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CDJ 2026 Ker HC 336 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : WP(C) No. 42400 of 2024
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.P. MOHAMMED NIAS
Parties : M. Fathima & Others Versus Permanent Lok Adalath For Public Utility Services, Thiruvananthapuram Represented By Its Chairman & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioners: T. Reshma, Francy John, H. Visakh, Abhirami Ani Krishna, Megha Sree Bala, Advocates. For the Respondents: B. Pramod, SC.
Date of Judgment : 27-02-2026
Head Note :-
Electricity Act, 2003 - Section 2(15) -

Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 17601,
Judgment :-

1. The petitioners herein challenge Ext. P8 order passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat (1st respondent). The petitioners were the complainants before the 1st respondent, seeking damages and compensation for the loss of life of their parents and the husband of the 4th petitioner due to electrocution, by filing Exts. P5, P6 and P7 complaints. The brief facts are as follows:

2. On 14.06.2021 at about 9.00 p.m., the father of the 1st petitioner heard his wife screaming. When he rushed to the spot, he saw his wife lying on the ground. Without knowing the gravity of the accident, he attempted to rescue her and suffered an electric shock. Thereafter, the neighbour, who is the husband of the 4th petitioner herein, rushed to the spot on hearing the scream and, while attempting to rescue them, also suffered an electric shock and lost his life.

3. It is submitted that the deceased Mr Santhosh, father of petitioners 1 to 3, was a “consumer” under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the “Electricity Act”), and had been regularly paying electricity bills without default. The accident occurred when the wife of the deceased attempted to remove clothes from the ‘azha’ and suffered an electric shock from a nearby twisted GI cable kept in the verandah of the house. The neighbours, realising that it was a case of electrocution, immediately turned off the main switch. However, the supply was not completely disconnected, and it was later realised that there was leakage of electricity from another source. The matter was reported to the nearby KSEB office. The officials found that the leakage was from the supply wire connected to the post. The victims were taken to the hospital, but they succumbed to their injuries.

4. Ext. P1 FIR was registered. On the very next day, officials from the 2nd and 3rd respondents visited the accident site, conducted an enquiry and prepared Ext.P3 site mahazar without examining any family members of the victims or eye-witnesses. Ext.P2 report of the Electrical Inspectorate dated 05.07.2021 was prepared, and it is submitted that vital aspects relating to the cause of the accident were deliberately concealed. After the death of their parents, petitioners 1 to 3 became orphans and were moved to a Balika Mandiram. Considering their financial condition and the urgent need for compensation, they approached the 1st respondent by filing Exts. P5, P6 and P7 complaints.

5. It is submitted that, without properly considering the arguments of the petitioners and without following the procedure under Section 22D of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, the 1st respondent dismissed the petitions and passed Ext. P8 order dated 20.02.2024. The specific contention of the petitioners is that the 1st respondent relied solely on minor discrepancies in the deposition of PW1 during cross-examination regarding the source of the power leakage.

6. It is further submitted that the respondents never denied that the parents of the petitioners were electrocuted due to a supply wire that had not been properly maintained. The contradictions in the statements of the respondents, police officials, site mahazar, Electrical Inspector’s report, and other records, which were specifically highlighted before the 1st respondent, were not considered while issuing Ext. P8. It is contended that the responsibility to supply electrical energy is conferred on the respondent Board, and if such energy causes injury or death, the primary liability to compensate lies with the supplier. This principle falls under the doctrine of strict liability as laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 LR (3) 330).

7. It is submitted that the discrepancies among the documents are material. The site mahazar states that there was a break in the wire and that the broken wire was in contact with the tin sheet. In Ext. A3, however, the respondent states that there was a twisted black and white wire and that only the black wire was broken, not the entire wire. The FIR refers to the whole wire, while Ext. A2 mentions only a phase wire. Ext. A4 police report states that the leakage originated from a broken wire. However, the photographs show no such broken wire, and in the photographer’s deposition, there is no statement that the wire was broken. It is further submitted that any person or organisation dealing with hazardous activities must take adequate precautions to prevent harm to others. A person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life is liable in tort to compensate for injury caused to others, irrespective of negligence or carelessness.

8. It is submitted that the respondents alleged that an extension was taken to an outside bathroom for lighting a lamp, and that this caused the leakage. Rule 29(1) of the Central Electricity Authority (Measures relating to Safety and Electric Supply) Regulations, 2010 stipulates the precautions to be adopted by consumers and provides that no electrical installation shall be made except by a licensed electrical contractor, except for the replacement of lamps, fans, fuses, switches, and domestic appliances not exceeding 250V. In the present case, no such alteration was carried out, and the alleged lamp fitting did not exceed 250V. The Kerala Electricity Supply Code, 2014 permits extension of electric supply through the meter to adjacent rooms, toilets or sheds within the same premises. Therefore, the respondents’ contention is untenable.

9. Another contention raised by the respondents is that the consumers were liable to install and maintain an Earth Leakage Circuit Breaker (ELCB)/Residual Current Circuit Breaker (RCCB). The petitioners submit that ELCB/RCCB are not defined under the Electricity Act, 2003, the 2010 Regulations, or the Supply Code. The respondents themselves admitted in their written statement that installation of the same is not a mandatory obligation on the part of consumers. It is the specific case of the petitioners that the actual leakage originated from the supply wire connected to the electrical post No. KJMP 111/3 and passed through the white PVC pipe fitted on the southern side of the house of the deceased Santhosh.

10. Rules 13(1), 16(1) and 19(2) of the Supply Code prescribe general safety requirements and cast a duty upon the supplier to ensure safety and take reasonable precautions. Rule 16(1) mandates that the supplier shall provide and maintain on the consumer’s premises a suitable earth terminal in an accessible position. Regulation 34(1) empowers the Electrical Inspector or supplier to inspect and take necessary steps if leakage is suspected. Regulation 46 mandates that all apparatus, cables and supply lines shall be maintained in good condition and tested periodically in accordance with relevant BIS standards. There is no case by the respondents that any periodical inspection was conducted. Hence, the respondents fall squarely within the ambit of strict liability.

11. The petitioners rely on M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [1987 (1) SCC 395] and M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari [2002 (2) SCC 162] to contend that in cases of death by electrocution, the doctrine of strict liability applies, and the defence that a third party committed mischief by diverting electricity would not absolve the Board of liability.

12. Rule 24 of the Kerala Supply Code provides that the service line, meter and associated equipment shall be deemed to be the property of the licensee. Even if an ELCB/RCCB or other protective device is installed within the consumer’s premises, the supplier retains the authority to inspect and disconnect the supply upon detecting anomalies. Rule 29(1) and Rule 30(1) of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 mandate that all electric supply lines and apparatus must be constructed, maintained and operated in a manner ensuring safety, and that the supplier must take due precautions to avoid danger on consumer premises. These provisions are mandatory and deal with general safety requirements. The conduct of the respondents demonstrates negligence and failure to discharge statutory duties.

13. Petitioner’s also rely on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. v. Heirs of Chandrikaben (2017 KHC 5296), wherein it was held that once strict liability is attracted, the Board is liable to pay compensation irrespective of whether precautions were taken, and allegations of contributory negligence such as attaching a clothesline to an angle are misconceived. In the above circumstances, the petitioners seek an order quashing Ext. P8 passed by the 1st respondent.

14. In the counter affidavit filed by respondents 2 and 3, it is stated that the accident occurred when the deceased Ramla came into contact with a tin roofing sheet that had become electrically charged due to a broken wire. It is submitted that the Permanent Lok Adalat (PLA), after evaluating the facts, evidence and records, dismissed the complaints, holding that there was no negligence or failure on the part of KSEBL in providing adequate safety measures, nor any lack of supervision. Therefore, the petitioners were found not entitled to any compensation. The decision was rendered by the PLA on the merits after considering the evidence adduced by the parties. The evidence consisted of the testimonies of six witnesses examined as PW1 to PW6 and Exhibits A1 to A27 marked on the side of the respondents. It is contended that, since the PLA has rendered its decision on the complaint, the issue has attained finality under Section 22E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, and therefore no writ petition is maintainable. Reliance is placed on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Sinha [(2008) 7 SCC 454] and Canara Bank v. G.S. Jayarama [(2018) 11 SCC 471].

15. It is further stated that the electric leakage did not originate from the supply installation of KSEB but from the internal wiring of the victims’ house, and that there was no negligence on the part of the KSEB officers. It is alleged that the deceased Santhosh Kumar had taken a temporary connection using wires with multiple joints running through the tin roofing sheet of the building without the knowledge or consent of KSEB. He allegedly failed to take adequate safety measures and used substandard materials to extend electricity to various parts of the building without informing the Board.

16. According to the respondents, the accident occurred when deceased Ramla came into contact with a rolled GI wire, approximately 1.35 metres above ground level, on the northern extension of the building, which was in contact with the tin roofing sheet. Upon receiving information, the Sub Engineer immediately reached the spot with his staff and disconnected the supply. Officials of KSEB and the Electrical Inspectorate inspected the premises and conducted a detailed enquiry into the cause of the accident. The inspection allegedly established that supply to the premises was provided by KSEB through a weatherproof wire without any joints or breaks. The said wire was not in contact with any metal part of the building and did not contribute to the accident.

17. It is stated that the inspection revealed that inside the house, wiring had been extended to all parts of the building using PVC and flexible wires with several joints running through the metal roofing sheet. The supply was also extended to the bathroom using flexible wires laid over the metal sheet. The said wire was found to be broken, and the broken portion was in contact with the metal roofing sheet, causing leakage that contributed to the accident.

18. It is contended that the Board is liable to provide supply only up to the “point of supply.” Regulation 2(64) of the Kerala Electricity Supply Code defines “point of supply” as the incoming terminal of the cut-out installed by the consumer in the case of low- tension consumers, and the incoming terminal of the control switchgear installed by the consumer in the case of high-tension and extra-high-tension consumers. Therefore, it is argued that the consumer is liable to install and maintain ELCB/RCCB in their installation. It is further stated that, with effect from 01.04.2014, in compliance with Regulation 15(5) of the Kerala Electricity Supply Code, the respondent has ensured that no consumer is given supply without installing ELCB/RCCB. Installations beyond the energy meter are to be properly maintained by the consumer, and it is the duty of the consumer to install and maintain ELCB/RCCB to prevent electric shocks and leakages. The report prepared by the Electrical Inspectorate allegedly reveals that a large number of temporary installations had been made in the building using wires with multiple joints running through the tin roofing sheet.

19. It is further submitted that, for the purpose of testing the source of electric leakage, the electric supply was restored by reconnecting the service wire to the electric post, with the main switch in the “off” position, after removing the distribution fuses. The tin roofing sheet and the curled GI wire hung at the north- eastern corner of the northern extension of the building were tested, and no leakage was detected. Thereafter, the cut-out fuse was inserted while keeping the main switch in the “off” position, and the tin roofing sheet and GI wire were tested again; no leakage was detected. However, when the main switch was turned on with the distribution fuses in place, leakage was detected in both the tin roofing sheet and the GI wire. When the test was repeated after removing the distribution fuse, no leakage was found. From this testing process, it is contended that the leakage originated not from the supply installation of KSEBL but from the internal wiring of the victims’ house.

20. The Electrical Inspector, in exercise of powers under Section 161 of the Electricity Act, prepared Ext. P2 electrical accident enquiry report pursuant to the inspection conducted on 15.06.2021. The Electrical Inspectorate also concluded that there was no negligence, lapse or default on the part of KSEBL. It is further submitted that the consumer is liable to maintain installations beyond the energy meter in accordance with the safety standards prescribed by law. Wiring and installations must be carried out and maintained by a licensed electrical contractor using standard equipment.

21. It is stated that responsibility would lie partly with the deceased Sri Santhosh Kumar, who had been residing in the house for the past ten years and had made several unsafe temporary installations without installing a 30 mA sensitive ELCB/RCCB. Section 161 of the Electricity Act deals with the powers of the Electrical Inspector to conduct enquiries and report the cause of accidents. It provides that if any accident occurs in connection with the generation, transmission, distribution, supply or use of electricity resulting in loss of human or animal life, the Electrical Inspector or such person appointed shall enquire into and report the cause of the accident. This section casts a duty on the Electrical Inspector to verify whether safety provisions have been complied with. The report submitted after inspection states that there was no negligence, lapse or default on the part of KSEBL.

22. It is further stated that the doctrine of strict liability invoked by the petitioners is not applicable in the present case, as the accident did not arise from any installation belonging to the Board. It is also submitted that a compassionate appointment is governed by Board Order No. PS.1.3146/83 dated 29.04.1985, issued at Thiruvananthapuram, which does not contain any provision for the appointment of the petitioners.

23. Heard Smt. Reshma T., learned counsel for the petitioners, and Sri. B Pramod, learned Standing Counsel for KSEB.

24. A perusal of Ext. P8 common order passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat would show that the dismissal of the complaints was primarily founded on its appreciation of the technical evidence regarding the source of leakage. The PLA has relied substantially on the accident enquiry report submitted by the Electrical Inspector under Section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the oral testimony of RW1 to conclude that the service wire drawn from the electric post to the premises was intact, without break or joint, and was not in contact with any metallic portion of the building. The PLA has further recorded that, on conducting site testing by restoring supply in stages, no leakage was detected when the main switch and distribution fuses were kept off, and that leakage was noticed only when the internal wiring system was energised. On that factual premise, the PLA concluded that the origin of the leakage was not from the Board’s service line but from the internal wiring within the consumer’s premises.

25. The reasoning of the PLA proceeds on the basis that the responsibility of the licensee extends only up to the “point of supply” as defined under the Kerala Electricity Supply Code, and that installations beyond the energy meter are to be installed and maintained by the consumer. It has also taken note of the finding that electricity had been extended to various portions of the house, including the bathroom, by means of flexible wires with multiple joints running over the tin roofing sheet, and that a broken internal wire had come into contact with the roofing sheet, thereby energising the GI wire used for drying clothes. On such an appreciation of evidence, the PLA rejected the contention that the accident emanated from any defect in the supply line maintained by KSEBL and consequently held that the principle of strict liability would not be attracted. It is on this line of reasoning that the complaints were dismissed, holding that no negligence or deficiency in service on the part of the Board stood established.

26. On a perusal of the report of the Electrical Inspectorate, it is evident that a detailed technical inspection was conducted at the site, including staged energisation, and it was categorically recorded that the service wire drawn from the post to the premises was intact, without snapping, joint defects, or contact with the structure. The Inspectorate specifically noted that flexible wires had been drawn over the GI sheet roofing, that one such internal wire was found broken and in contact with the sheet, and that the earthing arrangement within the premises was defective, thereby concluding that the leakage originated from internal wiring defects and not from any fault in the supply line maintained by the Board.

27. On a reading of the police report, it is seen that while the death was recorded as an unnatural death due to electrocution and the presence of electrical leakage at the premises was noted, there was no conclusive finding as to the source of such leakage nor any technical attribution of fault to the external service line. Thus, the contemporaneous materials disclose a clear technical finding by the competent statutory authority attributing the causative leakage to internal installation defects, whereas the police report merely establishes the factum of electrocution without determining responsibility for its origin.

28. Whilst the report of the Electrical Inspectorate has been heavily relied upon in the impugned order, as also by the KSEB in its counter affidavit and adverted to in the police records, it is imperative that the said authority be impleaded as a necessary party to the proceedings. The Electrical Inspectorate is the competent statutory authority entrusted with the technical determination of the cause of electrical accidents, and its findings form the very substratum of the conclusions drawn in the impugned order. In the absence of its presence as a party, the adjudication remains incomplete, particularly when its report is treated as determinative of liability. This is not a matter to be resolved on technicalities of pleadings or procedural convenience, especially when the incident has resulted in the loss of three lives. The adjudicatory process must therefore be comprehensive, fair and informed by the participation of the appropriate technical authority.

29. It is further to be noted that the Permanent Lok Adalat has proceeded entirely on an examination of negligence and statutory demarcation of responsibility up to the “point of supply”, without adverting to the well-settled principles governing strict liability in cases of electrocution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari (supra), following the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, has categorically held that where an authority undertakes a hazardous activity involving transmission of electrical energy, liability to compensate arises irrespective of negligence, the basis being the foreseeable risk inherent in such activity. The principle has been reiterated in Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. v. Heirs of Chandrikaben (supra), wherein it was held that once strict liability is attracted, the question whether reasonable precautions were taken becomes immaterial. This Court in Varghese v. Kerala State Electricity Board [2013 (1) KHC 816] has also recognised that in matters involving electricity supply, the inquiry shifts from “whose fault” to “whose risk”.

30. A perusal of Ext. P8 would indicate that the aforesaid binding principles governing strict liability have not been adverted to or analysed. The Permanent Lok Adalat confined its enquiry to negligence and demarcation of responsibility at the point of supply, without examining whether, even in the absence of proved negligence, liability could arise having regard to the inherently hazardous nature of electricity and the statutory obligations of the licensee. The non-consideration of this settled position of law constitutes a material omission going to the root of the adjudication. Further, in the first instance, the Permanent Lok Adalat is the appropriate forum to consider all issues, factual and legal and therefore be reconsidered comprehensively after impleading the Electrical Inspectorate or other parties PLA may deem fit and affording full opportunity to the parties.

31. As a result, the impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Permanent Lok Adalat for fresh consideration after impleading the Electrical Inspectorate as a necessary party. The said authority shall be allowed to place its findings and clarify the basis of its report, and the parties shall be given the opportunity to address the same. The Permanent Lok Adalat shall thereafter pass a reasoned order in accordance with law, untrammelled by any observations contained in its earlier order. A decision, as directed above, shall be taken within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

                  The writ petition is disposed of as above.

 
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