient to fasten any criminal liability on them for commission of an offence under Section 341 IPC or otherwise.
12. “Wrongful restraint” has been defined under Section 339 IPC in the following words:
“339. Wrongful restraint.—Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.”
The essential ingredients of the aforementioned provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that direction.
13. Section 341 IPC provides that:
“341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.—Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.”
14. The word “voluntary” is significant. It connotes that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must be a restriction on the normal movement of a person. It should be a physical one. They should have common intention to cause obstruction.
15. The appellants herein were not at the site. They did not carry out any work. No overt act or physical obstruction on their part has been attributed. Only because legal proceedings were pending between the Company and Bombay Municipal Corporation and/or with the first respondent herein, the same would not by itself mean that the appellants were in any way concerned with commission of a criminal offence of causing obstructions to the first respondent and his parents.
16. We have noticed hereinbefore that despite of the said road being under construction, the first respondent went to the police station thrice. He, therefore, was not obstructed from going to the police station. In fact, a firm action had been taken by the authorities. The workers were asked not to do any work on the road. We, therefore, fail to appreciate that how, in a situation of this nature, the Managing Director and the Directors of the Company as also the Architect can be said to have committed an offence under Section 341 IPC.
…… …… ……
19. Even as regards the availability of the remedy of filing an application for discharge, the same would not mean that although the allegations made in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence or it is found to be otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, still the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
20. Indisputably, there might have been some delay on the part of the appellants in approaching the High Court but while adjusting equity the High Court was required to take into consideration the fact that in a case of this nature the appellants would face harassment although the allegations contained in the complaint petition even assuming to be correct were trivial in nature. The High Court furthermore has failed to take into consideration the fact that in the first information report no allegation in regard to acts of common intention or common object on the part of the appellants was made out. The appellants were not named as accused therein. It is, therefore, really difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the complaint petition was filed.
21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The order summoning the appellant is quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Insofar as the other offences alleged under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC, the Apex Court in MOHD. WAJID v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (2023 SCC OnLine SC 951) has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
Sections 503, 504 and 506 IPC
25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:
“503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
Illustration
A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.”
26. Section 504 reads thus:
“504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
27. Section 506 reads thus:
“506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.— Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
28. An offence under Section 503 has the following essentials:
(1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.
(2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
29. Section 504 IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender.
30. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504 IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
31. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504 IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504 IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai [King Emperor v. ChunnibhaiDayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78] , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:
“To constitute an offence under Section 504 IPC it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. A bare perusal of Section 506 IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
33. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR.
34. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.”
…. …. ….
37. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not.
38. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, the Apex Court in the case of MADHUSHREE DATTA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2025 SCC OnLine SC 165) , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
17. To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section 323IPC, it is important to read Sections 319, 321 and 323 together.
18. What emerges on a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions is that, for a conviction under Section 323IPC, there must be a voluntary act of causing hurt i.e. bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused.
19. Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that the complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company's office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, the offences under Sections 323, 341, 504 and 506 are all loosely laid against the petitioner. Neither the complaint, statement nor the charge sheet would indicate any offence against the petitioner. The petitioner and the complainant belong to the same family and are fighting over clearance of loan. Therefore, the fact that the petitioner is brought into the web of crime to wreak vengeance for not clearing the loan cannot be ruled out. In that light, permitting further proceedings against the petitioner would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
O R D E R
(i) Criminal petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceeding in C.C.No.20653 of 2023 pending before the V Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru City and arising out of Crime No.116 of 2023 stands quashed.
(iii) The name of the petitioner shall be masked in the police records.
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