1] The petitioners have filed the present Writ Petition thereby praying for quashing and setting aside the order dated 29.1.2021 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.16/2018, whereby the order passed by the Tahsildar, Akrani in a proceeding initiated under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the instance of the Officer incharge of Dhadgaon Police Station, came to be quashed and set aside thereby holding that the respondents herein are in possession of the disputed land bearing Survey No. 44 area 4.29 Hectors and Survey No.48 area 3.13 Hectors.

2] The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the revision against an order passed in exercise of powers under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not maintainable.

3] The learned APP strongly opposed the said submission on the ground that the order passed under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure finally decides the right of the parties and is not an interlocutory order and as such revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code is maintainable.

4] I have gone through the impugned order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shahada in Criminal Revision No.16/2018. The learned Revisional Court has considered in detail objections raised by the respondents to the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure initiated at the behest of the Police Officer particularly when the petitioners herein have already filed Regular Civil Suit No.2 of 2017 for partition before the learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Dhadgaon. The Executive Magistrate / Tahsildar, Dhadgaon, thus, ought not to have passed the impugned order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in view of pendency of the said suit between the parties.

5] The learned Revisional Court has further relied upon the provisions of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and has come to the conclusion that in view of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the concerned Magistrate shall not go into merits or the claims of any of the parties to possess the disputed property and is required only to decide as to which party was in possession of the subject of the dispute on the date of the order made by him under sub- Section (1).

6] Perusal of the order passed by the Tahsildar, Akrani would show that the Tahsildar, Akrani had found the petitioners to be in possession only on the ground that they are entitled for obtaining possession of the said agricultural land and accordingly passed the impugned order under Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code by restraining the petitioners herein from causing any obstruction to the petitioners herein in its possession over the said agricultural lands until the said party is evicted lawfully. No reasoning stated in the impugned order as to how the Tahsildar has reached to a conclusion that the petitioners herein were in possession of the said land. From the record it could be seen that the respondents were in cultivating possession of the agricultural land Survey Nos. 44 and 48 since as long back as on 26.12.1939 through their ancestor Satya Kakdya Bhil (the father of respondent nos.2 to 5 and grand father of respondent nos. 6 to 8] and after his death on 16.05.1971, the respondent nos. 2 to 8 succeeded to the said agricultural lands and are in cultivating possession thereof. Thus, after taking into consideration the fact that there is already civil suit filed for partition and the same is pending before the Civil Court at Dhadgaon in respect of the said agricultural land, the findings arrived at by the learned Tahsildar merely on the basis of entitlement of the petitioners herein to be in possession of the land on the date of passing of the order was rightly set aside by the learned Revisional Court.

7] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of in case of M. Siddique Vs. Mahant Suresh Das, reported in (2020) 1 SCC 1 observed as under:-

                   299. Where a suit is instituted for possession or for declaration of title before a competent civil court, the proceedings under Section 145 should not continue. This Court has analysed the above proposition of law in the following cases:

                   299.1. In Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey, (2000) 4 SCC 440, S.N. Variava, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court held thus :

                   “12. … The law on this subject-matter has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ram Sumer PuriMahant v. State of U.P (1985) 1 SCC 427. In this case it has been held as follows :

                   ‘2. … When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. … parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of Receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue….’ ”

                   299.2. The Court in Amresh Tiwari [Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey, (2000) 4 SCC 440 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 806] rejected the submission that the principle in Ram Sumer PuriMahant v. State of U.P. [Ram Sumer PuriMahant v. State of U.P., (1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98] will apply only after the civil court has adjudicated on the issue:

                   “13. We are unable to accept the submission that the principles laid down in Ram Sumer case [Ram Sumer PuriMahant v. State of U.P., (1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98] would only apply if the civil court has already adjudicated on the dispute regarding the property and given a finding. In our view Ram Sumer case is laying down that multiplicity of litigation should be avoided as it is not in the interest of the parties and public time would be wasted over meaningless litigation. On this principle it has been held that when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute, the parallel proceedings i.e. Section 145 proceedings should not continue.”

Thus, in view of pendency of the civil suit between the petitioners and the respondents, particularly taking into consideration the fact that the civil suit is filed by the petitioners seeking partition and separate possession, the proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code was not maintainable. The findings arrived at by the learned Revisional Court does not call for any interference of this Court under its supervisory jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Constitution of India.

8] The other ground raised by the petitioner for interference in the impugned order is that revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the order passed by the Magistrate, exercising powers under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is not maintainable. The provisions of Section 397 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code would clearly show that the only prohibition for entertaining revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code is in relation to the interlocutory order passed in any other appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. The revision filed under Section 397 (1) of Criminal Procedure Code by the respondent herein was against the final order passed under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the learned Magistrate. The said prohibition under Section 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code against filing of the revision would therefore not apply in the present case. The order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a final order, deciding as to who was in possession on the date of passing of the order and after such decision, the entire proceedings terminates. Thus, in my opinion the order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be said to be an interlocutory order for the purposes of the bar under section 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code . The ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is, therefore, misconceived and liable to be rejected.

The Criminal Writ Petition is, therefore, devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. Hence, the present Writ Petition is hereby dismissed.

9] The observations by this Court are prima facie made with an intention to decide the present Criminal Writ Petition against the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Police Station Officer and the same shall not influence any other proceedings pending before any other Court.