(Prayers: This RFA is filed u/ Order 41 Rule 1 r/w Sec 96 of CPC, against the judgement and Decree dated 24.08.2009 passed in o.s.no.666/1992 on the file of XXXVII additional city civil & Sessions judge, Bangalore, partly decreeing the suit filed for declaration and injunction.

This RFA is filed u/s 96 r/w Order 41 Rule 1 /w order XXI Rule 103 of the CPC, against the judgment and decree dated 24.08.2009 passed in o.s.no.666/1992 on the file of the XXXVII additional city civil and sessions judge(cch-38), Bangalore, partly decreeing the suit for declaration and Injunction.)

Oral Judgment:

1. The appeal in RFA No.869/2010 is filed by defendant No.3 and the appeal in RFA No.1180/2009 is filed by defendant No.2. Both these appeals are filed by the alleged sisters of plaintiff questioning the legality and correctness of the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.666/1992, whereby the suit instituted by the plaintiff seeking declaration of title, possession and consequential relief of permanent injunction, has been partly decreed. The trial Court has answered the issue relating to the plaintiff’s alleged adoption in the affirmative and has granted declaratory relief to that extent, which finding is assailed in this appeal.

2. For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion, the parties shall be referred to in accordance with their ranking before the trial Court.

3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the suit, as borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:

                  The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking a declaration that he is the absolute owner in possession of the suit schedule properties as he is the legally adopted son of late P.M. Devanna and the first defendant. Consequential relief of permanent injunction was also sought to restrain the defendants from interfering with his alleged possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties.

4. The foundation of the plaintiff’s claim is a declaration allegedly executed by P.M. Devanna, wherein the plaintiff is described as his adopted son. The entire case of the plaintiff rests substantially upon the said declaration.

5. In the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that the suit schedule properties are ancestral and joint family properties of deceased P.M. Devanna. He has candidly admitted that his natural parents are Jayaram and Thangamma @ Jayamma. It is further pleaded that his natural mother Thangamma is the sister of Venkatamma, the wife of P.M. Devanna. According to the plaintiff, after the demise of his natural father Jayaram, his mother, Thangamma gave him in adoption to P.M. Devanna and his wife when he was about five years old. On that premise, the plaintiff asserts that he became the adopted son of P.M. Devanna and consequently acquired the status of a coparcener in the joint family properties.

6. Proceeding on the said assertion of adoption, the plaintiff claims entitlement to a share in the suit schedule properties and contends that the defendants, having no semblance of right, title or interest, are attempting to interfere with his possession and enjoyment. It is in this background that the present suit for declaration and injunction came to be filed.

7. On service of suit summons, the defendants entered appearance. Defendant No.1, who is the widow of late P.M. Devanna and admittedly the maternal aunt of the plaintiff, filed a detailed written statement stoutly denying the plaint averments in toto. The status of the plaintiff as an adopted son was specifically and categorically denied. It was contended that late P.M. Devanna had executed a registered Will dated 02.11.1991 making a testamentary disposition of his properties. According to defendant No.1, the plaintiff, though brought up as a foster son, was only a beneficiary under the said Will and cannot claim the status of an adopted son or any coparcenary right. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit was sought.

8. Both parties, in support of their respective claims, have placed reliance on voluminous oral and documentary evidence. The trial Court, on appreciation of the entire material on record, rejected the plaintiff’s claim insofar as declaration of absolute ownership over the suit schedule properties is concerned. However, it recorded a finding that the plaintiff has proved his status as an adopted son and consequently held that he is entitled to a legitimate share in the suit schedule properties. On that premise, the trial Court partly decreed the suit by granting declaratory relief to the extent of such share.

9. Assailing the said findings, learned counsel appearing for defendant No.3, reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal and placing reliance on extensive rebuttal evidence, has taken this Court through the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.No.10542/1996, which came to be affirmed by this Court in RFA.No.182/2004. He would contend that the status of the plaintiff stood conclusively adjudicated in the earlier round of litigation. The said suit was instituted by one of the beneficiaries under a registered Will executed by P.M. Devanna. The Will was held to be duly proved and in the said Will, the plaintiff is described only as a foster son. The decree in O.S.No.10542/1996 having been affirmed in RFA.No.182/2004, and the appeal filed by the present plaintiff having been dismissed, the findings regarding the genuineness and validity of the Will have attained finality. It is therefore contended that the present suit seeking declaration of status as adopted son and consequential ownership is a mischievous attempt to circumvent the binding findings recorded in the earlier proceedings.

10. Learned counsel further drew attention to Ex.D109 to demonstrate that even in the year 1992, the plaintiff claimed to be the natural son of Jayaram and Thangamma. In O.S.No.5963/1992, filed for specific performance of an agreement of sale executed by the plaintiff’s mother Thangamma, the plaintiff had asserted his status as the son of Jayaram and Thangamma and contested the proceedings accordingly. Reliance is also placed on the affidavits filed in support of applications in the said suit, marked at Ex.D113, wherein the plaintiff has unequivocally described himself as the son of Jayaram.

11. Further reliance is placed on Ex.D116, a registered sale deed executed by the plaintiff along with his children, wherein he has described himself as the son of Thangamma @ Jayamma. It is contended that this document clearly establishes that the plaintiff inherited the properties of his natural mother and exercised rights of alienation over the same, which is wholly inconsistent with the claim of prior adoption. Reference is also made to Ex.D120 to show that as early as in 1973, while applying for membership in a society, the plaintiff described himself as the son of Jayaram. Exs.D127 and D128, being objections filed by the plaintiff in connected proceedings, and Ex.D129 relating to mutation entries, also reflect the plaintiff as the son of Jayaram. According to the learned counsel, these consistent admissions at undisputed points of time demolish the theory of adoption.

12. It is further contended that defendant No.1 has specifically denied the alleged adoption in paragraph 2 of the written statement. Attention is invited to Ex.P47, the registered Will dated 02.11.1991, which was confronted to the plaintiff in cross-examination and marked on his admission. It is argued that the mutation entries effected pursuant to the Will also demonstrate that the testamentary disposition was acted upon and that the plaintiff’s name has been reflected only in respect of the properties bequeathed to him under the Will, thereby reinforcing the position that his rights, if any, flow solely from the Will and not by virtue of adoption.

13. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Sri. Vivek S. Reddy, appearing for the plaintiff, has sought to sustain the judgment of the trial Court. He has placed reliance on Exs.P29, P30, P32 and P33 to contend that the plaintiff was integrated into the family of P.M. Devanna by way of adoption. The medical bills and related documents, according to him, establish that the plaintiff discharged filial obligations by taking care of defendant No.1 during her illness. He has also relied upon photographs marked at Exs.P40, P50 and P51 and receipts, including Ex.P26, to contend that the plaintiff cultivated the suit lands and cleared loans, thereby demonstrating his status and conduct as an adopted son.

14. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions:

                  (i) Munivenkatappa Vs. Dodamuniyappa and Others – 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 530;

                  (ii) M.N. Aryamurthy and Another Vs. M.D. Subbaraya Setty (Dead) through LRs and Others – (1972) 4 SCC 1;

                  (iii) Kamla Rani Vs. Ram Lalit Rai Alias Lalak Rai (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others – (2018) 9 SCC 663;

                  (iv) Debi Prasad (Dead) by LRs Vs. Smt. Tribeni Devi and Others – (1970) 1 SCC 677.

15. This Court, being the final Court on facts, has meticulously re-appreciated the pleadings and the entire oral and documentary evidence on record. On an independent analysis of the material available, the following points arise for consideration:

                  "(i) Whether the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff has proved that he is the adopted son of late P.M. Devanna and defendant No.1 is palpably erroneous and suffers from perversity?

                  (ii) Whether the finding of the trial Court recognizing the plaintiff’s share is in direct conflict with the judgment and decree in O.S.No.10542/1996, wherein the registered Will executed by P.M. Devanna was held to be duly proved, and the said decree having attained finality?

                  (iii) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from asserting independent right and title on the basis of alleged adoption in view of findings recorded in

                  O.S No.10542/1996?

                  (iv) What order?"

Finding on Point Nos.(i) to (iii)

16. The entire edifice of the plaintiff’s claim rests upon a so-called declaration said to have been made by late P.M. Devanna, wherein the plaintiff is described as an adopted son. However, on meticulous scrutiny of the pleadings, particularly the averments in the plaint, this Court finds that the essential ingredients constituting a valid adoption are conspicuously absent. There is no specific pleading regarding the date of adoption, the performance of the mandatory ceremony of giving and taking (datta homam or the essential act of transfer), or the capacity of the natural mother to give the plaintiff in adoption, especially when he is stated to be her sole son. The plaint is singularly silent on these foundational facts.

17. It is trite that adoption, which has the effect of divesting the natural line of succession and creating a new line of inheritance, must be strictly proved. In the case on hand, the plaintiff has not produced any registered or unregistered deed evidencing adoption. No independent witness to the alleged ceremony has been examined. The claim is thus sought to be sustained solely on the basis of a unilateral declaration and subsequent conduct, which, in the absence of foundational pleadings and proof, cannot constitute proof of a valid adoption in the eye of law.

18. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Debi Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. Smt. Tribeni Devi and Others *1970(1) SCC 677) , has contended that long recognition and treatment of a person as an adopted son may, in appropriate cases, raise a presumption in favour of adoption. He would submit that though direct evidence of the ceremony of giving and taking may not be forthcoming, the consistent treatment of the plaintiff as a member of the adoptive family and his participation in family affairs would suffice to establish adoption.

19. In the light of the aforesaid submission and the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court deems it necessary to examine the contemporaneous documentary evidence to ascertain whether the plaintiff was, in fact, treated and acknowledged as an adopted son by the family and by himself in public records. For this purpose, it is apposite to advert to the cause title of O.S.No.10542/1996, which reads thus:

                  “Plaintiff:- P.M. Nagaraju S/o Late Jayaram, aged 45 years, Panathur Village, Panathur Post, Bangalore-87.

                  V/s.

                  Defendant:- 1. Sri. Trilokmurthy, S/o Late Jayaram, aged 42 years, Panathur Village, Panathur Post, Bangalore-87.

                  The Commissioner of Police, Infantry Road, Bangalore. Circle Inspector of Police, Vimanapura Police Station, Bangalore.”

                  A plain reading of the above cause title unmistakably reveals that the present plaintiff is described as “S/o Late Jayaram.” Significantly, the plaintiff himself challenged the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.10542/1996 by filing RFA.No.182/2004. Even in the said appeal, the plaintiff described himself as the son of Jayaram. This Court therefore deems it appropriate to extract the cause title of RFA.No.182/2004, which similarly reflects the plaintiff as the son of Jayaram. These recitals are not stray references but are solemn descriptions adopted by the plaintiff in judicial proceedings. The cause title of RFA.No.182/2004 is extracted as under:

                 

20. The next crucial document is Ex.D103, which evidences mutation of the plaintiff’s name as the son of Jayaram, following the demise of his natural mother Thangamma @ Jayamma. This mutation entry, made at an undisputed point of time, reflects the plaintiff’s status as the natural son of Jayaram and not as the adopted son of Devanna.

21. Equally significant is O.S.No.5963/1992, a suit for specific performance. In the said proceedings, the plaintiff filed two applications supported by affidavits, which are marked as Ex.D113. In those affidavits, sworn on oath, the plaintiff unequivocally asserted his parentage in the following terms:

                  “I, J.Thrilok Murthy, S/o Late Sri. Jayaram, Aged about 49 years resident of Pannathur Village, Bangalore East now at Bangalore City, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as follows:”

                  This categorical assertion on oath, made in judicial proceedings, is wholly inconsistent with the present claim of adoption.

22. The next vital document is the registered sale deed marked as Ex.D116. Under this document, the plaintiff alienated property which stood in the name of his natural mother Thangamma. The alienation was made in the capacity of a son who had inherited the property upon the demise of his natural mother. Such an assertion of inheritance through the natural line is directly destructive of the plea that he had been divested from his natural family by virtue of adoption.

23. Ex.D120 is another significant document. As early as in the year 1973, while applying for membership in a society and in the voters’ list, the plaintiff is described as the son of Jayaram. These entries predate the alleged declaration relied upon in the present suit and reflect the plaintiff’s acknowledged status in public records.

24. The nail in the coffin of the plaintiff’s claim is found in Exs.D127 and D128, being objections filed before this Court in RFA.No.1180/2009 and RFA.No.869/2010. In both proceedings, the plaintiff has sworn affidavits affirming his parentage as follows:

                  In RFA No. 1180/2009

                  “I, J.Thriolka Murthy (sic J.Thriloka Murthy), S/o Late Sri. Jayaram, Aged about 56 years resident of Panathur Village, Panathur post, Bangalore-560087, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as follows:”

                  In RFA No.869/2010

                  “I, J.Thriolka Murthy (sic J.Thriloka Murthy), S/o Late Sri. Jayaram, Aged about 56 years resident of Panathur Village, Panathur post, Bangalore-560087, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as follows:”

                  These repeated assertions on oath in judicial proceedings unequivocally acknowledge his status as the son of Jayaram.

25. It is also of considerable significance that defendant No.1, the widow of late P.M. Devanna and the very person who is alleged to have taken the plaintiff in adoption, has categorically and unequivocally disputed the plaintiff’s status as an adopted son. In paragraph 2 of the written statement, she has specifically denied the alleged adoption and asserted that the plaintiff was only brought up as a foster child. This denial assumes greater evidentiary value, for if there had indeed been a lawful adoption, the adoptive mother would have been the most competent witness to affirm the same. Her categorical repudiation of the alleged adoption strikes at the very root of the plaintiff’s case.

26. Equally telling is the consistent conduct of the plaintiff himself. At no point in the earlier round of litigation did he assert that he was the adopted son of Devanna. In O.S.No.10542/1996, which culminated in a decree holding that the registered Will dated 02.11.1991 executed by P.M. Devanna was duly proved, the present plaintiff was arrayed as a party. In the said Will, he is expressly referred to only as a “fostered son” and not as an adopted son. The Civil Court, after full-fledged trial, upheld the Will and decreed the suit. The said judgment and decree were challenged by the present plaintiff in RFA.No.182/2004 before this Court, and the appeal came to be dismissed, thereby affirming the finding that the testamentary disposition under the Will stood duly established.

27. Once the testamentary arrangement made by P.M. Devanna has been judicially upheld and has attained finality, the legal position that the plaintiff is merely a beneficiary under the Will, described therein as a fostered son, stands conclusively determined. It is impermissible for the plaintiff, after having suffered the decree in the earlier proceedings, to now institute a fresh suit seeking declaration of his status as an adopted son and thereby indirectly claim coparcenary rights in derogation of the Will. Such an attempt is nothing but a collateral challenge to a finding that has already attained finality between the parties.

28. The material on record, as discussed supra, unmistakably establishes two pivotal aspects. Firstly, neither Devanna nor defendant No.1 ever adopted the plaintiff in accordance with law. There is a total absence of pleadings and proof regarding the indispensable ceremony of giving and taking. The plaint does not disclose the date, month or year of the alleged adoption. There is no averment as to the capacity of the natural mother, Thangamma, to give her son in adoption. No deed of adoption, whether registered or otherwise, has been produced. No independent witness to the alleged ceremony has been examined.

29. Secondly, the plaintiff’s own conduct over decades is wholly inconsistent with the plea of adoption. From as early as 1970 onwards, he has consistently described himself as the son of Jayaram and Thangamma. In judicial proceedings, revenue records, affidavits and public documents, he has sworn on oath describing himself as “S/o Late Sri. Jayaram.” He inherited the properties of his natural mother Thangamma, had his name mutated as her son, and executed a registered sale deed (Ex.D116) alienating the said property as her legal heir along with his children. These acts are irreconcilable with the legal consequences of adoption, which severs the child from the natural family and divests him of rights in the natural line of succession.

30. The cumulative effect of these documents and admissions leaves no manner of doubt that the plaintiff was, at best, brought up by Devanna as a foster son after the untimely demise of his natural father when he was about five years old. Long association or affectionate upbringing cannot substitute the strict legal requirements of a valid adoption. More importantly, the plaintiff himself, even before this Court in earlier proceedings, has sworn affidavits asserting that he is the son of Jayaram. Such solemn admissions on oath demolish the subsequent plea of adoption.

31. In this backdrop, the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff has proved his status as an adopted son is not merely erroneous but perverse, being contrary to the pleadings, documentary evidence, prior adjudications and binding findings regarding the Will. The impugned finding therefore warrants interference in appellate jurisdiction.

32. These consistent recitals across multiple proceedings, revenue records, affidavits and conveyances, spanning several years, unmistakably demonstrate that the plaintiff himself projected and acknowledged his status as the son of Jayaram. Such consistent admissions, made in solemn judicial and statutory records, completely undermine the belated plea of adoption set up in the present suit. Accordingly, Point Nos.(i) to (iii) are answered in the ‘Affirmative’.

CONCLUSION:

33. On a comprehensive re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence, this Court is of the considered view that the finding of the trial Court holding that the plaintiff has proved his status as the adopted son of late P.M. Devanna and defendant No.1 is wholly unsustainable. The plaintiff has neither pleaded nor proved the essential ingredients constituting a valid adoption. There is no specific pleading regarding the date of adoption, the ceremony of giving and taking, or the legal capacity of the natural mother to give the child in adoption. No deed of adoption is forthcoming and no independent witness to the alleged ceremony has been examined. On the contrary, the documentary evidence placed on record unmistakably demonstrates that the plaintiff consistently projected himself as the son of Jayaram in judicial proceedings, revenue records and registered transactions. These admissions, made on oath and acted upon over several decades, are destructive of the plea of adoption. The trial Court, by ignoring these material admissions and foundational defects in pleadings, has recorded a finding which is perverse and contrary to the settled principles governing proof of adoption.

34. Further, the declaration granted by the trial Court recognizing the plaintiff’s legitimate share in the suit schedule properties is directly founded upon the erroneous conclusion that he is an adopted son. Once the status of adoption is not established, the consequential declaration of share cannot survive. More importantly, the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.No.10542/1996, wherein the registered Will dated 02.11.1991 executed by late P.M. Devanna was held to be duly proved, has attained finality upon dismissal of RFA.No.182/2004 preferred by the present plaintiff. In the said Will, the plaintiff is described only as a fostered son and is made a beneficiary to the extent specified therein. The testamentary arrangement having been judicially upheld, the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s rights stand conclusively determined.

35. The present suit seeking declaration of status as an adopted son and consequential coparcenary rights is, in substance, an indirect attempt to nullify or circumvent the binding findings recorded in the earlier round of litigation. The plaintiff, having participated in the earlier proceedings and having suffered an adverse decree, is bound by the said adjudication. He cannot now assert a superior and inconsistent status so as to defeat the testamentary disposition upheld by a competent Court. The principles of finality of litigation and estoppel squarely operate against him.

36. The earlier judgment conclusively established the validity of the registered Will executed by late P.M. Devanna. The plaintiff, having participated in the said proceedings and having suffered dismissal of his appeal in RFA No. 182/2004, is bound by the findings recorded therein.

37. The Will specifically describes the plaintiff as a fostered son and confers benefits upon him in that capacity. The testamentary arrangement having been upheld, the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s rights stand crystallized under the Will.

38. Principles analogous to res judicata and estoppel squarely apply. The plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate, he cannot accept benefits under the Will as a fostered son and simultaneously claim a superior status as an adopted son to defeat the testamentary scheme.

39. The trial Court’s recognition of a share in favour of the plaintiff directly conflicts with the decree in O.S.No.10542/1996 and amounts to sitting in appeal over a judgment which has already attained finality.

40. The plaintiff is therefore estopped from asserting an independent right or coparcenary title on the basis of alleged adoption.

41. In that view of the matter, the findings recorded by the trial Court recognizing the plaintiff as an adopted son and declaring his entitlement to a share in the suit schedule properties are legally untenable, contrary to the evidence on record, and in direct conflict with a binding prior judgment. The impugned judgment and decree, to that extent, are therefore liable to be set aside. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following:

Finding on Point No.(iv):

42. Accordingly, this Court proceeds to pass the following:

                  ORDER

                  (i) The appeals filed by defendant Nos.2 and 3 are allowed.

                  (ii) The judgment and decree dated 24.08.2009 passed in O.S.No.666/1992 by the learned Trial Judge, insofar as it declares that the plaintiff is the adopted son of late P.M. Devanna and defendant No.1 and further declares that the plaintiff has a legitimate share in the suit schedule properties, are hereby set aside.

                  (iii) The suit filed by the plaintiff seeking declaration of right, title and share in the suit schedule properties by virtue of being an adopted son stands dismissed in its entirety.

                  (iv) In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.

                  (v) Draw decree accordingly.