(Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records on the file of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench relating to the order dated 11.02.2026 in OA No. 97/2026 and quash the same and consequently, allow the Original Application in O.A No. 97 of 2026.
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records on the file of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench relating to the order dated 16.02.2026 in MA No.310/00077/2026 and OA 310/00150/2026 and quash the same and consequently, allow the Original Application in MA No.310/00077/2026 and OA 310/00150/2026 as prayed for.)
Common Order:
C.V. Karthikeyan, J. 1. Since arguments were advanced in both writ petitions in common and the learned Assistant Solicitor General also advanced his reply in common in both writ petitions and the issues raised in both writ petitions are similar, a common order is passed in the two writ petitions.
2. The writ petitioners had participated in the selection for the post of Sub Inspector of Police conducted by the Police Department, Government of Puducherry. There were two notifications which had been issued for such selection, one in the year 2022 and the other in the year 2025. The selection process was conducted on the basis of both the notifications. For the notification of the year 2022, there were totally 10645 applicants who had applied and for the notification of the year 2025, there were totally 7560 applicants. In all, 18205 applicants were called for selection for the post of Sub Inspectors of Police. It is to be noted even at the very outset that neither of the two notifications is under challenge before this Court.
3. The applicants had participated in the selection process. They have raised their grievances over the manner in which they had been disqualified during the process of selection. In the notifications, the qualification required had been given. The applicants must qualify in a Physical Standard Test which includes possessing the required height, weight and chest measurements. There is no dispute raised by the petitioners herein about that particular fact. Those who qualified in the said test were later called over to participate in a Physical Endurance Test. This consisted of the following:
| Men | Women | |||
| Stage | Event | Minimum Standard | Event | Minimum Standard |
| I | 100 mts Run | 15 seconds | 100 mts Run | 16.50 seconds |
| II | Long Jump | 3.80 mts | Long Jump | 3.25 mts |
| III | High Jump | 1.20mts | High Jump | 1.05 mts |
| IV | 800 mts run | 2 minutes 50 seconds | 800 mts run | 36 seconds |
5. It is alleged by the petitioner that there was malafide in the selection process. Since they were declared as not qualified in the 100 metres run within the stipulated time, they were not permitted to participate in the long jump, high jump and 800 metres run. Raising allegations against the manner in which the selection process was conducted, the petitioners had initially approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal had rejected their contentions necessitating filing of the writ petitions.
6. It must also be stated that in the notifications, an appeal procedure was given. The same was as follows:
Appeal:
The appeal made by any candidate on the same day of the Physical Standard Test and Physical Endurance Test will be examined and the decision of the Chairman of the Appeal Board in respect of the appeals shall be final.
7. It must again be pointed out that though there is an averment made and a representation made that appeals have been presented but were not taken note of, copies of such appeals have not been presented either before the Tribunal or before us. It is the specific case of the respondents that the petitioners herein had not preferred any appeal. The respondents have disclosed that 188 candidates who had failed passing the Physical Endurance Test had actually preferred an appeal. This fact is stated only to point out that the appeal provision was not an empty formality and there were candidates who had availed of the same. There is no reason given why the petitioners did not follow due process and procedure by preferring an appeal. There are also no records available before us that appeals had actually been preferred or that the appeals preferred by the petitioners had been rejected or that they were not permitted to file an appeal and that they had raised an objection that they were prevented from preferring any appeal.
8. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions, it had been stated that the petitioners had only marginally failed in completing the 100 metres run within the stipulated time and that some leverage could have been given. We have therefore called for the process by which the timings were recorded during the 100 metres run. It is informed by the learned Assistant Solicitor General that the respondents had adopted a Radio Frequency Identification Technology (RFTI) to time the run made by the candidates in the 100 metres run. This would indicate fixing a small chip in the legs of each one of those who are participating in the 100 metres run. It is also seen from the records that each candidates were also briefed by the Physical Education Teacher regarding the procedure to be followed including the method of timing, the requirement not to change lanes until completion of the run and other relevant instructions. After briefing, the Physical Education Teacher initiated the 100 metres run by sounding a wooden start clapper. Upon hearing the signal, the candidates commenced their run. Simultaneously, the technicians activated the electronic timing device upon which the timing started automatically through the RFTI system. The start signal and activation of the electronic timing system were coordinated to occur concurrently. No ground had been raised that the chip which had been fixed in the legs of the candidates failed or were faulty or that the timings were not recorded in proper manner. The timings of each one of the candidates in W.P.No.6616 of 2026 were as follows:
| S.No. | Name | Application Number | Time Consumed |
| 1 | M.Thamizharasan | SI2022-18968 | 15.098 |
| 2 | G.Senthilvel | SI2022-15447 | 15.269 |
| 3 | S.Sambath Rao | SI2022-17913 | 15.004 |
| 4 | S.Sivaprakash | SI2022-16957 | 15.621 |
| 5 | P.Vigneshwaran | SI2022-16715 | 15.166 |
| 6 | Agilan.A | SI2022-15037 | 15.468 |
| 7 | S.Gunasekar | SI2022-18481 | 15.215 |
| 8 | Ilamurugan | SI2022-13348 | 15.025 |
9. The specific details as aforementioned had however not been given to the writ petitioners in W.P.No.6824 of 2026.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioners made a fervent plea that two of the candidates had very marginally missed out on the 15 seconds mark by less than a second. But however, that is the rule of the game. Once a benchmark is set that a candidate must run the 100 metres within the time period of 15 seconds, any marginal increase can never be accommodated or a grace cannot be given for not keeping up the stipulated time.
11. It is also to be pointed out that in the counter, it had been stated that 3324 male candidates had participated in the 100 metres run and out of them, 2088 persons qualified and 1146 persons were disqualified. This would also indicate that the petitioners had not been singled out for disqualification, but were part of a larger number of candidates who had similarly failed to complete the 100 metres run within the stipulated time. With respect to the female candidates, 797 female candidates had participated in the 100 metres run, out of which, 99 female candidates qualified and 698 female candidates were disqualified. These are records available with the respondents and there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the same. Only a few of the candidates who had been so disqualified had approached the Tribunal without producing any records that they had filed an appeal in accordance with the procedure adopted, particularly since it is the case of the respondents that 188 candidates who had been similarly disqualified had taken recourse to the appellate procedure and appeals had been taken on record and appropriate orders had been passed in them.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners then widened the scope of arguments, though there were no averments made either in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition or before the Tribunal that the tenderer who had conducted the test had been disqualified by an other Union Territory. We must state that there are no available records regarding the said allegation. But however, the timings were recorded by the Agency with the assistance of the micro chip being fixed to the legs of each one of the candidates which recorded the timing from start to end. The timings had been given for the writ petitioners in W.P.No.6616 of 2026. A perusal of the same shows that the timing had been accurate to the 100th of a milli second.
13. It is also to be noted that though such representation was made, the agency had not even been named and had not been impleaded as a party to the writ petition. This Court cannot pass any order adverse to a party who is not before the Court. The allegations cannot be examined by this Court or taken as affirmed.
14. It is also to be noted that the notifications are very clear on the manner in which the Physical Endurance Test is to be conducted. It had been specifically stated that those who stood disqualified in the 100 metres run would not be permitted to move forward to participate in the long jump, high jump and 800 metres run. The petitioners failed to qualify in the 100 metres run and naturally they stood disqualified. The petitioners were among the 1146 male candidates and 698 female candidates similarly disqualified.
15. We hold that the petitioners have not made out a case that they have been singled out to be disqualified by the respondents. We are unable to uphold the contentions of malafide raised on behalf of the petitioners. The writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also closed.