Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The sole accused in S.C. No.894/2017 on the file of the Sessions Court, Kozhikode, has preferred this appeal challenging the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed against him for the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The prosecution case in brief is as follows:

The accused and the deceased Subair were brothers, residing together in their ancestral house bearing No.IX/2015 of Valayam Grama Panchayath. Prior to the incident, the deceased had purchased a pair of goats. But a dog attacked and killed one of the said goats, and the other sustained injuries. Following the said incident, on 03.05.2017, the deceased tied the injured goat in the verandah of the house to save it from the dogs' attack. The accused, who disliked the same, on the same day, at about 7 p.m. questioned the deceased, which resulted in a sudden quarrel between them. During the quarrel, the accused went inside the house, took a knife, placed it in his loin and came back to the courtyard of the house. On seeing this, the deceased took a rafter. Then the accused snatched the rafter from the deceased and beat him on the head. Thereafter, the accused took the knife and stabbed the deceased in the chest. After the incident, though the injured was taken to the hospital, he succumbed to the injuries. Hence, the accused is alleged to have committed the offences mentioned above.

3. Upon completion of the investigation, the final report was laid before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nadapuram. Being satisfied that the case is one triable exclusively by a Court of Session, the learned Magistrate, after complying with all the necessary formalities, committed the case to the Court of Session, Kozhikode, under section 209 of Cr.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge, having taken cognizance, issued process to the accused, and in response to the same, the accused, who was under judicial custody, was produced before the trial court. On production of the accused, the learned Sessions Judge, after hearing both sides under section 227 of Cr.P.C. and upon perusal of the records, framed a written charge against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 of IPC. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. During the trial, from the side of the prosecution, PW1 to PW24 were examined and marked Exts.P1 to P50. MO1 and MO6 were exhibited and identified. After the completion of the prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., during which he denied all the incriminating materials brought out in evidence against him. Thereafter, both sides were heard under Section 232 of Cr.P.C., and since it was not a fit case to acquit the accused under the said provision, the accused was directed to enter on his defence and to adduce any evidence that he may have in support thereof. However, no evidence whatsoever was produced from the side of the accused. Thereafter, both sides were heard in detail, and finally, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 302 of the IPC, and he was convicted. The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- for offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC. In default of payment of the fine, the accused was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The accused was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. In default of payment of the fine, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Fine amount, if paid or realised, Rs.50,000/- was ordered to be given to PW1 and her two children under Section 357(1)(c) of Cr.P.C. Furthermore, the trial court had directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the District Legal Services Authority concerned and recommended to fix and pay appropriate compensation as per the victim compensation scheme provided under Section 357-A of Cr.P.C. Challenging the said finding of guilt, conviction, and the order of sentence passed, the accused has preferred this appeal.

5. We heard Sri.Thareeq Anver K., the learned legal aid counsel appearing for the appellant, and Sri. T. R. Renjith, the learned Public Prosecutor.

6. This is a case of fratricide. The law was set in motion in this case on the strength of the statement given by a neighbour of the deceased to PW22, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, Valayam Police Station. Acting upon this initial statement, PW17, the Sub Inspector of Police, Valayam Police Station, registered the First Information Report (FIR), marked as Ext.P25, alleging the commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Following the registration of the FIR, the Circle Inspector of Police, Nadapuram (PW23), conducted investigation in the case, and after compiling the evidence and materials collected, he filed the final report before the Judicial Magistrate.

7. When the neighbour of the deceased, the first informant, was examined as PW21, he deposed as follows:

                  He was acquainted with both the accused and the deceased, who are brothers. On 03.05.2017, between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., while he was watching television in his house, he heard a loud noise emanating from the house of the accused. On hearing the same, he rushed to the accused’s house. Upon reaching there, he found Subair, the deceased, lying in the courtyard of the house in a pool of blood. At that time, apart from the accused, the wife (PW1), children, and mother of the deceased were present at the scene. He also noticed the presence of neighbours, namely Nadira, Shahina (PW19), and Abdulla. As directed by Abdulla, he took Abdulla’s jeep and took Subair to VIMS Hospital, Kallachi. The accused, the wife of the deceased, her children, Abdulla, and one Rashid (PW18) accompanied him in the said vehicle. After examining Subair, the doctor informed them that his condition was serious and referred him to the Medical College Hospital. Accordingly, Subair was taken to the Malabar Medical College Hospital, Modakkallur in an ambulance. He did not go to the Medical College hospital. PW21 further deposed that at the hospital, the wife of the deceased stated that it was the accused who had stabbed her husband and that he should not be spared. Subsequently, he came to know that Subair had succumbed to his injuries. Then he immediately went to the police station and gave a statement to the police. Ext.P28 is the statement so given by him.

8. The crucial evidence which the prosecution relies upon to prove the occurrence is the evidence of PW1 and PW4, the wife and son respectively of the deceased. When the wife of the deceased was examined as PW1, she deposed that the accused in this case is her husband’s brother. During the period of occurrence, she, along with her husband and children were residing in the tharavad house where her mother-in-law and the accused were also residing. The incident in this case occurred on 03.05.2017. Prior to the incident, her husband purchased two goats, out of which one was attacked and killed by a dog. In order to save the other goat from dog’s attack, her husband tied it in the verandah of the house. The accused, who disliked the same, asked her husband to remove the goat from the verandah. Then her husband replied that he would remove the goat on the next day after making a shed. Then there occurred a wordy altercation between both of them, and her husband started to search the number of the police to call them. Then the accused, who entered inside the house, returned with a knife. By that time, her husband, who came to the courtyard of the house, took a wooden rafter. Suddenly, the accused snatched the said rafter and struck on her husband’s head using the same. Thereafter the accused took a knife from his loin and stabbed on her husband’s chest. Then her husband fell down. When she cried aloud, the neighbours, namely Abdulla and Shahid, Najira and Ayisha rushed to the spot. Then her husband was lying unconscious in the courtyard and the accused was standing in the verandah. Then, one Nidhinlal (PW21) came with Abdulla’s jeep. Then she, her children, Rashid (PW18) and Abdulla took her husband to a hospital in the said jeep. At the compulsion of the neighbours, the accused also came to the hospital in the said jeep. Her husband was initially taken to VIMS hospital, Kallachi. After examining her husband, the doctor referred him to the Medical College Hospital and accordingly, he was taken to Malabar Medical College in an ambulance. After examining her husband, the doctor confirmed her husband’s death. According to PW1, when the wordy altercation between her husband and the accused started, she also came out of the house to the courtyard. PW1 identified the knife used by the accused to stab her husband, and the same was marked as MO1. The rafter with which the accused struck on the head of the deceased was also identified by PW1, and the same was marked as MO2. The shirt and dothi worn by her husband at the time of the occurrence were marked as MO3 and MO4, respectively. The lungi worn by the accused at the time of commission of the offence was also identified by PW1 and marked as MO5.

9. When the minor child of the deceased was examined as PW4, he deposed in tune with the evidence given by PW1. The evidence of PW1 and PW4 regarding the material aspects of the incident is mutually corroborative and free from contradictions and omissions, even of a minor nature.

10. Before examining the reliability and credibility of the eyewitnesses’ evidence in detail, it is appropriate to consider the medical evidence adduced regarding the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased and the cause of death. According to the prosecution case, immediately after the incident, the injured was taken to VIMS Hospital, Kallachi, and thereafter to the Malabar Medical College Hospital. When the casualty medical officer of the Medical College Hospital was examined as PW20, he deposed that on 03.05.2017, while he was working as the casualty medical officer, one Mr. Subair (the deceased) was brought before him by one Muhammad Rashid (PW18). PW20 stated that, upon examination, he noted a deep lacerated wound over the lower chest and that the injured was brought dead to the casualty. The examination report prepared by PW20 was marked as Ext.P27.

11. The doctor who conducted autopsy examination when examined as PW16, deposed that on 04.05.2017, while he was working as Assistant Professor and Assistant Police Surgeon, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government Medical College, Kozhikode, he conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the deceased in this case. Ext.P24 is the postmortem certificate issued by PW16. Referring to Ext.P24 postmortem certificate, PW16, deposed that in the autopsy examination, he had noticed the following antemortem injuries:-

                  1.       Scratch abrasion, 2.5cm long, curvilinear, transversely placed with convexity facing downwards over outer aspect of right upper arm, 7.5cm below tip of right shoulder.

                  2.       Multiple abrasions, over an area 12x2-14cm, involving back and both sides of right elbow and forearm, lower end, 19cm above right wrist.

                  3.       Abraded contusion, 3x2x1cm, on the front aspect of left mid thigh, 14cm above knee.

                  4.       Multiple skin contusions, over an area 12x2-4cm, over the inner aspect of left upper arm and elbow, lower end at elbow.

                  5.       Incised, punctured, penetrated wound, 3x0.5cm (maximum possible approximation), vertically oblique on the front of lower chest on right side, upper outer end 2.5cm to the right of midline and 19 cm below right collar bone. The margins of the wound were sharply cut. Upper end of the wound was blunt and lower end seen sharply cut and showed minimal tailing towards right. There was surrounding skin contusion, over an area 4x2 cm, broader around the upper and inner aspect of the wound. This wound entered into the mediastinum by penetrating the body of sternum over its lower part (2.8x1.3 cm) just above the xiphisternum and produced a cut over from portion of pericardium, 3.5x1cm (maximum possible approximation). The wound track reached to the right atrium, producing a cut over its anterior wall, 3x0.5x1cm and produced a through and through perforasion over the root of aorta. The right coronary artery seen transected at its origin. The wound track seen entered into the left atrium by penetrating its anterior wall. Pericardial sac contained 200 ml of fluid blood and 100 gm of clotted blood. Right chest cavity, contained 600 ml of fluid blood. Mediastinum showed thick blood infiltration. The wound was directed from right to left, below upwards and front to back. The total minimum depth of the wound=Anterior chest wall (1.5cm) + Sternum (1.3cm) Pericardium (0.1cm)+Right atrium (1cm)+Aorta (0.2+0.2=0.4cm)+ Left atrium (0.5cm) = 4.8cm.

                  6.       Scalp contusion, 5x2.5x0.3cm, over right parietal eminence.

                  7.       Contusion, 0.5x0.3x0.2cm, inner mucosa of lower lip on right side, 1.5cm outer to midline.

12.    During examination before court after referring to Ext.P24 postmortem certificate, PW16 opined that the death was due to the incised, punctured, penetrated (stab) wound sustained to the chest entering into the heart (injury No.5). Likewise, when PW16 was confronted with MO1 knife, the alleged weapon of offence, he deposed that injury No. 5 noted by him could be caused by a weapon like MO1. Furthermore, when confronted with MO2 wooden rafter, PW16 deposed that injury No.6 could be inflicted by using a weapon like MO2. A conjoint reading of the above-discussed evidence of PW20, PW16 and the post-mortem certificate issued clearly demonstrates that the death resulted from the incised, penetrating injury sustained to the chest, and that the nature of the death was homicidal.

13. One of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the doctor who conducted the autopsy did not expressly state that the injury observed during the post-mortem examination was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. While considering this contention, it is significant to note that the autopsy surgeon categorically deposed that it was Injury No. 5 that resulted in the death of the deceased. It is true that the doctor did not specifically state that the said injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. However, the question of whether a medical expert must invariably, in every case, state that an injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is no longer res integra. In Sannappa Rayappa Jadge v. State of Karnataka [1994 SCC (Cri) 1167], the Supreme Court held that “the failure of the doctor to specifically state that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death was immaterial.”

14. Likewise, in Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala [(2024) 8 SCC 102], the Supreme Court clarified that the medical expert's opinion about whether the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is highly relevant but not mandatory for establishing murder. However, the absence of a specific statement by the doctor that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature does not preclude the possibility of convicting an accused under Section 302 IPC, if other evidence indicates that the injury was likely to cause death. In State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammed Omar and Others [(2000) 8 SC Cases 382], it was observed as follows:

                  “ The question whether the bodily injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death was not put by Public Prosecutor to the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination. However, the doctor opined that the deceased was murdered and that death had resulted from multiple injuries and injuries on the vital organs. Where, from the nature of injuries, it could be concluded that injuries are responsible for causing death, the trial court itself could have come to the same conclusion and hence mere non-mention by the doctor that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death would be inconsequential.”

15. Therefore, even in the absence of a specific deposition by the doctor stating that the injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, the court can independently assess whether the injury was likely to result in death by carefully examining the nature of the wound, the part of the body affected, and the weapon used. In the present case, the medical evidence indicates that the stab wound penetrated the apex of the heart. It follows, without the necessity of an expert opinion, that such an injury is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination categorically deposed that the aforementioned injury was the cause of death of the deceased. Therefore, the absence of a specific statement by the doctor that the said injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death is of little consequence. Moreover, it is significant to note that PW20, the doctor who clinically examined the injured immediately after the incident, unequivocally deposed that the injury noted by him on the chest of the injured was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the medical evidence adduced in this case convincingly and unerringly establishes that the death of Subair was nothing but homicide.

16. As already stated, the primary evidence relied upon by the prosecution to prove the occurrence is the testimony of PW1 and PW4, the wife and minor child of the deceased, respectively. PW1 deposed in unequivocal terms that on the fateful day, while she was in the house, a quarrel ensued between her husband and the accused and during the said quarrel that the accused murdered her husband by stabbing him with a knife. PW1 placed before the Court the entire sequence of events relating to the occurrence with clarity and consistency. PW4, the son of the deceased, also deposed regarding the incident in lines similar to the testimony of PW1, thereby corroborating her version.

17. However, the evidence of PW1 and PW4 has been primarily challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground that, being the wife and child of the deceased, they are interested witnesses and that their testimony alone cannot form the basis for convicting the accused. It was further contended that it would be unsafe to rely upon the evidence of related witnesses to arrive at a finding of guilt against the accused.

18. While considering the appellant’s contention in this regard, it must be borne in mind that there is no rigid or inflexible rule requiring the evidence of a related witness to be viewed with suspicion in all circumstances. Nevertheless, in assessing the reliability of the testimony of a relative witness, the court must exercise caution and act with discerning circumspection. In the present case, we are therefore firmly of the view that the appellant’s contention that the evidence of PW1 and PW4 should be discarded at the threshold solely because they are the wife and son, respectively, of the deceased cannot be accepted.

19. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Rayappa and others [(2006) 4 SCC 512], the Supreme Court observed as under:

                  “Testimony of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence cannot be discarded on the ground that he being a relation of the deceased is an interested witness. A close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be termed as an interested witness. The term interested postulates that the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing the accused person being convicted somehow or the other either because of animosity or some other reasons. On the contrary, it has now almost become a fashion that the public is reluctant to appear and depose before the court especially in criminal cases because of varied reasons. Criminal cases are kept dragging on for years to come and the witnesses are harassed a lot. They have been threatened, intimidated and at the top of all they are subjected to lengthy cross- examination. In such a situation the only natural witness available to the prosecution would be the relative witness. The relative witness is not necessarily an interested witness. On the other hand, being a close relation to the deceased they will try to prosecute the real culprit by stating the truth. There is no reason as to why a close relative will implicate and depose falsely against somebody and screen the real culprit to escape unpunished. The only requirement is that the testimony of the relative witness should be examined cautiously.”

20. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar [(1996) 1 SCC 614], it was observed that “a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. The term “interested” postulates that the witness must have some interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some animosity or for some other reasons.”

21. Keeping in mind the principles enunciated in the aforementioned judicial pronouncements, while analysing the evidence of PW1 and PW4, it is significant to note that they testified regarding an incident in which their close relative tragically lost his life, allegedly at the hands of the accused. Importantly, the accused is the brother of the deceased. In ordinary human experience, it cannot reasonably be expected that either a wife or a minor child of the deceased would falsely implicate an innocent person in a case concerning the murder of their close relative. This is particularly so because doing so would allow the actual perpetrator of the offence to evade punishment.

22. Likewise, though PW1 and PW4 were subjected to thorough and searching cross-examination by the learned defence counsel, they successfully withstood the same. Even after cross-examination, their evidence remained consistent and free from contradictions or omissions, even of a minor nature. We also find no reason to doubt their presence at the scene of occurrence, as they were inmates of the house where the incident took place. Moreover, their presence at the house at the time of commission of the offence stands corroborated by the evidence of the neighbours who rushed to the scene immediately after the incident. In view of the foregoing circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the mutually corroborative testimonies of PW1 and PW4 are sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

23. The remaining question for consideration is whether the facts proved in this case attract the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. As spelt out in Section 300 of the IPC, culpable homicide amounts to murder only if the act causing death is committed by the accused with the intention of causing the death of the victim, as provided under the first limb of Section 300 IPC; or with the intention of causing bodily injury to the victim which the accused knows is likely to cause death, as provided under the second limb; or with the intention of causing bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, as provided under the third limb; or with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and committing the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury, as provided under the fourth limb of Section 300 IPC.

24. In short, culpable homicide amounts to murder if the act is done with the intention specified in Clauses (1), (2), or (3) of the definition of murder under Section 300 of the IPC, or with the knowledge specified in Clause (4) of the said Section. However, if the accused proves that his act falls within any of the five exceptions provided under the same Section, the act would be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

25. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that, if the appellant had committed any act that led to the death of the deceased, such act was done on the spur of the moment during a quarrel between the accused and the deceased. According to the learned counsel, the proved facts themselves indicate that the act was committed without premeditation, in the heat of passion, and without any intention to cause death or to inflict bodily injury likely to cause death.

26. While considering the said contention, it is significant to note that this Court in Antony @ Jose v. State of Kerala [2024 KHC Online 682] observed that when an incident occurs during a sudden quarrel without premeditation, the accused cannot be attributed with the intention to commit murder, though he knew that the act is likely to cause death. Similarly, in Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana [(2009) 15 SCC 635], the Supreme Court held that where the accused has no intention to cause death, but had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, Section 304 Part II is attracted.

27. In Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab (1981 (4) SCC 245), the accused, without any prior enmity or premeditation, pursuant to an abrupt quarrel, gave a single blow with a dagger which later proved to be fatal. The Apex Court observed that since there was no premeditation, Part III of Section 300 of the Penal Code would not be attracted as it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the conviction of the accused was altered from Section 302 to that under Section 304 Part II of IPC, and the accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years.

28. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1983) 2 SCC 342], the accused, on the spur of the moment, inflicted a knife-blow on the chest of the deceased. The injury proved to be fatal. The doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Apex Court held as under in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment:

                  “8. ……..The quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in such a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the appellant at least could be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death.”

                  The Apex Court altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years.

29. In Hem Raj v. The State (Delhi Administration) [1990 SCC (Cri) 713], the accused inflicted a single stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly had taken place on the spur of the moment and in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. According to the doctor, the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Apex Court observed as under:

                  “The question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular injury with the intention of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of the established facts and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither clause I nor clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted.”

                  The Apex Court, while setting aside the conviction under Section 302, convicted the accused under Section 304 Part II and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years.

30. In the case at hand, the evidence of PW1, the wife of the deceased, clearly establishes that, apart from the incident that occurred on the ill-fated day, the relationship between the accused and the deceased was very cordial. Other prosecution witnesses also deposed that the deceased and the accused shared a good relationship. Consequently, it is apparent that the accused harboured no prior animosity toward his brother that could have motivated him to contemplate his murder. Notably, the evidence shows that immediately before the unfortunate incident, a sudden quarrel arose between the accused and the deceased over a trivial matter, and in the heat of the moment, without any prior enmity or premeditation, the accused inflicted a stab injury on the deceased with a knife. It is evident that the incident was the direct outcome of a sudden quarrel, and the mere use of a knife alone cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that there was an intention to commit murder.

31. The circumstances proved in the case are not sufficient to hold that the accused intended to cause the death of the victim, or that he intended to cause bodily injury to the victim which is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. Similarly, the circumstances are not sufficient to hold that the act was committed by the accused with the knowledge that it was so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and that he committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury. In essence, the act of the accused does not fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC. At the same time, however, the accused can be attributed with the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death. If that be so, the act committed by the accused would fall under the third limb of Section 299 of the IPC, and he is liable to be convicted under Part II of Section 304 of the IPC.

                  In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed in part. The finding, conviction, and sentence for the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC, as recorded by the Sessions Judge, stand confirmed. However, the conviction of the appellant/accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is altered to one under Section 304 Part II of IPC. The appellant/accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- under Section 304 part II of IPC. In default of payment of the fine, the appellant/accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. The sentences imposed shall run concurrently. The fine, if realized or paid, shall be given to the wife of the deceased as compensation, as provided under Section 357(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The recommendation made by the Sessions Judge to the District Legal Services Authority to fix and pay compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme requires no interference.