logo

This Product is Licensed to ,

Change Font Style & Size  Show / Hide

24

  •            

 
CDJ 2026 Ker HC 381 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : WP(C) No. 25186 of 2025
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C. JAYACHANDRAN
Parties : Roslin John & Others Versus State Of Kerala Represented By The Secretary, Department Revenue, Secretariat, Thiruvanathapuram & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioners: Rajeev V. Kurup, Advocate. For the Respondents: Ajith Viswanathant, Government Pleader, V. Vinu, M.A. Shafik, O.M. Shalina-Deputy Solicitor General Of India.
Date of Judgment : 24-02-2026
Head Note :-
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 Section 64 -

Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 16465

Judgment :-

1. Petitioners are aggrieved by Ext.P9 Order of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-Settlement Authority, Kottayam, which refused to interfere with Ext.P7 Order of the Special Tahsildar. Vide Ext.P7, the delay in preferring a reference in terms of Section 64(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('2013 Act', for short) has not been condoned, resulting in rejection of the reference application.

2. The following facts are relevant:

Revised Awards were passed by the competent authority in respect of the petitioners' property on 19.04.2022 and 11.10.2021. The 1st petitioner preferred an application for reference under Section 64(1) on 03.09.2022. The same was dismissed, holding that the application was preferred beyond the period prescribed in the second proviso to Section 64(2) and that there exists no sufficient cause to condone the delay in terms of the second proviso. The petitioners approached this Court by filing a Writ Petition, which culminated in Ext.P2 judgment, directing the petitioners to file necessary application before the Special Tahsildar, explaining the reasons which prevented the petitioners from filing an application for reference within six weeks from the date of Award. Ext.P2 also directed consideration of that application, after affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners and to issue fresh Orders. The said exercise has been done vide Ext.P7. The operative portion of Ext.P7 is extracted herebelow:

                 

                 

3. Challenging Ext.P7, the petitioners approached the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority, Kottayam (District Court, Kottayam), which resulted in Ext.P9 Order, holding that the said authority has no power to entertain the application from an exercise made under the second proviso to Section 64(2). In other words, according to the learned District Judge, the power of the Court has been conferred only on the failure of the District Collector to make a reference within the stipulated period of 30 days in terms of the second proviso to Section 64(1).

4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader on the issues, this Court cannot strictly find any fault with Ext.P9. Going by the scheme of Section 64 of the 2013 Act, a person who is not accepting the Award can seek a reference. For determination of compensation before the authority, the reference has to be made by the Collector within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of application. An application for reference has to be made within a period of six weeks from the date of Collector's Award, in case the aggrieved person was represented before the Collector; and in cases where there was no such representation, within six months from the date of Collector's Award. Going by the first proviso to Section 64(1), the Collector is duty bound to make such reference within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of application; and if he fails to do so, the applicant/aggrieved party is at liberty to approach the authority, and the authority can direct the Collector to make reference within the said period of 30 days, as provided in the second proviso to Section 64(1). Section 64(2) speaks of the time period within which an application for reference has to be made. It is the second proviso to Section 64(2), which confers power on the District Collector to entertain an application for reference, dehors the expiry of the period stipulated in the first proviso to Section 64(2), but within a period of one year, provided the Collector is satisfied that there exists sufficient cause for not filing it within the stipulated period.

5. It could thus be seen that, the power conferred to the authority by virtue of the second proviso to Section 64(1) is only to direct the Collector to make a reference within a period of 30 days, as enjoined by the first proviso; and not to sit in appeal over the Collector's power to condone the delay afforded in terms of the second proviso to Section 64(2). In the light of the above interpretation, this Court cannot frown upon Ext.P9.

6. However, this Court has to view the matter from a different angle, especially in the touchstone of the important  right  guaranteed  by  Article  300A  of  the Constitution. Admittedly, petitioners' property has been acquired. Petitioners are aggrieved by the insufficiency of the compensation granted. They want to take recourse to a statutory machinery for seeking enhancement. The same cannot be turned down on the jejune ground of delay and laches. Even while this Court holds that Ext.P9 suffers from no illegality in law, this Court still choose to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to frown upon Ext.P7, inasmuch as it contains no reason, whatsoever, for not condoning the delay. The fact that Ext.P7 is an Order passed pursuant to the directions contained in Ext.P2 judgment aggravates the gravity. When this Court directs the authority concerned to consider an application for condonation of delay, an Order like Ext.P7 can hardly be countenanced, especially when it reflects no application of mind, whatsoever. As to why the explanation offered by the petitioners is not acceptable, is not decipherable from Ext.P7.

7. In the circumstances, Ext.P7 will stand set aside. There will be a direction to the 3rd respondent/Special Tahsildar to consider Exts.P3 to P6 applications, in accordance with law, specifically referring to the reasons stated by the petitioners for the delay in seeking reference, and answering the same, strictly in terms of the requirements of law. The legal position insofar as condonation of delay is concerned, when pitted against substantive rights of the parties, has already been elucidated by this Court, as also, by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions. The petitioners will place the relevant decisions before the 3rd respondent/Special Tahsildar, to take a legitimate and legal call in Exts.P3 to P6 applications. The afore-referred exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from the date of production of a copy of this judgment. The petitioners will produce a copy of the judgment before the 3rd respondent, for compliance. It is also clarified that the first application preferred by the petitioners seeking reference was on 03.09.2022, and therefore, the petitioners are duty bound to explain the delay only upto that point of time. The subsequent delay, if any, is not liable to be explained, nor to be reckoned by the authority. It will be open for the petitioners to file necessary affidavits in support of the above aspect.

                  The Writ Petition (Civil) will stand allowed as indicated above.

 
  CDJLawJournal