Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The petitioners in W.P.(C)No.14459 of 2019 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 27.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. For convenience of reference, the parties are hereinafter referred to in this judgment as they are referred to in the writ petition.

2. The petitioners are partners of M/s. K.Jamal Kutty Hajee and Son, a petroleum outlet in Malappuram district, under the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (‘BPCL’ for short). The petroleum outlet was initially started in 1940’s by the grandfather of the petitioners. The present partnership firm was formed in the year 1980. Ext.P1 is the acknowledgement of registration of the firm dated 15.01.1980. The licence for operating the petroleum outlet is granted to the firm by the BPCL initially for five years in the year 1980, and it was renewed from time to time. Ext.P2 is a copy of the agreement dated 07.08.2009, and Ext.P3 is a copy of the agreement dated 14.08.2014 executed between the parties.

                  2.1. The dispensing unit in the outlet is supplied, erected and maintained by BPCL. Servicing of the dispensing unit is done by the employees of the BPCL. According to the petitioners, the defects, if any, regarding the dispensing unit are to be reported to the company and the petitioners or their employees have no role in the service and maintenance of the dispensing unit.

                  2.2. The petitioners plead that after an inspection conducted by the Quality Control Cell (QCC) of BPCL on 25.09.2014, a show cause notice dated 18.10.2014 was issued to the petitioners' firm seeking explanation for the alleged two irregularities namely, (a) W & M seal was found broken/tampered in Zine SR NO JXL & T 6192 on HSD, and (b) Additional components /non-standard fittings were found in keypad of Z-Line L & T SR No.JXL & T 6192. The petitioners submitted their explanation as per the letter dated 03.11.2014, specifically contending that there are no deliberate laches on their part and that the problems, if any, would have been caused due to the oldness of the pump, voltage variation and continuous delivery. It was also pointed out that the defects pointed out earlier were rectified by the contractors of BPCL itself. Thereafter, Ext.P4 notice of hearing was issued to the petitioners on 04.03.2015, asking them to appear for a personal hearing at the Chennai office of BPCL on 11.03.2015. The petitioners appeared before the 2nd respondent on the said date and offered their explanation. Though the hearing was conducted by the 2nd respondent on 11.03.2015, no further steps were taken thereafter, and therefore, the petitioners were under the impression that the proceedings were dropped.

                  2.3.    The petitioners state that on 23.05.2019, the petitioners were served with Ext.P6 notice dated 21.05.2019 issued by the 3rd respondent stating that the dealership agreement has been terminated with immediate effect and representatives of the company will be taking over the retail outlet at 11.00 a.m on 28.05.2019. According to the petitioners, they have not violated any of the conditions in the agreement, and the intention on the part of the 3rd respondent in terminating the agreement is only to give the licence to another person of their choice. The belated attempt on the part of the 3rd respondent to terminate the agreement is made after conducting an interview for appointing an adhoc licensee on 21.05.2019. Evidencing the same, the petitioners have produced Ext.P7 notice of interview dated 21.05.2019. Contending Ext.P6 notice issued by the 3rd respondent as illegal, arbitrary, irrational and unsustainable on various grounds, the petitioners filed W.P.(C)No.14459 of 2019 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking an order to issue a writ of certiorari to quash Exts.P6 and P7.

3. Along with I.A. Nos.2 and 4 of 2019, the petitioners produced Exts.P8 and P9 documents in the writ petition.

4. The respondents 1 and 3 filed a counter-affidavit dated 18.12.2020 and an additional counter-affidavit dated 08.09.2021 in the writ petition. They produced Ext.R1(a) document along with I.A.No.2 of 2022. Paragraphs 5 to 10 of the counter affidavit dated 18.12.2020 filed by respondents 1 and 3 read thus;

                  “5. The thrust of the petitioners’ case appears to be that the person who provided the opportunity of personal hearing is not the person who issued the order of termination. As per Clause 8.6 of the MDG, in case of critical irregularities leading to termination, the Head of State Office/Regional Office/Zonal office of the concerned Oil Marketing Company or_their nominee before recommending/approving the termination of dealership will provide a personal hearing to the signatories to the dealership or their nominee [emphasis supplied]. Thus, the MDG only requires that the dealer be personally heard. The representative of the company, after having heard the dealer and taking into consideration the submissions made by the dealer during the personal hearing, recommends the decision that ought to be taken by the competent authority. The personal hearing contemplated under the MDG is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and personal hearing is part of compliance of the principles of natural justice. In the present case, it is admitted that personal hearing was afforded to the petitioners, and therefore, the order of termination is passed in compliance with the MDG, and cannot be found fault with in any manner whatsoever. It is submitted that the delay in issuing the order arose because after the personal hearing, additional clarification was sought from Legal Metrology department in 2016 and after several follow-up letters, upon receipt of the clarification in 2017, the termination note was put up to the concerned authorities of the 1st respondent.

                  6. It is submitted that as per Clause 13 of Dispensing Pump and Selling License (DPSL) Agreement, the respondent is empowered to terminate the agreement in the event of happening of any of the events in the contract. It is well within the ordinary exercise of powers by the 1st respondent and thus does not require any specific designation to any officer of the 1st respondent. Despite the said fact, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity vide personal hearing on 11.03.2015 to elucidate his case. Also, the Ext. P6 adduced by the petitioner is only the communication sent by the 3rd respondent on behalf of the 1st Respondent as the agreement was terminated by an Expert Committee comprising of Zonal Head (GM- South) and 2 other General Managers of the 1st Respondent as per the terms and conditions provided in the Marketing Discipline Guidelines (“MDG”) with respect to Authority to take action in case of any irregularity.

                  7. Without prejudice to the aforesaid and only for the purpose of addressing the contentions raised in the writ petition regarding the grounds for termination, these respondents will proceed to justify the decision to terminate the licence. It is, however, reiterated that since the subject matter involves complicated questions of fact, this Hon’ble Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not the appropriate forum for adjudication of the dispute. As regards the specific grounds for termination, it is submitted that the petitioners were appointed as Dispensing Pump Selling Licensee by the 1st respondent for operating the retail outlet. For the said purpose, a Dispensing Pump Selling License agreement (“Agreement”) was entered into between the petitioners and the 1st respondent. As per the Agreement, it shall be the duty of licensee/ dealer to check and ensure that the dispensing units/pumps are working properly. In clause 7(a) of the Agreement, it is clearly agreed between the parties that if at any time the pumps develop any defect, the licensee shall forthwith report such defect in writing to the company. In addition to that, as per clause 7(c) of the Agreement, the licensee shall, in their own interest and as often as may be required by the company, check the accuracy of the pumps. From the above clauses in the agreement, it is clear that the dealer/ licensee is duty bound to check and ensure the accuracy and proper working of the pumps. A mere statement to the effect that the petitioner was not aware of the defects which were pointed out by the inspection team is against the duty casted upon the dealer/ licensee as per the terms and conditions of the agreement and hence not acceptable.

                  8. The petitioners’ contention that breakage of seal is due to oldness of the pump, voltage variation and continuous delivery cannot be accepted as no complaint was lodged by the dealer through BROMA (dealer complaint logging mechanism of BPCL) for this defect. It was also observed that WEIGHTS & MEASURE seal which is affixed by the Legal Metrology Department of Government of India, was broken and hanging like a hook at the meter assembly. From this, it was clear that tampering of WEIGHTS & MEASURE seal has been done purposefully with manual interventions by the petitioner. This action by the petitioners are critical irregularities under clause 5.1.2(b) & 5.1.4 of the MDG. The said irregularities also violate Clauses 4 and 9 of the Agreement dated 13.08.2014 signed between the petitioners and BPCL. It is also pertinent to mention that BPCL has several retail outlets and it has never been reported by any outlet or observed in any inspections, that due to the vibration of the dispensing unit, the W&M Seals have been broken. There are parts in the dispensing unit which are really feeble and thinner than the W&M Seal. If the contention of the petitioners is correct, then such parts also would have been affected/damaged by such vibration. The inspection team had not observed any such damage to any other such part.

                  9. As regards the allegation made by the petitioners that the termination of the agreement is to give the license to another person of BPCL’s choice is false, despicable and unfounded, and hence, denied. The ad-hoc interview was conducted by the company so that the customers of the Retail Outlet are not put to any inconvenience due to the termination of the dealership, which was a result of the activities of the petitioner, by manipulating delivery and obtaining undue/illegal enrichment at the cost of customers. The ad hoc dealership awarded is a temporary arrangement by the company to operate the retail outlets which are terminated, so that customers in the area do not suffer due to the closure of retail outlet. The ad-hoc agreement is a stop gap arrangement to operate the Retail Outlet, till the Retail Outlet is naturally divested to weaker/under privileged sections of the society or by an advertisement.

                  10. Thus, the termination of the dealership has been carried out in a fair manner giving the petitioner enough time to produce documentary proof, if any, against the findings of the Quality Control Cell. Further, personal hearing was also granted to the petitioner, during which petitioner has not provided any additional evidence or submissions. Termination was on account of the facts observed and deviations by the dealership established, during the course of investigation and not predetermined as claimed by the petitioner. The termination is approved by a committee comprising of highly ranked officials of BPCL based on the observations and recommendations of various levels of officers with expertise in the dealings of the issue, strictly in accordance with the MDG. The 3rd respondent, being the Territory Manager of the Territory under whose jurisdiction the subject Retail Outlet falls, has merely communicated the termination to the petitioners and for takeover of the Retail Outlet. Thus, the action of these respondents is perfectly valid, strictly in terms of its policy and not liable to be interfered with by this Hon’ble Court”.

5. Similarly, paragraph 5 of the additional counter affidavit dated 08.09.2021 filed by the respondents 1 and 3 reads thus;

                  “5. 1t is submitted that as on the date of passing of the interim order dated 27.05.2019, the DPSL executed with the petitioner dated 13.08.2014 stood terminated by way of Ext. P6 notice dated 21.05.2019. Therefore, as on the date that status quo was directed to be maintained (27.05.2019), there was no subsisting DPSL with the petitioners. However, since this Hon’ble Court directed these respondents to maintain status quo with respect to the running of the outlet, these respondents had to continue supplies to the outlet. Therefore to ensure that there are necessary checks and balances, and that the relationship between the parties is governed by the standard terms during the subsistence of the interim order, the 1st respondent executed Ext. P9 agreement. It is submitted that the same was done only to give effect to the interim order of this Hon’ble Court in letter and spirit. These respondents had absolutely no intention of renewing the DPSL in view of the termination (Ext. P6), and Ext. P9 has been executed solely for the purpose of complying with the interim order of this Hon’ble Court and to ensure that the petitioner is governed by the standard terms while running the outlet on the strength of the interim order. If the petitioner was permitted to run the outlet without any agreement, the said situation would have catastrophic consequences, putting even the public at risk. The petitioners would then have been free to operate the outlet in any manner they wish without any control or oversight by the company. It is to prevent such a situation while complying with the interim order that Ext. P9 was executed. The same is done without prejudice to any of the contentions of these respondents in the counter affidavit and the writ petition”.

6. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of materials on record, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition permitting the petitioners to make an appropriate representation seeking for continuance of the agency, even on the face of the judgment rejecting the writ petition, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the said judgment. The 1st respondent was directed to sympathetically consider the continuance of the agency by the petitioners, if such a representation is being filed by them. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present writ appeal.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants- petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 to 3.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners would submit that in pursuance of Ext.P4 notice dated 04.03.2015, the hearing of the petitioners was conducted by the Head (Retail) South of BPCL Ltd. on 11.03.2015 at 11.00 a.m. in the Southern Regional Office of BPCL at Chennai. However, Ext.P6 order was passed by the Territory Manager (Retail) of BPCL at Calicut on 21.05.2019. The petitioners are highly prejudiced due to the long delay in passing the order, and also due to the reason that the order was not passed by the person who conducted a personal hearing. The learned counsel, by pointing out the pleadings in the counter affidavit of respondents 1 and 3 that the termination of the petitioners’ dealership was approved by a committee comprising highly ranked officials of BPCL, argued that there is no such reference in Ext.P6 order. It is also highlighted by the learned counsel that by Ext.P9 agreement dated 30.08.2019, the licence for operating the petroleum outlet by the petitioners is renewed for another 5 years. The period of Ext.P3 agreement was already over. According to the learned counsel, natural justice is denied to the petitioners by the belated passing of Ext.P6 order by a person who had not heard the matter.

9. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 to 3 would submit that the respondents had no intention of renewing the licence in view of Ext.P6 termination order. Ext.P9 agreement was executed only to give effect to the interim order dated 27.05.2019, passed by this Court in the writ petition. Therefore, the petitioners cannot rely on Ext.P9 agreement to argue that their licence is renewed by condoning the discrepancy detected in the inspection. The details of the discrepancies and tampering noted during the inspection conducted by the inter-region team of QCC of BPCL on 25.09.2014 are explained in Ext.P6 order. For the said discrepancies noted, the company decided to terminate the licence. It was on the basis of the opinion of an expert committee comprising the Zonal Head (GM- South) and two other General Managers of the company, as per the terms and conditions provided in the Marketing Discipline Guidelines, that the action was taken by Ext.P6 order. By pointing out the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Baby Girija v. India Oil Corporation Ltd [2025 (2) KLT 17], which was relied upon by the learned Single Judge also, the learned Standing Counsel argued that the delay in taking a decision after the personal hearing is not material, since it did not cause any prejudice to the petitioners. Similarly, in the light of the observations in the said judgment pertaining to the case of institutional decision, it is argued that the petitioners cannot contend that the same person who heard the matter has to pass the order. Being a public sector undertaking, the delay in passing the order due to administrative reasons is clearly explainable, and moreover, the petitioners have no claim that any change of circumstance had happened between the date of hearing and the date of the impugned decision. So also, the petitioners have no claim that any of their contentions were not appropriately answered in Ext.P6 decision.

10. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellants- petitioners submitted that in the case of Baby Girija [2025 (2) KLT 17], the allegation is that the retail petroleum outlet was run as benami. But in the instant case, the allegation is something different, and therefore the prejudice caused to the petitioners by non-supplying materials gathered after the hearing conducted in the year 2015, as stated in Ext.P6 order, cannot be taken lightly.

11. Admittedly, the partnership firm, in which the petitioners are some of the partners, has been running the petroleum outlet in Malappuram district, under the 1st respondent BPCL, for the past several years, which, according to the petitioners, is from 1980 onwards, on the strength of the agreement executed between the parties for every five years. Prior to the same, the predecessors of the petitioners had been running the outlet from the year 1940 onwards. In the inspection conducted on 25.09.2014 by the inspection team of BPCL, two irregularities were reported against the petroleum outlet. In pursuance of the same, a show cause notice dated 18.10.2014 was issued to the firm to which they submitted an explanation dated 03.11.2014. The personal hearing pursuant to Ext.P4 notice dated 04.03.2015 was conducted in the Chennai office of the BPCL on 11.03.2015, as evident from Ext.P5 proceedings of the hearing as well as from Ext.P6 termination order dated 21.05.2019 issued by the 3rd respondent. The petitioners are challenging Ext.P6 termination order on the grounds that it was issued not by the person who had conducted the personal hearing, and also on the ground of delay. It is also the contention of the petitioners that some materials collected as stated in Ext.P6, after the personal hearing were not within the knowledge of the petitioners, and they were not served with a copy of the expert committee opinion mentioned in the counter affidavit dated 18.12.2020, and thus natural justice was denied to them. It is also the contention of the petitioners that the agreement was subsequently renewed by virtue of Ext.P9 for another period of five years with effect from 08.08.2019, and hence, the action taken based on the previous agreement has no legal sanctity.

12. From the averments in the additional affidavit dated 08.09.2021 filed by respondents 1 and 3 and also from the materials placed on record, it is gatherable that Ext.P9 agreement was executed between the parties on the basis of the interim order dated 27.05.2019 passed by this Court in this writ petition. Therefore, the petitioners cannot contend that in view of Ext.P9 agreement, the respondents have either expressly or impliedly permitted them to continue the licence of the petroleum outlet by condoning the irregularities found in the inspection on 25.09.2014 by the QCC.

13. As far as the contention of the petitioners regarding delay in taking the decision by the company after the completion of the personal hearing and also pertaining to the change in the person who had issued Ext.P6 order is concerned, though the personal hearing was conducted by another official of the company, as noted by the learned Single Judge, those aspects are covered in the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Baby Girija [2025 (2) KLT 17]. In the said judgment, the Division Bench held thus:

                  “9. Mr. Adarsh Kumar contended that the decision to terminate the agency was vitiated by grave violations of the principles of natural justice and fair procedure. He argued that the Appellant was heard by Mr. Sanjib Kumar Behera, the then Chief General Manager of the 1st Respondent on 21 March 2023 at the State Office of the 1st Respondent. However, Ext.P2 notice intimating termination was issued by Mrs. Geetika Verma, Chief General Manager and State Head on 11 October 2024. The learned counsel submitted that the decision was taken after a long delay of several months. Delay defeated the purpose of hearing. The officer who heard the Appellant did not take the decision. Another officer took the decision and communicated it to the Appellant. He contended that the requirements of the principles of natural justice were flouted by the 1st Respondent Corporation. The counsel therefore submitted that the decision to terminate the agency of the Appellant is liable to be set aside and the agency may be restored to the Appellant.

                  10. The learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that no violation of the principles of natural justice was involved. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the Corporation had followed fair procedure and effective opportunity of hearing was provided to the Appellant before the impugned decision was taken. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the decision making process regarding termination of an agency involves various offices and authorities of the 1st Respondent. Though the hearing was offered by the Chief General Manager the said officer is not the authority competent to take a final call in the matter. The Chief General Manager and State Head has to place the matter before the Director (Marketing), Head Office, Mumbai with his proposal for the final decision. When the decision is taken by the Director (Marketing) the same will be communicated by the Chief General Manager and State Head. He therefore submitted that the decision to terminate an agency is an institutional decision and not one taken by an individual officer. The hearing offered therefore comes under the category of institutional hearing recognized under Administrative Law. Therefore, he submitted that there is no merit in the argument advanced by Mr. Adarsh Kumar that there is violation of the rule regarding fair hearing. He also added that the time consumed in taking the final decision and communicating the same to the dealer was on account of the various procedures involved in the process. In view of the submissions advanced by both sides, we find that the only aspect that merits our attention in the appeal is whether there was any violation of the principles of natural justice; to be precise, if the opportunity of hearing provided to the Appellant by the 1st Respondent Corporation satisfied the requirements of fair hearing or not”.

                  xxx     xxx     xxx

                  12. Respondent Corporation has explained the decision - making process followed by it in the case of terminating agencies. Appellant has not disputed the submission of the Corporation in this regard. Without doubt, the decision in the matter of terminating an agency is an institutional decision as per the procedure followed by the Respondent Corporation. It is not a decision taken by an individual officer or a designated authority. Several officers are involved in the process. Appraisal at various levels is also involved. In such a situation, the officer conducting the hearing need not be the authority to take the final call. 'Institutional hearing' is a well - recognised exclusion to the general rule - 'one who heard should decide'. We refer to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India and others, [(2013) 5 SCC 252] : -

                  "70. We also do not find much substance in the submission made by Mr.Krishnan that the Order dated 27.9.2001 is vitiated as it has been passed by an officer who did not give a hearing to the parties. This is clearly a case of an institutional hearing. The direction has been issued by the High Court for a hearing to be given by the Central Government. There was no direction that any particular officer or an authority was to give a hearing. In such circumstances, the orders are generally passed in the relevant files and may often be communicated by an officer other than the officer who gave the hearing.

                  71. The legality of institutional hearing has been accepted in England since Local Govt. Board v. Arlidge [1915 AC 120 : 1914-15 All ER Rep 1 (HL)]. The aforesaid judgment was quoted with approval by this Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose [AIR 1956 SC 285 : 1955 (2) SCR 1331]. This Court approved the following passage from the speech of the Lord Chancellor in the aforesaid case: (Arlidge case [1915 AC 120 : 1914-15 All ER Rep 1 (HL)], AC p. 133) "My Lords, I concur in this view of the position of an administrative body to which the decision of a question in dispute between parties has been entrusted. The result of its inquiry must, as I have said, be taken, in the absence of directions in the statute to the contrary, to be intended to be reached by its ordinary procedure. In the case of the Local Government Board it is not doubtful what this procedure is. The Minister at the head of the Board is directly responsible to Parliament like other Ministers. He is responsible not only for what he himself does but for all that is done in his department. The volume of work entrusted to him is very great and he cannot do the great bulk of it himself. He is expected to obtain his materials vicariously through his officials, and he has discharged his duty if he sees that they obtain these materials for him properly. To try to extend his duty beyond this and to insist that he and other members of the Board should do everything personally would be to impair his efficiency. Unlike a Judge in a court he is not only at liberty but is compelled to rely on the assistance of his staff."

                  In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is difficult to accept the submissions of Mr.Krishnan that the Order dated 27.09.2001 suffers from any legal or procedural infirmity.”

                  Institutional hearings are followed by many institutions in India for several decades and Hon'ble Supreme Court has approved it in plethora of judgments. In the Indian context of Administrative Law also, the practice of institutional hearing is thus accustomed and accepted. Unless any serious prejudice caused in the process is established, hearing offered by an institution as part of its decision - making procedure cannot be held as vitiated solely for the reason that the final decision was not taken by the authority who heard the party directly. Applying the principles of natural justice instinctively without analysing whether any prejudice was actually caused may lead to flawed fallouts.

                  In the instant case the Appellant has not established any such precise case of genuine prejudice on account of the procedure adopted by the Respondent Corporation.

                  13. We also find no merit in the contention raised by Mr. Adarsh Kumar regarding the delay in taking the decision by the Respondent Corporation. Appellant has no case that any change of circumstances had happened between the date of hearing and the date on which the impugned decision was taken. He has not pointed out any aspect to have been forgotten or omitted to be addressed by the competent authority of the Corporation on account of the delay. Therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the Appellant on account of the time taken by the Corporation in taking a decision in the matter. It is apposite in this connection to refer to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ossein and Gelatine Manufacturers' Association of India v. Modi Alkalies and Chemicals Limited and another, [(1989) 4 SCC 264]: -

                  "5. On the issue of natural justice, we are satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant by any of the circumstances pointed out by the appellant. It is true that the order has been passed by an officer different from the one who heard the parties. However, the proceedings were not in the nature of formal judicial hearings. They were in the nature of meetings and full minutes were recorded of all the points discussed at each meeting. It has not been brought to our notice that any salient point urged by the petitioners has been missed. On the contrary, the order itself summarises and deals with all the important objections of the petitioners. This circumstance has not, therefore, caused any prejudice to the petitioners. The delay in the passing of the order also does not, in the above circumstances, vitiate the order in the absence of any suggestion that there has been a change of circumstances in the interregnum brought to the notice of the authorities or that the authority passing the order has forgotten to deal with any particular aspect by reason of such delay "

                  Unless an explicit case of any flaw being caused on account of delay is made out, delay as such cannot be accepted as a reason to find fault with the decision taken.

14. By relying on the judgment of the Division Bench in Baby Girija [2025 (2) KLT 17], the learned Single Judge arrived at a conclusion that the issue of delay as well as the issue pertaining to institutional hearing is in favour of the 1st respondent BPCL. While going through the principles laid down in Baby Girija [2025 (2) KLT 17] as mentioned above, we find no reason to take a different stand, though the defect noted in Baby Girija [2025 (2) KLT 17] is not the same as that of the present case.

15. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the petitioners have no case in the pleadings that they were prejudiced in a particular manner by the delay caused in taking a decision by the BPCL after the personal hearing. They have no contention that at the time of personal hearing they were denied opportunity to explain their part. The decision of an expert committee consisting of Zonal Head (GM-south) and two other General Managers of the 1st respondent and the decisions taken on different levels, mentioned in the counter affidavit filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 3, is the internal decision-making process, which is inevitable in a company having an administrative setup at different levels. The petitioners cannot claim that these internal decisions in the administrative setup of the company ought to have been served on him, especially when Ext.P6 is a detailed decision with reasoning on each point. In fact, in Ext.P6 explanation offered on each point by the petitioners is dealt in detail, and answered with sufficient reasoning. The clarifications sought from the Legal Metrology department mentioned in the counter affidavit of respondents 1 and 3 are also for the purpose of putting up the matter before the internal authorities of BPCL in the administrative set up, as evident from the reading of the counter affidavit, and it cannot be said as collection of additional material or evidence. Therefore, the petitioners cannot contend that natural justice is denied to them on that count.

                  Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no ground to hold the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge as perverse or patently illegal, which warrants the interference of this Court by exercising appellate jurisdiction.

                  In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed.