Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 29.11.2025 passed against one Nikhil, the detenu, under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. The said order of detention was confirmed by the Government vide order dated 04.02.2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months, from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, on 30.09.2025 seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the KAAP Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known goonda' as defined under Section 2(o)(ii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, two cases in which the detenu got involved were considered by the detaining authority for issuing Ext.P1 order of detention. Out of the said cases, the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.467/2025 of Koppam Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act.

4. We heard Sri. M. H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. Anas K.A., the learned Government Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order is illegal, arbitrary, and was passed without proper application of mind. According to the learned counsel, there occurred an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as passing the detention order, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped. It was further submitted that the jurisdictional authority disregarded the fact that the detenu had already executed a bond for good behaviour under Section 129 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. According to the learned counsel, the said measure was sufficient to prevent the detenu from involving himself in criminal activities and therefore an order of detention was unwarranted. On these premises, it is contended that Ext.P1 order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order. The learned Government Pleader submitted that after the commission of the last prejudicial activity, the detenu was in jail in connection with the said case for a considerable period. Therefore, the short delay that occurred in mooting the proposal is only liable to be discarded, particularly since the detenu was in jail and there was no possibility of his engaging in criminal activities while under custody. According to the learned Government Pleader, it was only after being fully satisfied that proceedings under Section 129 of the BNSS would not be sufficient to deter the detenu from engaging in criminal activities that the jurisdictional authority resorted to passing an order under the preventive detention law. Therefore, it was submitted that no interference is warranted with the impugned order.

7. The records reveal that the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in narcotic peddling activities. As already stated, two cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.467/2025 of Koppam Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The detenu was caught red- handed with the contraband in the said case on 31.07.2025, and he was arrested on the same day. As evident from the records, he was granted bail in the said case only on 24.10.2025. It was on 30.09.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was forwarded by the sponsoring authority. Subsequently, on 29.11.2025, the detention order was passed.

8. Since the detenu was in judicial custody till 24.10.2025, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding the repetition of criminal activities, as he was already confined in jail. Moreover, the proposal was forwarded by the sponsoring authority prior to the detenu’s release from jail. Therefore, it cannot be contended that there was any delay in initiating proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against the detenu. With regard to the delay of approximately two months in passing the detention order from the date of the proposal, it cannot be overlooked that an order of preventive detention is a drastic measure that has a serious impact on an individual’s personal liberty. Consequently, such an order cannot be passed in a mechanical or hurried manner; rather, it requires proper application of mind and due consideration of the materials on record. Furthermore, the delay of two months in issuing the order from the date of the proposal cannot be regarded as unreasonable, particularly since time is necessarily required for scrutiny and verification of records. In addition, such a brief delay is justifiable on administrative grounds.

9. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the detenu had already executed a bond for keeping the peace under Section 129 of the BNSS and, without taking note of the said fact, the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order. According to the counsel, when action under the ordinary criminal law itself is sufficient to prevent further repetition of criminal activities by the detenu, an action under the preventive detention law is not at all necessitated. While considering the said contention, we also agree with the proposition that when actions under ordinary criminal law are sufficient to deter a person from repeating criminal activities, an action under preventive detention laws would not be legally permissible. However, merely because a person had executed a bond under Section 129 of the BNSS, the same by itself will not preclude the jurisdictional authority from passing a detention order if the authority is satisfied that such action would not be sufficient to prevent further criminal activities of the detenu.

10. Moreover, an action under preventive detention law and an action under Section 129 of the BNSS operate in different spheres. Undisputedly, an action under preventive detention is more stringent and effective than an order passed under Section 129 of the BNSS directing execution of a bond. Therefore, there is no legal impediment in passing a detention order against a person who has executed a bond under Section 129 of the BNSS.

11. It is true that in the impugned order, it is nowhere specifically stated that the detenu had executed a bond under Section 129 of the BNSS, although he had actually executed such a bond.

12. By producing a copy of the bond, the petitioner has succeeded in convincing us that a bond under Section 129 of the BNSS had in fact been executed on 27.11.2025, that is, two days prior to the issuance of the detention order. Nevertheless, the said fact is not mentioned in the impugned order. However, in the impugned order, the fact that proceedings under Section 129 of the BNSS had been initiated against the detenu is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the said order, it is stated that the action under Section 129 of the BNSS and the bail conditions imposed on the detenu while granting bail to him in the cases registered against him were not sufficient to deter him from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, it is apparent that there was proper application of mind on the part of the jurisdictional authority, and the sufficiency of the proceedings under the ordinary criminal laws, including the action under Section 129 of the BNSS, was duly considered by the jurisdictional authority while passing the detention order. Consequently, there is nothing to show that the objective as well as the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the authority is vitiated in any manner.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.