1. The Applicants, who are the Plaintiffs in the captioned Suit, have filed the present Interim Application under the provisions of Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“CPC”), seeking to amend the Plaint as well as Notice of Motion (L) No. 14688 of 2019 by adding additional documents as well as pleadings.

A Brief Background:

2. On 23rd August 2012, Plaintiff No. 2 obtained registration of the mark FINTREE (“the Plaintiffs’ mark”) bearing No. 23845600 in class 41.

3. On 14th June 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the captioned Suit for infringement since the Defendants were using the mark / FINTREE (“the impugned mark”). The Plaintiffs also filed Notice of Motion (L) No. 14688 of 2019 under the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, seeking an injunction against the Defendant from using the impugned mark and infringing the registered trade mark of Plaintiff No.2.

4. The Defendant, on 3rd September 2019, filed an Affidavit in Reply to the Notice of Motion.

5. Since the Plaint as filed did not contain any prayer for passing off, the Applicant, on 2nd December 2021, filed Interim Application (L) No. 28145 of 2021, seeking to amend the Plaint by adding a prayer of passing off (“First Application for Amendment”). The First Application for amendment was allowed by this Court vide an Order dated 20th February 2023.

6. However, while the pleadings in respect of passing off were added pursuant to the first amendment, it is the Plaintiffs’ case that some of the necessary pleadings and documents in support thereof were absent in the Plaint, and the separate prayer of passing off remained to be added in the prayer clause of Notice of Motion (L) No. 14688 of 2019. It was thus that the Applicant sought for and was granted liberty by this Court vide an Order dated 6th March 2025 to file an appropriate application for amendment.

7. It was thus that the present Interim Application (“Second Application for Amendment”) has been filed.

Submissions on behalf of the Plaintiff:

8. Mr. Kamod, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs, submitted that the proposed amendments sought by the Plaintiffs fall into four categories:

                   a. Documents produced in answer to the case set up by the Defendant in its Affidavit in Reply;

                   b. Documents which came into existence after the filing of the Suit;

                   c. Documents not in the power, possession and custody of the Plaintiffs at the time of institution of the Suit, and;

                   d. Amendments confined purely to the pleadings.

He then, in support of each of these four categories, made the following submissions:

a. Documents in answer to the case set up by the Defendant

9. He submitted that there was no dispute as to the fact that the disclosure regime under Order XI Rule 1 of the CPC, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”) applied to Commercial Suits, including applications for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. He thus submitted that ordinarily, a Plaintiff is required to disclose along with the Plaint all documents in its power, possession, control or custody pertaining to the Suit. He, however, emphasised that Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) itself carves out a specific exception, inasmuch as it provides that the Rule does not apply to documents produced by a Plaintiff which are relevant only in answer to any case set up by the Defendant subsequent to the filing of the Plaint.

10. According to Mr. Kamod, the legislative intent behind this exception was that a Plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected, at the time of instituting the Suit, to anticipate every defence that may subsequently be raised. He therefore submitted that documents that become relevant only because of a defence raised would be an exception to the requirement of initial disclosure. He submitted that the additional documents sought to be brought on record in the present Interim Application fall squarely within this exception, as they are being produced solely in response to the defence raised for the first time in the Affidavit in Reply. Consequently, he contended that the requirements under Order XI Rule 1(4) and Rule 1(5), including the need to establish reasonable cause for non-disclosure, would not apply.

11. In the present case, Mr. Kamod submitted that the documents which, according to him, fell in the above category were D1, F1, F6 and F7 since (i) Documents at Exhibit D1: the photographs of the Plaintiffs’ branches in Mumbai, Pune and Bangalore; Shops & Establishments Certificate and a Rent Agreement, which addresses Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiffs do not have branches at Pune and Bangalore;

                   (ii) Documents at Exhibit F1: the invoices of the expenditure incurred by Plaintiffs under the FINTREE mark, which addresses the Defendant’s case that the Plaintiffs had not advertised the mark;

                   (iii) Documents at Exhibit F6 and Exhibit F7: the screenshots of the Plaintiffs’ website and social media platform showing Plaintiffs’ virtual presence.

b. Documents which came into existence after the Suit was filed

12. Mr. Kamod then submitted that, apart from documents covered by Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii), certain documents were obtained or came into existence only after the institution of the Suit. He submitted that; thus, such documents could not have been in the Plaintiffs’ possession at the time of institution, and therefore the embargo under Order XI Rule 1(5) would not be attracted.

13. In the facts of the present case, he submitted that the documents which have come into existence after the Suit was filed were:

                   (i) Exhibit C1: the updated status page of the Plaintiffs’ renewed registration;

                   (ii) Exhibit F2: the Chartered Accountant’s Certificate dated 3rd March 2025;

                   (iii) Exhibit F3: the tax invoices certified by the Chartered Accountant after the institution of the Suit.

14. He further submitted that with regard to such documents that came into existence after the suit was filed, the Court at this stage was not required to go into the question as to whether such documents could have been obtained earlier or not, and to assess their evidentiary value. He submitted that this was a matter which would have to be decided at the trial. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Nitin Sukanraj Jain v. Neoliva Life Science Pvt. Ltd.([Bombay High Court] Order dated 25th July 2023 in IA(L) No. 17260 of 2023 in COMIP Suit No. 451 of 2022.)

c. Documents not in the power, possession and custody of the Plaintiffs at the time of institution of the Suit

15. Mr. Kamod submitted that there were certain documents which were not in the power, possession and custody of the Plaintiffs at the time of institution of the Suit and thus are required to be produced on record, since the same play a crucial role in showing the Plaintiffs’ use of the mark FINTREE. He submitted that though Order XI Rule 1 of the CPC mandates parties to disclose all the documents in their custody at the time of institution of the Suit, the party not being in possession of the documents at the time of institution of the Suit, may be allowed to produce them at a later stage. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B2 wherein the Court, while discussing the legislative intent behind Order XI Rule 1, observed that the restriction of Order XI Rule 1(5) against filing additional documents is not absolute but conditional, and thus a party can be allowed to produce relevant documents belatedly on justifiable reasons.

16. He then submitted that, in the present case, the documents at Exhibit F5, which are the testimonials and reviews of the Plaintiffs’ clients, were not in the Plaintiffs’ possession at the time of institution but were relevant to show the Plaintiffs’ continuous use and reputation pursuant to the mark FINTREE. In order to support this contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Sony Music Entertainment India Pvt. Ltd. v. Ilaiyaraja Music N Management Pvt. Ltd & Ors.([Bombay High Court] Order dated 8th November 2023 in IA(L) No. 25506 of 2023 in COMIP Suit No. 560 of 2022.) and the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Varshney v. Longlast Power Products Ltd. & Anr.(2023 SCC OnLine Del 3775.) wherein it was held that the rigors of Order XI Rule 1 will not apply to the documents which are sought to be produced in answer to a case set up by Defendant.

17. At the time of the arguments, Mr. Kamod fairly submitted that Exhibit F4 is a chart showing the export sales summary of the Plaintiffs. However, since the same lacks particulars such as the authority/personnel issuing the same, the Plaintiffs will not press for production of the said document.

d. Amendments confined only to the pleadings

18. Mr. Kamod then laid emphasis on the fact that the Suit was still at a pre- trial stage. He submitted it was well settled that pre-trial amendments were to be allowed liberally, particularly where no prejudice would be caused to the Defendant and the amendment is necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the dispute. He also submitted that the law does not impose an absolute bar on the production of documents after the institution of the Suit; rather, it permits such production where necessity arises, especially when the trial has not commenced.

19. He further submitted that Order XI Rule 1 does not require an overly technical or exhaustive recital of every document within the Plaint. The object of the provision is to promote discipline and expedition in commercial litigation, not to defeat substantive justice on technical grounds. In this context, he relied upon the decisions in Board of Mumbai Port Authority v. DSV Gerimal(2025 SCC Online Bom 2984.), and M/s. MLI Logistics India Pvt. Ltd. v. Sarr Freights Corporations([Bombay High Court] Order dated 9th May 2025 in Com. Suit No. 193 of 2023 & IA No. 4654 of 2024 a/w. IA No. 5949 of 2025.), to submit that procedural provisions should not be interpreted in a manner that confers an unwarranted technical advantage.

20. Mr. Kamod then, without prejudice to the above, submitted that intellectual property matters warrant a liberal approach in procedural application, particularly where statutory and proprietary rights are sought to be protected against continuing infringement. In support, he relied upon the decision of this Court in Ultra Media and Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Y-Not Films LLP & Ors.(2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3085.)

21. Lastly, Mr. Kamod submitted that certain proposed amendments were confined solely to the pleadings and are clarificatory and corrective in nature. They do not introduce a new cause of action or alter the nature of the Suit. Relying upon Valo Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Sprint Cars Pvt. Ltd.,(2021 SCC OnLine Del 4080.) he submitted that where a trial has not commenced, the governing consideration is whether the amendment is necessary to determine the real controversy between the parties. Pre-trial amendments, particularly those necessary to meet a defence raised for the first time, ought to be permitted to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure effective adjudication.

22. In these circumstances, he submitted that the present Interim Application deserves to be allowed.

Submissions on behalf of the Defendant:

23. Mr. Kirpekar, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Defendant, opposed the present application for amendment filed nearly six years after the institution of the Suit. He submitted that most of the documents now sought to be brought on record were admittedly in the Plaintiffs’ knowledge and possession or, at the very least, could have been within the Plaintiffs’ power, possession, control or custody had the Plaintiffs exercised the required diligence at the relevant time.

24. Mr. Kirpekar then submitted that the Plaintiffs’ conduct reflected a consistent lack of diligence. He submitted that it was only after this Court had declined ad-interim relief for infringement that the Plaintiffs sought to amend the Plaint and introduce a cause of action for passing off. He pointed out that although the first application for amendment was allowed by an Order dated 20th February 2023, the Plaintiffs once again failed to incorporate all necessary pleadings and documents. He submitted that the present Application, was therefore yet another attempt to fill in the lacunae in the Plaint in the guise of an Application under Order XI Rule 1.

25. On the aspect of the Plaintiffs’ lethargy in proceeding expeditiously, Mr. Kirpekar pointed out that even six years after the institution of the Suit, the writ of summons had not been served upon the Defendants, which he submitted was contrary to Practice Note 60 of the Bombay High Court original side practice notes.

26. It was in the context of the aforesaid facts that Mr. Kirperkar submitted that the real question which the Court must consider is as follows:

                   “Whether the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, permits a Plaintiff to repeatedly amend pleadings and introduce documents through successive applications, without proceeding with the Suit to trial?”

27. Mr. Kirperker then submitted that the aforesaid question would have to be answered in the negative since the Commercial Courts Act provides for a stringent procedural framework mandating complete and candid disclosure at the threshold. He submitted that the legislative intent behind the Commercial Courts Act was expedition, finality and procedural discipline. He thus submitted that any attempt to introduce documents belatedly must therefore be strictly scrutinised since the same militated against the scheme of the amended Order XI.

28. He submitted that the provisions of Order XI, as amended, were mandatory in nature, which required a Plaintiff to, along with the Plaint, file a list and copies of all documents in the Plaintiff’s power, possession, control or custody. He submitted that while sub-rule (4) of Order XI provides a limited window in urgent cases to bring additional documents within thirty days, any subsequent production of documents would have to satisfy the test of “reasonable cause” for non-disclosure as contemplated under sub-rule (5). He submitted that it was well settled that where a statute prescribes a manner of doing something, it must be done in that manner alone. He submitted that this would equally apply to intellectual property rights Suits which are governed by the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act.

29. Mr. Kirpekar then placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B to submit that strict adherence to amended Order XI was mandatory even in commercial intellectual property suits and that only documents brought on record in compliance with the scheme provided for in amended Order XI can be permitted. He further submitted that Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) must be construed narrowly and harmoniously with the overall scheme of the Act. The exception therein, he submitted, cannot be expanded to permit the introduction of documents which were admittedly within the Plaintiff’s possession when the Suit was filed.

30. He submitted that the central question was whether the Plaintiffs had satisfied the test of “reasonable cause” under Order XI Rule 1(5). He submitted that in the facts of the present case, no such cause has been made out. To amplify this contention, he pointed out that the Suit was instituted in 2019, alleging infringement of the trade mark FINTREE prior to which the Plaintiffs had issued a cease-and-desist notice dated 16th April 2019, to which the Defendant replied on 23rd April 2019. He thus submitted that the Plaintiffs were therefore fully aware of the Defendant’s stand well before filing their first amendment application.

31. He then submitted that even after ad-interim relief was refused in 2019, the Plaintiffs had filed a first amendment application, which was allowed in February 2023. Despite that opportunity, he submitted that the present second amendment application has been filed seeking further amendments and additional documents. He submitted that the explanation that the Plaintiffs realised only on 6th March 2025 that a specific prayer had not been incorporated, according to him, demonstrates callousness rather than a new development.

32. Mr. Kirperkar then, in dealing with the documents which were sought to be added, submitted as follows:

                   i. Exhibit C-1: He fairly stated that the Defendant has no objection to this document being taken on record.

                   ii. Exhibit D-1: The Shops and Establishments Certificate dating back to 2014 were admittedly within the Plaintiffs’ possession prior to the institution of the Suit. In respect of the other documents, he submitted that even assuming they were produced in answer to the Defendant’s Affidavit dated 3rd September 2019, no explanation has been offered as to why they were not placed on record at least at the time of the first amendment in 2021. No reasonable cause has been demonstrated.

                   iii. Exhibit F-1: Advertisement material prior to 2021 was within the Plaintiffs’ possession. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished for its earlier non-production.

                   iv. Exhibits F-2 and F-3: He submitted that reliance on Nitin Sukhraj Jain v. Neoliva Life Science Pvt. Ltd. is misplaced. In that case, documents were produced within a reasonable time. Here, the Chartered Accountant’s certificate and invoices are sought to be introduced after six years without explanation. The mere fact that a document was created subsequently does not justify its belated production, especially when viewed against the Plaintiffs’ overall conduct.

                   v. Exhibits F-4 to F-7: He submitted that Exhibit F-4 is not even a document in the eyes of law and that Exhibits F-5 to F-7 do not satisfy Order XI requirements. In particular, WHOIS search details reflecting registration of the Plaintiffs’ domain name in 2012 were clearly within the Plaintiffs’ knowledge and ought to have been disclosed earlier.

33. Mr. Kirpekar also then placed reliance upon the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Mohan Meakin Limited v. The Devicolam Distilleries Ltd.(2024:HHC:11877.) to submit that there is an absolute statutory bar against reliance on documents which were within a party’s possession but not disclosed at the prescribed stage, except upon strict proof of “reasonable cause”. Inadvertence, oversight or internal miscommunication, he submitted, do not constitute reasonable cause.

34. In dealing with the decision in the case of Board of Mumbai Port Authority v. DSV Gerimal, Mr. Kirpekar pointed out that the amendment was necessitated since a new case was raised in the Written Statement, which was not a mere denial. He submitted that a mere denial does not amount to “setting up a case” under Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii). He then pointed out that the decision in the case of Valo Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Sprint Cars Pvt. Ltd. was rendered prior to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sudhir Kumar, and to the extent it adopts a liberal approach, it cannot override the subsequent binding precedent. Similarly, he pointed out that the decisions in the case of Sugandhi by LRs v. P. Rajkumar((2020) 10 SCC 706.) and Menkabai v. Manohar Mukundrao Deshpande & Ors.(1970 SCC OnLine Bom 87.) relied upon by the Plaintiffs in oral pleadings, were not rendered in the context of Order XI as amended. Mr. Kirpekar then pointed out that in Sony Music Entertainment India Pvt. Ltd., the amendment was the first amendment and arose from a new factual dispute in the Written Statement. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Varshney, the delay was justified by specific circumstances, like COVID-19 and a plea of prior use. He therefore submitted that none of these cases would apply to the facts of the present case. He also pointed out that in the case of Nitin Sukhraj Jain, the documents were produced within a reasonable time and shortly after the institution of the Suit. In contrast, the present application is filed six years later and constitutes a second amendment.

Submissions in Rejoinder:

35. Mr. Kamod submitted that the Defendant’s reliance on Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B. was misplaced since in the said decision the Written Statement had already been filed and the defence had been crystallised. The Plaintiff in that case had failed to disclose documents admittedly in its possession at the time of filing the suit and later sought to introduce them without establishing “reasonable cause” under Order XI Rule 1(5). It was in those circumstances that the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to permit the belated production of documents. In contrast, in the present case, the documents are either produced in answer to the Defendant’s case within the meaning of Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) or came into existence subsequent to the filing of the Suit. Further, the Written Statement has not yet been filed, issues have not been framed, and the trial has not commenced. He therefore submitted that the factual matrix in Sudhir Kumar was entirely distinguishable, and the ratio thereof does not apply to the present case.

36. He similarly submitted that Mohan Meakin Ltd. v. The Devicolam Distilleries Ltd. was also inapplicable since the documents were sought to be introduced after the Written Statement had been filed, on the ground of inadvertence, without establishing reasonable cause. It was in that context that the Court refused to permit the party to fill lacunae in its case. In the present matter, however, no plea of inadvertence has been taken. The amendment is sought on the basis that the documents fell within the statutory exception under Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) or came into existence subsequently. Moreover, in Mohan Meakin, the trial had already commenced, whereas in the present case, the proceedings are still at the pre-trial stage.

Reasons and Conclusions:

37. Having heard Learned Counsel for the parties at length and having perused the pleadings and the case law upon which reliance is placed, I find as follows:

                   A. At the outset, it is undisputed that the present Suit is a Commercial Suit which is governed by the provisions of Order XI of the CPC, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. A plain reading of Order XI makes it clear that a Plaintiff is required to, at the threshold, disclose all documents in its power, possession, control or custody pertaining to the Suit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has in the case of Sudhir Kumar, inter alia held that the disclosure regime under Order XI of the CPC, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, is mandatory and must be strictly enforced in Commercial Suits. A Plaintiff is therefore required to disclose, at the time of filing the Plaint, all documents in its power, possession, control or custody relating to the Suit. If such documents are not disclosed at the threshold, they can be brought on record later only with the leave of the Court and upon establishing “reasonable cause” for the earlier non-disclosure. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that mere oversight, inadvertence, or the Plaint being voluminous does not constitute reasonable cause and that the scheme of Order XI is designed to ensure procedural discipline, early crystallisation of disputes, and expeditious disposal of commercial litigation. Thus, documents which were in the Plaintiff’s power, possession or custody at the time of institution of the Suit cannot be permitted to be brought on record subsequently unless the Plaintiff satisfies the statutory test of “reasonable cause” or unless they are in answer to a case set up by the Defendant.

                   B. In the aforesaid context, I am unable to accept the contention that a more liberal approach must be taken and greater latitude must be shown in intellectual property insofar as Order XI is concerned. This submission is untenable for two principal reasons. First, the scheme of amended Order XI itself expressly provides the circumstances in which additional documents may be brought on record, subject to compliance with the conditions prescribed therein. The statutory framework is therefore self-contained and does not contemplate a separate standard for particular categories of commercial disputes. Second, to permit greater latitude merely because the dispute concerns intellectual property would, in effect, dilute the discipline embedded in the amended Order XI and would undermine the very object of the provision. The Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the decision in the case of Ultra Media and Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Y-Not Films LLP & Ors. to contend that Commercial Intellectual Property Suits are governed by or subject to a more lenient approach is misplaced. The said decision primarily concerned the rejection of a Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act on the ground of non-compliance with pre-institution mediation. The observations therein regarding intellectual property matters standing on a different footing were made in the context of urgency and public interest considerations. The issue at hand concerns the Plaintiffs’ requirement at the time of the filing of the Suit to disclose and produce documents relied upon and in the power, possession, or control of the Plaintiffs. The decision does not in any manner even suggest that the requirements of Order XI can be diluted in Commercial Intellectual Property Suits. In any view, Rule 1(5) would take care of any contingency where the Plaintiff, at the time of filing of the Suit had not disclosed along with the Plaint despite being in power, possession and custody of such documents only if a case of “reasonable cause” has been made out.

                   C. Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) however undoubtedly carves out a limited exception in respect of those documents that might be in the power, possession and custody of the Plaintiff when the Suit was filed and which the Plaintiff is required to bring on record only in answer to a case set up by the Defendant after the filing of the Plaint. However, this exception cannot be interpreted so broadly as to render the overall scheme and purpose of amended Order XI, as mandated a rigorous disclosure regime overriding general provisions of the CPC as observed in the decision of Sudhir Kumar, nugatory. Therefore recourse to Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) is available only where the documents proposed to be produced are genuinely necessitated to meet the requirement of being the documents in answer to the case set up by the Defendant. Hence, when considering an application under this provision, the Court must carefully examine whether the documents are genuinely in response to the case set up by the Defendant and that the application is not merely filed under the provisions of Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) only as a ruse to overcome and/or circumvent the requirement of establishing “reasonable cause” under Order XI Rule 1(5).

                   D. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, for the Plaintiffs to succeed, the Plaintiffs must necessarily demonstrate that Exhibits C1, F2, F3 and F5 were not in the Plaintiffs’ possession when the Suit was filed and Exhibits D1, F1, F6, and F7 were being introduced in answer to the case pleaded in the Affidavit in Reply. It is therefore imperative to ascertain whether in fact the Plaintiffs have made out a case under the provisions of Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) of Order XI before allowing the amendment so as to ensure that the same do not override or defeat the statutory mandate of Sub-Rule (5) of Order XI Rule 1. It is in this context that the amendments which have been sought for must be considered.

                   E. As regards proposed Exhibits C1 and F2, which on the face of the documents came into existence after the institution of the Suit, and Exhibit F3 which might have been older documents but are recently certified by CA, such documents could not, by their very nature, have been disclosed along with the Plaint. The embargo under Order XI Rule 1(5) is therefore not attracted in respect of these documents, though their relevance and admissibility will, of course, be subject to scrutiny at trial. The Plaintiffs’ reliance on the decision of Nitin Sukanraj Jain is apposite, wherein the Court has considered a similar issue of production of the sales report, invoices, auditors’ report, etc., after institution of the Suit. The Defendant's attempt to distinguish the same on the ground that in the said case, documents were produced within a few months of institution, unlike the present case, would not, in my view, disentitle the Plaintiffs to the amendment sought for since what is relevant in the said decision is that it is not for the Court to go into the issue of whether such documents could have been obtained prior to the institution of the Suit.

                   F. As regards proposed Exhibits D1, F1, F6 and F7, which are sought to be introduced in answer to the case pleaded in the Affidavit in Reply, I am unable to accept the Plaintiffs’ contention that these documents would fall within the exception carved out under Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii). Firstly, the “case set up by the Defendant” as contemplated under Order XI must ordinarily be understood in the context of the pleadings, namely, the Plaint and the Written Statement, and not an Affidavit in Reply. Secondly, it is not in dispute that these documents were in existence at the time of the institution of the Suit. They were therefore available to the Plaintiffs even when the first amendment application was filed, which was admittedly after the Defendant had placed its Affidavit in Reply on record. The Plaintiffs have now, after a lapse of nearly six years from the filing of the Affidavit in Reply, sought to introduce these documents on the ground that they are required to answer the case set up therein. I am unable to accept this submission. The Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to place these documents on record when they moved the first amendment application. Having failed to do so at that stage, they cannot now invoke amended Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) as a device to introduce documents long within their knowledge and possession. In my view, the present attempt is nothing but an effort to circumvent the mandate of amended Order XI Rule 1(5), since the Plaintiffs would be unable to satisfy the statutory requirement of demonstrating “reasonable cause” for their earlier non-disclosure.

                   G. Insofar as the amendments which are confined solely to the pleadings are concerned, it is well settled that pre-trial amendments are to be liberally allowed. The present Suit is admittedly at a pre- trial stage since no Written Statement has not been filed and issues have not been framed. In this regard, the Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the decision in Valo Automotive Pvt. Ltd., is apposite since the Court is required to examine whether the proposed amendment is necessary for determining the real questions in controversy and whether it alters the fundamental character of the Suit. In my view, the amendments to the pleadings alone would satisfy this test and thus would have to be allowed.

                   H. The decisions in the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd. and Sudhir Kumar would not, in my view, disentitle the Plaintiff to the limited relief which I propose to grant since the facts in both cases were materially different. In the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd. the amendment was sought for after the trial had commenced. Similarly, the decision in Sudhir Kumar would not apply since the Defendant had filed Written Statement in that case and hence the present case are distinct as those of the aforesaid decision. Thus, in neither of the cases was the Suit at the pre-trial stage.

38. In the aforesaid backdrop and as per the reasons mentioned above, the Interim Application is partly allowed in the following terms:

                   i. The documents at Exhibits C1, F2 and F3 of the captioned Interim Application are permitted to be placed on record along with the Plaint. Consequently, the Plaintiffs are allowed to carry out necessary amendments in paragraphs 5 and 14A of the Plaint respectively.

                   ii. The Plaintiffs are also permitted to carry out amendments to paragraphs 11, 14A and prayer clause (a1) of the Notice of Motion (L) No. 14688 of 2019, as specified in paragraphs 5(h), 5(i) and 5(j) of the captioned Interim Application, respectively.

                   iii. iii. No orders as to costs.

39. The Interim Application is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.