Abasaheb D. Shinde, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant as well as the learned counsel Mr. Manorkar for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and learned AGP for respondent Nos.4 to 6.

2. By this review application the applicant – original petitioner is seeking review of order dated 06.07.2022, passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.2137/2021, by which, this Court had dismissed the writ petition filed by the applicant herein. The circumstance in which this Court had passed the order under review can be summarized as follows :

                   2.1 The petitioner approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.2137/2021, thereby, contending that his land bearing Gut No.257, situated at Village Adgaon (Budruk), Taluka and Dist. Aurangabad, was acquired by respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein. The petitioner also contended that before passing of the award he raised an objection regarding non-mentioning of the sweet lime trees and custard apple trees correctly.

                   2.2 It was further contended that ultimately award came to be passed on 11.10.2017 without including the valuation of sweet lime trees and custard apple trees. The petitioner further contended that the objection raised by him in respect of fruit bearing plants was not considered. On the contrary, his claim came to be rejected by the respondent authorities by communication dated 09.11.2020, and therefore, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court by challenging the said decision of the respondent authorities as well as seeking direction against respondent Nos.1 to 3 to prepare an award in respect of fruit bearing plants and for disbursing amount accordingly. It was also prayed that in the light of claim decided by the respondent authorities in respect of his brother, the petitioner be treated at par with the claim of his brother and be paid the amount of compensation accordingly.

                   2.3 It appears that respondent Nos.1 to 3 filed their affidavit in reply in the writ petition and had pointed out that being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the non-inclusion of the fruit bearing plants, the petitioner initially had approached the Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short the Act of 1956), and the Arbitrator vide its award dated 27.06.2019 had already decided the proceedings against which the petitioner had even filed proceedings before the learned District Judge which was pending.

                   2.4 This Court after considering the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner as well as the respondent Nos.1 to 3 found that the petitioner had suppressed the fact about filing of Arbitration Application before the Arbitrator as well as passing of award and challenge raised to the said award passed by the Arbitrator before the learned District Judge. This Court, therefore, by an order dated 06.07.2022, dismissed the writ petition on both the grounds i.e. suppression of material facts as well as the petitioner having availed the statutory remedy before the learned District Judge. This Court while dismissing the writ petition had made it clear that the rival contentions of the parties are kept open for being considered by the learned District Judge on its own merits after hearing the parties. It is this order, which is sought to be reviewed by way of this review application.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant was not aware of filing of the said proceeding as the advocate representing the applicant before an arbitrator and the learned District Judge had obtained his signatures on blank papers and, the applicant was unaware, for what purpose his signatures were obtained. It is further contended that applicant being an agriculturist and a layman signed those papers, even the fact about passing of award as well as filing of proceedings before the Arbitrator and dismissal of the same was not communicated to the applicant, as such, the suppression was neither intentional nor deliberate. He would further submit that even though the applicant had availed the remedies available under the Act of 1956, still applicant could pursue the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, urged that the order under review may be recalled and the writ petition be decided on merits by imposing appropriate costs as this Court may deem fit.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3, would submit that it cannot be countenanced that the applicant was unaware of passing of award dated 27.06.2019 by the arbitrator, so also filing of the proceeding before the learned District Judge. He would further submit that in the proceedings filed before the Arbitrator, after considering the submissions advanced by the parties, a specific point for consideration was framed as to whether the applicant was able to prove the valuation of sweet lime trees as well as other fruit bearing plants and the said point has been answered in negative. He would further submit that the submission which are sought to be canvased by the applicant in this review application were duly considered by this Court and this Court found that the applicant had suppressed material facts from this Court without disclosing the same in the petition. He, therefore, urged that the review application deserves to be rejected.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the applicant as well as learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3, we find that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is, therefore, imperative that one who approach this Court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or withholding any information. We thus find that applicant had suppressed material fact of passing of award and rejection of the arbitration application filed before the Arbitrator. The applicant had also suppressed the fact of filing proceeding before the learned District Judge, challenging an award passed by the Arbitrator. The record depicts that after having suffered rejection of Arbitration Application from the Arbitrator and after filing the proceeding before the learned District Judge, the applicant had simultaneously filed the writ petition.

6. We, therefore, find that the applicant having invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should have came with clean hands by disclosing all the material facts before this Court being a Court of equitable relief and having discretionary jurisdiction. It would be apposite in that regard to rely on the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K. Jayaram and Ors. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors.; (2022) 12 SCC 815, and more particularly paragraph Nos.12 to 15 which reads thus:

                   “12. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the Petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or relevant material in order to gain advantage over the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with the court as well as with the opposite parties which cannot be countenanced.

                   13. This Court in Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC 449 has held that a prerogative remedy is not available as a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, a writ court would indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party which is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. It was held thus:

                   33. It is thus clear that though the Appellant Company had approached the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a court of law is also a court of equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the writ court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.

                   14. In Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 560, this Court has reiterated that the writ remedy is an equitable one and a person approaching a superior court must come with a pair of clean hands. Such person should not suppress any material fact but also should not take recourse to legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law.

                   15. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and Ors. : (2008)12 SCC 481, it was held thus :

                   34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under Article 32 and of the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the Petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the Petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.

                   35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs. (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA) in the following words: (KB p. 514)

                   … it has been for many years the Rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts--it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it--the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement. (emphasis supplied)

                   36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done." The Rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.

                   37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs.(supra), Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96)

                   ... Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a Rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit." (emphasis supplied)

                   38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court Under Article 32 or of a High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The Petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because "the court knows law but not facts".

                   39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. (supra) is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and "clean breast" cannot hold a writ of the court with "soiled hands". Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the Rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.”

7. It would also be apt to rely on the observation of Hon’ble Apex Court in para No.17 which reads thus :

                   “17. In the instant case, since the Appellants have not disclosed the filing of the suit and its dismissal and also the dismissal of the appeal against the judgment of the civil court, the Appellants have to be non-suited on the ground of suppression of material facts. They have not come to the court with clean hands and they have also abused the process of law. Therefore, they are not entitled for the extraordinary, equitable and discretionary relief.”

8. We, therefore, find that this Court has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the applicant on count of suppression of material facts thereby refusing to hear the petitioner on merits stating that “We will not listen to your application because of what you have done”.

9. Now dealing with the scope of review, it is trite law that, its scope is restricted to the contingencies contemplated under Order XLVII Rule 1 which reads thus :

                   “ORDER XLVII – REVIEW

                   1. Application for review of judgment.— (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

                   (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                   (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

                   (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

                   and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

                   (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

                   [Explanation.—The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.]”

10. The scope of review application has been highlighted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Arun Dev Upadhyaya Vs. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. and Anr.; (2023) 8 SCC 11, and more particularly in paragraph Nos.29 to 35 which reads thus :

                   “29. A three-Judge Bench of this Court comprising of Hon'ble Shri S.R. Das, C.J., M. Hidayatullah and Shri K.C. Das Gupta, JJ. in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [AIR 1960 SC 137], discussed the scope of the phrase “error apparent on the face of record”. The challenge before this Court in the said case was the judgment [Mallikarjun Bhavani Tirumale v. Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde, 1952 SCC OnLine Bom 82] of the High Court on the ground whether it suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. The High Court had issued a writ of certiorari and had quashed order of the Tribunal and restored that of the Mamlatdar. In para 8 of the Report, the issue which was to be considered is reflected. The same is reproduced hereunder : (Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde case [Satyanarayan AIR 1960 SC 137], AIR p. 139, para 8).

                   “8. The main question that arises for our consideration in this appeal by special leave granted by this Court is whether there is any error apparent on the face of the record so as to enable the superior court to call for the records and quash the order by a writ of certiorari or whether the error, if any, was ‘a mere error not so apparent on the face of the record’, which can only be corrected by an appeal if an appeal lies at all.”

                   30. After discussing the relevant material on record, the conclusion is stated in para 17 of the report. The view was that where an error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. The view that long-drawn process of arguments to canvass a point attacking the order in a review jurisdiction, cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of record. Relevant extract from para 17 of the Report is reproduced hereunder : (Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde case [AIR 1960 SC 137], AIR pp. 141-42).

                   “17. … Is the conclusion wrong and if so, is such error apparent on the face of the record ? If it is clear that the error if any is not apparent on the face of the record, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the conclusion of the Bombay High Court on the question of notice is correct or not. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. As the above discussion of the rival contentions show the alleged error in the present case is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments. We do not think such an error can be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. In our opinion the High Court was wrong in thinking that the alleged error in the judgment of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal viz. that an order for possession should not be made unless a previous notice had been given was an error apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari.”

                   31. Another case which may be briefly dealt with is Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715], where, this Court ruled that under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. It also observed that a review petition cannot be allowed to be treated as an appeal in disguise.

                   32. A series of decisions may also be referred to wherein, it has been held that power to review may not be exercised on the ground that decision was erroneous on merits as the same would be the domain of the court of appeal. Power of review should not be confused with appellate powers as the appellate power can correct all manners of errors committed by the subordinate courts. The following judgments may be referred:

                   (1) Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 1909]

                   (2) Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [AIR 1979 SC 1047]

                   (3) Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170]

                   (4) Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [(2009) 12 SCC 40]

                   33. Recently, this Court in a judgment dated 24-2-2023 passed in S. Murali Sundaram v. Jothibai Kannan [(2023) 13 SCC 515], observed that even though a judgment sought to be reviewed is erroneous, the same cannot be a ground to review in exercise of powers under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. Further, in Perry Kansagra v. Smriti Madan Kansagra [(2019) 20 SCC 753], this Court observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC, the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order.

                   34. In another case between Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB [(2020) 2 SCC 677], this Court observed that scope of review under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue questions which have already been addressed and decided. It was further observed that an error which is not selfevident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record.

                   35. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”

11. We thus find that the error apparent on the face of record shall be an error which merely looking at record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. It is equally settled position of law that, while dealing with the review application the court does not sit in appeal over its own order nor it can be allowed to be converted into an appeal in disguised. We thus find that refusing to exercise the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of suppression of material facts, could neither be termed as a mistake nor an error apparent on the face of record. We, therefore are of the considered view that the review application is devoid of any merit and the same is liable to be rejected. Hence, the review application is rejected.