(Prayer: Appeals against the judgment and decree dated 26-2-2009 in O.S. No. 38 of 2002 on the file of the Court of the IV Additional District Judge, Tirupati, Chittoor District.

IA NO: 1 OF 2009(ASMP 508 OF 2009

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant injunction restraining the respondents herein from interfering with the petitioner's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property in Sy.No.496/5 of Tirupati Revenue Village in O.S.No.38 of 2002, IV Additional District Judge, Tirupati situated at Tirupati town, Chittoor District, pending disposal of the above appeal and to pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice.

IA NO: 2 OF 2009(ASMP 509 OF 2009

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the respondents not to alienate or create any third party's right over the suit schedule property in Sy.No. 496/5 of Tirupati Revenue Village, situated at Tirupati town, Chittoor District in O.S.No. 38 of 2002, IV Additional District Judge, pending disposal of the above appeal and to pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice.

IA NO: 3 OF 2009(ASMP 1233 OF 2009

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to vacate the interim orders dated 26-03-2009 granted in ASMP. No. 508 of 2009 in A.S.No.156 of 2009.

IA NO: 4 OF 2009(ASMP 1234 OF 2009

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to vacate the interim orders dated 26-03-2009 granted in ASMP. No. 509 of 2009 in A.S.No.156 of 2009.

IA NO: 5 OF 2009(ASMP 1473 OF 2009

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date for hearing of A.S.No. 156 of 2009.

IA NO: 1 OF 2010(ASMP 1688 OF 2010

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date for hearing of AS No. 156 of 2009, preferably in the 1st week of September, 2010.

IA NO: 1 OF 2015(ASMP 1342 OF 2015

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date of hearing of the appeal in AS.No. 156 of 2009

IA NO: 2 OF 2015(ASMP 1501 OF 2015

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the registry to list the appeals bearing A.S.No.372 of 2009 and A.S.No.842 of 2011 along with appeal bearing A.S.No.156 of 2009

IA NO: 1 OF 2019

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone delay 1539 days in filing the LR petition the above appeal AS.No.156 of 2009 and pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2019

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to set aside the abatement against the above appeal AS.No.156 of 2009 and pass

IA NO: 3 OF 2019

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to permit the petitioners 8 to 10 to come on record as appellants 8 to 10 as LRs of petitioner No.5, in the above appeal A.S.No.156 of 2009 and pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2024

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to direct the registry to delete A.S.156 of 2009 and A.S.372 of 2009 from being listed along with A.S.842 of 2011, A.S. 431 of 2007 and post the appeals A.S.156 of 2009 and A.S.372 of 2009 separately before the Division Bench for hearing and pass.

IA NO: 1 OF 2009(ASMP 1164 OF 2009

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant ad interim injunction restraining the respondents in not interfering with the suit schedule property and pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

IA NO: 2 OF 2009(ASMP 1165 OF 2009

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay of operation of the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 38 of 2002 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Tirupati pending disposal of the above appeal suit and pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

IA NO: 1 OF 2012(ASMP 433 OF 2012

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to club AS.No.372 of 2009 along with AS.No.156 of 2009 AS.No.431 of 2007 and AS.No.842 of 2011 for disposal

IA NO: 1 OF 2015(ASMP 1453 OF 2015

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date of hearing of the appeal AS.No.372 of 2009

IA NO: 2 OF 2015(ASMP 1502 OF 2015

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the registry to list the appeals bearing AS.No.156 of 2009, AS.No.431 of 2007 and AS.No.842 of 2011 along with appeal bearing AS.No.372 of 2009

IA NO: 1 OF 2022

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased please to condone the delay of 102 days in filing the Legal Representatives Petition in respect of Respondent No.11 in A.S.No.372 of 2009 pending before this Hon'ble Court and to pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2022

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased please to permit the appellants to set aside the abetment in respect of Respondent No.11 in A.S.No.372 of 2009 pending before this Hon'ble Court and to pass

IA NO: 3 OF 2022

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased please to permit the appellants to implead the Respondents No.12 to 15 as LRs of the Respondent No.11 viz., Late T. Devanarayana Reddy in A.S.No.372 of 2009 and also in all Interlocutory Applications, pending before this Hon'ble Court, and to pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to order /direct for transposition of the Petitioner's /Appellants herein from Defendants No.5 to 7 in

O.S. 38 of 2002 to the status of Plaintiffs No. 8, 9 & 10 in O.S. 38 of 2002 on the file of the Learned IV Additional District Judge, Tirupati, and pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to receive as additional evidence on our behalf, the documents more fully annexed along with this petition, by condoning the delay in the interest of justice and pass

IA NO: 3 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to frame additional issues as stated supra in the interest of justice and to pass

IA NO: 4 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased please to condone the delay of 2940 days in filing the Legal Representatives Petition in respect of Respondent No.11 in A.S.No.372 of 2009 pending before this Hon'ble Court and to pass

IA NO: 5 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased please to permit the appellants to set aside the abetment in respect of Respondent No.5 in A,S.No.372 of 2009 pending before this Hon'ble Court and to pass

IA NO: 6 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased please to permit the appellants to implead the Respondents No.16 to 18 as LRs of the Respondent No.5viz., Late G. Pattabhi Reddy S/o Late Kumara Swamy Reddy in A.S.No.372 of 2009 and also in all Interlocutory Applications, pending before this Hon'ble Court, and to pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2024

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to amend the prayer in I.A.No.2 of 2023 in A.S.No.372 of 2019 as “to receive as additional evidence on our behalf, the documents more fully described herein in the annexed petition, by condoning the delay in the interest of justice and remit this appeal to the IV additional District Court at Tirupati for receiving further evidence, pending disposal of the main Appeal, in the interest of justice” Instead of “to receive as additional evidence on our behalf, the documents more fully described herein in the annexed petition, by condoning the delay in the interest of justice” and to pass)

Common Judgment:

1. These regular appeals under Section 96 Code of Civil Procedure are directed against the decree and judgment in O.S.No.38 of 2002 dated 26.02.2009 on the file of the Court of learned IV Additional District Judge at Tirupati.

2. The plaintiffs, before the Trial Court, are the appellants in A.S.No.156 of 2009 as well the defendant Nos.5 to 7, before the Trial Court, are the appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009.

3. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as they arrayed before the Trial Court.

4. The plaintiffs, who are appellants in A.S.No.156 of 2009, instituted the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents or anybody claiming under them from in anyway interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs and for costs.

5. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff No.3 died and his legal representatives were added as plaintiff Nos.4 to 7, vide order dated 10.06.2005 passed in I.A.No.178 of 2005, by the Trial Court.

6. As well, the defendant Nos.5 to 7, who are appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009, were also impleaded by themselves, vide order, dated 03.04.2006 passed in I.A.No.01 of 2006 by the Trial Court.

7. Before adverting to the material and evidence on record and nature of findings in the judgment of the Trial Court, it is necessary to scan through the case pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings.

8. The case of the plaintiffs in brief in the plaint was as follows:

                  (i) The plaintiffs are related to each other and they purchased the suit schedule property from one T.Veeramma and P.Lakshmi Devi under an agreement of sale dated 09.05.1980 and possession was delivered to them on the date of agreement itself. Then the plaintiffs obtained three sale deeds dated 05.11.1990, 15.11.1990 and 23.11.1990 and enjoying the entire plaint schedule property, which is covered in ‘A’ schedule as three items and consolidated as ‘B’ schedule.

                  (ii) The plaint schedule land used an agricultural land.

                  As the town developed, the plaintiffs could not cultivate the same. With an intention to dispose of the property by making into parts, they have reclaimed the land in the last week of October 1999. They leveled the plaint schedule property which is part and parcel of ‘A’ schedule property and made it ready to make layout.

                  (iii) The defendant No.4 is the cousin of the vendors of the plaintiffs and they had some misunderstandings since a long time. Defendant Nos.1 to 4 have no manner of right over the plaint schedule property. The defendant Nos.1 to 3 with due connivance of the defendant No.4, about a week back came to the plaint schedule property and objected the plaintiffs that they are having right over the property in Survey No.496/2.

                  (iv) Originally, the land in Survey No.496 was sub- divided into five sub-divisions i.e., 496/1 to 496/5. The plaint schedule property is situated in Survey No.496/5 and none of the defendants have right, title or interest over the plaint schedule property. The defendants with an evil intention to knock away the plaint schedule property, tried to dispossess the plaintiffs on 13.11.1999 and 14.11.1999. Hence, the suit.

9. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 failed to contest the case before the Trial Court and they remained exparte.

10. The defendant No.3 denying all the allegations in the plaint and contending in the written statement as well additional written statement as follows:

                  i). There is no agreement of sale dated 05.09.1980 in favour of the plaintiffs. In the legal notices dated 20.01.1982 and 07.06.1984 issued by Veeramma to this defendant, she only claimed an undivided share in the suit land along with this defendant’s vendors. There is no mention that she was the absolute owner, in exclusive possession, or that she executed an agreement of sale dated 09.05.1980 in favor of the plaintiffs.

                  ii). The present suit is the result of conspiracy and collusion between Defendant No. 4 and the plaintiffs. A commercial building belonging to this defendant stands on the plaint schedule property, assessed by Tirupati Municipality as House No. 20-3-128. The defendant developed the land, reclaimed it, formed a road on the northern side, and installed a bore well with an electric motor.

                  iii). Survey No. 496 of Tirupati Revenue Village measures Ac.15.50 cents. T. Adisesha Reddy, son of Chinna Muni Reddy, purchased it at a public revenue auction on 14.03.1930 along with other lands, and patta was granted to him. His younger brother, Venkatesam Reddy, predeceased him on 30.06.1940 without male issue. Adisesha Reddy married thrice: his first wife, Ammayamma, died issueless; his second wife, Lakshmamma, had a daughter, Kamalamma; and his third wife, Pedda Veeramma, had two sons, Venkatamuni Reddy and Devanarayana Reddy, and one daughter. These children inherited their father’s properties. Accordingly, the Ac.15.50 cents in Survey No. 496 was recorded in the name of Venkatamuni Reddy, the elder son.

                  iv). The Government issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring Ac.3.83 cents in Survey No. 496 for road formation, and advance possession was taken on 27.03.1980. As there was no official sub-division then, the remaining land was assumed to be Survey No. 496/2.

                  v). Venkatamuni Reddy executed an agreement of sale dated 23.09.1981, attested by his brother Devanarayana Reddy, for Ac.4.00 cents in favor of Defendant No. 3 and delivered possession. Advance payments were made, and a receipt dated 28.12.1981 was scribed by Devanarayana Reddy. The land was later sub-divided on 31.07.1982, and Survey No. 496/5 measured Ac.11.93 cents. With rising land values, the vendor and his brother became greedy and, to defeat this defendant’s rights, set up Veeramma (wife of their paternal uncle Venkatesam Reddy) to issue notices dated 20.01.1982 and 07.06.1984 claiming an undivided half share.

                  vi). A suit, O.S. No. 79 of 1985, was filed on 22.04.1985 by the minor sons of Devanarayana Reddy through their mother Vijayalakshmi, claiming a share and alleging the agreement was against their interest. Venkatamuni Reddy, Devanarayana Reddy, and this defendant were parties. This defendant opposed the suit and filed O.S. No. 201 of 1985 for specific performance and injunction. Both suits were clubbed and disposed of by a common judgment: O.S. No. 201 of 1985 was decreed, and O.S. No. 79 of 1985 was dismissed. The decree became final. An appeal in A.S. No. 149 of 1991 before the High Court was dismissed on 25.06.1998, and a further appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dismissed on 09.11.1998. This defendant filed E.P. No. 142 of 1998, and the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, executed  a sale deed on 09.04.1999 in favor of this defendant for the ‘B’ schedule property.

                  vii). Venkatamuni Reddy died unmarried on 20.04.1993, and the decree was executed against his brother Devanarayana Reddy. To defeat the court sale, Devanarayana Reddy initiated fresh litigation. He caused his sons to file O.S. No. 20 of 1998 on 14.10.1998 for partition, describing the land as Survey No. 496/2. He also instigated O.S. No. 62 of 1999 by Umapathi Reddy and Vijayabhushanamma, claiming to be children of Kamalamma (daughter of Adisesha Reddy through Lakshmamma), for declaration and injunction against this defendant. Their claim was based on an unregistered family arrangement and memorandum of partition dated 15.04.1985, allegedly executed between Venkatamuni Reddy, Devanarayana Reddy, and others. In that memorandum, Veeramma and her daughter P. Lakshmi Devi were shown as parties with Ac.1.56 cents allotted, though they claimed to have sold Ac.4.00 cents in 1980 and executed three registered sale deeds in 1990.

                  viii). Pursuant to District Collector’s orders dated 28.02.2004, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupati Urban, issued proceedings and effected mutations. The property purchased by this defendant was assigned new sub- division number 496/2-C-1, which is the plaint schedule property.

                  ix). Defendant No. 4 also filed a suit through his mother Pedda Veeramma in O.S. No. 15 of 2006 for partition against her son Devanarayana Reddy and this defendant, which is pending. The decree in O.S. No. 64 of 1987 and execution in E.P. No. 171 of 2000 cannot divest this defendant’s title over the plaint schedule property, as the deceased plaintiff No. 3 and his vendors had no title. Neither the plaintiffs nor Defendant Nos. 5 to 7 are entitled to any relief.

                  x). The suit property was purchased by Adisesha Reddy with his own income for Rs. 9.50, making it his self-acquired property. His brother Venkatesam Reddy died intestate on 30.06.1940. After his death, Adisesha Reddy became sole owner of all agricultural properties by survivorship. Upon Adisesha Reddy’s death on 25.12.1945, the property devolved upon his two sons. His widows, daughters, or his brother’s widow and daughter did not acquire any rights over the suit property, as it is agricultural land. Hence, the suit deserves dismissal.

11. The defendant No.4 denying the allegations in the plaint and contending in the written statement that he is nothing to do with the plaint schedule property and he never attempted to encroach upon the plaint schedule property and that the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties.

12. The defendant No.5 contending in the written statement, which was adopted by the defendant Nos.6 and 7, as follows:

                  i). The suit is not maintainable either on facts or in law. The husband of the defendant No.5 by name Soora Muninadha Reddy purchased item No.3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule from the plaintiff for valid consideration under an agreement of sale dated 29.01.1993.

                  ii). Since the plaintiff No.3 committed breach of contract, the said Soora Muninadha Reddy filed a suit in O.S.No.64 of 1997 on the file of the Court of learned Additional Senior Civil Judge at Tirupati for specific performance of agreement of sale and the same was decreed on 15.04.1997. Subsequently, he filed E.P.No.171 of 2000 for execution of said sale deeds. The sale deed was executed by the Court and the same was submitted before the Sub-Registrar for registration. The Sub-Registrar raised an objection to pay deficit stamp duty and returned the sale deed to the Court. Meanwhile, said Soora Muninadha Reddy died on 11.04.2001 leaving behind the defendant Nos.5 to 7 as his legal heirs. As per the registered sale deed executed through Court, the defendant Nos.5 to 7 are in continuous possession and enjoyment of item No.3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property.

13. Subsequent to filing of the written statement by the defendant No.5 as well additional written statement by the defendant No.3, the plaintiff No.1 filed rejoinder, which was adopted by the plaintiff Nos.2 and 4 to 7, and contended as follows:

                  i). The O.S.No.64 of 1997 on the file of the Court of learned Additional Senior Civil Judge at Tirupati is pending for disposal. Defendant Nos.5 to 7 have not obtained registered sale deed through Court. Mere possession of decree does not confer any right or title.

                  ii). During the lifetime of Adisesha Reddy and Venkatesam Reddy, they were joint family properties. Adisesha Reddy has got three wives and the third wife of Adisesha Reddy begot two sons and one daughter. The joint family got joint family properties. In the plaint schedule property, T.Venkatesam Reddy, who is the younger brother of T.Adisesha Reddy has got half share. The said half share of Venkatesam Reddy devolved on his wife T.Veeramma by way of succession. The plaintiffs purchased the plaint schedule property from T.Veeramma and they are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the same. The defendant No.3 has got exclusive knowledge about the joint family status and right of T.Veeramma.

14. On these pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues and an additional issue for trial:

                  “1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of perpetual injunction as prayed for?

                  2. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation?

                  3. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to? and

                  Additional Issue:

                  Whether the plaint ‘B’ schedule property is the joint family property of T.Adisesha Reddy and T.Venkatesam Reddy and if so the wife of Sri T.Venkatesam Reddy succeeded the property ?”

15. At the trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, the plaintiff Nos.2, 1 and 4 were examined as P.Ws.1 to 3 as well the attestor of Ex.A.1 sale deed was examined as P.W.4 and the daughter of T.Venkatesam Reddy and T.Veeramma by name P.Lakshmi Devi was examined as P.W.5, while relying on Exs.A.1 to A.23 in support of their contentions. On behalf of the defendant No.3, he was examined as D.W.1 as well Assistant Director of Survey & Land Records was examined as D.W.2 and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.32, B.34 and B.35. On behalf of defendant Nos.5 to 7 defendants, defendant No.6 was examined as D.W.3 and Ex.B.33 was marked.

16. Based on the evidence and materials presented, the Trial Court concluded that T. Veeramma, the plaintiffs’ vendor, had no right over the plaint schedule property under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act. The Court further held that the plaintiffs failed to prove possession and enjoyment of the property, while the record indicated that Defendant No. 3 was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property. Consequently, the suit was dismissed with costs.

17. It is against this decree and judgment, the present appeals are preferred by the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.5 to 7, respectively.

18. Heard Sri Addepalli Suryanarayna, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Nooka Jagannadham, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants in A.S.No.156 of 2009, Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.3/respondent No.3 in A.S.No.156 of 2009 and Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Y.N.Vivekananda, learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 7/appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009.

19. Even if it is a suit for permanent injunction, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on both sides, presented their respective arguments at length by touching various factual and legal aspects as borne out from the record.

20. It is relevant to make note of the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Rama KT.Barman v. MD.Mahim Ali(2024 INSC 644), which are as follows:

                  “It is well-settled principle of law that the Court cannot create any new case at the appellate stage for either of the parties, and the appellate court is supposed to decide the issues involved in the suit based on the pleadings of the parties.”

21. Before addressing the merits, this Court noticed the procedural history reflected in the trial record. The suit was originally filed before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, as O.S. No. 213 of 1999 on 15.11.1999, where issues 1 to 3 were framed. Before witness examination, the Principal District Court concerned, by order dated 09.08.2002 in Tr.O.P. No. 372 of 2001, transferred the case to the IV Additional District Judge, Tirupati, and renumbered it as O.S. No. 38 of 2002. Subsequently, Defendants 5 to 7 were impleaded on 03.04.2006 (I.A. No. 1 of 2006). Defendant No. 3 filed an additional written statement on 11.09.2006, and the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder on 19.09.2006, leading the Trial Court to frame an additional issue on 12.10.2006. The trial proceeded thereafter, culminating in the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.02.2009 now under appeal.

22. It is against this backdrop, the following points, which arise for determination and need for consideration now:

                  I).Whether the vendors of the plaintiffs i.e., T.Veeramma and her daughter P.Lakshmi Devi have prima-facie right or title over the suit schedule property to transfer the same to the plaintiffs by way of sale deeds?

                  II). If so, whether the plaintiffs are able to prove their case to get the relief of perpetual injunction as prayed for?

                  III). Whether the defendant No.3 put forth substantial material on record to prove his prima-facie right, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property as claimed before the Trial Court?

                  IV). Whether the appeal preferred by the defendant Nos.5 to 7/appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009 is maintainable, if so, they are entitled for any relief?

                  V). Whether the decree and judgment of the Trial Court is liable to be set aside, if so, to what extent and to what relief?

23. POINT NOs.I & II:

                  I). Whether the vendors of the plaintiffs i.e., T.Veeramma and her daughter P.Lakshmi Devi have prima-facie right or title over the suit schedule property to transfer the same to the plaintiffs by way of sale deeds?

                  II). If so, whether the plaintiffs are able to prove their case to get the relief of perpetual injunction as prayed for?

                  In a suit for permanent injunction, the Court is not required to conclusively determine or declare title to the property. It must examine whether there is a prima facie case, the existence of a legal right, balance of convenience, and the likelihood of irreparable harm. However, when the title is seriously disputed, the Court may incidentally consider it to decide whether an injunction can be granted. This does not convert the suit into one for declaration of title. Further, where de jure possession depends on ownership, such as in the case of a vacant site; the issue of title becomes central, as possession cannot be determined without addressing ownership.

24. At this Juncture, it is relevant to refer the celebrated judgement regarding the injunction by the Honorable Supreme Court rendered in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy(2008(4)SCC594), wherein at paragraph Nos.14 to 16 n para 14 to 16 held as follows:

                  “14. We may, however, clarify that a prayer for declaration will be necessary only if the denial of title by the defendant or challenge to the plaintiff's title raises a cloud on the title of the plaintiff to the property. A cloud is said to raise over a person's title, when some apparent defect in his title to a property, or when some prima facie right of a third party over it, is made out or shown. An action for declaration, is the remedy to remove the cloud on the title to the property. On the other hand, where the plaintiff has clear title supported by documents, if a trespasser without any claim to title or an interloper without any apparent title, merely denies the plaintiff's title, it does not amount to raising a cloud over the title of the plaintiff and it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to sue for declaration and a suit for injunction may be sufficient. Where the plaintiff, believing that the defendant is only a trespasser or a wrongful claimant without title, files a mere suit for injunction, and in such a suit, the defendant discloses in his defence the details of the right or title claimed by him, which raise a serious dispute or cloud over the plaintiff's title, then there is a need for the plaintiff, to amend the plaint and convert the suit into one for declaration. Alternatively, he may withdraw the suit for bare injunction, with permission of the court to file a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. He may file the suit for declaration with consequential relief, even after the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue of possession and not any issue of title.

                  15. In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession, the plaintiff will have to establish that as on the date of the suit he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant tried to interfere or disturb such lawful possession. Where the property is a building or building with appurtenant land, there may not be much difficulty in establishing possession. The plaintiff may prove physical or lawful possession, either of himself or by him through his family members or agents or lessees/licensees. Even in respect of a land without structures, as for example an agricultural land, possession may be established with reference to the actual use and cultivation. The question of title is not in issue in such a suit, though it may arise incidentally or collaterally.

                  16. But what if the property is a vacant site, which is not physically possessed, used or enjoyed? In such cases the principle is that possession follows title. If two persons claim to be in possession of a vacant site, one who is able to establish title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the person who is not able to establish title. This means that even though a suit relating to a vacant site is for a mere injunction and the issue is one of possession, it will be necessary to examine and determine the title as a prelude for deciding the de jure possession. In such a situation, where the title is clear and simple, the court may venture a decision on the issue of title, so as to decide the question of de jure possession even though the suit is for a mere injunction. But where the issue of title involves complicated or complex questions of fact and law, or where court feels that parties had not proceeded on the basis that title was at issue, the court should not decide the issue of title in a suit for injunction. The proper course is to relegate the plaintiff to the remedy of a full-fledged suit for declaration and consequential reliefs.”

25. Besides, it is well settled legal preposition that a party seeking a permanent injunction to restrain interference of third party, he must establish lawful possession of the property. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and cannot rely on the weakness of the defendant’s case.

26. Before addressing these points, the Court noticed following admitted facts on record. T.Adisesha Reddy and T.Venkatesam Reddy, who were uterine brothers, lived together as a joint family. Venkatesam Reddy, the younger brother, predeceased Adisesha Reddy on 30.06.1940, after which Adisesha Reddy acted as the family’s kartha (head). Even during Venkatesam Reddy’s lifetime, on 14.03.1930, Adisesha Reddy purchased 15.50 acres in Survey No. 496 of Tirupati revenue village at a public auction for ₹9.50, along with other properties. The plaintiffs’ vendors, T. Veeramma and P. Lakshmi Devi, are the wife and daughter of Venkatesam Reddy.

27. The primary contention of Defendant No. 3, the main contesting party, is that since Venkatesam Reddy died without a male heir, the entire property devolved upon Adisesha Reddy by survivorship. Adisesha Reddy later died on 25.12.1945. This issue will be addressed in the later part of this judgment.

28. The Trial Court observed that since Venkatesam Reddy passed away before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, any share he held in the property devolved upon Adisesha Reddy by the rule of survivorship. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the Federal Court’s interpretation that the term “property” under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 does not include agricultural land. Consequently, as the property in question was agricultural land, Veeramma was held to have no rights over the plaint schedule property under the 1937 Act. The judgment further clarified that Veeramma’s family would not acquire any rights under the principle of survivorship.

29. Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel for Defendant No. 3, advanced detailed arguments supporting the Trial Court’s view that Veeramma acquired no rights over the property, as it is agricultural land and her husband died before 1956. He further contended that the burden lies on the party alleging the existence of a joint family to prove that the property was purchased with funds from the joint family nucleus. Accordingly, he strongly argued that the plaintiffs cannot claim any rights over the suit schedule property through their vendors.

30. Per contra, Sri Addepalli Suryanarayna, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants in A.S. No. 156 of 2009, strongly contended that the plaintiffs’ vendors, T. Veeramma and her daughter P. Lakshmi Devi, had valid title and rights over the suit schedule property to execute sale deeds marked as Exs. A-1, A-3, and A-14. He argued that Survey No. 496 was joint family property purchased by T.Adisesha Reddy in a revenue auction on 14.03.1930 as the kartha of the joint family. Being the wife and daughter of the deceased T. Venkatesam Reddy, who was Adisesha Reddy’s brother, the vendors were entitled to half share in the property and had the right to execute the agreement of sale dated 05.09.1980. Senior Counsel submitted that the trial court failed to appreciate this aspect and wrongly concluded that Veeramma had no rights under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act. He emphasized that the settled law, as laid down by several Supreme Court judgments, interprets the term “property” in the 1937 Act broadly to include agricultural land. Therefore, Defendant No. 3’s claim that the vendors lacked title is unsustainable, and the trial court erred in applying an incorrect legal proposition.

31. In support of the above contentions, he relied upon the certain pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vaijanath v. Guramma((1999) 1 Supreme Court Cases 292), Babu Ram v. Santhokh Singh((2019) 14 SCC 162) and Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar(1967 SCC Online SC 182).

32. Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Y.N.Vivekananda, learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 7/appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009 wholly supported the case of the plaintiffs.

33. In view of the rival contentions, this Court has examined the record and the legal principles cited by both parties. It is undisputed that when T. Adisesha Reddy purchased the entire property in Survey No. 496 of Tirupati Village on 14.03.1930 for ₹9.50, which includes the suit schedule property, the family was joint—a fact not denied by Defendant No. 4, the son of Adisesha Reddy. The testimony of P.W.5, P. Lakshmi Devi (one of the vendors), clearly affirms that Adisesha Reddy acted as the kartha and acquired the property using joint family funds. Although Defendant No. 3 contends that Adisesha Reddy purchased the property with his personal earnings, no substantial evidence was produced to rebut the joint family status at the time of purchase. Defendant No. 3 consistently argued that after Venkatesam Reddy’s death without a male heir, his share devolved upon Adisesha Reddy by survivorship. However, P.W.5 testified during cross-examination that the properties were never divided between Adisesha Reddy and her parents at the time of Adisesha Reddy’s death on 25.12.1945 and remain undivided to date, being jointly enjoyed. Defendant No. 3 produced no contrary evidence before the trial court. Therefore, his contention that the property was not joint family property at the time of purchase is untenable.

34. Upon perusal of Exhibits A.21 to A.23, it is evident that the plaint schedule property constitutes the joint family property of T. Adisesha Reddy and T. Venkatesam Reddy. In Exhibit A.21, dated 09.04.1975, a declaration by T. Venkatamuni Reddy, son of T. Adisesha Reddy, states that the property covered under Survey No. 496, measuring 15.50 acres, is ancestral property. This fact has not been disputed by Defendant No. 4, the younger and only surviving son of Adisesha Reddy. Therefore, it is unequivocally clear that the property in question is the joint family property of Adisesha Reddy and his brother, Venkatesam Reddy.

35. As regards Veeramma’s entitlement to a share in the property as the wife of Venkatesam Reddy, Exhibit A-23 states that she had no rights since Venkatesam Reddy died in 1940. However, in a sworn statement before the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer (L.R.), Chandragiri, T. Venkatamuni Reddy, the elder son of T. Adisesha Reddy, affirmed that 24.21 acres constituted ancestral property, was joint, and that his paternal uncle’s wife also had rights in it. Further, Defendant No. 3 admitted in his written statement that Veeramma issued legal notices dated 20.01.1982 and 07.06.1984 (Exhibits B-2 and B- 3) asserting her undivided share along with his vendors. Notably, Defendant No. 3 did not respond to these notices. He also acknowledged that under Exhibit B-19, a memorandum of partition among the heirs of Adisesha Reddy and Venkatesam Reddy, including the plaintiffs’ vendors and Defendant No. 3,Veeramma was allotted 1.56 acres. While the genuineness of this partition deed cannot be conclusively determined in these proceedings without all parties, it is evident that Defendant No. 3 filed Exhibit B-19, which indicates that the plaintiffs’ vendors had rights in the joint family property as legal heirs of Venkatesam Reddy.

36. As stated supra, the Trial Court by relying upon a reference judgment of the Federal Court has firmly come to the conclusion that the women’s property used in Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act 1937 does not include the agricultural land, thereby, the said T.Veeramma has not got any right over the said property.

37. But, the law is otherwise settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in plethora of pronouncements. Among them in Vaijanath case (referred to supra-3), the Apex Court categorically held as follows:

                  “8…...The language of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 as enacted in the State of Hyderabad is as general as the original Act. The words “property” as well as “interest in joint family property” are wide enough to cover agricultural lands also. Therefore, on an interpretation of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 as enacted by the State of Hyderabad, the Act covers agricultural lands. As the Federal Court has noted in the above judgment, the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act is a remedial Act seeking to mitigate hardships of a widow regarding inheritance under the Hindu law prior to the enactment of the 1937 Act; and it ought to receive a beneficial interpretation. The beneficial interpretation in the present context would clearly cover agricultural lands under the word “property”. This Act also received the assent of the President under Article 254(2) and, therefore, it will prevail.

                  9…….The language of the earlier Act is wide enough to cover agricultural land also. In the entire Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act 1937, there is nothing which would indicate that the Act does not apply to agricultural land. The word “property” is a general term which covers all kinds of property, including agricultural land. A restricted interpretation was given to the original Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 enacted by the then Central Legislature, entirely because of the legislative entries in the Government of India Act, 1935, which excluded the legislative competence of the Central Legislature over agricultural lands. Such is not the case in respect of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, as enacted by the State Legislature of the State of Hyderabad. The ratio of the Federal Court judgment, therefore, would not apply. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the subsequent Act of 1954 restricted the application of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 brought into force by the earlier Hyderabad Act of 1952. As is pointed out by the High Court, the Act of 1954 was enacted by way of abundant caution, to make sure that the agricultural lands were not considered as excluded from the scope of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act as enacted in 1952. The Second Act is, therefore, clarificatory.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

38. It is also more clarified in a judgment in Babu Ram (referred to supra-4) and held that “the decision of the Federal Court no longer holds good in view of the changed position of law”. As well it was also held as follows:

                  “7……It is clear that Parliament had omitted the phrase “save as regards agricultural land” from Item 5 of the Concurrent List in order to have a uniform personal law for Hindus throughout India, and accordingly, it necessitated the enlargement of Entry

                  5. We have no doubt, therefore, that in view of the change of law, the Act will apply to agricultural lands also, and the decision in Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, would no longer hold good.

                  18. In the aforesaid background, we are called upon to decide the applicability of Section 22 of the Act in respect of agricultural lands. Before we consider the issues in question, we must refer to the decision of this Court in Vaijanath v. Guramma. In that case matters pertaining to intestacy and succession relating to joint family property including agricultural land, were dealt with by a State law which had received the assent of the President. Following observations of this Court, are relevant for the present purposes:-

                  “8. There is no exclusion of agricultural lands from Entry 5 which covers Wills, intestacy and succession as also joint family and partition. Although Entry 6 of the Concurrent List refers to transfer of property other than agricultural land, agriculture as well as land including transfer and alienation of agricultural land are placed under Entries 14 and 18 of the State List. Therefore, itis quite apparent that the Legislature of the State of Hyderabad was competent to enact a Legislation which dealt with intestacy and succession relating to Joint Family Property including agricultural land. The language of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act,1937 as enacted in the State of Hyderabad is as general as the Original Act. The words 'property' as well as 'interest in Joint Family Property' are wide enough to cover agricultural lands also. Therefore, on an interpretation of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 as enacted by the State of Hyderabad, the Act covers agricultural lands. As the Federal Court has noted in the above judgment, the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act is a remedial Act seeking to mitigate hardships of a widow regarding inheritance under the Hindu Law prior to the enactment of the 1937 Act; and it ought to receive a beneficial interpretation. The beneficial interpretation in the present context would clearly cover agricultural lands under the word 'property'. This Act also received the assent of the President under Article 254(2) and, therefore, it will prevail.”

                  19. When the Federal Court was called upon to consider the matter, Entry21 of List II of 1935 Act had inter alia dealt with “transfer, alienation and devolution of agricultural land”. It was in the exclusive domain of the provincial legislatures. The idea that the provincial legislatures were alone entitled to deal with matters relating to “transfer, alienation and devolution of agricultural land” was again made clear in Entry 7 of List III by expression “…succession, save as regards agricultural land” which dealt with concurrent powers. The provincial legislature had thus exclusive competence with regard to transfer, alienation and devolution of agricultural land. In the circumstances, the Federal Court had answered the first question that the provisions of Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, and Hindu Women’s Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 would not regulate succession to agricultural lands in the provinces.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

39. It is also required to note the certain observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sukhram case (referred to supra-5), which are as follows:

                  “4. It is true that under the Benares school of the Mitakshara a coparcener may not, without the consent of the other coparceners, sell his undivided share in the family estate for his own benefit: Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh; Balgobind Das v. Narain Lal and Ors. and Chandradeo.Singh & Ors. v. Mata Prasad & Anr. But the words of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act are express and explicit; thereby a female Hindu possessed of property whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act holds it as full owner and not as a limited owner. The interest to which Kishan Devi became entitled on the death of her husband under Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, in the property of the joint family is indisputably her "property" within the meaning of Section 14 of Act 30 of 1956, and when she became "full owner" of that property she acquired a right unlimited in point of user and duration and uninhibited in point of disposition.

                  6. On the death of her husband, Kishan Devi became entitled to the same interest which Hukam Singh had in the joint family property of that interest, she became full owner on June 17, 1956, and being full owner she was competent to sell that interest for her own purposes, without the consent of the male coparceners of her husband.”

40. Admittedly, until the date of the agreement of sale, i.e., 09.05.1980, executed by T. Veeramma and her daughter in favor of the plaintiffs, no transaction had taken place concerning the suit schedule property, and it continued to remain as joint family property. By that time, the Hindu Succession Act had already come into force. Furthermore, the enactment of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, marked a significant departure in this branch of law, granting a Hindu widow the same interest in the property that her husband held at the time of his death. In view of the above settled legal position, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that Veeramma, being the wife of Venkatesam Reddy, had rights over the said property, even though it is agricultural land and was entitled to half share in the entire property in Survey No. 496/2.

41. More so, as per Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 any property includes both movable and immovable possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner there for and not as a limited owner. It is also clear that even if a female Hindu be, in fact, out of actual possession, the property must be held to be possessed by her, if her ownership rights in that property still exist. The said proposition is fortified by a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mangal Singh v. Rattno(1967 AIR 1786).

42. Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.3 also contends that it is well settled that in the absence of pleadings, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered and no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading. In support of the said contention, he relied upon a pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College(AIR 1987 SC 1242)

43. Such a contention absolutely has no legs to stand, since the additional written statement filed by the defendant No.3 as well rejoinder filed by the plaintiffs categorically show that there is a dispute regarding the title of the property to the vendors of the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the testimony P.W.5 even during cross examination depicts the title of the property in dispute.

44. Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.3 also contends that even if it considered that the vendors of the plaintiffs have right over the half share in the entire property, it cannot be presumed that the vendors of the plaintiffs have exclusive right, possession and enjoyment of the same, since there are other coparceners are also entitled for the same property.

45. It may be true, the other coparceners of vendors of the plaintiffs have also right over the said property. But the said right has to be claimed by them only, but not by the defendant No.3. In the present case on hand, it is categorically pleaded by the defendant No.4, who is surviving male issue of said Adisesha Reddy that he is nothing to do with the plaint schedule property, he is unnecessary party to the suit and he never attempted to encroach upon the plaint schedule property. On the other hand, it is the categorical testimony of P.W.5, who is daughter of Venkatesam Reddy and Veeramma, that they have been enjoying the property jointly. Thereby, the material on record as well law settled by the Apex Court categorically proves that, the vendors of the plaintiffs i.e., T.Veeramma and her daughter P.Lakshmi Devi have prima-facie right or title over the suit schedule property to transfer the same to the plaintiffs by way of sale deeds.

46. Coming to the case of the plaintiffs to get the relief of perpetual injunction as sought, the said T.Veeramma and her daughter P.Lakshmi Devi sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 under an agreement of sale dated 09.05.1980 and possession was also delivered to them on the date of agreement itself. The plaintiffs obtained sale deeds dated 05.11.1990, 15.11.1990 and 23.11.2990 under Exs.A.1, A.3 and A.14, which shown in item Nos.1 to 3 in plaint ‘A’ schedule.

47. Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.3 argues that there is no agreement of sale dated 09.05.1980 exists, which is a concocted one and no copy of the same was submitted before the Trial Court and the regular sale deeds were executed after ten years, which shows the falsity in the case of the plaintiffs. It is his further contention that permanent injunction can be granted only to a person who is in actual possession of the property. The burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove that he was in actual and physical possession of the property on the date of suit. In support of the said contention, he relied upon a pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande v. Balakrishna Rambharose Gupta(AIR 2019 Supreme Court 933).

48. In reply, Sri Addepalli Suryanarayna, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs vehemently contends that the said agreement of sale dated 09.05.1980 is concluded by way of regular sale deeds, thereby, which cannot be denied by the defendant No.3, who is third party to the said agreement.

49. Undisputedly, the suit was one for permanent injunction and in such a suit the plaintiffs have to establish that they are in possession in order to be entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. The said proposition was fortified by a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thimmaiah v. Shabira(2008 AIR SCW 1310)

50. Admittedly, it is not the case of the defendant No.3 that by the date of agreement on 09.05.1980 between the plaintiffs and their vendors, he is entered into any transaction pertaining to the suit schedule property. It is the categorical case of the plaintiffs that they have been delivered possession by their vendors on the date of agreement itself. But, it is the testimony of P.W.5 that the land was delivered to the plaintiffs on the date of execution of sale deed under Exs.A.1, A.3 and A.14. However, on perusal of Ex.A.3 it is categorically averred that they have entered into an agreement on 09.05.1980 to sell the part of the suit schedule property, received an advance amount of Rs.27,000/- and handed over the possession of the schedule agricultural land. Thereby, it is evident from the record that by the date of agreement itself the possession was delivered.

51. Furthermore, it is settled legal position that the de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property in the case of vacant site. In the present case on hand, as stated supra, the vendors of the plaintiffs have primafacie title or right over the suit schedule property to pass the legal right to the plaintiffs, thereby, based on the material on record coupled with legal position settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the plaintiffs proved their possession over the suit schedule property.

52. POINT NO.III:

                  Whether the defendant No.3 put forth substantial material on record to prove his prima-facie right, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property as claimed before the Trial Court?

                  Admitted defendant No.3 claimed the right over the said property by virtue of agreement of sale dated 23.09.1981 as well sale deed dated 09.04.1999 executed through the Additional Senior Civil Judge at Tirupati and obstructed the plaintiffs for enjoying the suit schedule property, thereby, they are entitled for the relief as sought.

53. Admittedly, to prove his possession over the said property, the defendant No.3 mainly relied upon Ex.B.14 registration copy of sale deed dated 09.04.1999 executed through Additional Senior Civil Judge at Tirupati. As per the version of defendant No.3, the deceased T.Venkatamuni Reddy, who is brother of defendant No.4, got executed an agreement of sale dated 23.09.1981 to sell the property an extent of Ac.4.00 cents and delivered possession to him (defendant. No.3).

54. On this point, Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel for Defendant No. 3, argued that when the vendors of Defendant No. 4 refused to execute the sale deed, Defendant No. 3 filed O.S. No. 201 of 1985 for specific performance of the agreement of sale. The suit was decreed in his favor, and the decree attained finality by virtue of judgement rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Subsequently, Defendant No. 3 filed E.P. No. 142 of 1998 and obtained a court-executed sale deed on 09.04.1999 for the ‘B’ schedule property. Therefore, he contends that the plaintiffs cannot dispute his title or possession, as the sale deed executed through the court is binding on the parties which includes the plaintiffs.

55. Sri Addepalli Suryanarayna, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, strongly refuted this contention. He argued that the judgment in the earlier suit is not binding on the plaintiffs for several reasons, primarily because it is a judgment in personam, not a judgment in rem. He further contended that the sale deed obtained by Defendant No. 3 through the court, was not executed in accordance with law, no valid title passed to him, and therefore he cannot claim that the deed binds the plaintiffs or their vendors.

56. He further contended that Order 21 Rule 34 CPC governs the execution of sale deeds by the court. Under this provision, the draft sale deed must be served on the opposite party, and if the sale consideration is not in accordance with the decree of the trial court or the appellate court, the court is required to raise an objection. Since the appellate decree merges with the trial court decree, any modifications must be reflected in the recitals of the sale deed under the doctrine of merger. The sale consideration and interest constitute a single component, not separate elements. The appellate court directed payment of interest, which forms part of its decree; however, the sale deed fails to  mention payment of sale consideration, excluding the interest ordered. This omission is fatal, as the entire sale deed is silent on consideration. Therefore, the sale deed marked as Exhibit B-14, obtained by Defendant No. 3, is not in conformity with the appellate decree in A.S. No. 149 of 1985 (High Court of A.P.), which affirmed with modifications the decree in O.S. No. 201 of 1985 (Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupati).

                  Consequently, Defendant No. 3 cannot claim any valid right over the disputed property. In support of the said contention, he relied upon a recent pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh (Dead) Through His Legal Representatives and Others((2025) 3 Supreme Court Cases 543), Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan((2022) 14 Supreme Court Cases 609) as well another decision in Prem Jeevan v. K.S.Venkata Raman((2017) 11 Supreme Court Cases 57).

57. In this regard, it is required to note another Three-Judge Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad((2004) 8 SCC 724), wherein held as follows:

                  "23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system.

                  The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time.

                  24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court."

58. Same analogy followed in Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh (Dead) (referred to supra-11), which are as follows:

                  “28.The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale that there cannot be more than one operative decree at a given point of time. The doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court has affirmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial court. The doctrine has been discussed and explained succinctly by this Court in Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lal (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2020) 15 SCC 771.”

59. Per contra, Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.3 submits that there is no need to reflect the actual sale consideration in the sale deed, since the same is not denied by the executants, however, the entire sale consideration was paid by the vendor with interest as per the terms of the decree of the Appellate Court, thereby, the contention raised by the plaintiffs that the Ex.B.14 sale deed vitiates for not executing the same in terms of the decree of the Appellate Court has no legs to stand.

60. It is not in dispute that the decree and judgment obtained by the defendant No.3 against his vendors in a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale became final in his favour even before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

61. This Court finds considerable merit in the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs that the sale deed obtained by Defendant No. 3 through the Additional Senior Civil Judge at Tirupati is not in conformity with the appellate court’s decree in A.S. No. 149 of 1985, as required under Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On perusal of the judgment and decree in A.S. No. 149 of 1985, it is evident that the appellate court modified the trial court’s decree by directing the plaintiff therein (Defendant No. 3 herein) to pay the balance sale consideration as per the decree of the lower court, together with interest at 12% per annum, within two months from the date of the order. However, upon examining the sale deed marked as Exhibit B-14, dated 09.04.1999, it is clear that the deed was not executed in accordance with the modification made by the appellate court.

62. Furthermore, in Rajbir case (referred to supra-11) it was categorically held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that “The draft of the sale deed must further be in accordance with the terms of the decree. When objections are filed pointing out in a given case that the proposed draft of the sale deed is not in conformity with the decree, it becomes the duty of the executing court to apply its mind and to make alterations in the draft, if need, to make it in conformity with the decree. If the sale deed is found to not be in conformity with the decree, fresh proceedings will be taken. Appropriate order will be passed by the court so that the decree is executed as is provided in the decree. Needless to say, in case the sale deed which has been executed on the strength of the draft sale deed is found to be violative of the decree, it will necessarily be set aside, and thereafter, a fresh sale deed must be executed by the executing court. The entire process shall be completed within four months from the date copy of the judgment is produced before the court.” (emphasis supplied)

63. In the present case, the sale deed covered under Ex.B.14, which was executed by the executing court, is not in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the settled legal position, it is evident that the sale deed obtained by Defendant No. 3 through the court is not in accordance with the appellate decree and, therefore, is neither binding nor legally valid. Consequently, it cannot confer any right over the disputed property. The contention of Defendant No. 3 that a sale deed need not reflect the actual consideration as per the appellate decree is wholly without merit. Furthermore, no material has been placed on record to show that Defendant No. 3 paid the consideration directed by the appellate court to the executant of Ex.B.14. Thus, under Ex.B.14, Defendant No. 3 does not acquire any legal right over the property in dispute.

64. Moreover, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs rightly contended that Exhibit B-15 pertains to property in Survey No. 496/2, measuring 4.00 acres out of a total extent of 15.50 acres. In contrast, the property claimed by the plaintiffs lies in Survey No. 496/5. According to the plaintiffs, Survey No. 496 was originally subdivided into five parts—496/1, 496/2, 496/3, 496/4, and 496/5—and the plaint schedule property falls within Survey No. 496/5.

65. Furthermore, a review of the trial court’s judgment shows that it relied on Exhibits B-28 to B-30 to determine the rights of Defendant No. 3. According to the testimony of D.W.2, the Assistant Director of Survey and Land Records, and Exhibit B- 29, an extent of 4.00 acres was recorded under Survey No. 496/2-CI. D.W.2 also stated that, pursuant to the Joint Collector’s proceedings, he inspected the property in Survey No. 496/2, prepared new subdivisions, and reassigned the land originally in Survey No. 496/5 (measuring 11.93 acres) as Survey No. 496/2C. It is important to note that these actions— surveying the land, preparing subdivisions, and reassigning survey numbers—occurred after 2004, long after the sale deed was obtained by Defendant No. 3. Therefore, these steps appear to have been taken subsequently to the present suit. Consequently, the testimony of D.W.2 cannot be given significant weight in assessing Defendant No. 3’s claim.

66. Another significant aspect from D.W.2’s testimony is that, as elicited, on the date of the award (30.10.1989), Survey No. 496/5 measuring 11.93 acres was assigned and never cancelled. Even according to D.W.2’s chief examination affidavit filed on behalf of Defendant No. 3, the subdivision was effected on 31.12.1990, and after bifurcation for road formation, the remaining 11.93 acres were assigned as Survey Nos. 496/1, 496/3, and 496/5. He also admitted that no notices were issued to interested parties before the subdivision, making it clear that the process occurred without the plaintiffs’ or their vendors participation. Furthermore, D.W.2 confirmed that proceedings for further subdivision were issued only on 24.02.2004, creating Survey Nos. 496/2C, 496/2D, and 496/2—well after the suit was filed and again without notice to the plaintiffs. He also stated that the land was not in anyone’s occupation. The trial court itself observed that D.W.2, despite signing his chief affidavit, was unable to provide clear and consistent answers. He also testified that the land which was surveyed was not in occupation of anybody. Yet, the trial court relied on this inconsistent and unreliable testimony, along with self-serving documents (Exs. B-28 to B-30), to conclude possession and enjoyment by Defendant No. 3, which is legally unsound.

67. Furthermore, in one stretch, it is the testimony of D.W.1/defendant No.3 during cross examination that the original S.No.496 is divided into 496/1, 496/2 and 496/3 in the year, 1923. In other stretch, he stated that Government issued notification under Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act for acquiring an extent of Ac.3-83 cents in Survey No.496 for forming a road. Advance possession was taken on 27.03.1980. There being no official sub-division by that time, it was assumed that the remaining portion of the land would be 496/2. So that there is no consistency in his case.

68. It is also contention of the defendant in his pleadings as well evidence that there is a commercial building constructed in the plaint schedule property belonging to this defendant. It is assessed house No.20-3-128 by Tirupati Municipality. The defendant developed and reclaimed the land and formed a road on the Northern side of the suit schedule land. There is also a bore well with electric motor. But perusal of commissioner report is form part of the record, found in the record shows, it is otherwise to the above pleading and evidence.

69. It is not in dispute that the agreement of sale entered by said T.Veeramma and her daughter P.Lakshmi Devi with the plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 is more than one year prior to the agreement of sale between the defendant No.3 and his vendor defendant No.4. Thereby, the above all categorically proved that the defendant No.3 failed to put forth any substantial material on record to prove his prima-facie right, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property as claimed before the Trial Court. Thus, this point is answered against the defendant No.3.

70. POINT NO.IV:

                  Whether the appeal preferred by the defendant Nos.5 to 7/appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009 is maintainable, if so, they are entitled for any relief?

                  Admittedly, the defendant Nos.5 to 7 were got impleaded by themselves before the Trial Court, vide order, dated 03.04.2006 passed in I.A.No.01 of 2006. It is their categorical contention in the written statement filed by them before the Trial Court that the husband of the defendant No.5 purchased the item No.3 of plaint A schedule property from the plaintiff No.3 for valid consideration under an agreement of sale dated 29.01.1993. Then the plaintiff No.3 committed breach of contract, on that the husband of the defendant No.5 filed a suit in O.S.No.64 of 1997 and the same was decreed on 15.04.1997. Subsequently, the husband of the defendant No.5 filed E.P.No.171 of 2000 before the Court of learned Additional Senior Civil Judge at Tirupati for execution of the sale deed.

                  Then submitted before the Sub-Registrar at Tirupati for execution. But, the Sub-Registrar concerned raised an objection to pay the deficit stamp duty and the same was returned to the Court concerned. In the meanwhile, the husband of defendant No.5 died on 11.04.2001 leaving defendant Nos.5 to 7 as his legal representatives. Then they came to know the filing of the present suit by suppressing the above-mentioned facts. They denied the right of the plaintiff No.3 over the item No.3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property. The defendant Nos.5 to 7 are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the said property. There is no cause of action to the plaintiff No.3 to file the present suit and the suit is liable to be dismissed against the plaintiff Nos.4 to 7, who are legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff No.3 and prays to decreed the suit in their favour.

71. The above said pleading were fortified by the testimony of defendant No.6 as D.W.3 and in support of the same he got filed Ex.B.33 photostat copy of draft sale deed dated 27.01.2001. It is also testimony of D.W.3 during cross examination by the counsel for the plaintiffs therein that the original of Ex.B.33 is not yet registered and it is pending for registration. He has not taken any steps to get it registered. He does not know whether E.P.No.171 of 2011 on the file of ASJ, Tirupati was closed long back. It is true that as his father was asked to pay Rs.16 lakhs towards registration charges and as his father failed to pay those charges, the E.P. was closed. There are no other documents with them except sale agreement to prove possession.

72. On this point, Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.3 vehemently contends that the appeal preferred by the defendant Nos.5 to 7 is not at all maintainable since no decree passed against these defendants and the no appeal lies against the findings in the judgment, thereby, the appeal preferred by the defendant No.5 to 7 in A.S.No.372 of 2009 is liable for dismissal.

73. In support of the above contentions, he relied upon certain pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Banarsi v. Ram Phal((2003) 9 Supreme Court Cases 606), wherein it was categorically held that “Section 96 and 100 CPC make provision for an appeal being preferred from every original decree or from every decree passed in appeal respectively; none of the provisions enumerates the person who can file an appeal. However, it is settled by a long catena of decisions that to be entitled to file an appeal the person must be one aggrieved by the decree. Unless a person is prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree he is not entitled to file an appeal. No appeal lies against a mere finding. It is significant to note that both Sections 96 and 100 CPC provide for an appeal against decree and not against judgment.” (emphasis supplied)

74. The said proposition was fortified by another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court way-back in the year, 1974 in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar(AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1126) and held that “These provisions show that the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal lies only as against a decree or as against an order passed under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Order 43, Rule 1. No appeal can lies against a mere finding for the simple reasons that the Code does not provide for any such appeal.” (emphasis supplied)

75. But, in the same judgment, it was also held that “On grounds of justice, an appeal may lie against a finding, provided that it would operate as re judicata so as to preclude a party aggrieved by the finding from agitating the question covered by the finding in any other proceeding.”

76. Even the defendant Nos.5 to 7 entirely appreciate the case of the plaintiffs/appellants in A.S.No.156 of 2009, on this point, at large Sri Addepalli Suryanarayna, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs supported version of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.3 and he denied the maintainability of the appeal preferred by the defendant No.5 to 7.

77. Per contra, Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Y.N.Vivekananda, learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 7 vehemently contends that it is well settled that even a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment; that there is no dispute that as against a decree, an appeal would be maintainable in terms of 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such an appeal, however, would be maintainable only at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree; that since the dispute between parties was in relation to the property and more so, the appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009 are impleaded as defendant Nos.5 to 7 before the Trial Court itself, they have every right to file an appeal against the findings aggrieved, thereby, it is not correct to contend that the appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009 have no locus standi to prefer the said appeal against the findings in the judgment.

78. In support of the said contentions, he relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt.Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) LTD.( (1970) 3 Supreme Court Cases 573) and Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma((2003) 1 Supreme Court Cases 34).

79. This Court has no quarrel with the proposition relied upon by both the learned counsel and, to decide the present point, it would appropriate to certain facts as culled out from the record. Coming to the grounds of appeal in A.S.No.372 of 2009 preferred by the defendant Nos.5 to 7, out of fifteen grounds, except ground Nos.3 and 4 nothing pleaded about their case and they only appreciating the case of the plaintiffs and their vendors. Even on perusal of the ground Nos.3 and 4, they are only subject matter of suit filed by the husband of defendant No.5 and father of defendant Nos.6 and 7 against the plaintiff No.3 regarding item No.3 of ‘A’ schedule property but not pertaining to the lis in the present suit.

80. Even on perusal of the ground No.10, it is averred that “as per registered sale deed executed by Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati these appellants are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the said property, in pursuance of agreement of sale dated 29.01.1993 and in pursuance of the decree”, which is nothing but contra to their entire case, since, as per the testimony D.W.3, they have not obtained any regular sale deed from the Court and the Sub-Registrar concerned raised an objection to register regular sale deed and returned the draft sale deed to the Court concerned and they have only filed Ex.B.33 photocopy of draft sale deed, which not at all having any sanctity in the eye of law to create any charge over the property in dispute. Undisputedly, the defendant Nos.5 to 7 are claiming right over the item No.3 of the ‘A’ schedule property through plaintiff No.3. But, this Court is conscious of the fact that the agreement holder cannot claim right or title over the property concerned until it was concluded as registered sale deed. Even on perusal of the entire judgment of the Trial Court, except admitted facts culled out from the record, nothing adverse finding made against them. Thereby, they could not get any relief from plaintiff No.3 by way of this appeal in A.S.No.372 of 2009.

81. Furthermore, during the pendency of the appeal, they (defendant Nos.5 to 7) got filed applications in I.A.Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2023 & 1 of 2024, praying the Court to transpose them as plaintiff Nos.8 to 10 in O.S.No.38 of 2002, receive the additional document to prove the joint family status of T.Adisesha Reddy and T.Venkatesam Reddy, frame the additional issues to prove the plaintiffs case as well to amend the prayers in I.A.No.2 of 2023 in addition to receive the additional evidence to remit the appeal to the Trial Court for receiving further evidence, respectively.

82. The above all goes to show that the defendant Nos.5 to 7 completely appreciate the case of the plaintiffs, even if they go to the extent by filing additional evidence to prove the joint family status of vendors of the plaintiffs. But, in the considered opinion of this Court, it is not required to receive any additional documents to prove the case of the plaintiffs in view of the findings in Point Nos.I and II. Furthermore, as stated supra, even the defendant Nos.5 to 7 transposed as plaintiff Nos.8 to 10 in O.S.No.38 of 2002, they could not get any relief in the present suit in the absence of substantial material on record to prove their right or otherwise over the property in dispute. Thereby, these applications have absolutely no merits. More so, this Court cannot do any futile exercise by deciding the right of defendant Nos.5 to 7 against the property of plaintiff No.3 in the present proceedings without any substantial material on record.

83. Having regard to the above, leave apart from the law relied upon by the learned counsel for both sides about the maintainability of the appeal, as stated supra, no relief can be granted to them by way of appeal in A.S.No.372 of 2009 and the same is liable for dismissal. Thus, this point is answered accordingly.

84. POINT NO.V:

                  Whether the decree and judgment of the Trial Court is liable to be set aside, if so, to what extent and to what relief?

                  Having regard to the findings in Point Nos.I and II, the vendors of the plaintiffs has primafacie right or title over the suit schedule property to pass legal right to them under Exs.A.1, A.3 and A.14 and that the plaintiffs are able to prove their possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. On the other hand, in view of the findings in Point No.III, the defendant No.3 failed to put forth any substantial material on record to prove his prima-facie right, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property as claimed before the Trial Court, thereby, the Trial Court went wrong in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs, as such, the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court is liable to be set aside and consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is decreed for granting relief as prayed.

85. Furthermore, in view of the findings in Point No.IV, the appeal preferred by the defendant Nos.5 to 7 is liable to be dismissed.

86. In the result, the appeal in A.S.No.156 of 2009 is allowed with costs, setting aside the decree and judgment dated 26.02.2009 passed in O.S.No.38 of 2002 on the file of the Court of learned IV Additional District Judge at Tirupati. Consequently, decreed the suit, restraining the defendants, their men, agents and anybody interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs.

87. The appeal in A.S.No.372 OF 2009 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

                  Interim orders granted earlier if any, stand vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending if any, stand closed.