1. The present CRLMC application has been filed by the Petitioner with a prayer to quash the charge-sheet dated 25.06.2025, under Annexure-2, and the entire criminal proceeding against the Petitioner in Chandrasekharpur P.S. Case No.330 of 2023 corresponding to C.T. Case No.837 of 2023, for commission of offences punishable under sections 498A/ 341/ 323/ 294/ 506/ 34 of the IPC read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-II, Bhubaneswar.

FACTS OF THE CASE

2. The factual matrix of the case leading to the filing of the present CRLMC application, as gathered form the F.I.R and Charge-sheet, is as follows; initially an F.I.R was lodged on 13.07.2023 and registered as Chandrasekharpur P.S. Case No.330 of 2023 against the present Petitioner, alleging commission of offences under the IPC as well as the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter ‘DP Act’). The Informant in the present case is the sister-in-law of the Petitioner, this implies that the Petitioner is the younger brother of the husband of the Informant- Opposite Party No.2. The marriage between the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 and the Petitioner’s older brother was earlier solemnized on 23.01.2019, and the Informant’s parents have allegedly given a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- along with around 200gm of gold ornaments and other valuables to the groom’s family. However, after a few days of the solemnization of marriage, the Informant’s in-laws and husband demanded a further sum of Rs.30,00,000/- as dowry. Since the informant expressed her inability to fulfil the same, she was allegedly harassed and tortured, mentally and physically, in pursuance of such dowry demand, by her in-laws and husband.

3. The F.I.R further reveals that not only was the Informant-Opposite Party No.2, who happened to be a doctor, not allowed to continue her medicine practice or pursue higher education but also on 04.03.2019, 24.05.2019, 19.01.2021, and several other occasions the husband and her in-laws would physically torture, including strangulating the Informant till the point she passes out and then confining her to a room. As per the F.I.R, on one such occasion while the Informant was being physically assaulted by her husband and a few of her in-laws, she was saved at the last moment by her mother-in-law and grandfather-in-law. An attempt was once also made to find common ground between the parties and mutually resolve the issue by holding a discussion between the families of the parties. However, such discussion could not fructify into something tangible on account of the Informant’s husband abusing and assaulting the Informant and her mother by hurling chairs at them and attempting to assault them with a Panikhi. Apart from the aforesaid instances of assault and abuse, the in-laws and husband of the Informant have also, on many occasions, threatened to kill the Informant if she ever attempted to lodge any complaint against the perpetrators.

4. Consequently, the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 lodged the F.I.R, at Annexure-1, implicating her husband and in-laws including the Petitioner. After registration of the F.I.R, the investigation in the matter was initiated, the seizure list, zimanama, and injury report were prepared and, statement of witnesses were recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C, available at Annexure-3. Finally, the Investigating Officer has filed the impugned Charge-sheet bearing C.S No.465 on 25.06.2025, at Annexure- 2, against the present Petitioner, among others, as the accused, for commission of the offences as mentioned above. Aggrieved by his implication as an accused in the case, the Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer as mentioned above.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

5. Heard Mr.Shibani Shankar Pradhan, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner. The Petitioner, from the very outset, has maintained that on the basis of the allegations in the F.I.R and the Chargesheet, no case whatsoever is made out against the Petitioner for commission of the offences alleged therein. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that being the younger brother-in-law of the Informant, the Petitioner’s name has been mechanically included in the F.I.R with an oblique motive and malafide intention to wreck vengeance on the Petitioner’s personal life. It was submitted that at no point in time had the Petitioner ever demanded any dowry from the Informant- Opposite Party No.2, nor has he ever subjected her to any torture, either physical or mental.

6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that when the marriage of the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 was solemnized with the Petitioner’s brother on 23.01.2019, the Petitioner was residing at the hostel of S.C.B Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack (hereinafter “SCB MCH”) where he was continuing his internship/ housemanship. Whereas, the Informant-Opposite Party No.2, being a Dental Surgeon and having her practice at Bhubaneswar, moved into her parental house at Bhubaneswar along with her husband. Later, in August of 2019, after completing his internship, the Petitioner took up a house on rent at Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar as he was engaged as a Medical Officer at Capital Hospital until March of 2020. From March, 2020 till July, 2020 the Petitioner was posted as a Medical Officer at Puri Hospital, and then from July 2020 up until the same time in 2023, the Petitioner was pursuing his Post-graduate at SCB MCH. As such, it has been strenuously contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner and the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 have never shared a common household at any point of time during the Informant’s marriage. Therefore, it can safely be inferred that the Petitioner could not have, at any point in time, indulged in any act of harassment or torture the Informant-Opposite Party No.2.

7. The learned counsel for the Petitioner, further submitted that the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 has not levelled any specific allegation against the Petitioner, either in the F.I.R or in her statement recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Moreover, referring to the statements of other charge-sheeted witnesses recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C, the learned counsel for the Petitioner stated before this Court that no allegation has been made against the Petitioner that would justify his implication in the present case. In the aforesaid context the learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Investigating Officer has proceeded on a presumption that the allegation in the F.I.R is completely true and, instead of carrying out a proper investigation, he has mechanically filed a charge-sheet against the Petitioner despite there being no material on record for doing so.

8. Lastly, to further support his contentions, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Geeta Mehrotra and Anr. v. State of U.P and Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741, Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana and Anr., reported in (2025) 3 SCC 756 and Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, reported in (2025) 3 SCC 735, and contended that mere reference to the Petitioner’s name without any specific allegation against him does not implicate him in the alleged crime. In such view of the matter, the learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that hypothetically, even if the allegation in the F.I.R is taken at its face value, no case is made out against the Petitioner. It was submitted that this is a clear instance of a malafide prosecution instituted against an innocent Petitioner and, in the event the present criminal proceeding is allowed to continue against the Petitioner, the same would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Accordingly, it was prayed that the present criminal proceeding against the Petitioner be quashed to secure the ends of justice.

CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES

9. Heard Mr.Udit Narayan Jena, AGA and Mr.Ramdas Achary, learned counsel for the Opposite Party No.2-Informant. Learned AGA, at the outset submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R are grave and serious in nature and make out a good case against the Petitioner. It was further contended that after a thorough investigation the IO has filed a charge- sheet where the Petitioner has also been shown as an accused. As such, it was submitted that the criminal proceeding against the Petitioner be allowed to continue to the stage of trial where the actual guilt of the Petitioner, or lack thereof, can be determined.

10. Similarly, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties, referring to the law laid down in Bhajanlal’s case, submitted before this Court that the inherent powers of a High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C must be exercised sparingly in exceptional circumstances only, and, a criminal proceeding or an F.I.R can be quashed in exercise of such inherent powers excepting when no clear case is made out against the Petitioner as per the allegations on record. The learned counsel for the Opposite Parties contended that in the present case, as per the F.I.R and the Charge-sheet a clear case of cruelty on account of demand for dowry is made out against the present Petitioner. As such, no valid case for quashing of the criminal proceeding can be said to have been made out against Petitioner. Additionally, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties has submitted before this Court that while considering an application under section 482 of the Cr.P.C with a prayer to quash a criminal proceeding, the High Court must confine itself to a prima facie examination of the materials on record and not enter into to evidence produced by the accused in his/ her defence, since the later exercise would clearly amount to conducting a mini-trial. In support of the aforesaid contention, the learned counsel has relied on Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 317.

11. Lastly, referring to Muskan v. Ishaan Khan and Ors., bearing 2025 INSC 287, learned counsel for the Opposite Parties contended that even though, on many instances, the Courts have granted the relief of quashing a criminal proceeding involving matrimonial disputes, a routine exercise of such power under section 482 of Cr.P.C should be strictly avoided when the allegations are of a grave and serious nature. As such, given the fact that the present case involves serious allegations of demand of dowry along with persistent physical/ mental harassment and torture, it would be apt to let the criminal proceeding follow its natural course and culminate in a trial where the guilt, or lack thereof, of all the parties involved would be comprehensively determined.

12. In such view of the matter, the learned AGA and the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties opposed the application filed by the Petitioner and prayed that the present CRLMC application be dismissed forthwith.

ANANLYSIS OF THE COURT

13. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the F.I.R, the Chargesheet, the statement of witnesses under section 161 Cr.P.C and other documents available on record. On a prima facie perusal of the F.I.R and the Charge-sheet it appears that the Informant, who is the Opposite Party No.2 in the present case, has alleged physical and mental harassment on account of dowry demand from the side of her in-laws. Pursuant to such allegations, the in-laws family members along with the present Petitioner, who happens to be the Informant’s brother-in-law, have been implicated as the accused in the present case. On a prima facie perusal of the F.I.R and the Charge-sheet, it appears that allegations are indeed serious in nature. However, the present Petitioner has filed this CRLMC application with a prayer to quash the criminal proceeding against him on the primary ground that he is in no way involved in the said occurrence and there is no material on record to entangle him in the present crime. Accordingly, the Petitioner has prayed for quashing of the criminal proceeding against him. It is in this factual and legal backdrop that this Court is called upon to scrutinise the Petitioner’s prayer on the touchstone of the inherent powers vested in it under Section 528 of the BNSS (formerly Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.), read with the established principles governing quashing of criminal proceedings.

14. The principles governing the quashing of an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings are now well settled through a catena of pronouncements of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court. As such, a detailed excursus is unnecessary. It would suffice to make a brief reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, wherein the scope of the High Court’s inherent powers to quash an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings was delineated. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in para 102 thereof, laid down the following illustrative scenarios where the High Court may proceed with the exercise of its inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice.

                   “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

                   (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

                   (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

                   (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

                   (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

                   (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

                   (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Having adverted to the time-tested and settled principles emanating from Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), the enquiry must now shift to the governing touchstone for exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The power under Section 528 of the BNSS is intended to be invoked only where such exercise is necessary to give effect to orders under the Code, to prevent abuse of the process of Court, or to secure the ends of justice.

15. The aforesaid principles have been repeatedly reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases, more recently, in B.N. John v. State of U.P., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 and in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185. Relevant paragraphs of the Hon’ble Court’s judgement in Ajay Malik’s case (supra) are reproduced hereinbelow;

                   “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

                   9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).”

                   (Emphasis supplied)

16. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, has laid down that the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C, has to take the allegations in the FIR at the face value. The Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that;

                   “29. It is settled law that power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.”

17. Furthermore, in addition to the aforesaid basic principles which are to be followed by this Court while evaluating whether a criminal proceeding is fit for being quashed, certain additional clarifications/ restrictions have also been enumerated by the Apex Court in many of its decisions. Recently, in Abhishek Singh v. Ajay Kumar & Ors., bearing 2025 INSC 807, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further clarified that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, is not justified to conduct a mini- trial. Instead, the High Court is required to restrict its inquiry to whether the allegations made in the complaint or FIR, if accepted as true on their face, constitute a prima facie offence (reference, in this regard, may also be had to the Apex Court’s dictum in CBI vs Aryan Singh, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 379). In a similar vein, in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has once again observed that;

                   “13. it is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of its inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.”

18. Furthermore, in Abhishek Singh’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, relying on its prior dictum in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 317, also stressed that this limited scope prevents the High Court from delving into the sufficiency or reliability of the material, or from evaluating the likelihood of conviction. Such matters are squarely within the domain of the trial court. The underlying rationale is to ensure that genuine prosecutions are not stifled at the very outset, while at the same time guarding against abuse of the judicial process through frivolous or vexatious proceedings. Similar sentiments were also reflected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 604, wherein it was observed that;

                   “18. It is well settled that when considering an application under Section 482CrPC, the court cannot conduct a mini-trial but instead is to be satisfied that prima facie the offences as alleged are made out. To put it differently, it is to be seen, without undertaking a minute examination of the record, that there is some substance in the allegations made which could meet the threshold of statutory language.”

19. The present matter is predominantly matrimonial in nature and involves allegation of dowry torture meted out to the Informant- Opposite Party No.2 by her husband and in-laws. The Petitioner in the present CRLMC application happens to be one of the in-laws family member of the Informant. There can be no doubt whatsoever that cases of the present nature are sensitive and warrant a thorough investigation by the investigating authorities. However, it must also be borne in mind that while conducting such investigation the Investigating Authority must exercise restraint in roping in innocent family members of the principal accused on general allegation of omnibus nature. So far as matrimonial disputes are concerned, especially those involving demand for dowry and offences under the DP Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court on several occasions has issued warning against implicating the family members of the accused without any specific allegations against such person. In Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741, the Hon’ble Apex Court while overruling the impugned order passed by the High Court, allowed the appeal on the ground that the F.I.R did not disclose any material to constitute any offence against the appellants. Relying on its earlier pronouncements in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 and B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675, observed that;

                   “25. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegations of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasise by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against the accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognizance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant wife. It is the well- settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of overimplication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.”

                   (Emphasis supplied)

20. Likewise in Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar, reported in (2022) 6 SCC 599, in a dowry demand and harassment case, where a woman had lodged criminal complaint against her husband and in-laws but no specific role was attributed to the in-laws, a two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it would be unjust if the in-laws are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial and that general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. The Court observed that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged. The Hon’ble Court took note of several rulings wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It was observed that;

                   “17. The abovementioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this Court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498-AIPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long-term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this Court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

                   18. Coming to the facts of this case, upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the appellants. The complainant alleged that “all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy”. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the appellants herein i.e. none of the appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are, therefore, general and omnibus and can at best be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes. Insofar as husband is concerned, since he has not appealed against the order of the High Court, we have not examined the veracity of allegations made against him. However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.”

                   (Emphasis Supplied)

21. More recently, in Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana and Anr., reported in (2025) 3 SCC 756, a division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again referring to its earlier decisions in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 15 SCC 488, Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741, G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273, overturned the impugned judgement of the High Court and allowed the appeal. While doing so, the Hon’ble Apex Court even urged the legislature to take note of the pragmatic realities, as enumerated in the judgement, and consider suitable amendments to Sections 85 and 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 before they were put into force, and held that;

                   “24. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute.

                   ***

                   35. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. [Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488] , authored by one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.), the legal principle applicable apropos Section 482CrPC was examined. Therein, it was observed that when an accused comes before the High Court, invoking either the inherent power under Section 482CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.

                   36. For the foregoing reasons, we have reached to the conclusion that if the criminal proceedings are allowed to continue against the appellant, the same will be nothing short of abuse of process of law and travesty of justice. This is a fit case wherein, the High Court should have exercised its inherent power under Section 482CrPC for the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings.”

                   (Emphasis Supplied)

22. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana and Ors. v. State of Telengana and Anr., reported in (2025) 3 SCC 735, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referring to its earlier decisions on the topic summarised the position as follows;

                   “27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

                   ***

                   33. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 473] held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband's close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection.”

                   (Emphasis supplied)

23. Reverting to the present case, from the undisputed facts of the case and the allegations made in the F.I.R as well as the Charge-sheet, two distinct inferences emerge clearly. Firstly, that the Petitioner, at no point in time has shared a household with the Informant-Opposite Party No.2. Secondly, there is no specific allegation against the Petitioner. Rather, the Informant has clearly stated in the F.I.R that the husband and her in-laws except ‘Manas’, i.e. the present Petitioner, would assault her physically and deprive her of food and clothing. Additionally, on perusal of the statement of witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C, under Annexure-3, it can be seen that even though there have been repeated mention of the husband of the Informant-Opposite Party No.2, there has been no specific allegation against the present Petitioner which would disclose the commission of the offences as have been made out in the present case.

24. So far as the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties are concerned, this Court is of the considered view that they pertain to a general clarification of the scope of exercise of the High Court’s inherent powers. Additionally, in Muskaan’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has set-aside the impugned order of the High Court, wherein the petition by the respondents under section 482 of the Cr.P.C was allowed resulting in quashing of the criminal proceeding against them, primarily on the ground that the High Court had exceeded its scope while exercising its inherent powers and had conducted a ‘mini- trial’. In the present case, the core issue that falls for consideration is the sustainability of the Petitioner’s implication, particularly in view of the conspicuous absence of any specific allegations against him. Therefore, it would appear that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties are of little assistance to their case.

25. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and upon a careful examination of the F.I.R., the charge-sheet, the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., and the other materials placed on record, this Court is of the considered view that no specific role or overt act has been attributed to the Petitioner in respect of the alleged offences. Even on a prima facie assessment of the material forming the basis of the prosecution, the allegations do not disclose the commission of any offence under either the IPC or the D.P. Act insofar as the Petitioner is concerned. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the present case falls within the exceptional category contemplated under the third illustration in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), justifying interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) to prevent abuse of the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice.

26. Accordingly, the present criminal proceeding bearing Chandrasekharpur P.S. Case No.330 of 2023 corresponding to C.T. Case No.837 of 2023, for commission of offences punishable under sections 498A/ 341/ 323/ 294/ 506/ 34 of the IPC, read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-II, Bhubaneswar, is hereby quashed so far as the present Petitioner.

27. The CRLMC application is allowed. However, there shall be on order as to costs.